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Reports of the battle of Chickamauga 19-20 Sept. 63

1. William S. Rosecrans
2. George H. Thomas
3. Thomas J. Wood
4. Col. John G. Parkhurst, Provost-Marshal.
5. Col. John T. Wilder
6. Charles A. Dana, dispatches
7. Braxton Bragg plus correspondence
8. James Longstreet
9. Leonidas Polk
10. Patrick R. Cleburne



1. William S. Rosecrans
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXX/1 [S# 50] AUGUST 16-SEPTEMBER 22, 1863.--The Chickamauga Campaign.
No. 3. --Report of Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans, U.S. Army, commanding the Army of the Cumberland.

[ar50_47 con't]
[OCTOBER --, 1863.]
THE OCCUPATION OF MIDDLE TENNESSEE AND PASSAGE OVER THE CUMBERLAND MOUNTAINS.
The rebel army, after its expulsion from Middle Tennessee, crossed the Cumberland Mountains by way of the Tantallon and University roads, then moved down Battle Creek, and crossed the Tennessee River on bridges, it is said, near the mouth of Battle Creek and at Kelley's Ferry, and on the railroad bridge at Bridgeport. They destroyed a part of the latter after having passed over it, and retired to Chattanooga and Tyner's Station, leaving guards along the river. On their arrival at Chattanooga, they commenced immediately to throw up some defensive fieldworks at that place and also at each of the crossings of the Tennessee as far up as Blythe's Ferry.
Our troops, having pursued the rebels as far as supplies and the state of the roads rendered it practicable, took position from McMinnville to Winchester, with advances at Pelham and Stevenson. The latter soon after moved to Bridgeport in time to save from total destruction a saw-mill there, but not to prevent the destruction of the railroad bridge.
After the expulsion of Bragg's forces from Middle Tennessee, the next objective point of this army was Chattanooga. It commands the southern entrance into East Tennessee, the most valuable if not the chief sources of supplies of coal for the manufactories and ma-chine-shops of the Southern States and is one of the great gateways through the mountains to the champaign counties of Georgia and Alabama. <ar50_48>
For the better understanding of the campaign, I submit a brief outline of the topography of the country from the barrens of the northwestern base of the Cumberland range to Chattanooga and its vicinity.
The Cumberland range is a lofty mass of rocks, separating the waters which flow into the Cumberland from those which flow into the Tennessee, and extending from beyond the Kentucky line, in a southwesterly direction, nearly to Athens, Ala. Its northwestern slopes are steep and rocky, and scalloped into coves, in which are the heads of numerous streams that water Middle Tennessee. Its top is undulating or rough, covered with timber, soil comparatively barren, and in dry seasons scantily supplied with water. Its southeastern slope, above Chattanooga, for many miles, is precipitous, rough, and difficult all the way up to Kingston. The valley between the foot of this slope and the river seldom exceeds 4 or 5 miles in width, and with the exception of a narrow border along the banks is undulating or hilly.
The Sequatchie Valley is along the river of that name, and is a cañon or deep cut, splitting the Cumberland range parallel to its length. It is only 3 or 4 miles in breadth and 50 miles in length. The sides of this valley are even more precipitous than the great eastern and western slopes of the Cumberland which have just been described. To reach Chattanooga from McMinnville or north of the Tennessee it is necessary to turn the head of this valley by Pikeville and pass down the Valley of the Tennessee, or to cross it by Dunlap or Therman.
That part of the Cumberland range between Sequatchie and the Tennessee, called Walden's Ridge, abuts on the Tennessee in high, rocky bluffs, leaving no practicable space sufficient for a good wagon road along the river. The Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad crosses that branch of the Cumberland range west of the Sequatchie, through a low gap, by a tunnel, 2 miles east of Cowan, down the gorge of Big Crow Creek to Stevenson at the foot of the mountain, on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, 3 miles from the Tennessee and 10 miles from Bridgeport.
Between Stevenson and Chattanooga, on the south of the Tennessee, are two ranges of mountains, the Tennessee River separating them from the Cumberland, its channel a great chasm cut through the mountain masses, which in those places abut directly on the river. These two ranges are separated by a narrow valley, through which runs Lookout Creek.
The Sand Mountain is next the Tennessee and its northern extremity is called Raccoon Mountain. Its sides are precipitous and its top barren oak ridges, nearly destitute of water. There are but few, and these very difficult, wagon roads, by which to ascend and descend the slopes of this mountain.
East of Lookout Valley is Lookout Mountain a vast palisade of rocks rising 2,400 feet above the level of the sea, in abrupt, rocky cliffs, from a steep wooded base. Its eastern sides are no less precipitous. Its top varies from 1 to 6 or 7 miles in breadth, is heavily timbered, sparsely settled, and poorly watered. It terminates abruptly upon the Tennessee, 2 miles below Chattanooga, and the only practicable wagon roads across it are one over the nose of the mountain, at this point, one at Johnson's Crook. 26 miles distant, and one at Winston's Gap, 42 miles distant from Chattanooga. <ar50_49>
Between the eastern base of this range and the line of the Chattanooga and Atlanta or Georgia State Railroad are a series of narrow valleys separated by smaller ranges of hills or low mountains, over which there are quite a number of practicable wagon roads running eastward toward the railroad.
The first of these ranges is Missionary Ridge, separating the waters of Chickamauga from Chattanooga Creek.
A higher range with fewer gaps, on the southeast side of the Chickamauga, is Pigeon Mountain, branching from Lookout, near Dougherty's Gap, some 40 miles south from Chattanooga. It extends in a northerly direction, bearing eastward until it is lost in the general level of the country, near the line of the Chattanooga and La Fayette road.
East of these two ranges and of the Chickamauga, starting from Ooltewah and passing by Ringgold to the west of Dalton, is Taylor's Ridge, a rough, rocky range, traversable by wagon roads only through gaps, generally several miles apart.
Missionary Ridge passes about 3 miles east of Chattanooga, ending near the Tennessee at the mouth of the Chickamauga. Taylor's Ridge separates the East Tennessee and Georgia Railroad from the Chattanooga and Atlanta Railroad.
The junction of these roads is at Dalton, in a valley east of Taylor's Ridge and west of the rough mountain region, in which are the sources of the Coosa River. This valley, only about 9 or 10 miles wide, is the natural southern gateway into East Tennessee, while the other valleys just mentioned terminate northwardly on the Tennessee to the west of it, and extend in a southwesterly direction toward the line of the Coosa, the general direction of which, from the crossing of the Atlanta road to Rome and thence to Gadsden, is southwest.
From the position of our army at McMinnville, Tullahoma, Decherd, and Winchester, to reach Chattanooga, crossing the Tennessee above it, it was necessary either to pass north of the Sequatchie Valley, by Pikeville or Kingston, or to cross the main Cumberland and the Sequatchie Valley, by Dunlap or Therman and Walden's Ridge, by the routes passing through these places, a distance from 65 to 70 miles, over a country destitute of forage, poorly supplied with water, by narrow and difficult wagon roads.
The main Cumberland range could also have been passed, on an inferior road, by Pelham and Tracy City to Therman.
The most southerly route on which to move troops and transportation to the Tennessee, above Chattanooga, was by Cowan, University, Battle Creek, and Jasper or by Tantallon, Anderson, Stevenson, Bridgeport, and the mouth of Battle Creek, to same point, and thence by Therman or Dunlap and Poe's Tavern, across Walden's Ridge. The University road, though difficult, was the best of these two, that by Cowan, Tantalon, and Stevenson being very rough between Cowan and Anderson and much longer.
There were also three roads across the mountains to the Tennessee River below Stevenson, the best but much the longest by Fayetteville and Athens, a distance of 70 miles.
The next, a very rough wagon road from Winchester, by Salem, to Larkinsville, and an exceedingly rough road by the way of Mount Top, one branch leading thence to Bellefonte and the other to Stevenson.
On these latter routes little or no forage was to be found except at «4 R R--VOL XXX, PT I» <ar50_50> the extremities of the lines, and they were also scarce of water. The one by Athens has both forage and water in abundance.
It is evident from this description of the topography that to reach Chattanooga, or penetrate the country south of it, on the railroad, by crossing the Tennessee below Chattanooga was a difficult task. It was necessary to cross the Cumberland Mountains, with subsistence, ammunition, at least a limited supply of forage, and a bridge train; to cross Sand or Raccoon Mountains into Lookout Valley, then Lookout Mountain, and finally the lesser ranges, Missionary Ridge, if we went directly to Chattanooga, or Missionary Ridge, Pigeon Mountain, and Taylor's Ridge, if we struck the railroad at Dalton or south of it. The Valley of the Tennessee River, though several miles in breadth between the bases of the mountains, below Bridgeport, is not a broad, alluvial farming country, but full of barren oak ridges, sparsely settled, and but a small part of it under cultivation.
OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY UNTIL IT REACHED THE TENNESSEE RIVER.
The first step was to repair the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, to bring forward to Tullahoma, McMinnville, Decherd, and Winchester needful forage and subsistence, which it was impossible to transport from Murfreesborough to those points over the horrible roads which we encountered on our advance to Tullahoma. The next was to extend the repairs of the main stem to Stevenson and Bridgeport, and the Tracy City branch, so that we could place supplies in depot at those points, from which to draw after we had crossed the mountains.
Through the zeal and energy of Colonel Innes and his regiment of Michigan Engineers, the main road was open to the Elk River Bridge by the 13th of July, and Elk River Bridge and the main stem to Bridgeport by the 25th, and the branch to Tracy City by the 13th of August.
As soon as the main stem was finished to Stevenson, Sheridan's division was advanced, two brigades to Bridgeport and one to Stevenson, and commissary and quartermaster stores pushed forward to the latter place with all practicable speed. These supplies began to be accumulated at this point in sufficient quantities by the 8th of August, and corps commanders were that day directed to supply their troops, as soon as possible, with rations and forage sufficient for a general movement.
The Tracy City branch, built for bringing coal down the mountains, has such high grades and sharp curves as to require a peculiar engine. The only one we had answering the purpose, having been broken on its way from Nashville, was not repaired until about the 12th of August. It was deemed best, therefore, to delay the movement of the troops until that road was completely available for transporting stores to Tracy City.
THE MOVEMENT OVER THE CUMBERLAND MOUNTAINS
began on the morning of the 16th of August, as follows:
General Crittenden's corps in three columns, General Wood, from Hillsborough, by Pelham, to Therman, in Sequatchie Valley.
General Palmer, from Manchester by the most practicable route to Dunlap.<ar50_51>
General Van Cleve, with two brigades from McMinnville--the third being left in garrison there--by the most practicable route to Pikeville, the head of the Sequatchie Valley.
Colonel Minty's cavalry to move on the left by Sparta, to drive back Dibrell's cavalry toward Kingston, where the enemy's mounted troops, under Forrest, were concentrated, and then, covering the left flank of Van Cleve's column, to proceed to Pikeville.
The Fourteenth Army Corps, Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas commanding, moved as follows:
General Reynolds, from University, by way of Battle Creek, to take post concealed near its mouth.
General Brannan to follow him.
General Negley to go by Tantallon and halt on Crow Creek, between Anderson and Stevenson.
General Baird to follow him and camp near Anderson.
The Twentieth Corps, Maj. Gen. A. McD. McCook commanding, moved as follows:
General Johnson by Salem and Larkin's Fork to Bellefonte. General Davis by Mount Top and Crow Creek, to near Stevenson.
The three brigades of cavalry by Fayetteville and Athens, to cover the line of the Tennessee from Whitesburg up.
On his arrival in the Sequatchie Valley, General Crittenden was to send a brigade of infantry to reconnoiter the Tennessee near Harrison's Landing, and take post at Poe's Cross-Roads. Minty was to reconnoiter from Washington down, and take post at Smith's CrossRoads, and Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry was to reconnoiter from Harrison's Landing to Chattanooga and be supported by a brigade of infantry, which General Crittenden was to send from Therman to the foot of the eastern slope of Walden's Ridge, in front of Chattanooga.
These movements were completed by the evening of the 20th of August. Hazen's brigade made the reconnoissance on Harrison's Landing, and reported the enemy throwing up works there, and took post at Poe's Cross-Roads on the 21st. Wagner, with his brigade, supported Wilder in his reconnaissance on Chattanooga, which they surprised and shelled from across the river, creating no little agitation.
Thus the army passed the first great barrier between it and the objective point, and arrived opposite the enemy on the banks of the Tennessee.
THE CROSSING OF THE RIVER
required that the best points should be chosen, and means provided for the crossing. The river was reconnoitered, the pontoons and trains ordered forward as rapidly as possible, hidden from view in rear of Stevenson and prepared for use. By the time they were ready the places of crossing had been selected and dispositions made to begin the operation.
It was very desirable to conceal to the last moment the points of crossing, but as the mountains on the south side of the Tennessee rise in precipitous rocky bluffs to the height of 800 or 1,000 feet, completely overlooking the whole valley and its coves, this was next to impossible.
Not having pontoons for two bridges across the river, General Sheridan began trestlework for parts of one at Bridgeport, while <ar50_52> General Reynolds' division, seizing Shellmound, captured some boats, and from these and material picked up prepared the means of crossing at that point, and General Brannan prepared rafts for crossing his troops at the mouth of Battle Creek.
The laying of the pontoon bridge at Caperton's Ferry was very handsomely done by the troops of General Davis, under the directions of General McCook, who crossed his advance in pontoons at daylight, driving the enemy's cavalry from the opposite side· The bridge was ready for crossing by 11 a.m. the same day, but in plain view from the rebel signal stations opposite Bridgeport.
The bridge at Bridgeport was finished on the 29th of August, but an accident occurred which delayed its final completion till September 2.
THE MOVEMENT ACROSS THE RIVER
was commenced on the 29th and completed on the 4th of September, leaving the regular brigade in charge of the railroad and depot at Stevenson until relieved by Major-General Granger, who was directed, as soon as practicable, to relieve it and take charge of the rear.
General Thomas' corps was to cross as follows: One division at Caperton's and one at Bridgeport, Reynolds at Shellmound in boats, and one division at Battle Creek on rafts. All were to use the bridge at Bridgeport for such portions of their trains as they might find necessary, and to concentrate near Trenton, and send an advance to seize Frick's or Cooper's and Stevens Gaps on the Lookout Mountain, the only practicable routes leading down the mountains into the valley called McLemore's Cove, which lies at its eastern base and stretches northeastwardly toward Chattanooga.
General McCook's corps was to cross two divisions at Caperton's Ferry, move to Valley Head, and seize Winston's Gap, while Sheridan was to cross at Bridgeport as soon as the bridge was laid and join the rest of his corps near Winston's, by way of Trenton.
General Crittenden's corps was ordered down the Sequatchie, leaving the two advanced brigades, under Hazen and Wagner, with Minty's cavalry and Wilder's mounted infantry to watch and annoy the enemy. It was to cross the river, following Thomas' corps at all three crossings, and to take post on the Murphy's Hollow road, push an advance brigade to reconnoiter the enemy at the foot of Lookout, and take post at Wauhatchie, communicating from his main body with Thomas on the right up the Trenton Valley and threatening Chattanooga by the pass over the point of Lookout.
The cavalry, crossed at Caperton's and a ford near Island Creek, were to unite in Lookout Valley, take post at Rawlingsville, and reconnoiter boldly toward Rome and Alpine.
These movements were completed by McCook's and Crittenden's corps on the 6th, and by Thomas' corps on the 8th of September. The cavalry for some reason was not pushed with the vigor nor to the extent which orders and the necessities of the campaign required. Its continual movement since that period and the absence of Major-General Stanley, the chief of cavalry, have prevented a report which may throw some light on the subject.
The first barrier south of the Tennessee being crossed, the enemy was found firmly holding the point of Lookout Mountain with infantry and artillery, while our force on the north side of the river <ar50_53> reported the movement of the rebel forces from East Tennessee and their concentration at Chattanooga. To dislodge him from that place it was necessary to carry Lookout Mountain, or so to move as to compel him to quit his position by endangering his line of communication. The latter plan was chosen.
The cavalry was ordered to advance on our extreme right to Summerville, in Broomtown Valley, and General McCook was ordered to support the movement by a division of infantry thrown forward to the vicinity of Alpine, which was executed on the 8th and 9th of September.
General Thomas was ordered to cross his corps by Frick's or Cooper's and Stevens' Gaps and occupy the head of McLemore's Cove.
General Crittenden was ordered to reconnoiter the front of Lookout Mountain, sending a brigade up an almost impracticable path called the Nickajack trace to Summertown, a hamlet on the summit of the mountain overlooking Chattanooga, and holding the main body of his corps either to support these reconnaissances to prevent a sortie of the enemy over the nose of Lookout, or to enter Chattanooga in case the enemy should evacuate it or make but feeble resistance. Simultaneously with this movement, the cavalry was ordered to push by way of Alpine and Broomtown Valley and strike the enemy's railroad communication between Resaca bridge and Dalton.
These movements were promptly begun on the 8th and 9th of September. The reconnaissance of General Crittenden on the 9th developed the fact that the enemy had evacuated Chattanooga the day and night previous and his advance took peaceable possession at 1 p.m.
His whole corps, with its trains, passed around the point of Lookout Mountain on the 10th and encamped for the night at Rossville, 5 miles south of Chattanooga.
During these operations, General Thomas pushed his corps over the mountains at the designated points, each division consuming two days in the passage.
The weight of evidence, gathered from all sources, was that Bragg was moving on Rome, and that his movement began on the 6th of September. General Crittenden was therefore directed to hold Chattanooga, with one brigade, calling all the forces on the north side of the Tennessee across, and to follow the enemy's retreat vigorously, anticipating that the main body had retired by Ringgold and Dalton.
Additional information, obtained during the afternoon and the evening of the 10th of September, rendered it certain that his main body had retired by the La Fayette road, but uncertain whether he had gone far. General Crittenden was ordered, at I a.m. on the 11th, to proceed to the front and report, directing his command to advance only as far as Ringgold, and order a reconnaissance to Gordon's Mills. His report, and further evidence, satisfied me that the main body of the rebel army was in the vicinity of La Fayette.
General Crittenden was therefore ordered to move his corps, with all possible dispatch, from Ringgold to Gordon's Mills, and communicate with General Thomas, who had by that time reached the eastern foot of Lookout Mountain. General Crittenden occupied Ringgold during the 11th, pushing Wilder's mounted infantry as far as Tunnel Hill, skirmishing heavily with the enemy's cavalry. Hazen <ar50_54> joined him near Ringgold on the 11th, and the whole corps moved rapidly and successfully across to Gordon's Mills on the 12th. Wilder following, and covering the movement, had a severe fight with the enemy at Leet's Tan-yard.
During the same day the Fourth U.S. Cavalry was ordered to move up the Dry Valley road, to discover if the enemy was in the proximity of that road on Crittenden's right, and open communication with Thomas' command, which, passing over the mountain, was debouching from Stevens' and Cooper's Gaps, and moving on La Fayette through Dug Gap of the Pigeon Mountain.
On the 10th, Negley's division advanced to within a mile of Dug Gap, which he found heavily obstructed, and Baird's division came up to his support on the morning of the 11th. Negley became satisfied that the enemy was advancing upon him, in heavy force, and perceiving that if he accepted battle in that position he would probably be cut off, he fell back after a sharp skirmish, in which General Baird's division participated, skillfully covering and securing their trains, to a strong position in front of Stevens' Gap. On the 12th, Reynolds and Brannan, under orders to move promptly, closed up to the support of these two advanced divisions.
During the same day General McCook had reached the vicinity of Alpine, and, with infantry and cavalry, had reconnoitered the Broomtown Valley to Summerville, and ascertained that the enemy had not retreated on Rome, but was concentrating at La Fayette.
Thus it was ascertained that the enemy was concentrating all his forces, both infantry and cavalry, behind the Pigeon Mountain, in the vicinity of La Fayette, while the corps of this army were at Gordon's Mills, Bailey's Cross-Roads, at the foot of Stevens' Gap, and at Alpine, a distance of 40 miles, from flank to flank, by the nearest practicable roads, and 57 miles by the route subsequently taken by the Twentieth Army Corps. It had already been ascertained that the main body of Johnston's army had joined Bragg, and an accumulation of evidence showed that the troops from Virginia had reached Atlanta on the 1st of the month, and that re-enforcements were expected soon to arrive from that quarter. It was therefore a matter of life and death to effect the
CONCENTRATION OF THE ARMY.
General McCook had already been directed to support General Thomas, but was now ordered to send two brigades to hold Dougherty's Gap, and to join General Thomas with the remainder of his command with the utmost celerity, directing his march over the road on the top of the mountain. He had, with great prudence, already moved his trains back to the rear of Little River, on the mountain, but, unfortunately being ignorant of the mountain road, moved down the mountain at Winston's Gap, down Lookout Valley to Cooper's Gap, up the mountain and down again, closing up with General Thomas on the 17th, and having posted Davis at Brooks', in front of Dug Gap, Johnson at Pond Spring, in front of Catlett's Gap, and Sheridan at the foot of Stevens' Gap.
As soon as General McCook's corps arrived General Thomas moved down the Chickamauga toward Gordon's Mills. Meanwhile, to bring General Crittenden within reach of General Thomas and beyond the danger of separation, he was withdrawn from Gordon's Mills, on the 14th, and ordered to take post on the southern spur of Missionary <ar50_55> Ridge, his right communicating with General Thomas, where he remained until General McCook had effected a junction with General Thomas.
Minty, with his cavalry, reconnoitered the enemy on the 15th and reported him in force at Dalton, Ringgold, and Leet's, and Rock Springs Church. The head of General McCook's column being reported near the same day, General Crittenden was ordered to return to his old position at Gordon's Mills, his line resting along the Chickamauga via Crawfish Spring.
Thus, on the evening of the 17th, the troops were substantially within supporting distance. Orders were given at once to move the whole line northeastwardly down the Chickamauga, with a view to covering the La Fayette road toward Chattanooga, and facing the most practicable route to the enemy's front.
The position of our troops and the narrowness of the roads retarded our movements. During the day while they were in progress, our cavalry, under Colonel Minty, was attacked on the left in the vicinity of Reed's Bridge, and Wilder's mounted infantry were attacked by infantry and driven into the La Fayette road.
It became apparent that the enemy was massing heavily on our left, crossing Reed's and Alexander's Bridges in force while he had threatened Gordon's Mills.
Orders were therefore promptly given to General Thomas to relieve General Crittenden's corps, posting one division near Crawfish Spring, and to move with the remainder of his corps by the Widow Glenn's house to the Rossville and La Fayette road, his left extending obliquely across it near Kelly's house.
General Crittenden was ordered to proceed with Van Cleve's and Palmer's divisions, to drive the enemy from the Rossville road and form on the left of General Wood, then at Gordon's Mills.
General McCook's corps was to close up on General Thomas, occupy the position at Crawfish Spring, and protect General Crittenden's right, while holding his corps mainly in reserve.
The main cavalry force was ordered to close in on General McCook's right, watch the crossing of the Chickamauga, and act under his orders.
The movement for the concentration of the corps more compactly toward Crawfish Spring was begun on the morning of the 18th, under orders to conduct it very secretly, and was executed so slowly that McCook's corps only reached Pond Spring at dark, and bivouacked, resting on their arms during the night Crittenden's corps reached its position on the Rossville road near midnight.
Evidence accumulated during the day of the 18th that the enemy was moving to our left. Minty's cavalry and Wilder's mounted brigade encountered the enemy's cavalry at Reed's and Alexander's Bridges, and toward evening were driven into the Rossville road. At the same time the enemy had been demonstrating for 3 miles up the Chickamauga. Heavy clouds of dust had been observed 3 or 4 miles beyond the Chickamauga, sweeping to the northeast.
In view of all these facts, the necessity became apparent that General Thomas must use all possible dispatch in moving his corps to the position assigned it. He was therefore directed to proceed with all dispatch, and General McCook to close up to Crawfish Spring as soon as Thomas' column was out of the way. Thomas pushed forward uninterruptedly during the night, and at daylight the head of his column had reached Kelly's house on the La Fayette road, where <ar50_56> Baird's division was posted. Brannan followed, and was posted on Baird's left, covering the roads leading to Reed's and Alexander's Bridges.
At this point Colonel McCook, of General Granger's command, who had made a reconnaissance to the Chickamauga the evening before and had burned Reed's Bridge, met General Thomas, and reported that an isolated brigade of the enemy was this side of the Chickamauga, and, the bridge being destroyed, a rapid movement in that direction might result in the capture of the force thus isolated.
General Thomas ordered Brannan with two brigades to reconnoiter in that direction and attack any small force he should meet. The advance brigade, supported by the rest of the division, soon encountered a strong body of the enemy, attacked it vigorously, and drove it back more than half a mile, where a very strong column of the enemy was found, with the evident intention of turning our left and gaining possession of the La Fayette road between us and Chattanooga.
This vigorous movement disconcerted the plans of the enemy to move on our left, and opened the
BATTLE OF THE 19TH SEPTEMBER.
The leading brigade became engaged about 10 a.m. on the 19th, on our extreme left, and extending to the right, where the enemy combined to move in heavy masses. Apprehending this movement, I had ordered General McCook to send Johnson's division to Thomas' assistance. He arrived opportunely.
General Crittenden, with great good sense, had already dispatched Palmer's, reporting the fact to me, and received my approval. The enemy returned our attack, and was driving back Baird's right in disorder, when Johnson struck the attacking column in flank and drove it back more than a half a mile till his own right was overlapped, and in imminent danger of being turned, when Palmer, coming in on Johnson's right, threw his division against the enemy and drove back his advance columns.
Palmer's right was soon overlapped, when Van Cleve's division came to his support, but was beaten back, when Reynolds' division came in and was in turn overpowered. Davis' division came into the fight then, most opportunely, and drove the enemy, who soon, however, developed a superior force against his line and pressed him so heavily that he was giving ground, when Wood's division came and turned the tide of battle the other way.
About 3 p.m. General McCook was ordered to send Sheridan's division to support our line near Wood and Davis, directing Lytle's brigade to hold Gordon's Mills, our extreme right. Sheridan also arrived opportunely to save Wood from disaster, and the rebel tide was thoroughly staid in that quarter.
Meanwhile, the roar of musketry in our center grew louder, and evidently approached headquarters at Widow Glenn's house, until musket balls came near and shells burst about it. Our center was being driven.
Orders were sent to General Negley to move his division from Crawfish Spring and above, where he had been holding the line of the Chickamauga, to Widow Glenn's, to be held in reserve to give succor wherever it might be required. At 4.30 p.m. he reported with his division, and as the indications that our center was being <ar50_57> driven became clearer, he was dispatched in that direction, and soon found the enemy had dislodged Van Cleve from the line, and was forming there even while Thomas was driving their right. Orders were promptly given Negley to attack him, which he soon did, and drove him steadily until night closed the combat.
General Brannan, having repulsed the enemy in our extreme left, was sent by General Thomas to support the center, and at night took a position on the right of Reynolds.
Colonel Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry occupied during the day a position on the La Fayette road, 1 mile north of Gordon's Mills, where he had taken position on the afternoon previous when, contesting the ground step by step, he had been driven by the enemy's advance from Alexander's Bridge.
Minty's cavalry had been ordered from the same position about noon of the 10th, to report to Major-General Granger, at Rossville, which he did at daylight on the 20th, and was posted near Mission Mills, to hold in check the enemy's cavalry on their right, from the direction of Ringgold and Graysville.
The Reserve Corps covered the approaches from the Chickamauga toward Rossville and the extension of our left.
The roar of battle hushed in the darkness of night, and our troops, weary with a night of marching and a day of fighting, rested on their arms, having everywhere maintained their positions, developed the enemy, and gained thorough command of the Rossville and Dry Valley roads to Chattanooga, the great object of the battle of the 19th of September.
The battle had secured us these objects. Our flanks covered the Dry Valley and Rossville roads, while our cavalry covered the Missionary Ridge and the Valley of Chattanooga Creek, into which latter place our spare trains had been sent on Friday, the 18th.
We also had indubitable evidence of the presence of Longstreet's corps and Johnston's forces, by the capture of prisoners from each, and the fact that at the close of the day we had present but two brigades which had not been opportunely and squarely in action, opposed to superior numbers of the enemy, assured us that we were greatly outnumbered, and that the battle the next day must be for the safety of the army and the possession of Chattanooga.
THE BATTLE OF THE 20TH.
During the evening of the 19th the corps commanders were assembled at headquarters at Widow Glenn's house, the reports of the positions and condition of their commands heard, and orders given for the disposition of the troops for the following day.
Thomas' corps, with the troops which had re-enforced him, was to maintain substantially his present line, with Brannan in reserve.
McCook, maintaining his picket line till it was driven in, was to close on Thomas, his right refused, and covering the position at Widow Glenn's, and Crittenden to have two divisions in reserve near the junction of McCook's and Thomas' lines to be able to succor either.
Plans having been explained, written orders given to each and read in the presence of all, the wearied corps commanders returned about midnight to their commands.
No firing took place during the night. The troops had assumed position when day dawned. The sky was red and sultry, the atmosphere <ar50_58> and all the woods enveloped in fog and smoke. As soon as it was sufficiently light I proceeded, accompanied by General Garfield and some aides, to inspect the lines.
I found General McCook's right too far up on the crest, and General Davis in reserve on a wooded hill-side west of and parallel to the Dry Valley road. I mentioned these defects to the general, desiring Davis division to be brought down at once, moved more to the left and placed in close column by division, doubled on the center, in a sheltered position.
I found General Crittenden's two divisions massed at the foot of the same hill in the valley and called his attention to it, desiring them to be moved farther to the left.
General Thomas' troops were in the position indicated, except Palmer's line was to be closed more compactly.
Satisfied that the enemy's first attempt would be on our left, orders were dispatched to General Negley to join General Thomas and to General McCook to relieve Negley. Returning to the right, I found Negley had not moved, nor were McCook's troops coming in to relieve him. Negley was preparing to withdraw his two brigades from the line. He was ordered to send his reserve brigade immediately and follow it with the others only when relieved on the line of battle. General Crittenden, whose troops were nearest, was ordered to fill General Negley's place at once, and General McCook was notified of this order growing out of the necessity of promptly sending Negley to Thomas.
Proceeding to the extreme right I felt the disadvantages of its positions, mentioned them to General McCook, and when I left him enjoined on him that it was an indispensable necessity that we should keep closed to the left, and that we must do so at all hazards.
On my return to the position of General Negley, I found to my astonishment that General Crittenden had not relieved him, Wood's division having reached the position of Negley's reserve. Peremptory orders were given to repair this, and Wood's troops moved into position, but this delay subsequently proved of serious consequence. The battle began on the extreme left at 8.30 a.m., and it was 9.30 o'clock when Negley was relieved.
An aide arriving from General Thomas, requesting that Negley's remaining brigades be sent forward as speedily as possible to succor the left, General Crittenden was ordered to move Van Cleve, with all possible dispatch, to a position in the rear of Wood, who closed in on Brannan's right. General McCook was ordered to move Davis up to close in on Wood, and fill an opening in the line.
On my return from an examination of the ground in the rear of our left center, I found to my surprise that General Van Cleve was posted in line of battle on a high ridge much too far to the rear to give immediate support to the main line of battle, and General Davis in line of battle in rear of the ridge occupied by Negley's reserve in the morning. General Crittenden was ordered to move Van Cleve at once down the hill to a better position, and General Davis was also ordered to close up the support of the line near Wood's right.
The battle, in the meanwhile, roared with increasing fury, and approached from the left to the center. Two aides arrived successively within a few minutes, from General Thomas, asking for re-enforcements. The first was directed to say that General Negley had already gone and should be near at hand at that time, and that Brannan's <ar50_59> reserve brigade was available. The other was directed to say that General Van Cleve would at once be sent to his assistance, which was accordingly done.
A message from General Thomas soon followed, that he was heavily pressed, Captain Kellogg, aide-de-camp, the bearer, informing me at the same time that General Brannan was out of line, and General Reynolds' right was exposed. Orders were dispatched to General Wood to close up on Reynolds, and word was sent to General Thomas that he should be supported, even if it took away the whole corps of Crittenden and McCook.
General Davis was ordered to close on General Wood, and General McCook was advised of the state of affairs and ordered to close his whole command to the left with all dispatch.
General Wood, overlooking the direction to" close up "on General Reynolds, supposed he was to support him, by withdrawing from the line and passing to the rear of General Brannan, who, it appears, was not out of line, but was en échelon, and slightly in rear of Reynolds' right. By this unfortunate mistake a gap was opened in the line of battle, of which the enemy took instant advantage, and striking Davis in flank and rear, as well as in front, threw his whole division in confusion.
The same attack shattered the right brigade of Wood before it had cleared the space. The right of Brannan was thrown back, and two of his batteries, then in movement to a new position, were taken in flank and thrown back through two brigades of Van Cleve, then on the march to the left, throwing his division into confusion from which it never recovered until it reached Rossville.
While the enemy poured in through this breach, a long line stretching beyond Sheridan's right was advancing. Laiboldt's brigade shared in the rout of Davis. Sheridan's other two brigades, in movement toward the left, under orders to support Thomas, made a gallant charge against the enemy's advancing column, but were thrown into disorder by the enemy's line advancing on their flank, and were likewise compelled to fall back, rallying on the Dry Valley road, and repulsing the enemy, but they were again compelled to yield to superior numbers and retired westward of the Dry Valley road, and by a circuitous route reached Rossville, from which they advanced by the La Fayette road to support our left.
Thus Davis' two brigades, one of Van Cleve's, and Sheridan's entire division were driven from the field, and the remainder, consisting of the divisions of Baird, Johnson, Palmer, Reynolds, Brannan, and Wood, two of Negley's brigades and one of Van Cleve s, were left to sustain the conflict against the whole power of the rebel army, which, desisting from pursuit on the right, concentrated their whole efforts to destroy them.
At the moment of the repulse of Davis' division, I was standing in rear of his right, waiting the completion of the closing of McCook's corps to the left. Seeing confusion among Van Cleve's troops, and the distance Davis' men were falling back, and the tide of battle surging toward us, the urgency for Sheridan's troops to intervene became imminent, and I hastened in person to the extreme right, to direct Sheridan's movement on the flank of the advancing rebels. It was too late. The crowd of returning troops rolled back, and the enemy advanced. Giving the troops directions to rally behind the ridge west of the Dry Valley road, I passed down it accompanied by General Garfield, Major McMichael, Major Bond, and Captain Young, <ar50_60> of my staff, and a few of the escort, under a shower of grape, canister, and musketry, for 200 or 300 yards, and attempted to rejoin General Thomas and the troops sent to his support, by passing to the rear of the broken portion of our lines, but found the routed troops far toward the left, and hearing the enemy's advancing musketry and cheers, I became doubtful whether the left had held its ground, and started for Rossville. On consultation and further reflection, however, I determined to send General Garfield there, while I went to Chattanooga, to give orders for the security of the pontoon bridges at Battle Creek and Bridgeport, and to make preliminary dispositions either to forward ammunition and supplies, should we hold our ground, or to withdraw the troops into good position.
General Garfield dispatched me, from Rossville, that the left and center still held its ground. General Granger had gone to its support. General Sheridan had rallied his division, and was advancing toward the same point, and General Davis was going up the Dry Valley road to our right. General Garfield proceeded to the front, remained there until the close of the fight, and dispatched me the triumphant defense our troops there made against the assaults of the enemy.
THE FIGHT ON THE LEFT,
after 2 p.m., was that of the army. Never, in the history of this war at least, have troops fought with greater energy and determination. Bayonet charges, often heard of but seldom seen, were repeatedly made by brigades and regiments in several of our divisions.
After the yielding and severance of the divisions of the right, the enemy bent all efforts to break the solid portions of our line. Under the pressure of the rebel onset, the flanks of the line were gradually retired until they occupied strong advantageous ground, giving to the whole a flattened crescent shape.
From 1 to half past 3 o'clock, the unequal contest was sustained throughout our line. Then the enemy in overpowering numbers flowed around our right, held by General Brannan, and occupied a low gap in the ridge of our defensive position, which commanded our rear. The moment was critical. Twenty minutes more and our right would have been turned, our position taken in reverse, and probably the army routed.
Fortunately, Major-General Granger, whose troops had been posted to cover our left and rear, with the instinct of a true soldier and a general, hearing the roar of battle on our left, and being beyond the reach of orders from the general commanding, determined to move to its assistance. He advanced and soon encountered the enemy's skirmishers, whom he disregarded, well knowing that, at that stage of the conflict, the battle was not there. Posting Col. Daniel McCook's brigade to take care of anything in the vicinity and beyond the left of our line, he moved the remainder to the scene of action, reporting to General Thomas, who directed him to our suffering right.
Arrived in sight. General Granger discovered at once the peril and the point of danger--the gap. Quick as thought he directed his advance brigade upon the enemy. General Steedman, taking a regimental color, led the column. Swift was the charge and terrible the conflict, but the enemy was broken. A thousand of our brave <ar50_61> men, killed and wounded, paid for its possession, but we held the gap.
Two divisions of Longstreet's corps confronted the position. Determined to take it, they successively came to the assault. A battery of six guns, placed in the gorge, poured death and slaughter into them. They charged to within a few yards of the pieces, but our grape and canister, and the leaden hail of our musketry, delivered in sparing but terrible volleys from cartridges taken in many instances from the boxes of their fallen companions, was too much even for Longstreet's men. About sunset they made their last charge, when our men, being out of ammunition, rushed on them with bayonet, and they gave way to return no more.
The fury of the conflict was nearly as great on the fronts of Brannan and Wood, being less furious toward the left. But a column of the enemy had made its way to near our left and to the right of Colonel McCook's position. Apprised of this, General Thomas directed Reynolds to move his division from its position, and pointing out the rebels told him to go in there.
To save time, the troops of Reynolds were faced by the rear rank and moved with the bayonet at a double-quick, with a shout walked over the rebels, capturing some 500. This closed the battle of the 20th. At nightfall the enemy had been repulsed along the whole line, and sunk into quietude without attempting to renew the combat.
General Thomas, considering the excessive labors of the troops, the scarcity of ammunition, food, and water, and having orders from the general commanding to use his discretion, determined to retire on Rossville, where they arrived in good order, took post before morning, receiving supplies from Chattanooga, and offering the enemy battle during all the next day and repulsing his reconnaissance. On the night of the 21st we withdrew from Rossville, took firm possession of the objective point of our campaign--Chattanooga--and prepared to hold it.
The operations of the cavalry during the battle on the 19th were very important. General Mitchell, with three brigades, covered our right flank along the line of the Chickamauga, above Crawfish Spring, against the combined efforts of the great body of the rebel cavalry, whose attempts to cross the stream they several times repulsed.
Wilder fought, dismounted, near the center, intervening two or three times with mountain howitzers and Spencer rifles very opportunely.
On the 20th Minty covered our left and rear at Missionary Mills, and later in the day on the Ringgold road.
General Mitchell, with his three brigades, covered our extreme right, and with Wilder, after its repulse, extended over Missionary Ridge, held the whole country to the base of Lookout Mountain, and all our trains, artillery, caissons, and spare wagons sent there for greater safety retiring from the field. He was joined by Post's brigade of Davis' division, which had not closed on the army and was not in action.
On the 21st the cavalry still covered our right as securely as before, fighting and holding at bay very superior numbers. The number of cavalry combats during the whole campaign have been numerous, the successes as numerous, but the army could not have dispensed with those of the 19th, 20th, and 21st. <ar50_62>
OUR ARTILLERY
fired fewer shots than at Stone's River, but with even greater effect. I cannot but congratulate the country on the rapid improvement evidenced in this arm of the service. Our loss of pieces is, in part, attributable to the rough, wooded ground in which we fought, and the want of experience in posting artillery, and partly to the unequal nature of the contest, our infantry being heavily outnumbered.
For the details of these actions, the innumerable instances of distinguished bravery, skill, and gallantry displayed by officers of every rank, and, above all, for self-reliant, cool, and steady courage displayed by the soldiers of the army, in all arms, in many instances even shining above that of their officers, I must refer to the accompanying reports of the corps, division, brigade, regimental, and battery commanders. The reports of the cavalry command are not in, for the best of all reasons, that they have been out nearly ever since, writing with their sabers on the heads and backs of the enemy.
The signal corps has been growing into usefulness and favor daily for the last four months, and now bids fair to become one of the most esteemed of the staff services. It rendered very important service from the time we reached the Valley of the Tennessee. For its operations, I refer to the report of Capt. Jesse Merrill, chief signal officer.
Our medical corps proved very efficient during the whole campaign, and especially during and subsequent to the battle. A full share of praise is due to Dr. Glover Perin, the medical director of the department, ably assisted by Dr. Gross, medical director of the Fourteenth, Dr. Perkins, Twentieth, and Dr. Phelps, Twenty-first Army Corps.
A very great meed of praise is due Capt. Horace Porter, of the Ordnance, for the wise system of arming each regiment with arms of the same caliber, and having the ammunition wagons properly marked, by which most of the difficulties in supplying ammunition where troops had exhausted it in battle were obviated. From his report will be seen that we expended 2,650,000 rounds of musket cartridges, 7,325 rounds of cannon ammunition; we lost 36 pieces of artillery, 20 caissons, 8,450 stand of small-arms, 5,834 infantry accouterments; being 12,675 rounds less of artillery and 650,000 rounds more of musketry than at Stone's River.
From the report of Lieutenant-Colonel Wiles, provost-marshal-general, it will be seen that we took 2,005 prisoners. We have missing [4,945], of which some 600 have escaped and come in, and probably 700 or 800 are among the killed and wounded; of our wounded about 2,500 fell into the hands of the enemy, swelling the balance of prisoners against us to about 5,500.
It is proper to observe the battle of Chickamauga was absolutely necessary to secure our concentration and cover Chattanooga. It was fought in a country covered with woods and undergrowth, and wholly unknown to us. Every division came into action opportunely and fought squarely on the 19th. We were largely outnumbered, yet we foiled the enemy's flank movement on our left, and secured our own position on the road to Chattanooga. The battle of the 20th was fought with all the troops we had, and but for the extension and delay in closing in our right, we should probably have driven the enemy, whom we really beat on the field. I am fully satisfied that the enemy's loss largely exceeds ours. <ar50_63>
It is my duty to notice the services of those faithful officers who have none but myself to mention them.
To Major-General Thomas, the true soldier, the prudent and undaunted commander, the modest and incorruptible patriot, the thanks and gratitude of the country are due for his conduct at the battle of Chickamauga.
Major-General Granger, by his promptitude, arrived and carried his troops into action in time to save the day. He deserves the highest praise.
Major-General McCook, for the care of his command, prompt and willing execution of orders, to the best of his ability, deserves this testimonial of my approbation.
I bear testimony likewise to the high-hearted, noble Major-General Crittenden. Prompt in the moving and reporting the position of his troops, always fearless on the field of battle, I return my thanks for the promptness and military good sense with which he sent his divisions toward the noise of battle on the 19th.
To Brig. Gen. James A. Garfield, chief of staff, I am especially indebted for the clear and ready manner in which he seized the points of action and movement, and expressed in orders the ideas of the general commanding.
Col. J. C. McKibbin, aide-de-camp, always efficient, gallant, and untiring, and fearless in battle.
Lieut. Col. A. C. Ducat, brave, prompt, and energetic in action.
Maj. Frank S. Bond, senior aide-de-camp; Capt. J.P. Drouillard, aide-de-camp; and Capt. R. S. Thoms, aide-de-camp, deserve very honorable mention for the faithful and efficient discharge of their appropriate duties always, and especially during the battle.
Col. James Barnett, chief of artillery; Lieut. Col. S. Simmons, chief commissary; Lieut. Col. H. C. Hodges, chief quartermaster; Dr. G. Perin, medical director; Capt. Horace Porter, chief of ordnance; Capt. William E. Merrill, chief topographical engineer, and Brig. Gen. J. St. Clair Morton, were all in the battle and discharged their duties with ability and to my entire satisfaction.
Col. William J. Palmer, Fifteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry, and his command, have rendered very valuable services in keeping open communications and watching the movements of the enemy, which deserve my warmest thanks.
Lieut. Col. W. M. Ward, with the Tenth Ohio, provost and headquarters guard, rendered efficient and valuable services, especially on the 20th, in covering the movement of retiring trains on the Dry Valley road, and stopping the stragglers from the fight. Captain Garner and the escort deserve mention for untiring energy in carrying orders.
Lieut. Col. C. Goddard, assistant adjutant-general; Lieut. Col. William M. Wiles, provost-marshal-general; Maj. William McMichael, assistant adjutant-general; Surg. H. H. Seys, medical inspector; Capt. D. G. Swaim, assistant adjutant-general, chief of the secret service; Capt. William Farrar, aide-de-camp; Capt. J. H. Young, chief commissary of musters; Capt. A. S. Burt, acting assistant inspector-general; Capt. Hunter Brooke, acting judge-advocate; Capt. W. C. Margedant, acting topographical engineer; Lieut. George Burroughs, topographical engineer; Lieut. William L. Porter, acting aide-de-camp: Lieut. James K. Reynolds, acting aide-de-camp; Lieut. M. J. Kelly, chief of couriers, and Asst. Surg. D. Bache were <ar50_64> on the field of battle, and there and elsewhere discharged their duties with zeal and ability.
I must not omit Col. J.P. Sanderson, of the regular infantry, who, having lately joined us, on those two days of battle acted as aide-de-camp and carried orders to the hottest portions of the field.
Of those division and brigade commanders whose gallantry, skill, and services were prominent, individual special mentions accompany this report. A list of names of these and others of every grade whose, conduct according to the reports of their commanders, deserves special praise, is also herewith sent.
 W. S. ROSECRANS,
Major-General.

RECAPITULATION.
O Officers. A Aggregate. M Enlisted Men. C Captured or missing

                                                         --Killed-- -Wounded- -----C-----
Command. O M O M O M A
General.headquarters  .... .... .... 2 .... 4 6
Fourteenth.Army.Corps 40 625 228 3,333 111 1,777 6,114
Twentieth.Army.Corps 49 374 164 2,535 63 1,172 4,357
Twenty-first.Army.Corps. 31 291 144 2,238 28 671 3,403
Reserve.Corps  16 199 66 910 35 596 1,822
Cavalry.Corps  4 28 7 129 11 289 468
Total.Army.of.the.Cumberland 140 1,517 609 9,147 248 4,509 16,170



2. George H. Thomas
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXX/1 [S# 50] AUGUST 16-SEPTEMBER 22, 1863.--The Chickamauga Campaign.
No. 13. --Report of Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas, U.S. Army, commanding Fourteenth Army Corps.

[ar50_245 con't]
HEADQUARTERS FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
Chattanooga, Tenn., September 30, 1863.
GENERAL: I have the honor to report the operations of my corps from the 1st September up to date, as follows, viz:
General Brannan's division crossed the Tennessee River at Battle <ar50_246> Creek; General Baird ordered to cross his division at Bridgeport, and to move to Taylor's Store; General Negley's division to cross the river at Caperton's Ferry, and to report at Taylor's Store also.
September 2.--General Baird's division moved to Widow's Creek.
General Negley reports having arrived at Moore's Spring, 1¼ miles from Taylor's Store, and 2 miles from Bridgeport; he was ordered to cross the mountain at that point, it being the most direct route to Trenton, in the vicinity of which place the corps was ordered to concentrate.
September 3.--Headquarters Fourteenth Army Corps moved from Bolivar Springs at 6 a.m. via Caperton's Ferry to Moore's Spring, on the road from Bridgeport to Trenton. Baird's division reached Bridgeport, but could not cross in consequence of damage to the bridge; Negley's division marched to Warren's Mill, on the top of Sand Mountain, on the road to Trenton; Brannan's division reached Graham's Store, on the road from Shellmound to Trenton; Reynolds' division marched 6 miles on the Trenton road from Shellmound.
September 4.--Negley's division camped at Brown's Spring, at the foot of Sand Mountain, in Lookout Valley; Brannan's division at Gordon's Mill, on Sand Mountain; Reynolds' division at foot of Sand Mountain, 2 miles from Trenton; Baird's division crossed the river at Bridgeport, and camped at that point; corps headquarters at Moore's Spring.
September 5.--Baird's division arrived at Moore's Spring; Negley's division still in camp at Brown's Spring. He reports having sent forward a reconnaissance of two regiments of infantry and a section of artillery to scour the country toward Chattanooga, and secure some captured stores near Macon Iron-Works. They captured some Confederate army supplies. No report from Brannan's division; Reynolds' division in camp at Trenton; Brannan somewhere in the neighborhood; corps headquarters at Warren's Mill.
September 6.--Baird's division encamped at Warren's Mill; Negley's division reached Johnson's Crook; Beatty's brigade was sent up the road to seize Stevens' Gap; met the enemy's pickets, and, it being dark, did not proceed farther. The Eighteenth Ohio, of Negley's division, went to the top of Lookout Mountain, beyond Payne's Mill; met the enemy's pickets and dispersed them. The head of Brannan's column reached Lookout Valley, 2 miles below Trenton. Reynolds' division in camp at Trenton. Rumors of the enemy's design to evacuate Chattanooga. Corps headquarters at Brown's Spring.
September 7.--Baird's division closed up with Negley's in the mouth of Johnson's Crook. Negley's gained possession of the top of the mountain, and secured the forks of the road. Brannan's division reached Trenton; Reynolds' remained in camp at that place. Corps headquarters still at Brown's Spring.
September 8.--Baird's division remained in its camp of yesterday, at the junction of Hurricane and Lookout Creeks. Negley's division moved up to the top of Lookout Mountain, at the head of Johnson's Crook, one brigade occupying the pass; another brigade was sent forward and seized Cooper's Gap, sending one regiment to the foot of the gap to occupy and hold it; one regiment was also sent forward to seize Stevens' Gap, which was heavily obstructed with fallen trees. Brannan's division occupied the same position as last night. Reynolds' division headquarters at Trenton, with one brigade <ar50_247> at Payne's Mill, 3 miles south of Trenton. Headquarters of the corps still at Brown's Spring.
September 9.--Baird's division moved across Lookout Mountain to the support of Negley. Negley's division moved across the mountain and took up a position in McLemore's Cove, near Rodgers' farm, throwing out his skirmishers as far as Bailey's Cross-Roads; saw the enemy's cavalry in front, drawn up in line; citizens reported a heavy force concentrated in his front at Dug Gap, consisting of infantry, cavalry, and artillery. Brannan's division in camp same as yesterday; Reynolds' division also. The Ninety-second Illinois (mounted infantry)sent on a reconnaissance toward Chattanooga, along the ridge of Lookout Mountain. Colonel Atkins, commanding Ninety-second Illinois, reports September 9, 11 a.m., entered Chattanooga as the rear of the enemy's column was evacuating the place; corps headquarters moved from Brown's Spring to Easley's farm, on Trenton and Lebanon road.
September 10.--General Negley's in front of or 1 mile west of Dug Gap, which has been heavily obstructed by the enemy and occupied by a strong picket line. General Baird ordered to move up to-night to Negley's support. General Reynolds to move at daylight to support Baird's left, and General Brannan to move at 8 a.m. to-morrow morning to support Reynolds. Headquarters and General Reynolds' division camped at foot of the mountain; Brannan's division at Easley's.
September 11.--Baird's division closed up on Negley's at Widow Davis' house about 8 a.m. Soon afterward, Negley being satisfied, from his own observations and from the reports of officers sent out to reconnoiter, and also from loyal citizens, that the enemy was advancing on him in very superior force, and that his train was in imminent danger of being cut off if he accepted battle at Davis' Cross-Roads, determined to fall back to a strong position in front of Stevens' Gap. This movement he immediately proceeded to put into execution, and by his untiring energy and skill, and with the prompt co-operation of Baird, succeeded in gaining possession of the hills in front of Stevens' Gap and securing his trains, without losing a single wagon. For a detailed account of this movement, see reports(*) of Generals Negley and Baird, annexed, marked A and B. General Turchin, commanding Third Brigade, Reynolds' division, was pushed forward, by way of Cooper's Gap, to Negley's support, on the left, reaching his position about 10 a.m. Orders were sent to General Brannan to close up as rapidly as possible. Corps headquarters at top of Cooper's Gap.
September 12.--Brannan's division reached Negley's position by 8 a.m., and took post next on the left of Baird. Reynolds' division was posted on the left of Brannan, one brigade covering Cooper's Gap. Reports from citizens go to confirm the impression that a large force of the enemy is concentrated at La Fayette. A report from General McCook confirms that fact. A later dispatch from the same source says it is reported that Bragg's whole army, with Johnston's, is at La Fayette. Generals Brannan and Baird, with parts of their commands, went out on a reconnaissance toward Dug Gap at 1 p.m. to-day. General Brannan reports they advanced 2 miles beyond Davis' Cross-Roads without finding any enemy with the exception of a few mounted men. Corps headquarters encamped at top of Stevens' Gap. <ar50_248>
September 13.--Negley's, Baird's, and Brannan's divisions remained in their camps of yesterday awaiting the arrival of McCook's corps, which had been ordered to close up to the left. Reynolds concentrated his division on the road from Cooper's Gap to Catlett's Gap. Two deserters from Eighteenth Tennessee state that they belong to Buckner's corps. Buckner's corps consists of eight brigades and two batteries of six guns each; were in the fight with Negley. Saw a brigade of Forrest's cavalry, commanded by Forrest in person, pass toward the fight on the 11th. Hill's and Buckner's corps were both engaged. Bragg's army is concentrated at La Fayette. Headquarters moved by way of Cooper's Gap to the foot of the mountain.
September 14.--General Reynolds took up a position at Pond Spring with his two infantry brigades, and was joined by Wilder at that place. Turchin's brigade, of Reynolds' division, made a reconnaissance to the mouth of Catlett's Gap with the Ninety-second Illinois (mounted infantry). Was opposed by rebel mounted pickets from Chickamauga Creek to mouth of Catlett's Gap, at which place he found their reserve drawn up, also a strong line of skirmishers to the right of the road; but having received instructions to avoid bringing on an engagement, he returned to camp with the brigade, leaving two regiments on Chattanooga Valley road, strongly posted on outposts. General Brannan advanced one brigade of his division to Chickamauga Creek, east of Lee's Mill, 1 mile to the right and south of Reynolds' position at Pond Spring. A mounted reconnaissance was also pushed forward to within a mile of Blue Bird Gap without encountering any of the enemy. A negro who had been taken before General Buckner yesterday and released again reports that Buckner and his corps are in Catlett's Gap preparing to defend that place. A negro woman, lately from the neighborhood of Dug Gap, reports a large force of rebels between Dug Gap and La Fayette.
September 16.--Corps headquarters and First and Second Divisions remained camped, as last reported, at foot of Stevens' Gap. Turchin's brigade, of Reynolds' division, made a reconnaissance toward Cat-lett's Gap. The enemy fell back as he advanced, until he came upon a force strongly posted, with two pieces of artillery, in the road. He made a second reconnaissance at 2 p.m. that day with but little further result, as he could advance but a short distance farther, the enemy being in force in his front.
September 17.--First. Second, and Third Divisions changed their positions from their camps of yesterday: Baird's (First) division, with its right resting at Gower's Ford and extending along Chickamauga Creek to Bird's Mill; Negley's (Second) division, with its right at Bird's Mill and its left connecting with Van Cleve's division at Owens' Ford; Brannan's (Third) division on the right of the First, covering four fords between Gower's Ford and Pond Spring. One brigade of the Fourth Division (Reynolds') thrown out in front of Pond Spring, on the Catlett's Gap road, covering the pass through the mountains. Wilder's brigade detached and ordered to report to department headquarters. The left of McCook's corps closed in; connected with our right near Pond Spring.
September 18.--At 4 p.m. the whole corps moved to the left along Chickamauga Creek to Crawfish Spring. On arriving at that place received orders to march on the cross-road leading by Widow Glenn's house to the Chattanooga and La Fayette road, and take up a position near Kelly's farm, on the La Fayette road, connecting with Crittenden on my right at Gordon's Mills. The head of the column <ar50_249> reached Kelly's farm about daylight on the 19th, Baird's division in front, and took up a position at the forks of the road, facing toward Reed's and Alexander's Bridges over the Chickamauga. Colonel Wilder, commanding the mounted brigade of Reynolds' division, informed me that the enemy had crossed the Chickamauga in force at those two bridges the evening before and drove his brigade across the State road, or Chattanooga and La Fayette road, to the heights east of Widow Glenn's house.
Kelly's house is situated in an opening about three-fourths of a mile long and one-fourth of a mile wide, on the east side of the State road, and stretches along that road in a northerly direction, with a small field of perhaps 20 acres on the west side of the road, directly opposite to the house. From thence to the Chickamauga the surface of the country is undulating and covered with original forest timber, interspersed with undergrowth, in many places so dense that it is difficult to see 50 paces ahead. There is a cleared field near Jay's Mill, and cleared land in the vicinity of Reed's and Alexander's Bridges. A narrow field commences at a point about a fourth of a mile south of Kelly's house, on the east side of the State road, and extends, perhaps, for half a mile along the road toward Gordon's Mills. Between the State road and the foot of Missionary Ridge there? a skirt of timber stretching from the vicinity of Widow Glenn's house, south of the forks of the road to McDonald's house, three-fourths of a mile north of Kelly's. The eastern slope of the Missionary Ridge, between Glenn's and McDonald's, is cleared and mostly under cultivation. This position of Baird's threw my right in close proximity to Wilder's brigade; the interval I intended to fill up with the two remaining brigades of Reynolds' division on their arrival. General Brannan, closely following Baird's division, was placed in position on his left, on the two roads leading from the State road to Reed's and Alexander's Bridges.
Col. Dan. McCook, commanding a brigade of the Reserve Corps, met me at General Baird's headquarters, and reported to me that he had been stationed the previous night on the road leading to Reed's Bridge, and that he could discover no force of the enemy except one brigade, which had crossed to the west side of the Chickamauga at Reed's Bridge the day before; and he believed it could be cut off, because, after it had crossed, he had destroyed the bridge, the enemy having retired toward Alexander's Bridge. Upon this information I directed General Brannan to post a brigade, within supporting distance of Baird, on the road to Alexander's Bridge, and with his other two brigades to reconnoiter the road leading to Reed's Bridge to see if he could locate the brigade reported by Colonel McCook, and, if a favorable opportunity occurred, to capture it. His dispositions were made according to instructions by 9 a.m.
General Baird was directed to throw forward his right wing, so as to get more nearly in line with Brannan, but to watch well on his right flank. Soon after this disposition of those two divisions, a portion of Palmer's division, of Crittenden's corps, took position to the right of General Baird's division. About 10 o'clock Croxton's brigade of Brannan's division, posted on the road leading to Alexander's Bridge, became engaged with the enemy, and I rode forward to his position to ascertain the character of the attack. Colonel Croxton reported to me that he had driven the enemy nearly half a mile, but that he was then meeting with obstinate resistance. I then rode back to Baird's position, and directed him to advance to <ar50_250> Croxton's support, which he did with his whole division, Starkweather's brigade in reserve, and drove the enemy steadily before him for some distance, taking many prisoners. Croxton's brigade, which had been heavily engaged for over an hour with greatly superior numbers of the enemy, and being nearly exhausted of ammunition, was then moved to the rear to enable the men to fill up their boxes; and Baird and Brannan, having united their forces, drove the enemy from their immediate front. General Baird then halted for the purpose of readjusting his line; and hearing from prisoners that the enemy were in heavy force on his immediate right, he threw back his right wing in order to be ready for an attack from that quarter.
Before his dispositions could be completed, the enemy, in overwhelming numbers, furiously assaulted Scribner's and King's brigades, and drove them in disorder. Fortunately, at this time Johnson's division, of McCook's corps, and Reynolds' division, of my corps, arrived, and were immediately placed in position. Johnson preceded Reynolds, his left connecting with Baird's right, and Palmer being immediately on Johnson's right, Reynolds was placed on the right of Palmer, with one brigade of his division in reserve. As soon as formed they advanced upon the enemy, attacking him in flank and driving him in great disorder for a mile and a half, while Brannan's troops met him in front as he was pursuing Baird's retiring brigades, driving the head of his column back and retaking the artillery, which had been temporarily lost by Baird's brigades, the Ninth Ohio recovering Battery H, Fifth U.S. Artillery, at the point of the bayonet. The enemy, at this time being hardly pressed by Johnson, Palmer, and Reynolds in flank, fell back in confusion upon his reserves, posted in a strong position on the west side of Chickamauga Creek between Reed's and Alexander's Bridges.
Brannan and Baird were then ordered to reorganize their commands and take position on commanding ground on the road from McDonald's to Reed's Bridge, and hold it to the last extremity, as I expected the next effort of the enemy would be to gain that road and our rear. This was about 2 p.m. After a lull of about one hour, a furious attack was made upon Reynolds' right, and he having called upon me for re-enforcements, I directed Brannan's division to move to his support, leaving King's brigade, of Baird's division, to hold the position at which Baird and Brannan had been posted, the balance of Baird's division closing up to the right on Johnson's division. It will be seen by General Reynolds' report, Croxton's brigade, of Brannan's division, reached his right just in time to defeat the enemy's efforts to turn Reynolds' right and rear.
About 5 p.m., my lines being at that time very much extended in pursuing the enemy, I determined to concentrate them on more commanding ground, as I felt confident that we should have a renewal of the battle in the morning. I rode forward to General Johnson's position and designated to him where to place his division; also to General Baird, who was present with Johnson. I then rode back to the cross-roads to locate Palmer and Reynolds on Johnson's right and on the crest of the ridge about 500 yards east of the State road. Soon after Palmer and Reynolds got their positions, and while Brannan was getting his on the ridge to the west of the State road, near Dyer's house, and to the rear and right of Reynolds, where I had ordered him as a reserve, the enemy assaulted first Johnson and then Baird in a most furious manner, producing some <ar50_251> confusion, but order was soon restored, and the enemy repulsed in fine style; after which these two divisions took up the positions assigned them for the night.
Before adjusting the line satisfactorily, I received an order to report to department headquarters immediately, and was absent from my command until near midnight. After my return from department headquarters, about 2 a.m. on the 20th, I received a report from General Baird that the left of his division did not rest on the Reed's Bridge road, as I had intended, and that he could not reach it without weakening his line too much. I immediately addressed a note to the general commanding requesting that General Negley be sent me to take position on Baird's left and rear, and thus secure our left from assault. During the night the troops threw up temporary breastworks of logs, and prepared for the encounter which all anticipated would come off the next day.
Although informed by note, from General Rosecrans' headquarters, that Negley's division would be sent immediately to take post on my left, it had not arrived at 7 a.m. on the 20th, and I sent Captain Willard, of my staff, to General Negley to urge him forward as rapidly as possible, and to point out his position to him. General Negley, in his official report, mentions that he received this order through Captain Willard at 8 a.m. on the 20th, and that he immediately commenced withdrawing his division for that purpose, when the enemy was reported to be massing a heavy force in his front, sharply engaging his skirmishers, and that he was directed by General Rosecrans to hold his position until relieved by some other command. General Beatty's brigade, however, was sent under the guidance of Captain Willard, who took it to its position, and it went into action immediately. The enemy at that time commenced a furious assault on Baird's left, and partially succeeded in gaining his rear. Beatty, meeting with superior numbers, was compelled to fall back until relieved by the fire of several regiments of Palmer's reserve, which I had ordered to the support of the left, being placed in position by General Baird, and which regiments, with the cooperation of Van Derveer's brigade of Brannan's division and a portion of Stanley's brigade of Negley's division, drove the enemy entirely from Baird's left and rear. General Baird being still hardly pressed in front, I ordered General Wood, who had just reported to me in person, to send one of the brigades of his division to General Baird. He replied that his division had been ordered by General Rosecrans to support Reynolds' right, but that if I would take the responsibility exchanging his orders, he would cheerfully obey them, and sent Barnes' brigade, the head of which had just reached my position. General Wood then left me to rejoin the remainder of his division, which was still coming up.
To prevent a repetition of this attack of the enemy on our left I directed Captain Gaw, chief topographical officer on my staff, to go to the commanding officer of the troops on the left and rear of Baird, and direct him to mass as much artillery on the slopes of Missionary Ridge, west of the State road, as he could conveniently spare from his lines, supported strongly by infantry, so as to sweep the ground to the left and rear of Baird's position. This order General Negley, in his official report, mentions having received through Captain Gaw, but from his description of the position he assumed he must have misunderstood my order, and instead of massing the artillery near Baird's left, it was posted on the right of Brannan's division, nearly in <ar50_252> rear of Reynolds' right. At the time that the assault just described was made on Baird, the enemy attacked Johnson, Palmer, and Reynolds, with equal fierceness, which was continued at least two hours, making assault after assault with fresh troops, which were met by my troops with a most determined coolness and deliberation. The enemy having exhausted his utmost energies to dislodge us, apparently fell back entirely from our front, and we were not disturbed again until near night, after the withdrawal of the troops to Rossville had commenced. Just before the repulse of the enemy on our left, General Beatty came to me for fresh troops, in person, stating that most of those I had sent to him had gone back to the rear and right, and he was anxious to get at least another brigade before they attacked him again. I immediately sent Captain Kellogg to hurry up General Sheridan, whose division I had been informed would be sent to me.
About 2 p.m., very soon after Captain Kellogg left me, hearing heavy firing to my right and rear through the woods, I turned in that direction and was riding to the slope of the hill in my rear to ascertain the cause. Just as I passed out of the woods bordering the State road, I met Captain Kellogg returning, who reported to me that in attempting to reach General Sheridan he had met a large force in an open corn-field to the rear of Reynolds' position, advancing cautiously, with a strong line of skirmishers thrown out to their front, and that they had fired on him and forced him to return. He had reported this to Colonel Harker, commanding a brigade of Wood's division, posted on a ridge a short distance to the rear of Reynolds' position, who also saw this force advancing, but, with Captain Kellogg, was of the opinion that they might be Sheridan's troops coming to our assistance. I rode forward to Colonel Harker's position, and told him that, although I was expecting Sheridan from that direction, if those troops fired on him, seeing his flag, he must return their fire and resist their farther advance. He immediately ordered his skirmishers to commence firing, and took up a position with his brigade on the crest of a hill a short distance to his right and rear, placing his right in connection with Brannan's division and portions of Beatty's and Stanley's brigades of Negley's division, which had been retired to that point from the left, as circumstantially narrated in the reports of General John Beatty and Colonel Stanley. I then rode to the crest of the hill referred to above. On my way I met General Wood, who confirmed me in the opinion that the troops advancing upon us were the enemy, although we were not then aware of the disaster to the right and center of our army. I then directed him to place his division on the prolongation of Brannan's, who, I had ascertained from Wood, was on the top of the hill above referred to, and to resist the farther advance of the enemy as long as possible. I sent my aide, Captain Kellogg, to notify General Reynolds that our right had been turned, and that the enemy was in his rear in force.
General Wood barely had time to dispose his troops on the left of Brannan before another of those fierce assaults, similar to those made in the morning on my lines, was made on him and Brannan combined, and kept up by the enemy throwing in fresh troops as fast as those in their front were driven back, until near nightfall. About the time that Wood took up his position, General Gordon Granger appeared on my left flank at the head of Steedman's division of his corps. I immediately dispatched a staff officer, Captain Johnson, Second <ar50_253> Indiana Cavalry, of Negley's division, to him with orders to push forward and take position on Brannan's right, which order was complied with with the greatest promptness and alacrity. Steedman, moving his division into position with almost as much precision as if on drill, and fighting his way to the crest of the hill on Brannan's right, moved forward his artillery and drove the enemy down the southern slope, inflicting on him a most terrible loss in killed and wounded. This opportune arrival of fresh troops revived the flagging spirits of our men on the right, and inspired them with new ardor for the contest. Every assault of the enemy from that time until nightfall was repulsed in the most gallant style by the whole line.
By this time the ammunition in the boxes of the men was reduced, on an average, to 2 or 3 rounds per man, and my ammunition trains having been unfortunately ordered to the rear by some unauthorized person, we should have been entirely without ammunition in a very short time had not a small supply come up with General Steedman's command. This, being distributed among the troops, gave them about 10 rounds per man.
General Garfield, chief of staff of General Rosecrans, reached this position about 4 p.m., in company with Lieutenant-Colonel Thruston, of McCook's staff, and Captains Gaw and Barker, of my staff, who had been sent to the rear to bring back the ammunition, if possible. General Garfield gave me the first reliable information that the right and center of our army had been driven, and of its condition at that time. I soon after received a dispatch from General Rosecrans, directing me to assume command of all the forces, and, with Crittenden and McCook, take a strong position and assume a threatening attitude at Rossville, sending the unorganized forces to Chattanooga for reorganization, stating that he would examine the ground at Chattanooga, and then join me; also that he had sent out rations and ammunition to meet me at Rossville.
I determined to hold the position until nightfall, if possible, in the meantime sending Captains Barker and Kellogg to distribute the ammunition, Major Lawrence, my chief of artillery, having been previously sent to notify the different commanders that ammunition would be supplied them shortly. As soon as they reported the distribution of the ammunition, I directed Captain Willard to inform the division commanders to prepare to withdraw their commands as soon as they received orders. At 5.30 p.m. Captain Barker, commanding my escort, was sent to notify General Reynolds to commence the movement, and I left the position behind General Wood's command to meet Reynolds and point out to him the position where I wished him to form line to cover the retirement of the other troops on the left.
In passing through an open woods bordering the State road, and between my last and Reynolds' position, I was cautioned by a couple of soldiers, who had been to hunt water, that there was a large force of the rebels in these woods, drawn up in line and advancing toward me. Just at this time I saw the head of Reynolds' column approaching, and calling to the general himself, directed him to form line perpendicular to the State road, changing the head of his column to the left, with his right resting on that road, and to charge the enemy, who were then in his immediate front. This movement was made with the utmost promptitude, and facing to the right while on the march, Turchin threw his brigade upon the rebel force, routing <ar50_254> them and driving them in utter confusion entirely beyond Baird's left. In this splendid advance more than 200 prisoners were captured and sent to the rear.
Colonel Robinson, commanding the Second Brigade, Reynolds' division, followed closely upon Turchin, and I posted him on the road leading through the ridge to hold the ground while the troops on our right and left passed by. In a few moments General Willich, commanding a brigade of Johnson's division, reported to me that his brigade was in position on a commanding piece of ground to the right of the Ridge road. I directed him to report to General Reynolds, and assist in covering the retirement of the troops. Turchin's brigade, after driving the enemy a mile and a half, was reassembled, and took its position on the Ridge road, with Robinson and Willich.
These dispositions being made, I sent orders to Generals Wood, Brannan, and Granger to withdraw from their positions. Johnson's and Baird's divisions were attacked at the moment of retiring, but, by being prepared, retired without confusion or any serious losses. General Palmer was also attacked while retiring. Grose's brigade was thrown into some confusion, but Cruft's brigade came off in good style, both, however, with little loss. I then proceeded to Rossville, accompanied by Generals Garfield and Gordon Granger, and immediately prepared to place the troops in position at that point. One brigade of Negley's division was posted in the gap, on the Ringgold road, and two brigades on the top of the ridge to the right of the road, adjoining the brigade in the road; Reynolds' division on the right of Negley's and reaching to the Dry Valley road; Brannan's division in the rear of Reynolds right, as a reserve; McCook's corps on the right of the Dry Valley road, and stretching toward the west, his right reaching nearly to Chattanooga Creek; Crittenden's entire corps was posted on the heights to the left of the Ringgold road, with Steedman's division of Granger's corps in reserve behind his left; Baird's division in reserve, and in supporting distance of the brigade in the gap; McCook's brigade of Granger's corps was also posted as a reserve to the brigade of Negley on the top of the ridge, to the right of the road; Minty's brigade of cavalry was on the Ringgold road, about a mile and a half in advance of the gap.
About 10 a.m. of the 21st, receiving a message from Minty that the enemy were advancing on him with a strong force of cavalry and infantry, I directed him to retire through the gap and post his command on our left flank, and throw out strong reconnoitering parties across the ridge to observe and report any movements of the enemy on our left front. From information received from citizens, I was convinced that the position was untenable in the face of the odds we had opposed to us, as the enemy could easily concentrate upon our right flank, which, if driven, would expose our center and left to be entirely cut off from our communications. I therefore advised the commanding general to concentrate the troops at Chattanooga. About the time I made the suggestion to withdraw, the enemy made a demonstration on the direct road, but were soon repulsed. In anticipation of this order to concentrate at Chattanooga, I sent for the corps commanders, and gave such general instructions as would enable them to prepare their commands for making the movement without confusion. All wagons, ambulances, and surplus artillery carnages were sent to the rear before night.
The order for the withdrawal being received about 6 p.m. the <ar50_255> movement commenced at 9 p.m., in the following order: Strong skirmish lines, under the direction of judicious officers, were thrown out to the front of each division to cover this movement, with directions to retire at daylight, deployed and in supporting distance, the whole to be supported by the First Division, Fourteenth Army Corps, under the superintendence of Major-General Rousseau, assisted by Minty's brigade of cavalry, which was to follow after the skirmishers. Crittenden's corps was to move from the hill to the left of the road at 9 p.m., followed by Steedman's division. Next Negley's division was to withdraw at 10 p.m.; then Reynolds, McCook's corps, by divisions from left to right, moving within supporting distance one after the other; Brannan's division was posted at 6 p.m. on the road about half way between Rossville and Chattanooga to cover the movement. The troops were withdrawn in a quiet, orderly manner, without the loss of a single man, and by 7 a.m. on the 22d were in their positions in front of Chattanooga, which had been assigned to them previous to their arrival, and which they now occupy, covered by strong intrenchments thrown up on the day of our arrival, and strengthened from day to day until they were considered sufficiently strong for all defensive purposes.
I respectfully refer you to the reports of division, brigade, and regimental commanders for the names of those of their respective commands who distinguished themselves. Among them I am much gratified to find the names of Col. F. Van Derveer, Thirty-fifth Ohio, commanding Third Brigade, and Col. John T. Croxton, Fourth Kentucky, commanding Second Brigade, Brannan's division, both of whom I saw on Saturday, and I can confirm the reports given of them by their division commander. Col. B. F. Scribner, Thirty-eighth Indiana, commanding First Brigade, Baird's division, was on the right of that division on Saturday morning, when it was attacked in flank by an overwhelming force of the enemy and driven back; yet Colonel Scribner was enabled to rally and reorganize it without the least difficulty, as soon as supported by Johnson's division.
All the troops under my immediate command fought most gallantly on both days, and were ably handled by their respective commanders, viz: Major-Generals Palmer and Reynolds, and Brigadier-Generals Brannan, Johnson, and Baird, on Saturday, and on Sunday, in the afternoon, in addition to the above, Maj. Gen. Gordon Granger, commanding Reserve Corps, and Brigadier-General Wood, commanding First Division, Twenty-first Army Corps, who, with two brigades of his division, under their brave commanders, Colonels Harker and Buell, most nobly sustained Brannan's left, while Brigadier-General Steedman, commanding a division of the Reserve Corps, as valiantly maintained his right. Col. Dan. McCook, commanding a brigade of the Reserve Corps, and left by General Granger near McDonald's house, in a commanding position, kept a large force of the enemy's cavalry at bay while hovering on Baird's left, and with his battery materially aided Turchin's handsome charge on the enemy, who had closed in on our left. Brigadier-General Willich, commanding a brigade of Johnson's division, on Saturday, in the attack, and especially on Sunday, nobly sustained his reputation as a soldier. Brig. Gen. John Beatty and Col. T. R. Stanley, commanding brigades of Negley's division, bravely supported Baird's left in the morning of Sunday. Colonel Stanley being struck by the fragments of a shell and disabled in the afternoon, the brigade fought with Brannan's division, under the command of Col. W. L. Stoughton, <ar50_256> Eleventh Michigan. Col. J. G. Parkhurst, commanding Ninth Michigan Volunteers, and provost-marshal Fourteenth Army Corps, at the head of his regiment, did most valuable service on the 20th, in arresting stragglers and reorganizing the troops which had been driven from the field. His report is herewith inclosed, and special reference made thereto for particulars.
I also tender my thanks to the members of my staff for the services they rendered me. To Lieut. Col. G. E. Flynt, my assistant adjutant-general; Lieut. Col. A. J. Mackay, chief quartermaster; Lieut. Col. J. R. Paul, chief commissary of subsistence, who, although not present on the field of battle, were discharging their duties in their respective departments entirely to my satisfaction. Lieut. Col. A. von Schrader, Seventy-fourth Ohio, assistant inspector-general, who rendered most efficient service as aide-de-camp during the first day's fight, and who was taken prisoner on the afternoon of the 19th while in the discharge of his duty; Maj. W. E. Lawrence, First Ohio Artillery, my chief of artillery; Capts. J.P. Willard and S.C. Kellogg, aides-de-camp; Capt. J. D. Barker, First Ohio Cavalry, commanding my escort: Capt. W. B. Gaw, chief topographical officer Fourteenth Army Corps, as also the signal officers of the corps, who did duty on the field as aides, and were of great assistance in conducting the operations of my command. Surgs. F. H. Gross, medical director, and H. C. Barrell, medical purveyor, were untiring in their efforts to relieve the wants of the wounded. Dr. Gross was wounded early in the engagement Sunday, but continued in the discharge of his duties. Capt. G. C. Moody, Nineteenth U.S. Infantry, commissary of musters, also rendered efficient service as aide-de-camp. Captain Johnson, Second Indiana Cavalry, of General Negley's staff, and Capt. T. C. Williams, Nineteenth U.S. Infantry, of General Baird's staff, having been cut off from their respective commanders, reported to me for duty, and were of great assistance as aides.
I submit herewith annexed a consolidated report of the casualties of the Fourteenth Army Corps.(*)
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 GEO. H. THOMAS,
 Major-General U.S. Volunteers, Commanding.
 Brig. Gen. JAMES A. GARFIELD,
Chief of Staff, Department of the Cumberland.
ADDENDA.
[CHATTANOOGA, TENN.,
September 30, 1863.]
 General THOMAS:
Your report says you received my dispatch of 12.15 p.m., directing you to retire on Rossville. This is an error in the hour of the dispatch. I did not leave the battle-field until after that hour, nor reach Chattanooga before 3.40 p.m.
Please have the error corrected. The first dispatch to you must have been written as late as 4.15.
 W. S. ROSECRANS.
 <ar50_257>
HEADQUARTERS FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
Chattanooga, October 3, 1863.
 Major-General ROSECRANS,
Commanding Department:
GENERAL: Your dispatch just received. I made mention of the time of receiving your dispatch on the battle-field to call attention to the fact, believing it to have been an error. I will make the correction in my forthcoming report, or in my fair copy.(*)
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 GEO. H. THOMAS,
Major-General U. S. Volunteers, Commanding.
-----
CHATTANOOGA, TENN.,
January 11, 1864--9.30 p.m.
(Received 10.50 a.m., 12th.)
 Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief:
The papers are publishing what purports to be my official report of the operations of the Fourteenth Army Corps at the battle of Chickamauga. It is not a full copy of the report which I sent in, to be forwarded to Washington, and, in addition, contains many inaccuracies.
 GEO. H. THOMAS,
Major-General.
-----
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Washington, January 12, 1864.
 Maj. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS,
Chattanooga:
GENERAL: Your telegram in regard to the newspapers publishing an incorrect version of your official report of the battle of Chickamauga is received, and I have telegraphed a brief reply. I deem it my duty to write you some additional facts in relation to the publication complained of.
Before the reports on that battle were received here the Secretary of War, from some suspicion or intimation that copies or extracts would be given clandestinely to the newspapers, directed Colonel Townsend to lock them up as soon as they arrived, and to keep the keys in his own possession till they were called for by Congress.
As no copies or extracts from your report could possibly have been obtained from these headquarters, you will form your own conclusions in regard to how and where they were obtained. It is stated that portions of these reports were telegraphed to the New York newspapers even before the originals were received at the Adjutant-General's Office here.
I will only add that I have never read or seen your report.
Truly, yours,
 H. W. HALLECK.
«17 R R--VOL XXX, PT I» <ar50_258>
WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington City, March 9, 1864.
  Maj. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS,  Chattanooga, Tenn.:
GENERAL: It is stated by a newspaper correspondent that on the 19th of January you were serenaded by the Ninth Ohio Regiment, and on that occasion declared to some of the officers of the regiment that you had praised them in your official report of the battle of Chickamauga, and then added:
I wanted to do justice to the regiment, and I cannot understand why--I feel sorry--that the War Department saw fit to curtail my report so as to leave this out.
I presume that you are aware that the only copy of your report which has yet been published was the rough draft furnished by you to Major-General Rosecrans, that officer being in great haste to make out his own report. General Rosecrans gave this rough draft which you had sent him to Mr. Villard, the correspondent of the Tribune, and it was published in that paper. The final report which you sent to Washington was, so far as I am aware, never seen by Mr. Villard. I am confident that you have not imputed to the War Department the mutilation of any official documents, but it seems proper that you should be aware of a statement which pretends to be made on the authority of your own language.
I am, general, with great regard, yours, faithfully,
 C. A. DANA.
-----
ITINERARY OF THE FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS.(*)
August 1.--Corps headquarters and Second and Third Divisions at Decherd, First Division at Cowan, and Fourth Division at University Place.
August 10.--First Division left Cowan for a point on the railroad between Anderson and Stevenson, Stanley's brigade of Second Division relieving them at Cowan.
August 16.--Second Division entire moved from Decherd to a point a little north of Stevenson.
August 17. --Third and Fourth Divisions were moved to the Sequatchie and Battle Creek Valleys.
Corps headquarters moved on the 18th from Decherd.
The positions of the divisions on the 21st stood as follows, viz: Corps headquarters at Bolivar, Ala., First Division at Anderson Station, Second Division 2 miles north of Stevenson, Third Division at Battle Creek, and Fourth Division at Jasper, operating at and near Shellmound, also in front of Chattanooga and Harrison's, which places were shelled by Colonel Wilder on the 21st.
Preparations made by the whole command to cross the Tennessee River on or about the 1st of September.



3. Thomas J. Wood
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXX/1 [S# 50] AUGUST 16-SEPTEMBER 22, 1863.--The Chickamauga Campaign.
No. 136. --Report of Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Wood, U. S. Army, commanding First Division.

[ar50_625 con't]
HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, 21ST ARMY CORPS,
Chattanooga, East Tenn., September 29, 1863.
SIR: At early dawn of the morning of Sunday, the 16th August, I received an order to move with my division from Hillsborough, in Middle Tennessee, by the most practicable and expeditious route across the Cumberland Mountains to Therman, in the Sequatchie Valley. Wednesday evening, the 19th, was the time fixed for the division to arrive at the destination assigned to it. The Second Brigade (Wagner's) had for a month previously occupied Pelham, near the foot of the mountains, and General Wagner had been ordered to repair the road up the mountains known as the Park road. As the order of movement left to my discretion the route by which my division should cross the mountains, I determined to make the ascent by the Park road, thence to Tracy City, thence by Johnson's to Purdons, whence I would fall into the road leading from McMinnville by Altamont to Therman.
Immediately on receiving the order I dispatched instructions to General Wagner to commence the ascent of the mountains, and to insure his being out of the way of the other two brigades, I directed he should continue the work of getting up his train during the night of the 16th. This was done, and early in the morning of the 17th, the road being free, the First and Third Brigades, with their baggage trains and the ammunition and supply trains of the division, began to ascend the mountains. The work was continued unintermittingly through the day and entire night of the 17th, and by 10 o'clock of the 18th the whole was up. Wagner's brigade had advanced to Tracy City Monday morning, the 17th, with orders to move forward as far as the Therman and Anderson road. On Tuesday, the 18th, I allowed the First and Third Brigades (Buell's and Harker's) to rest till 1 p.m., and then moved to Tracy City. Wagner was ordered to advance on the Therman road to Therman Wednesday morning, select a good encampment, and await my arrival there with the other two brigades and heavy trains. The distance from Tracy City to Therman is 28 miles, which had to be accomplished in one day with First and Third Brigades, their batteries, and the trains, to be at the rendezvous assigned me at the designated time.
At 4 a.m. on the 19th the march was commenced, and a little after nightfall the brigades encamped at Therman. The order for the general movement directed me to take with me ten days' subsistence «40R R--VOL XXX, PT I» <ar50_626> for the men and ten days' grain for the animals. I descended into the Sequatchie Valley with twenty-five days subsistence for the men and sixteen days' grain for the animals. I do not mention this fact in a spirit of egotism, but simply to show what can be accomplished by intelligence, good judgment, energy, and a willingness to make some sacrifice of personal comfort by commanders. Every educated and experienced soldier knows that one of the greatest drawbacks on the mobility and activity, and consequently on the offensive power of an army, is to be found in the immense baggage and supply trains which usually accompany its movements; hence, whatever lessens the number of vehicles required for the transportation of baggage and supplies by so much increases the efficiency of the army. I transported all the supplies I took into the Sequatchie Valley in the wagons originally assigned to my division for the transportation of regimental and staff baggage. I was then prepared with my division for a campaign of twenty-five days on full rations, or fifty days on half rations. The additional forage required beyond what I brought with me could have been found in the country. In conformity with the order for the general movement, I dispatched Wagner's brigade early Thursday morning, the 20th, to the eastern slope of Walden's Ridge, to make something of a show of force, and at the same time closely to observe, and if opportunity permitted, to threaten the enemy. With the other two brigades, First and Third, I remained encamped at Therman till the early morning of the 1st of September. I then moved in conformity to orders to Jasper, lower down in the valley.
Late in the afternoon of the 2d I received an order to send one of my brigades to Shellmound to cross the Tennessee River. The First Brigade was immediately put in motion under this order, and under the skillful management of Colonel Buell was thrown across the river rapidly, and without accident, during the night. Early in the morning of the 3d I moved with the Third Brigade, and the ammunition and ambulance trains, to the crossing, and with the energetic and judicious assistance of Colonel Harker had everything passed rapidly across without accident. I remained encamped at Shellmound till Saturday afternoon, the 5th, awaiting orders, the delay being occasioned by the necessity of waiting for the arrival of the supply train, which had been sent to cross the river at Bridgeport.
During the afternoon of the 5th I received an order to move, with the two brigades of my division with me, via Whiteside's and the River road, to the junction of the Nashville and Chattanooga Railway with the Trenton and Chattanooga Railroad, for the purpose of observing and threatening the enemy posted on the spur of Lookout Mountain. I advanced as far as Whiteside's Saturday afternoon and evening. Early Sunday morning I continued to advance, Harker's brigade leading. Soon very light parties of the enemy were encountered, but they rapidly fell back before my sturdy, onward movement, though the country through which my line of march led me is most favorable to a prolonged and obstinate resistance by a small force.
Crossing Raccoon Mountain, I descended into Lookout Mountain Valley, and then followed down the valley northward to the junction of the two railways. As I moved down the valley the enemy's signal stations on the crest of Lookout Mountain were in full and perfect view, evidently watching my advance, and actively communicating <ar50_627> the result of their observations to the rear. At the junction of the railways my command was about 2 to 2½ miles from the enemy's advanced works, but the outposts and pickets were much nearer to each other; in fact, in hearing distance. As I was well aware that the enemy had been able to learn from his signal stations with very close approximate correctness the strength of my command, and hence would most probably be disposed to take advantage of my inferiority of force to attempt to crush me by a sudden blow, I immediately made the best possible dispositions to foil such an effort. In making these dispositions I soon became convinced of the utter untenableness of the position at the junction of the railways for an inferior force to receive an attack from a superior one. The position is entirely open, capable of being assailed simultaneously in front, on both flanks, and in the rear. I was well satisfied that I was in the immediate proximity of a very large force of the enemy (which could be still further swelled in very short time). This information I had gained satisfactorily during my advance, and it was strengthened and corroborated during the afternoon and early evening of the 6th. At 2 p.m. I communicated to the corps commander my position, 7 miles from Chattanooga (being at the junction of the railways), informed him of my immediate proximity to the enemy, and attempted to describe briefly the obstacles which barred my farther progress to Chattanooga.
At 4 p.m. I communicated to him the result of further observations and some facts omitted in my note of 2 p.m. In my note of 2 p.m. I suggested that he should move part of the force immediately with him to cover my rear from a reverse attack. This he declined to do on the ground of a want of authority, and indicated that in case I should be attacked by a superior force, I would have to fall back on him; also indicating that if I should have to retreat, I had better do so by the Trenton road. I had already opened communication with him by that road. Not intending to retreat except as a matter of the last and direst extremity, and as the evidences continued to thicken and multiply during the evening that I would be attacked in heavy force early next morning, I determined to shift my command a mile and a half to the rear, to a very strong and highly defensible position, in which I was satisfied I could maintain myself against almost any odds for a long time, and if finally overpowered could draw off my command to the rear. From this position I could maintain my communication by the Trenton road with the force immediately with the corps commander.
The movement was commenced at 10 p.m., the 6th, and made with perfect success, though my pickets were at the time in hearing of the enemy's pickets. My command was thus safely extricated from immediate imminent danger. I learned satisfactorily during the afternoon of the 6th that the spur of Lookout Mountain was held by Cheatham's division, supported immediately in rear by Hindman's (late Withers') division, being the whole of Lieutenant-General Polk's corps. My two small brigades confronted this force.
About 8 a.m. in the morning of the 7th I received a copy of a communication addressed by the commanding general to the corps commander, saying that he thought it would be safe (judging from some indications he had obtained of the movements of the enemy) to threaten the enemy on the spur of Lookout Mountain, with a part of my force. This communication the corps commander appears to have interpreted into an order to make a reconnaissance <ar50_628> in force, and accordingly ordered that I should make such a reconnaissance without loss of time. I accordingly commenced at once to make my preparations for making the reconnaissance, and actually made it at the earliest possible moment compatible with the safety of my command and the assurance of the success of the reconnaissance itself.
As the results of the reconnaissance have hitherto been reported, I will not recapitulate them. After taking the necessary precautions to insure, as far as possible, the safety of the command to be engaged in the reconnaissance and the success of the reconnaissance, I committed the conduct of it to that gallant and accomplished officer, Colonel Harker, commanding the Third Brigade of my division. I instructed him to proceed with the utmost circumspection, but to force his command as near to the enemy's position as he might deem prudent.
This point I was, of course, compelled to submit to his judgment. It affords me the greatest satisfaction to record in a permanent official manner that Colonel Harker conducted the reconnaissance in exact conformity to my wishes and instructions. Securing well his flanks and rear from being assailed without timely notice, he drove his solid line to within some thousand yards of the enemy's batteries (and his line of skirmishers to within some 600 yards), whence twelve guns opened on him, and then drew off his command with the loss of but one man. I know no parallel in military history to this reconnaissance. My command being much jaded and worn by the labors of the several preceding days, I allowed it to rest during the 8th, but I was on the alert to gain information of the movements and designs of the enemy. Near nightfall I obtained some information which led me to suspect the enemy was evacuating Chattanooga, but the indications were by no means positive. With a view to verify, this information, I addressed a note to the corps commander, informing him that I had observed some mysterious indications on the part of the enemy, of which I proposed to compel a development by a reconnaissance in force early next morning. During the night I received a reply to my note, saying the corps commander could not approve the making of the reconnaissance on account of some indications of a general movement of the army, but that he would refer the note to the commanding general. Confidently believing the commanding general would approve my proposition to make the reconnaissance, I held my command in readiness for the movement. In the meantime General Wagner, having with him the Second Brigade of my division, had received information on the north side of the river that the enemy was evacuating Chattanooga. The information having been communicated to the commanding general of the army, an order was dispatched to me to move my command to Chattanooga, prepared for a vigorous pursuit of the enemy.
This agreeable order was joyfully obeyed, and in a very few minutes my command was in rapid motion. Between my late camp in Lookout Mountain Valley and the spur of the mountain my command was overtaken by the Ninety-second Illinois Mounted Infantry, commanded by Colonel Atkins, who informed me he had been ordered to press forward to Chattanooga with all haste, to secure any property the enemy might have left behind, and to discover something of his lines of retreat. I allowed his regiment to pass my command, but on the spur of the mountain I overtook the regiment, halted, when the colonel informed me that the enemy's skirmishers <ar50_629> outflanked his, and his farther progress was debarred. I immediately threw forward the Twenty-sixth Ohio, Lieutenant-Colonel Young commanding, to the right and higher up the mountain side than the skirmishers of Colonel Atkins extended, and rapidly drove the enemy's skirmishers from the mountain side. No further opposition was encountered in occupying Chattanooga, and the Ninety-second Illinois pushed rapidly into the town, followed by my First and Third Brigades. The Second Brigade crossed from the north side of the river during the afternoon and evening of the 9th.
The colors of the Ninety-seventh Ohio, of the Second Brigade of my division, were the first planted on the works of Chattanooga, having been brought across the river by a few men in a small boat early in the morning. Thus was this great strategic position, the long-sought goal, gained to us and occupied by our troops. Placing myself as soon as possible after the occupation in communication with the most intelligent and reliable citizens, I learned that a portion of the enemy's troops had retreated by the Cove road, and that the remainder, with the baggage and material of war, had retreated by the Rossville and La Fayette road. I was informed further, that Buckner's command, which had been posted at Tyner's Station on the railway, had retreated by Johnson toward Ringgold, but I subsequently learned he did not go so far eastward as Ringgold, but passed through Graysville and thence to La Fayette. The bulk of these facts I reported to the commander of the corps immediately on his arrival, and by him I am informed they were communicated to the commanding general.
My division remained in Chattanooga till the morning of the 10th. I then received an order to detail one brigade to occupy the town, and move with the other two in pursuit of the enemy by the Rossville and Ringgold road. The Second Brigade was detailed to remain in Chattanooga. At 10 a.m. of the 10th I led the First and Third Brigades out of Chattanooga to commence the pursuit of the enemy. At 2 p.m. of that day I advised the corps commander of the reported presence of a considerable force on my right flank, and at 7 p.m. I further advised him that I had taken a contraband during the late afternoon, who reported the bulk of the rebel army, with General Bragg in person, at Gordon's Mills on the Chickamauga where it is crossed by the Rossville and La Fayette road. I was incredulous of the story, and so expressed myself; but if true, it was so important it should be known that I deemed it my duty to report his narrative. It is due to the humble person who furnished me this invaluable information to record that subsequent developments proved his report to be singularly accurate and correct. Based on my note of 7.30 p.m. of the 10th, a communication was sent me by the commanding general to send a brigade by the way of Rossville to make a reconnaissance in the direction of Gordon's Mills with a view to verifying the truth of the contraband's report. The order was received at early daylight of the morning of the 11th. Colonel Harker's brigade was immediately sent to execute this service. About the time Harker's brigade was moving the corps commander arrived at my camp. I was directed by him to move forward with my remaining brigade 2 miles on the Ringgold road and then to await further orders. The order was obeyed. At 3.30 p.m., while awaiting further instructions, I received an order from the commanding general to move across the country, by the shortest and most expeditious <ar50_630> route, to the Rossville and La Fayette road to support Colonel Harker. Near the same hour I received a note from Colonel Harker, informing me that he had been driving the enemy all day and had arrived within 3 miles of Gordon's Mills.
I immediately sent him an order to press forward to the mills, and informing him that I would make a junction with him during the evening. The junction was made and fortunately, for Harker had been driving his little brigade all day against a vastly superior force, the rear guard of the enemy's great army. A full report of this brilliant and dangerous reconnaissance has been already made, and it is not now necessary that I should say more than that it was superbly made. When I arrived at Gordon's Mills, at 8.30 p.m. of the 11th, the enemy's camp fires could be distinctly seen on the other side of the creek. Their light, reflected over a wide section of the horizon, and, extending upward on the heavens, told that the foe was present in considerable force.
It was my intention to continue the pursuit early next morning, the 12th, but till 8 a.m. the atmosphere was so loaded with haze, fog, and smoke that it was difficult to see a hundred yards in advance. While I was waiting for the atmosphere to became sufficiently clear to continue the pursuit, I received an order to remain at Gordon's Mills till the corps commander arrived there with the other two divisions of the corps. This was done during the afternoon of the 12th. My two brigades remained quiet during the 13th, enjoying much-needed rest.
During the evening of the 13th a copy of a letter of instructions from the commanding general to the corps commander was furnished me by the latter, in which he was directed to leave my command at Gordon's Mills and proceed with the other two divisions to a position on Missionary Ridge, with a view of facilitating the concentration with the other corps of the army. My orders directed me to try stoutly to maintain the position at Gordon's Mills, but if attacked by a superior force, to fallback slowly, resisting stoutly, to Rossville, where it was supposed I would be supported by Major-General Granger's force. In case of extremity, and in case also I should not be supported by General Granger at Rossville, I was directed to select a position guarding the roads leading to Chattanooga and around the point of Lookout Mountain, and hold them at all hazards.
Resolved to make the most stubborn resistance at Gordon's Mills, I took advantage of the creek, a very strong defensible feature in the position, and barricaded my entire front and flanks strongly. So strengthened, I could have successfully resisted a front attack of a vastly superior force. With the exception of an occasional firing on my pickets, the enemy left him undisturbed at Gordon's Mills till between 11 a.m. and 12 m. of Friday, the 18th instant. A rapid advance of his light troops, supported by troops in a solid line, on my right front drove in my pickets as far as the creek, but no effort was made to pass the stream. Such an attempt would have been foiled and cost the enemy dearly.
At about 1 p.m. a force, apparently about a brigade of four regiments, emerged from the wood on the southern side of the creek, nearly opposite the center of my position, apparently with the intention of forcing a passage at the ford near the mills. A few well-directed shots from Bradley's battery soon forced him to relinquish this design and seek the shelter of the woods. The enemy continued <ar50_631> to hover in my front during the whole afternoon, making however no serious attempts, and accordingly I became reasonably satisfied that his demonstrations were only a mask to his real design, that of passing a heavy force across the creek lower down, with a view of turning our left and cutting off our communication with Chattanooga.
I communicated my opinion on this point to the commanding general at his headquarters during the evening of the 18th. It was verified by the opening of a terrific engagement on our left as early as 8.30 a.m. on the 19th. Troops had been moved to our left during the night of the 18th to meet the emergency. The battle continued throughout the forenoon and into the afternoon, but my command was left at Gordon's Mills until 3 p.m.
At this hour, I received a verbal order from the corps commander through one of his staff to move with my command and take position, as well as I now remember, on the right of some part of General Van Cleve's division. Throughout the entire preceding part of the day I had distinctly observed a considerable force in front of my position at Gordon's Mills, and just before I received the order to move into action a contraband came into my lines, from whom I learned that this force was the division of General Bushrod R. Johnson. Knowing it would pass the creek immediately I vacated my position, if it should not be occupied by some other troops, I dispatched one of my aides-de-camp to the commanding general, to inform him of the presence of this force in my front, and to suggest that at least a brigade should be sent to occupy the position as soon as I should vacate it. On his way to the headquarters of the commanding general my aide-de-camp encountered Major-General McCook, to whom he communicated the object of his mission to headquarters. General McCook immediately ordered a brigade from his corps to move into position at Gordon's Mills. My aide-de-camp rode on to headquarters and reported what had been done to the commanding general, who approved the dispositions. No delay, however, had occurred on this account in the movement of my command from Gordon's Mills.
Immediately on the receipt of this order my command was put in rapid motion for the scene of the great conflict.
As already remarked, the order directed me to take position on the right of General Van Cleve's command, but as I was totally ignorant of his position in the battle, and met no one on my arrival on the field to enlighten me, I found myself much embarrassed for the want of information whereby I could bring my command judiciously and effectively into action. It should be borne in mind that many of the troops were engaged in the woods, and that it was next to impossible to gain information by sight of the arrangement of the troops already engaged. This information could only be given by general and staff officers, posted in advance to aid in bringing the troops arriving freshly on the ground into action properly. Fortunately, shortly after my arrival on the field I met General Davis, from whom I received some useful information in regard to the status of the conflict. From him I learned that his left brigade (Heg's) was sorely pressed and needed assistance. While I was in conference with him a staff officer informed him that Colonel Heg reported that he could not maintain his position, and at the same instant I saw a stream of fugitives pouring out of the woods, across the Rossville and La Fayette road and over the field to the west of it. These, I <ar50_632> learned, belonged to Heg's brigade, of Davis' division. It was evident a crisis was at hand. The advance of the enemy, before which these men were retiring, must be checked at once, or the army would be cut in twain.
Desiring Major Mendenhall, of the corps commander's staff, who chanced to be near me at the moment, to go and rally the fugitives rushing across the field on the west of the road, I at once commenced my dispositions to check the advancing foe. When I first met General Davis on the field I had inquired of him where the fight was. He pointed into the woods, whence the roar and rattle of a very sharp musketry fire resounded, and told me that Heg's brigade was heavily engaged in there. I immediately directed Colonel Harker to form his brigade in battle array nearly parallel to the Rossville and La Fayette road, advance into the woods, and engage the enemy. But the evidence immediately brought to my notice that Heg's brigade was retiring, made a change in this disposition necessary. I consequently directed Colonel Harker to throw forward his right, holding his left as a pivot on the road, thus giving his line an oblique direction to the road, and then advance his whole line. By this disposition I hoped to be able to take the enemy's advancing force in flank. These dispositions, though most expeditiously made, were scarcely completed when a staff officer rode up and reported that the enemy had gained the road and was advancing up it, i.e., in the direction of Gordon's Mills.
This information rendered necessary a further change in the arrangement of Harker's brigade. I ordered him to refuse his left, which brought the left half of his line at right angles with the road and gave to his whole front the form of a broken line, with the apex toward the enemy. In this shape he advanced rapidly, engaged the enemy and drove him between a half and three-fourths of a mile. I followed his advance nearly half a mile, and finding he was doing well, as well as having perfect confidence in his ability to handle his brigade, I remarked to him that I would leave him and go to look after my other brigade, Colonel Buell commanding, which had followed Harker's to the field of battle. For the details of the severe conflict through which Harker's brigade passed in this stage of the battle, for an account of the valuable services it rendered in checking the force which threatened to cut the right of the army from the left, for a report of the heavy loss of gallant officers and men which occurred here, and for a description of the skillful manner in which the brigade was extricated from the perils by which it became environed from encountering in its advance a vastly superior force, I must refer to the more detailed report of the brigade commander. The list of casualties attests the severity of the fighting. The gallant commander himself had 2 horses shot under him. Bradley's battery, attached to Harker's brigade, owing to the density of the woods into which the brigade advanced, did not accompany it. The signal service which this battery rendered at a little later period of the action will be chronicled at the proper time. Leaving Harker's brigade, I returned to where I had ordered Colonel Buell to halt and form his brigade.
When I first met General Davis on the field of battle I was informed by him that Carlin's brigade, of his division, was hotly engaged in the woods in advance or eastward of the corn-field in which our meeting occurred. The sharp and quick rattle of musketry fully assured the correctness of the statement. Seeing no other reserves <ar50_633> at hand, and assured that both Harker and Carlin were severely engaged, I determined to hold Buell's brigade in hand to meet emergencies. And it was fortunate I did so, for ere long Carlin's brigade was swept back out of the woods, across the corn-field and into the woods beyond the field on the western side of the road, carrying everything away with it. When I observed the rush across the cornfield I was near the One hundredth Illinois.
With a view of checking an exultant enemy, I ordered Colonel Bartleson, commanding One hundredth Illinois, to fix bayonets and charge the foe. The bayonets were promptly fixed, and the regiment had just commenced to advance, when it was struck by a crowd of fugitives and swept away in the general mélange. The whole of Buell's brigade was thus carried off its feet. It was necessary for it to fall back across the narrow field on the western side of the road to the edge of the woods, under whose cover it rallied. As soon as possible it was formed along the fence separating the field from the woods, and with the aid of a part of Carlin's brigade, and a regiment of Wilder's brigade, dismounted there, repulsed the enemy. This result was greatly contributed to by the heavy and most effective fire, at short range, of Bradley's and Estep's batteries. At this critical moment these two batteries were most splendidly served. The narrow field separating the woods on the west from the Rossville and La Fayette road is scarcely 200 paces wide. Buell's brigade was formed just east of the road when it was struck by Carlin's brigade. It, hence, had to retire but the distance of less than 200 yards to get the shelter of the woods for reforming. But in crossing this narrow space it suffered terribly. The killed and wounded were thickly strewn on the ground. Captain George, Fifteenth Indiana, of my staff, was struck by a ball by my side and knocked from his horse. So soon as the enemy was repulsed, I addressed myself to reforming Buell's brigade, for the purpose of advancing it to recover the lost ground.
Order being restored and a sufficiently solid formation acquired to warrant an advance, I led the brigade back in person, and reoccupied the ground from which it had been forced--the site on which it had been originally formed. In this advance my horse was twice shot, the second time proving fatal. I dismounted one of my orderlies near me and took his horse.
In this advance a portion of Carlin's brigade participated, led by General Carlin. Estep's battery, attached to Buell's brigade, accompanied the advance. Scarcely had the lost ground been repossessed than the enemy emerged from the woods on the eastern side of the corn-field, and commenced to cross it. He was formed in two lines, and advanced firing. The appearance of his force was large. Fortunately re-enforcements were at hand. A compact brigade of Sheridan's division, not hitherto engaged, was at the moment crossing the field in the rear of the position then occupied by Buell's brigade and the portion of Carlin's. This fresh brigade advanced handsomely into action, and joining its fire to that of the other troops, most materially aided in repelling a most dangerous attack. But this was not done until considerable loss had been inflicted on us. The enemy advanced near enough to cut down so many horses in Estep's battery that he could not bring off his guns; but as our infantry held its ground, they did not fall into the hands of the enemy. After the attack had been repelled some of the men of the brigade of Sheridan's division kindly drew the pieces to the ravine, or rather dip in the <ar50_634> ground, in rear of the ridge on which the battery was posted, where Captain Estep retook possession of them. For this act of soldierly fraternity and kindness I desire publicly and officially to return my thanks and those of my division to the troops who rendered it, and I regret that I do not know the number of the brigade and the name of its commander, that I might more distinctly signalize them in my report.
The day was now far spent; in truth, it was near sunset. No further serious demonstration was made by the enemy on our immediate front. The troops were posted in a strong position to resist a night attack, the brigade of Sheridan's division and Buell's brigade being in juxtaposition, the former on the right and the latter on the left. Harker's brigade was held as a reserve in the edge of the woods on the western side of the road, and Bradley's battery was posted near to it, covering the troops in the front line.
Just after nightfall a sharp fire ran along the line, caused by some movement of the enemy, which at first was taken for an advance, but in the end proved to be nothing more than a picket demonstration. Jaded, worn, and thirsty, the men lay down on their arms to pass a cheerless, comfortless night on the battle-field.
It affords me much pleasure here to record a Samaritan deed rendered to my division during the night by Colonel Harrison, of the Thirty-ninth Indiana and a part of his mounted regiment. The men were very thirsty, but the distance to water was so great that but few could hope to get permission to go for it. During the night Colonel Harrison brought to us some 400 canteens of good water. They were distributed among my men as equitably as possible, and proved the cooling drop to the thirsty soldiers.
Estep's battery was refitted during the night and was ready for service the next morning.
Between midnight and daylight of the morning of the 20th I received an order to move my command to a position on the slope of Missionary Ridge, to be held there as part of the reserve of the army in the coming conflict of the morning. The movement was quietly and successfully made. In the early morning I was directed to move my division eastward from the slope of Missionary Ridge and take the position hitherto occupied by Negley's division, keeping my left in constant communication with General Branan's right. Colonel Barnes' brigade, of Van Cleve's division, was ordered to report to me for service during the day. Placing his brigade on the left, Harker's in the center, and Buell's on the right (the whole formed in two lines, the front one deployed, the second one in double column closed en masse, with their batteries following and supporting), I advanced my command and occupied the position assigned. In doing so I met with no opposition from the enemy. I was instructed not to invite an attack, but to be prepared to repel any effort of the enemy. In throwing out skirmishers to cover my front I aroused the enemy, and had quite a sharp affair with him. By a very imprudent advance of his regiment, done without an order, Colonel Bartleson (moving himself in advance of his troops) was shot from his horse, and either killed or very severely wounded; it was impossible to decide which, on account of the proximity of the place where he fell to the enemy's lines. He was an accomplished and gallant officer, and a high-toned, pure-minded gentleman. His loss is a serious disadvantage to his regiment and to the service.
The position my command then occupied closed the gap in our <ar50_635> lines between Sheridan's left and Brannan's right. Although I had not been at all seriously engaged at any time during the morning, I was well satisfied the enemy was in considerable force in my immediate front. Consequently I was extremely vigilant. Such was the status of the battle in my immediate vicinity when I received the following order:
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
September 20--10.45 a.m.
Brigadier-General WOOD,
Commanding Division, &c.:
The general commanding directs that you close up on Reynolds as fast as possible, and support him.
Respectfully, &c.,
FRANK S. BOND,
 Major, and Aide-de-Camp.
I received the order about 11 o'clock. At the moment of its receipt I was a short distance in rear of the center of my command. General McCook was with me when I received it. I informed him that I would immediately carry it into execution, and suggested that he should close up his command rapidly on my right to prevent the occurrence of a gap in our lines. He said he would do so, and immediately rode away. I immediately dispatched my staff officers to the brigade commanders with the necessary orders, and the movement was at once begun. Reynolds' division was posted on the left of Brannan's division, which, in turn, was on the left of the position I was just quitting. I had consequently to pass my command in rear of Brannan's division to close up on and go in to the support of Reynolds.
So soon as I had got the command well in motion, I rode forward to find General Reynolds and learn where and how it was desired to bring my command into action. I did not find General Reynolds, but in my search for him I met General Thomas, to whom I communicated the order I had received from the commanding general, and desired to know where I should move my command to support General Reynolds. General Thomas replied that General Reynolds did not need support, but that I had better move to the support of General Baird, posted on our extreme left, who needed assistance. I exhibited my order to him, and asked whether he would take the responsibility of changing it. He replied he would, and I then informed him I would move my command to the support of General Baird. I requested General Thomas to furnish me a staff officer who could conduct me to General Baird, which he did. Taking this staff officer with me, I rode at once to Barnes' brigade and directed the staff officer to conduct it to and report it to General Baird. I then rode to the other two brigades for the purpose of following with them in the rear of Barnes' brigade to the assistance of General Baird. When I rejoined them I found the valley south of them swarming with the enemy.
It appears that when I moved my command to go to the support of General Reynolds, the gap thus made in our lines was not closed by the troops on my right, and that the enemy poured through it very soon in great force. The head of his column struck the right of Buell's brigade, and cutting off a portion of it, forced it over the adjacent ridge, whence it retired, as I have subsequently learned, with the vast mass of fugitives from the troops on our extreme right toward Rossville. In moving to the support of General Reynolds, <ar50_636> naturally following the shortest route, I moved through the woods. My two batteries, Estep's and Bradley's, could not follow their brigades through the woods, and consequently were compelled to make a short détour to the left to get into the open fields on the slope of the ridge, intending to move thence parallel to their brigades. But they were caught in this movement by the rapidly advancing columns of the enemy. Estep's guns were captured (in the neighborhood as I understand of infantry on the right, which might have supported him if it had stood), while Bradley's battery, more fortunate, succeeded in getting over the ridge and drew off toward Rossville with the tide of fugitives setting strongly in that direction.
For further details in regard to the movements of these batteries at this stage of the action, I must refer to the reports of Captains Bradley and Estep.
I will only remark that while their movements did not occur under my immediate observation, but took place beyond the reach of my infantry support, I am fully satisfied from all I have learned that neither Captains Bradley nor Estep can be censured for what occurred. When I discovered the enemy in force in the valley south of my command, I at once divined his intention, and appreciated the terrible hazard to our army and the necessity for prompt action. His object was clear.
Having turned our right and separated a portion of our forces from the main body, he was seeking the rear of our solid line of battle, to attack it in reverse, hoping thus to cut our communication with Chattanooga and capture and destroy the bulk of our army. I had with me at the time but one brigade (Harker's) and a portion of Buell's. I immediately formed a line across the valley facing southward, determined, if possible, to check the advance of the enemy. He was in full and plain view in the open fields, and it was evident his force far outnumbered mine. But I felt that this was no time for comparing numbers· The enemy, at all hazards, must be checked. I was without the support of artillery and knew I had to depend alone on the musket. I formed my line in a skirt of woods reaching across the valley. In front of me was the open fields across which the enemy was advancing. It was a matter of great importance to get possession of the fence which bounded this field on the northern side. My line was some 150 or 200 yards from the fence on the north of it, while the enemy's lines were perhaps as much as 350 yards south of it. In person I ordered the One hundred and twenty-fifth Ohio, Colonel Opdycke commanding, to advance and seize the fence· There was a momentary hesitation in the regiment to go forward. Its gallant colonel immediately rode in front of the center of his regiment, and taking off his hat, called on his men to advance. His regiment gallantly responded by a prompt advance, as men ever will under the inspiration of such leadership. The regiment quickly lined the fence, whence a sharp fire was opened on the enemy. Soon the Sixty-fourth Ohio, Colonel McIlvain commanding, followed and formed along the fence on the left of the One hundred and twenty-fifth Ohio.
This bold and rapid offensive movement seemed to take the enemy by surprise and disconcert his movements, for his hitherto advancing lines halted. The other regiments, Sixty-fifth Ohio and Third Kentucky (Major Brown commanding the former and Colonel Dunlap the latter), of Harker's brigade, with the Fifty-eighth Indiana, <ar50_637> of Colonel Buell's brigade, Lieutenant-Colonel Embree commanding, were formed on the right of the One hundred and twenty-fifth Ohio, higher up the fence and on a hill dominating the field in which the enemy had halted. The One hundred and twenty-fifth and Sixty-fourth Ohio again advanced, and took position behind a copse of woods near the center of the field, the now debatable ground of the contending bodies.
The movements of the enemy at this moment were so singular, and his blurred and greasy and dusty uniform so resembled our own when travel-stained, coupled with the fact that it was expected a part of McCook's command would come from that direction (the terrible disaster to his force on the right not then being known to us), that for a few minutes the impression prevailed and the cry ran along the line that the troops in front of us were our own. I ordered the firing to cease, the thought of firing on our comrades in arms being too horrible to contemplate. In a few moments, however, the delusion was dispelled, the enemy commencing to advance again in a way that left no doubt of his identity, for he advanced firing on us. I do not mention this singular mistake on account of its possessing any particular importance per se, but rather to record it as an instance of the strange delusions that sometimes occur on the battle-field without any sufficient cause and without the possibility of a reasonable explanation. This mistake was the more remarkable as the enemy was probably not more than 300, certainly not over 350 yards distant, and was halted in a broad open field. But for the mistake we could have punished him most severely at the time he was halted. The hour was now about high noon; possibly it may have been as late as 12.30 p.m. When the One hundred and twenty-fifth and Sixty-fourth Ohio advanced to the copse in the open field, I ordered Colonel Opdycke to line the southern side of the copse with skirmishers, with a view of annoying and delaying the progress of the enemy. As he advanced, he inclined to his left, evidently with the intention of outflanking my line and turning my right. This movement of the enemy made it necessary I should gain a position in which I could form a shorter and more compact line, in which my right would be more protected by natural obstacles.
I accordingly retired my command to a narrow and short ridge which shoots out nearly at right angles as a spur from the general ridge which is parallel to the Rossville and La Fayette road. The short and narrow ridge extends athwart the valley in a nearly east-and-west course. The abruptness of the declivity on either side of it almost gives to this ridge the quality of a natural parapet. Troops holding it could load and fire behind it out of reach of the enemy's fire, and then advance to the crest of it to deliver a plunging fire on the advancing foe. In addition there was a moral effect in its command over the ground south of it which inspired the courage of the troops holding it. Here I determined to make an obstinate and stubborn stand. When General Brannan's right was turned (by the opening of the gap in our lines by the movement of my division to support General Reynolds), he had been compelled to fall back to the general ridge inclosing, on the west, the valley in which the great battle was fought, which ridge, as already remarked, runs nearly parallel to the Rossville and La Fayette road. When I took position with Harker's brigade on the narrow ridge extending partially across the valley, General Brannan formed his command <ar50_638> on my right and higher up on the main ridge, thus giving to our united lines something of the shape of an irregular crescent, with the concavity toward the enemy. This disposition gave us a converging fire on the attacking column. Colonel Buell formed his command with General Brannan's. When my arrangements in this position were concluded it was probably 1 p.m. or a little after.
The enemy did not leave us long in the quiet possession of our new position. Soon a most obstinate and determined attack was made, which was handsomely repulsed. Similar attacks were continued at intervals throughout the entire afternoon. To describe each one in detail would be unnecessary and only add useless prolixity to my report. But I deem it proper to signalize one of these attacks specially. It occurred about 4 o clock, and lasted about 30 minutes. It was unquestionably the most terrific musketry duel I have ever witnessed. Harker's brigade was formed in two lines. The regiments were advanced to the crest of the ridge alternately, and delivered their fire by volley at the command, retiring a few paces behind it after firing to reload. The continued roar of the very fiercest musketry fire inspired a sentiment of grandeur in which the awful and the sublime were intermingled. But the enemy was repulsed in this fierce attack, and the crest of the ridge was still in our possession.
Finally the evening shades descended and spread the drapery of moonlight over the hardly contested field. The battle ceased, and my command still held the position it had taken about 1 o'clock, maintaining with glorious courage a most unequal contest in point of numbers. But our inferiority of strength did not appall my men. Their courage and steadfast resolution rose with the occasion. I do not believe that history affords an instance of a more splendid resist-ante than that made by Harker's brigade and a portion of Buell's brigade, from 1 p.m. on the 20th to nightfall. A part of the contest was witnessed by that able and distinguished commander, Major-General Thomas. I think it must have been near to 2 o'clock when he came to where my command was so hotly engaged. His presence was most welcome. The men saw him, felt they were battling under the eye of a great chieftain, and their courage and resolution received fresh inspiration from the consciousness.
At a most opportune hour in the afternoon, probably between 2 and 3 o'clock, Major-General Granger arrived on the field with two brigades of fresh troops of the division of General Steedman. They were brought into action on the right of General Brannan (who was on my right). and rapidly drove the enemy before them. This movement very considerably relieved the pressure on my front. The gallant bearing of General Granger during the whole of this most critical part of the contest was a strong re-enforcement. It affords me much pleasure to signalize the presence with my command for a length of time during the afternoon (present during the period of the hottest fighting) of another distinguished officer. Brigadier-General Garfield, chief of staff. After the disastrous rout on the right, General Garfield made his way back to the battle-field (showing thereby that the road was open to all who might choose to follow it to where duty called), and came to where my command was engaged.
The brigade which made so determined a resistance on the crest of the narrow ridge during all that long September afternoon had been commanded by General Garfield when he belonged to my division. <ar50_639> The men remarked his presence with much satisfaction, and were delighted that he was a witness of the splendid fighting they were doing.
Early in the afternoon my command was joined by portions of two regiments belonging to Van Cleve's division, the Seventeenth Kentucky, Colonel Stout commanding, and the Forty-fourth Indiana, Lieutenant-Colonel Aldrich commanding. The fact that these parts of regiments, preserving the form of a regimental organization, did not leave the field after this disaster on the right, where so many other troops fled from the contest, is certainly most creditable to them.
The fact also affords very just ground for the inference that if a more determined effort had been made by the officers, many other regiments that left the field might have been kept on it. The remains of the two regiments most nobly and gallantly aided my command in repulsing the repeated attacks of the enemy. The Forty-fourth Indiana bore itself with special gallantry.
I should do injustice to my feelings were I to omit to record my testimony to the splendid resistance made on my right by General Brannan and his command. It was the ne plus ultra of defensive fighting.
About 7 p.m. I received an order from General Thomas to withdraw my command from the field and retire to Rossville. The order was executed without noise, without confusion, and without disaster. My command left the field, not because it was beaten, but in obedience to an order. With a fresh supply of ammunition it could have renewed the contest next morning. And here I can appropriately return my thanks to Major-General Granger for a timely supply of ammunition given me during the afternoon, when that in the car-tridge-boxes and men's pockets was reduced to 2 or 3 rounds per man, and when the prospect of being reduced to the bayonet alone as a means of defense seemed inevitable. My own ammunition train had been carried off by the rout from the right. My command reached Rossville about 10 p.m., where it bivouacked for the night.
Early next morning, the 21st, in obedience to orders, I took a strong position on Missionary Ridge. Strong barricades against an infantry assault were at once made. During the day there was some light firing on my picket front, but nothing serious. The enemy was, however, evidently in considerable force in my front.
At 10 p.m. of the 21st my command, in obedience to orders, left its position on Missionary Ridge and withdrew to this place.
Early Tuesday morning, the 22d, it occupied its present position in the line of defenses, and has since been most constantly and actively engaged in strengthening them.
To the officers and men of my command I return my thanks for their gallant bearing, soldierly conduct, and steadfast courage, exhibited both in the contest of Saturday, the 19th, and Sunday, the 20th. Their conduct on both days deserves all praise, and I commend it to the consideration of the commanding general. There were undoubtedly instances of individual misconduct, which deserve reprehension, but as a whole the behavior of the command was most satisfactory.
Of the numerous killed and wounded I would gladly speak by name, but the list is too numerous. To do so would extend my report beyond all reasonable compass. I can only here express my sincere condolence with the relatives and friends of the gallant dead <ar50_640> and wounded. The regiments and batteries in my command represented the States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Kentucky. The citizens of these great and loyal States have much cause to be proud of their representatives in the late great conflict. They may safely trust their honor and the public weal to such representatives. For the special commendation by name of the more subordinate officers and men who distinguished themselves, I must refer the commanding general to the reports of my brigade commanders, Colonels Harker and Buell, with their accompanying documents, the sub-reports of regimental commanders.
Where so great a portion of my command behaved well, it is difficult to distinguish officers by name, and perhaps may be regarded as making an invidious distinction. Nevertheless, I consider it my duty, on account of their distinguished services, to commend to the notice of the commanding general Colonel Dunlap, commanding Third Kentucky; Colonel McIlvain, commanding Sixty-fourth Ohio; Colonel Opdycke, commanding One hundred and twenty-fifth Ohio, and Captain Bradley, commanding Sixth Ohio Battery.
I desire to commend Colonel Opdycke, especially, to the favorable consideration of the commanding general. The record of his regiment (a comparatively new one and never before in a general engagement) in the late battle will, I am sure, compare most favorably with that of the most veteran regiments engaged. The credit is mainly due to the colonel commanding. His untiring zeal and devoted attention to his regiment has brought forth fruit worthy of his efforts. I commend him to the commanding general as an officer capable and worthy of commanding a brigade.
Colonel Buell, commanding the First Brigade of my division, has exercised this command about three months. He bore himself with great gallantry on the field both on Saturday, the 19th, and Sunday, the 20th. With a little more experience he would make an excellent brigadier-general, and should receive the promotion.
In my report of the battle of Stone's River I especially signalized the services of Colonel Harker, commanding the Third Brigade of my division, and earnestly recommended him for promotion, both as a reward for his merits and as an act of simple justice. In the late campaign he has peculiarly distinguished himself. He made two of the most daring and brilliant reconnaissances during the campaign-reconnaissances almost without a parallel in the annals of warfare; and his personal gallantry on the battle-field, the skillful manner in which he handled his brigade, holding it so well together when so many other troops broke, and his general good conduct, are beyond all praise. To speak of his services in the language of what I conceive to be just encomium might be considered fulsome praise. I earnestly recommend him for immediate promotion to the rank of brigadier-general.
Returns herewith submitted show that I went into action on Saturday with an effective force of men and officers of 2,965. The return of casualties shows that my command lost in killed and wounded, absolutely known to be such, 844, and in killed, wounded, and missing, 1,035. Taking the number of the killed and wounded actually known, it will be found to be 28.80 per cent. of the effective force with which I went into action. But it is fair to presume as we retired from the field Sunday evening, that many of the 191 reported missing were either killed or wounded, and that their bodies fell into <ar50_641> the hands of the enemy. Taking the number of the killed, wounded, and missing it will be found to be 34.90 per cent. of my whole command. These figures show an almost unparalleled loss. They attest the severity of the conflicts through which my command passed on the 19th and 20th. The record of its participation in the great battle of the Chickamauga is written in blood.
Before closing my report I deem it my duty to bring to the notice of the commanding general certain facts which fell under my observation during the progress of the conflict on the 20th. As I was moving along the valley with my command to the support of General Reynolds, in conformity with the order of the commanding general, I observed on my left (to the west of me) a force posted high up on the ridge. I inquired what force it was, and was informed it was a part (a brigade, perhaps) of General Negley's division. I was informed that General Negley was with this force in person. I remember distinctly seeing a battery on the hillside with the troops. At the time it was certainly out of the reach of any fire from the enemy. This was between 11 and 12 o'clock in the day. A little later in the day, perhaps half or three-fourths of an hour, when I became severely engaged, as already described, with the large hostile force that had pierced our lines and turned Brannan's right, compelling him to fall back, I looked for the force which I had seen posted on the ridge, and which, as already remarked, I had been informed was a part of General Negley's division; hoping, if I became severely pressed, it might re-enforce me, for I was resolved to check the enemy, if possible. But it had entirely disappeared. Whither it had gone I did not then know, but was informed later in the day it had retired toward Rossville, and this information, I believe, was correct. By whose order this force retired from the battle-field I do not know, but of one fact I am perfectly convinced, that there was no necessity for its retiring. It is impossible it could have been at all seriously pressed by the enemy at the time; in fact I think it extremely doubtful whether it was engaged at all.
Near sundown of the 20th I met General John Beatty not far from where I had fought the enemy all the afternoon. He was entirely alone when I met him and did not seem to have any special command. I at once came to the conclusion that he had not retired from the battle-field when the bulk of the division he is attached to did. At the moment I met him I was engaged halting some troops that were crossing the valley north and west of my position, and who appeared to have straggled away from the front on which General Thomas' command had fought all day. General Beatty desired to know where I wished these troops reformed. I pointed out a position to him and desired him to reform them, which he said he would do. I then rode back to my command. It is proper that I should remark that I did not see the corps commander from about 9.30 a.m. of Sunday, the 20th, to some time after sunrise of the 21st, when I met him at Rossville.
The officers of my staff performed their duties well in the late arduous campaign, as well on the march and in camp as on the battle-field. I deem it due to them to record their names in my official report, and to thank them individually for their valuable assistance and co-operation. Capt. M.P. Bestow, assistant adjutant-general; Lieut. J. L. Yaryan, Fifty-eighth Indiana, aide-de-camp; Lieut. George Shaffer, Ninety-third Ohio, aide-de-camp; Lieut. Col. T. R. Palmer, «41 R R--VOL XXX, PT I» <ar50_642> Thirteenth Michigan, inspector-general; Surg. W. W. Blair, medical director; Capt. L. D. Myers, assistant quartermaster; Capt. James McDonald, commissary of subsistence; Capt. William McLoughlin, Thirteenth Michigan, topographical engineer; Capt. J. E. George, Fifteenth Indiana, assistant commissary of musters; Lieut. P. Haldeman, Third Kentucky, ordnance officer; Capt. M. Keiser, Sixty-fourth Ohio, provost-marshal up to the occupation of Chattanooga, when his leg was accidentally broken, since which time his duties have been well performed by Lieutenant Ehlers, of the same regiment; Capt. Cullen Bradley, Sixth Ohio Battery, who, in addition to commanding his own battery, ably performed the duties of chief of artillery.
It affords me much pleasure to mention in my official report the true courage and faithful devotion exhibited throughout the entire conflict by two members of my personal escort. Early in the conflict of Sunday my color-bearer was wounded. The colors were then taken by Sergt. Samuel W. Goodridge, Company A, One hundredth Illinois, who bore aloft my standard through the remainder of the day, remaining with me all the time. Private Robert Lemon, Company I, Fifty-eighth Indiana, a member of my escort, rode immediately in rear of me through the whole conflict of Sunday, the 20th. Whenever I called, this brave and devoted boy, a youth of not more than sixteen or seventeen years of age, responded.
I have the honor to forward herewith as accompaniments to my report: First, official report of Colonel Harker, commanding Third Brigade (with sub-reports of regimental commanders), marked A; second, official report of Colonel Buell, commanding First Brigade (with sub-reports of regimental commanders), marked B; third, return of effective force taken into action on the 10th September, 1863, marked C; fourth, return of casualties in the battles of the 10th and 20th, marked D; fifth, map showing the various positions of command in the battles of the 19th and 20th, marked E.
I cannot conclude my report of the participation of my command in the great battle of the Chickamauga--a battle in which the fate of the proud Army of the Cumberland hung trembling in the balance; in truth, a battle in whose result the great nation's life seemed involved--without returning thanks to Almighty Providence for His merciful deliverance vouchsafed to us from the hosts of our enemies. For His protection of myself through all the dangers of the bloody conflict I am humbly thankful.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 TH. J. WOOD,
 Brigadier-General of Volunteers, Commanding.
 Capt. P. P. OLDERSHAW,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Twenty-first Army Corps.
 <ar50_643>
 [Inclosure C.]
Effective force of the First Division, Twenty-first Army Corps, September 19, 1863.
Command. Officers. Enlistedmen. Total.

First Brigade  107 1,214 1,321
Third Brigade 96 1,295 1,391
Total  203 2,509 2,712

Artillery:
6th Ohio Battery 5 114 119
8th Indiana Battery 5 129 134
Total  10 243 253

Grand total 213 2,752 2,965
 

 TH. J. WOOD,
 Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers.
 CHATTANOOGA, TENN., September 30, 1863.
[Inclosure D.]
Report of Casualties in the First Division, Twenty-first Army Corps, Department of the Cumberland, in the engagement of September 19 and 20, 1863.
K Killed. A Aggregate.
W Wounded. C Commissioned officers.
M Missing.

 ---------C---------- -----Enlisted men.----
Command. K W M A K W M A

First Brigade, Col. G. P. Buell commanding:
100th Illinois Volunteers  .... 6 2 8 23 111 22 156
 26th Ohio Volunteers  4 6 2 12 23 134 43 200
13th Michigan Volunteers  2 6 2 10 11 61 24 96
58th Indiana Volunteers  2 5 1 8 14 96 24 134
Total  8 23 7 38 71 402 113 586

Third Brigade, Col. C. G. Harker commanding:
l25th Ohio Volunteers  1 2 .... 3 16 81 5 102
64th Ohio Volunteers  1 2 .... 3 5 41 16 62
65th Ohio Volunteers  3 5 .... 8 12 65 18 95
Kentucky Volunteers  1 8 .... 9 12 70 22 104
Total  6 17 .... 23 45 257 61 363

Artillery:
6th Ohio Battery(a) .... 1 .... 1 .... 5 3 8
8th Indiana Battery(b) .... .... .... .... 1 8 7 16
Total  .... 1 .... 1 1 13 10 24

RECAPITULATION.
K Killed. A Aggregate.
W Wounded. C Commissioned officers.
M Missing.

 ---------C---------- -----Enlisted men.----
Command. K W M A K W M A

First Brigade  8 23 7 38 71 402 113 586
Third Brigade  6 17 .... 23 45 257 61 363
Artillery  .... 1 .... 1 1 13 10 24
Aggregate. 14 41 7 62 117 672 184 973
Total killed, 131; total wounded, 713; total missing, 191. Grand total, 1,035.(*)
HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, TWENTY -FIRST ARMY CORPS,
Chattanooga, Tenn., September 29, 1863.
 TH. J. WOOD,



4. Col. John G. Parkhurst, Provost-Marshal.
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXX/1 [S# 50]
AUGUST 16-SEPTEMBER 22, 1863.--The Chickamauga Campaign.
No. 15. --Report of Col. John G. Parkhurst, Ninth Michigan Infantry, Provost-Marshal.

[ar50_263 con't]
HEADQUARTERS FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
PROVOST-MARSHAL'S OFFICE,
Chattanooga, September 27, 1863.
COLONEL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by the Ninth Regiment Michigan Infantry, provost <ar50_264> guard to the Fourteenth Army Corps, in the advance upon the enemy, from Stevenson, Ala.
Agreeably to orders received from corps headquarters, the regiment marched from Bolivar at 6 o'clock on the morning of the 3d of September, in charge of headquarters train, and continued to move with the general commanding, from day to day, up to the morning of the 17th, performing the usual provost ditties of the corps.
On the 15th one company of the regiment was detailed as a guard to the supply train and sent to Stevenson.
On the 17th I was ordered to take the train to Dickey's Post-Office, on the Valley road.
On the evening of the 17th the regiment and train was again moved to the headquarters of the general commanding.
On the evening of the 18th, by direction of the general commanding, the regiment in charge of the train moved on to the Valley road in rear of Crawfish Spring and camped for the night.
On the 19th, by direction of the general commanding, I moved the train into Chattanooga and parked it on the bank of the Tennessee River.
About 9 o'clock in the evening of the 19th, Dr. Gross, medical director, ordered the medical supply train to the hospital established for the Third Division on Missionary Ridge. Deeming it unsafe to send the medical supply train without a guard, I left one company in camp to guard the balance of headquarters train, and on the morning of the 20th I left Chattanooga with eight companies of my regiment in charge of the medical train, intending to take it to the battle-field. I reached Rossville without any difficulty and proceeded up the Dry Valley road to a point on the ridge to the right and rear of the field hospital, and about 1 ½ miles from it, where Dr. Barrell, medical purveyor, reported to me that the hospital to which I was going had fallen into the hands of the enemy.
I immediately sent Adjutant Duffield forward to ascertain the position of the troops, and as to the truth of the report of Dr. Barrell, and meantime halted the train and regiment and stacked arms. Before my adjutant returned, and about half past 12 o'clock, many stragglers from the front began to make their appearance. I deployed two companies of the regiment on the right and left of the road and arrested the stragglers as they came up and organized them into companies.
About 1 o'clock a large body of troops, several batteries, and transportation wagons came rushing through the woods and over the road in the utmost confusion. I formed a line of battle across the road with fixed bayonets, and with much difficulty succeeded in checking the stampede. I at once put the troops thus stopped in position to resist a pursuing force, the artillery under command of Captain Hitchcock [Hotchkiss] and the stragglers under command of Major Jenney, of the Ninth Michigan. The troops from the front continued to rush on toward my line in great confusion, and at this moment I discovered Major-General Crittenden, of the Twenty-first Army Corps, with some of his staff. I immediately rode up to him and respectfully asked him to stop and take command of the forces I was collecting and had then collected, and place them in a position to resist an attack or take them back to the battle-field, which I then supposed and now believe could have been successfully accomplished. <ar50_265> Major-General Crittenden declined to take command, saying, "This," meaning the forces there collected, "is no command for me." I remarked to the general that the force I then had collected and should succeed in collecting was too much of a command for me. General Crittenden replied, "You have done marvelously well and you had better keep command." Just at that moment a sergeant reported to General Crittenden that a large force of the enemy was advancing upon the left flank of my line. General Crittenden suggested that I had better change the position of my force to meet the attack, which I at once commenced doing, and General Crittenden proceeded to the rear. Before I had taken a new position General Crittenden's aide came to me, and said that the general requested that I should take the force I had and move it with the trains on the road in as much order as possible to Chattanooga, which would be our next point for making a stand. Agreeably to this request I ordered the wagon trains into the road, headed toward Chattanooga, and put my regiment and the force in command of Major Jenney in the rear and moved quietly down the road some 3 miles to a large open field, where I found a captain of the Anderson Cavalry collecting stragglers in our advance. Soon after reaching this point General J. C. Davis arrived and assumed command and took the management of reorganizing the straggling troops. I soon afterward saw Lieutenant-Colonel Ducat assisting in the reorganization, and soon thereafter Major-General Negley arrived and took command. Major-General Sheridan also came up with a small force.
I directed Lieutenant Dobbelaere, of the Ninth Michigan, to take the medical train into Chattanooga, which he did, and I reported to Major-General Negley with my regiment and a regiment of stragglers for duty. That portion of the army which retreated and left the field was at this point reorganized under the direction of Major-General Negley, and moved on to Rossville and placed in position, the Ninth Michigan Infantry forming a part of a brigade.
I remained under command of Major-General Negley until about 2 o'clock on the morning of the 21st, when, by direction of the general commanding, I put my regiment in a position to enable me to arrest stragglers from the field in the anticipated battle of the 21st. During the engagement on the 21st I arrested a large number of stragglers, and sent them to their commands in the field, and by direction of the general commanding, forwarded 167 to the provost-marshal-general at Chattanooga, with directions to have them sent to Nashville for trial as cowards and skulkers from the battle-field. Many of these last-named were arrested leaving the field with their arms, which I took from them. The most of the arms thus taken have since been put into the hands of returned convalescents who have been forwarded to their commands.
On the night of the 21st I retired with my regiment to Chattanooga, since which time it has been on provost and fatigue duty at corps headquarters and at the corps hospitals.
I append hereto a statement of casualties in the corps since crossing the Tennessee River. Also a statement of the number of prisoners captured by this corps from the enemy.
I remain, colonel, your obedient servant,
 J. G. PARKHURST,
Col., Comdg. 9th Mich. Infty., and Prov. Mar., 14th A. C.
 Lieut. Col. GEORGE E. FLYNT,
Assistant Adjutant-General, and Chief of Staff.
 <ar50_266>
[Inclosures.]
Statement of Casualties in the Fourteenth Army Corps since crossing the Tennessee River.
K Killed. T Total.
W Wounded. A Aggregate.
C Captured.

 Commissioned officers. --------Enlisted men.---------
Command. K W C T K W C T A
First Division  13 44 82 139 182 738 1,333 2,253 2,392
Second Division 5 32 13 50 81 420 334 725 875
Third Division(a) .... .... .... .... 317 1,629 407 2,353 2,353
Fourth Division  5 39 21 65 121 719 359 1,199 1,264
Headquarters Fourteenth Army Corps  .... .... 1 1 .... .... 1 1 2
Total  23 115 117 255 701 3,506 2,434 6,531 6,886
-----
Statement of prisoners captured by the Fourteenth Army Corps since crossing the Tennessee River, number of deserters from the enemy, and number paroled.
A Number.
B Number of deserters.
C Sent to provost- marshal, Fourteenth Army Corps.
D Sent to provost-marshal-general.
E Paroled.

Command. A B C D E
First Division 477 8 7 478 ....
Second Division 62 23 12 63 10
Third Division  95 4 .... 99 ....
Fourth Division 445 26 34 437 ....
Total  1,079 61 53 1,077 10



5. Col. John Thomas Wilder

O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXX/1 [S# 50] AUGUST 16-SEPTEMBER 22, 1863.--The Chickamauga Campaign.
No. 63. --Report of Col. John T. Wilder, Seventeenth Indiana Infantry, commanding First Brigade (Mounted Infantry).

[ar50_444 con't]
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Chattanooga, November 27, 1863.
  Brig. Gen. LORENZO THOMAS,  Adjutant-General, U.S. Army:
GENERAL: Inclosed herewith I have the honor to transmit the report of Col. John T. Wilder, Seventeenth Regiment Indiana Volunteers, commanding brigade of mounted infantry, of the operations of his brigade in co-operation with the main portion of the Army of the Cumberland before and after the evacuation of Chattanooga by the rebel army, including the battle of Chickamauga, and up to the time of the assembling of the army at Chattanooga.
For his ingenuity and fertility of resource in occupying the attention of an entire corps of the rebel army while our army was getting around its flank, and for his valor and the many qualities of a commander displayed by him in the numerous engagements of his brigade with the enemy before and during the battle of Chickamauga, and for the excellent service rendered by him generally, I would respectfully recommend him to the President of the United States for an appointment as brigadier-general.(*)
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 GEO. H. THOMAS,
 Major-General, Commanding.

 <ar50_445>
HDQRS. 1ST BRIG., 4TH Div., 14TH ARMY CORPS,
November 10, 1863.
 GENERAL: On August 16, in accordance with orders received from headquarters Department of the Cumberland, my command, consisting of the Seventy-second Indiana, Col. A. O. Miller; Seventeenth Indiana, Lieut. Col. Henry Jordan; Ninety-second Illinois, Col. S. D. Atkins; Ninety-eighth Illinois, Col. J. J. Funkhouser: One hundred and twenty-third Illinois, Col. James Monroe; and the Eighteenth Indiana Battery, Capt. Eli Lilly, constituting the First Brigade of Mounted Infantry, commenced the ascent of the Cumberland Mountains on the road from Decherd to Tracy City. We camped that night at the Southern University, and early next morning started for Tracy City, arriving there at night, over roads very muddy and much cut up by the retreat of the rebels. The next morning we moved on toward Therman, in Sequatchie Valley, making about 20 miles, being delayed to repair the roads so that our artillery and trains could pass. Next day we descended into Sequatchie Valley at Therman, surprising and capturing a party of 14 rebels and releasing 5 Union prisoners they were about to hang, and proceeded to Dunlap, arriving there about an hour sooner than General Palmer's division, of General Crittenden's corps. The next morning we started over Walden's Ridge. Being delayed by General Hazen's brigade in going up the mountain we did not reach the summit until 1 p.m., when, taking the lead, crossed the mountain, going down it at Poe's Tavern, surprising and capturing Captain Carson and a party of rebels, 11 in number, releasing 3 Union men whom they held as prisoners.
The next morning before daylight I put the command in motion, sending Colonel Funkhouser with the Ninety-eighth Illinois and Ninety-second Illinois and a section of Lilly's battery to demonstrate upon Harrison, 6 miles distant, and with the remainder of the command proceeded rapidly toward Chattanooga, 15 miles distant, sending a scouting party of two companies of the Seventeenth Indiana, under Captain Vail (Company H, Seventeenth Indiana), to examine the river between the mouth of North Chickamauga and Chattanooga. We approached Chattanooga so unexpectedly as to capture the animals and some of the men of a battery, and part of the picket stationed on the north side of the river, and wounding a number of the relief pickets who were crossing in a boat to the north side of the river before they could get beyond our fire. The troops and people in the town seemed to be in great consternation, running in all directions. Presently some guns in a battery on the west side of town opened upon us, and Captain Lilly replied to them, in a short time silencing their fire, when they opened upon us from a rifled 32-pounder, the first shot from which killed 4 horses and mortally wounded Corporal McCorkle, of the Eighteenth Indiana Battery. It, however, fired but four shots before Captain Lilly silenced it also, one of his shells exploding in the embrasure from which the gun was being fired, killing a captain and 3 men He succeeded also in sinking the steamer Paint Rock, and disabling another lying at the landing, and sinking a number of their pontoons, which were laid in the stream preparatory to being swung across the river. We then commenced making feints as if trying to cross the river at different points for 40 miles above the town, and succeeded in so deceiving them as to induce them to use an entire army corps to prevent the execution of such a purpose, they working every night fortifying <ar50_446> the south bank of the river at every feasible crossing for miles above. Details were made nearly every night to build fires indicating large camps, and by throwing boards upon others and hammering on barrels and sawing up boards and throwing the pieces in streams that would float them into the river, we made them believe we were preparing to cross with boats. This was kept up until Chattanooga was evacuated, when my command was immediately thrown across the river at the ford at Friar's Island, 8 miles above Chattanooga. The first across was Colonel Funkhouser with the Ninety-eighth Illinois, who gallantly crossed the ford at 12 m. in the face of the rebel cavalry on the south bank. This was on September 9.
Colonel Atkins had been previously ordered to report to General Thomas with his regiment (Ninety-second Illinois), and had crossed the river at Battle Creek several days before, and coming up Lookout Mountain from Lookout Valley had entered Chattanooga at 10 a.m. the same day, driving the rebel rear guard of cavalry before him, and moving up the south bank of the river joined the command near Friar's Island.
On the 10th we moved south toward Ringgold, and camped that night at Taylor's Gap, sending a party consisting of four companies of the Seventy-second Indiana, under Lieutenant-Colonel Kirkpatrick, Seventy-second Indiana, forward to Ringgold that night; they returning that night, reported no rebels. The next morning, 11th, we started forward at daylight, and when 2 miles from Ringgold met Scott's brigade of rebel cavalry, drawn up in line of battle, their left resting on Chickamauga Creek and their right on a ridge of hills. Colonel Atkins' regiment being in advance, immediately formed line, dismounted, and gallantly attacked them, while the Seventeenth Indiana, under Major Jones, was sent to flank their right.
They soon fell back, leaving 13 dead. We pressed them, hoping to cut them off from retreating through the gap at Ringgold, when General Van Cleve, coming up from the direction of Rossville, drove them in confusion through the gap before my flanking party could intercept them. We immediately passed General Van Cleve, and about 3 miles from Ringgold found them drawn up in line of battle in a strong position, with artillery. Here they made a stubborn resistance, but we flanked and drove them, pursuing them to Tunnel Hill, where we again found them in line of battle, re-enforced by another brigade under General Armstrong, all under command of General Forrest. We attacked them and drove them to within 4 miles of Dalton, wounding General Forrest and inflicting considerable loss on them. Night coming on, we camped in line of battle in a secure position near Tunnel Hill, expecting a fight in the morning.
In the night I received orders from General Crittenden to return to Ringgold at daylight. This we did, and I was then ordered to report to General Reynolds at La Fayette, Ga., by way of Leet's Tan-yard. About 4 miles from Ringgold my advance encountered General Pegram's pickets. At the same time my rear guard reported an enemy in our rear. I immediately made preparation for battle, and advancing in line, found Pegram's force drawn up in line of battle, occupying a high wooded hill to the south of Leet's Tan-yard. I immediately attacked him. Being unable to use my artillery, on account of the woods, my left flank was now attacked by a force under Armstrong, while the force in our rear pressed us closely. With two regiments I boldly attacked Pegram, driving back toward <ar50_447> La Fayette the other two regiments holding my rear and left flank. On our right, toward Pea Vine Church, a brigade of rebel infantry, under General Strahl, occupied the road toward Gordon's Mills. I immediately determined to cut my way through this and join General Crittenden at Gordon's Mills. Leaving a strong line of skirmishers facing the rear, left, and front, I, with the remainder of the command, charged Strahl's command, driving back his left and opening the road to Napier's Gap, in the Pea Vine Ridge, safely withdrawing my command by that route, and joining General Crittenden at midnight.
On the next day my command made a reconnaissance to Pea Vine Church, discovering a considerable number of rebels in that vicinity. The (lay after we rejoined General Reynolds at Cooper's Gap.
On the 17th we were sent down Chickamauga Creek to guard the crossing at Alexander's Bridge, 3 miles below Gordon's Mills.
On the 18th, at 10 a.m., we were attacked by a brigade of rebel infantry, but our position being a strong one we repulsed them easily. Colonel Minty, being at Reed's Bridge, 2 miles below, with a brigade of cavalry, sent a pressing request for help. I sent Colonel Miller with the Seventy-second Indiana and seven companies of the One hundred and twenty-third Illinois and a section of the Eighteenth Indiana Battery to his assistance. Soon after three brigades of rebel infantry again attempted to carry my position. We repulsed them, however, with severe loss to them. At 5 p.m. a picket stationed in my rear reported a strong force of rebel infantry in my rear. Having driven the cavalry away from a ford below me, I immediately commenced withdrawing my forces in the direction of Gordon's Mills, and intercepted the force that was trying to surround me, when, being re-enforced by two regiments of infantry from General Wood's division and Colonel Miller returning to my assistance, we held the rebels from farther advance until morning, although they made a desperate attempt to drive us at 9 o'clock at night.
On the morning of the 19th I received orders from department headquarters to take up a position "on the right fighting flank of our army, and keep the department commander advised of events in that vicinity" I immediately occupied the woods at the edge of a field on the west side of the road from Gordon's Mills to Rossville, at a point where the road from Alexander's Bridge and the fords in the vicinity of Napier's Gap intersect that road, being satisfied that the rebels would attempt an advance in that direction. At about 1 p.m. heavy fighting was heard in my front, and by General Crittenden's order I advanced my line across the road, when, seeing a rebel column in the act of flanking a battery of General Davis' command, I sent two regiments to the right to repel them. This was done in handsome style by Colonels Monroe and Miller, with their regiments, when my skirmishers reported a heavy rebel column flanking my left under cover of the woods. I now brought my entire command double-quick back to their original position, changing direction to my left with two regiments, and opened a deadly fire on a dense mass of rebels, enfilading their left flank as they were making way (across the road to Gordon's Mills) in the open ground in front of Mrs. Glenn's house, first staggering them and soon routing them in confusion, driving them back into the woods east.
In a few moments this or another column of rebels came out of the woods near Vineyard's house moving obliquely at and to my right, driving General Davis' command before them. General Crittenden <ar50_448> at this point came near being captured in trying to rally these troops. I immediately again changed front and enfiladed their right flank with an oblique fire, which soon drove them back with terrible slaughter. General Davis now rallied his men, who gallantly advanced on my right under a galling fire, but were soon driven by overwhelming numbers back again to my right, being followed to the center of the field to a ditch in which the rebel advance took cover. I at once ordered Captain Lilly to send a section of his battery forward on my left to a clump of bushes and rake the ditch with canister. This was promptly done, with terrible slaughter, but very few of the rebels escaping alive.
In these various repulses we had thrown into the rebel columns, which attacked us closely massed, over 200 rounds of double-shotted 10-pounder canister, at a range varying from 70 to 350 yards, and at the same time kept up a constant fire with our repeating rifles, causing a most fearful destruction in the rebel ranks. After this we were not again that day attacked.
On the morning of the 20th I was directed by General Rosecrans in person to take up a position on the right of General McCook's line, and ordered to report to General McCook. I immediately did so, and he (General McCook) placed me in a very strong position on his right, on the crest of the east slope of Mission Ridge, about one-quarter of a mile to the south of Widow Glenn's house. We lay here until about half past 11 a.m., when I received orders from General McCook to "close up on his right, and keep the line connected, and occupy the ground left vacant by him, as he was going to move to the left." At this moment desperate fighting was heard down the line a mile or more to the left. As the troops on my left moved from their position still farther to the left, a column of rebels, five lines deep, assaulted them, breaking and dispersing the troops at my left, and driving them by weight of numbers in great confusion into the woods in their rear. My command was at this time advancing by regiments in line of battle. The Ninety-eighth Illinois immediately changed front to the left, and charged double-quick at the rebels (who had taken a battery stationed at Mrs. Glenn's house) and retook the battery, their gallant colonel, Funkhouser, falling severely wounded while gloriously fighting in the front rank, still cheering his men forward after he fell.
The other regiments coming up in succession formed in their proper places into line, rapidly and without confusion, when the whole line was ordered to charge obliquely into the left flank of the rebels, and completely driving back their left down to the Gordon's Mills road, and taking two guns from them still loaded with canister, which was emptied into their fleeing ranks.
At this time a force of the enemy that had been menacing my right fell back with but little fighting, apparently under the impression that their right had been driven back, and that they were being flanked. Captain Lilly was in the meantime pouring a heavy fire to the left down the rebel line, when word was brought me that a rebel line was advancing around my left. I immediately transferred three regiments from my right to the top of the hill west of Mrs. Glenn's house, and with them and four pieces of artillery of Captain Lilly's battery, soon drove them northeast across the road north of Mrs. Glenn's. I now organized my line on the top of Mission Ridge, so as to command the road to the rear of Rossville, and deploying skirmishers <ar50_449> north and east of my position, I sent messengers to find General McCook.
Lieutenant-Colonel Thruston, chief of General McCook's staff, soon appeared and notified me that the line to my left was driven back and dispersed, and advised that I had better fall back to Lookout Mountain. I determined, however, to attempt to cut my way to join General Thomas at Rossville, and was arranging my line for that purpose when General Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, came up and said that "our troops had fled in utter panic; that it was a worse rout than Bull Run; that General Rosecrans was probably killed or captured;" and strongly advised me to fall back and occupy the passes over Lookout Mountain to prevent the rebel occupancy of it. One of my staff officers now came up and reported that he had found General Sheridan a mile and a half to the rear and left, who sent advice to me that he "was trying to collect his men and join General Thomas at Rossville, and that I had better fall back to the Chattanooga Valley." I now, at 4 p.m., did so with great reluctance, bringing off with me a number of wagons loaded with ammunition, a great many ambulances, a number of caissons, a great many stragglers, and quite a number of straying beef-cattle.
After reaching Chattanooga Valley at dark, my pickets were properly posted to guard all approaches to Chattanooga from that direction, when I sent a courier to you at Chattanooga informing you of my position and dispositions.
The list of casualties (*) in my command has been forwarded heretofore.
In conclusion, I am happy to state that through the entire campaign my commands were obeyed with cheerful promptness, men and officers seeming to fully appreciate our dangers and difficulties, and willingly submitting to the great privations incident thereto.
My subordinate commanders are entitled to the warmest praise for their gallantry and judgment in the numerous engagements, in all of which each did his whole duty.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 J. T. WILDER,
 Colonel Seventeenth Indiana, Comdg. Mounted Brigade.
 Maj. Gen. W. S. ROSECRANS,
 U.S. Army, Commanding, &c.

-------------------------

O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXX/3 [S# 52] CORRESPONDENCE, ORDERS, AND RETURNS RELATING TO OPERATIONS IN KENTUCKY, SOUTHWEST VIRGINIA, TENNESSEE, MISSISSIPPI, NORTH ALABAMA, AND NORTH GEORGIA, FROM AUGUST 11, 1863, TO OCTOBER 19, 1863.--UNION CORRESPONDENCE, ETC.(*)--#5

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, FOURTH DIVISION,
Opposite Chattanooga, August 22, 1863.
(Via Tracy City, 3 a.m., 23d.)
 General GARFIELD:
I have the honor to report that the forces under my command reached the east foot of Walled’s Ridge late in the evening of August 20. The next morning I sent Colonel Funkhouser, with two regiments and two rifled guns, to Harrison's Landing. He reported a brigade of infantry guarding the river, with four pieces of artillery and three hills fortified and rifle-pits on the banks. I also sent two companies to the mouth of Chickamauga, who report a regiment guarding the ford, with rifle-pits for protection. The ford at Friar's Island, at the mouth of Chickamauga, is about 4½ feet deep and rapid. I went with the balance of corps, three regiments and four pieces of artillery, to Chattanooga. We came within 50 yards of capturing a horse ferry-boat plying across the river. When we got in position on the river hills they had but three small pieces of artillery in position. Two steam-boats were lying at the landing, the largest of which we sank with shells before steam could be raised on it. The other, a small tow-boat, is, I think, disabled. A pontoon-bridge of forty-seven boats was lying stretched up the river, ready to swing across the stream. An attempt was made to remove it, which was prevented by a line of sharpshooters on the river bank. The river is about 600 yards wide. The town is pretty well fortified. <ar52_123>
A rifled 32-pounder gun killed 4 artillery horses and took off the leg of Corpl. Abram S. McCorkle, of Lilly's battery, at one shot. This comprises the list of my casualties.
The roads down Walden's Ridge are very steep and rough. I am now repairing the Anderson road down the mountain on this side. Wagner's brigade is on the mountain, on the Anderson road, and Hazen's brigade is on the mountain, on the Poe road, with three regiments at Poe's. I am camped at the foot of the mountain, on the Anderson road, with parties thrown out to the vicinity of the river on all roads. Two of my regiments are at Poe's, with parties out to the river at Harrison.
I wish to get further orders. My artillery ammunition is getting short. Can you send me 200 rounds percussion-shell to Tracy City for 3-inch guns, and 200 rounds fuse-shell (Hotchkiss) and 1,000 friction- primers?
I think that the rebels have one corps of two divisions at Chattanooga and vicinity--D. H. Hill's, formerly Hardee's corps. Polk's corps is reported to be down the road toward Bridgeport. None of this information is very well founded, being made up from reports from deserters, negroes, and citizens. There is no rebel force north of the river except bushwhackers on the mountains, who try to take our couriers. I have sent a company up Walden's Ridge after them to-day. Dibrell's--formerly Starnes'--brigade is reported to be in vicinity of Smith's Cross-Roads, and Forrest, with a brigade, is said to be near Kingston.
I have taken, in the entire, 40 men and killed 2 and wounded several; also took a train of 4 empty wagons and the mules of a battery that were grazing on the north side of the river near Chattanooga.
We shelled Chattanooga, at intervals, from 10 to 5 p.m. yesterday, silencing every battery that opened on us. But few of their guns could reach us, being mostly 12-pounder howitzers and 6-pounders rifled. They opened on us with nineteen different guns. One 32-pounder rifled gun covers all on this side. Lilly made most excellent shots, dismounting guns at 2,000 yards. He threw shells directly in their embrasures. Their parapets are very broad; appear to beat least 15 feet or more, certainly not less. Their water batteries are sunk in pits level with the ground and with the banks built up for protection, with embrasures through the banks.
It is reported that Johnston came here on the night of the 20th, bringing with him two trains of troops and superseded Bragg, who is sent to Atlanta. This I learn from an intelligent negro who came from Chattanooga yesterday, and who claims to have seen them all. The citizens state that Bragg is at Atlanta.
There appears to be a large camp-fire 5 or 6 miles in the rear of Chattanooga. A movement appears to have been made down the river last night; it sounded like cavalry. They may be coming in on our rear, on top of Walden's Ridge, by crossing the river below. A good watch should be kept at the mouth of Sequatchie Valley. They have a steamer on the river below here, the old Paint Rock.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 JOHN T. WILDER,
Colonel, Commanding.
P. S.--No changes have been reported this morning. All is quiet across the river; but few troops can be seen.
 J.T.W.



6. Charles A. Dana
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXX/1 [S# 50]
AUGUST 16-SEPTEMBER 22, 1863.--The Chickamauga Campaign.
No. 6. --Dispatches of Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War.

[ar50_182 con't]
LOUISVILLE, September 6, 1863.
I arrived here this forenoon, having been much delayed on railroads and steamboats. Finding at Cincinnati that it was impossible to join Burnside by his line of march, I determined to go to Nashville, and thence to Rosecrans. Shall be at Nashville to-morrow. Burnside abandoned his base nearly a fortnight ago, and has since been living on the country. His animals have suffered severely for want of forage; nevertheless, he occupied Knoxville on the 4th instant. Of this event no particulars are known here. He has ordered the Ninth Corps to that place, and it will march at once, though, as it is considerably scattered, some time will be required for its concentration. Its present effective force is under 5,000 men. The effective force with which Burnside set out was under 18,000. Rosecrans has telegraphed to the clergy all over the country that he expected to fight a great battle to-day and desired their prayers.
General Boyle complains that he is unable to get new troops mustered in, although the need for their services is pressing. The ordnance officer here, Boyle says, also throws obstacles in the way of arming even those who have been mustered. Orders for arms, issued even by Burnside, have been subjected to the delay of first sending to Washington for General Ripley's consideration and approval.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
NASHVILLE, September 8, 1863.
I have had this morning a prolonged conversation with Governor Johnson. With regard to the general condition of Tennessee he expresses himself in cheering terms. The occupation of Knoxville he regards as completing the expulsion of rebel power, and he proposes to order a general election for the first week in October. A Governor and other State officers, Legislature, and members of Congress will then be elected. The judiciary, now entirely lacking, he intends to fill by appointment, previous to this election. Judges of the election will also be appointed by him throughout the State. Sufficient means will be taken to prevent all except loyal citizens from voting or being voted for. Slavery he says is destroyed in fact, <ar50_183> but must be abolished legally. He is thoroughly in favor of immediate emancipation, both as a matter of moral right and as the indispensable condition of that large immigration of industrious free-men which is necessary to repeople and regenerate the State. He has already declared himself publicly in behalf of unconditional abolition, and will recommend it emphatically to the Legislature when it assembles. He says the great majority of the people of Tennessee are to-day in favor of freedom, their only doubt being about the subsequent status of the negro. He is confident that the Legislature will provide for emancipation, either immediately or at an early day. The time of its meeting will be the first week in December, probably. Respecting military movements, Johnson complains of the tardiness of Rosecrans, and of these long months of precious time wasted in the construction of useless fortifications. Rosecrans he regards as a patriot at heart and not a damned traitor like his predecessor; but he has fallen under bad influence and especially under that of his chief of detective police, a man named Truesdail. This man is deep in all kinds of plunder, and has kept the army inactive to enable his accomplices and himself to become rich by jobs and contracts. These statements, it is hardly necessary to say, were made to me confidentially, and were not attended by the allegation of any special facts. Of Gordon Granger, here, Johnson speaks in high terms. I should add that he says he will not himself be a candidate for any office at the coming election.
From North Carolina, he tells me, he has some communications, especially from Holden, of the Raleigh Register. The people of the whole State, and particularly of the western portion, are true to the Union and will seize the first opportunity to free themselves from the Confederate Government. In this respect the occupation of East Tennessee is of the highest importance. There is the center of the whole mountain region with its population of a million and a half, all naturally haters of slavery and of the rebellion. Gordon Granger and Johnson are going the front to-morrow or next day. I shall go with them. It is but a day's distance by rail. Before leaving Louisville impressive testimony was presented to me of various frauds in the quartermaster's department, there and here. There is an extensive swindle now being consummated at Louisville by the furnishing of two-year old mules on a contract requiring three-year olds.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
NASHVILLE, September 8, [1863]--7 p.m.
 I have spent the afternoon in examining the fortifications for the defense of this place. The principal works are three in number, all on the southern side of the town. One of these, the easternmost, named Fort Negley, is finished, or nearly so, and armed. It is a work of very intricate design, and requires about a thousand men for its garrison. The central work, known as Fort Morton, is scarcely yet commenced. Simpler in design and more powerful when done than Negley. It is situated on a hill of hard limestone, and the very extensive excavations required must all be done by blasting. At the present rate of progress it will take two years to finish it. A part of <ar50_184> that its parapet might be used as a rifle-pit and might afford seine protection to field guns. This work will require a garrison of from 1,500 to 2,000 men. The two redoubts and barracks connecting them, of which its main body consists, will be altogether 700 feet long. The third and westernmost fort is precisely the same in plan as Morton, but is on land that can be easily dug.  This fort is about one-quarter done, and can be completed with comparative rapidity and cheapness. The cost of Morton must be heavy.
Nothing new from the front. Judicious men here think there will be no battle, and that Bragg has only the shadow of a force at Chattanooga to delay Rosecrans' advance.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
BRIDGEPORT, September  p.m.
 We have no particulars of the occupation of Chattanooga, except that it took place at 10 a.m. yesterday, and that Rosecrans arrived there to-day. The place is held by Crittenden's corps. Thomas is at Trenton, Rosecrans 7 miles farther up the Lookout Valley, and McCook has the extreme right, some 8 miles farther. Of the Reserve Corps the division of Steedman has arrived here, and other troops, making in all 10,000 men, are rapidly approaching. Gordon Granger is here in command of all the forces north of the [river]. To strengthen this part of the army, the garrisons between here and Nashville have been reduced to the last degree. Fears of incursions upon the railroad are entertained, especially as it is not known here whether Bragg has taken his cavalry with him. The stock of commissary supplies is running short. There are but insufficient stores at [Nashville] instead of those amply filled deposits which have been reported. The railroad between Louisville and [Nashville] is not transporting these necessaries as rapidly as is requisite, but 16 car-loads being sent over daily, while 65 are but enough. The reserve ammunition train of 800 wagons will be closed up to-night at Stevenson. No further advance of the army can take place until this gets up to Trenton or Chattanooga. There will also be delay in getting the troops closed up ready to move again, I presume. Indeed, it will be ten days before any new step is taken. Probably the depot of commissary and quartermaster's supplies will be brought forward from Stevenson to this place. It will require a month at least to replace the railroad bridge here, of which three-quarters is destroyed. I shall reach headquarters to-morrow.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
CHATTANOOGA, September 12, 1863--11 a.m.
 Arriving here last evening I at once found that my report from Bridgeport, that the advance would be stopped and the army concentrated before moving farther forward, was incorrect. McCook and Thomas had both been moved from the Valley of Lookout Creek <ar50_185> through the gaps of Lookout Mountain, the former toward Summerville and the latter toward La Fayette, while Crittenden had marched to Ringgold. The enemy have, however, unexpectedly appeared in force on the south bank of the Chickamauga, on the road hence to La Fayette, while a force of from 10,000 to 20,000, debouching westward through Catlett's Gap, attacked Negley in front of Stevens' Gap yesterday afternoon and compelled him to fall back to the gap. Last night it seemed probable that Bragg had abandoned his retreat on Rome and returned with the purpose of failing upon the different corps and divisions of our army, now widely separated by the necessity of crossing the mountains at gaps far apart, and destroying them in detail. The indications of this morning are that he was merely making a stand to check pursuit, the attack on Negley appearing to have been stopped as soon as he fell back. Crittenden is now ordered to move from Ringgold to his own right flank, and should have had his main body at the Chickamauga crossing on the La Fayette road by 10 a.m. to-day. This is the place where his right wing found the enemy in force yesterday. Thomas has sent Brannan to help Negley, who will thus renew this advance from Stevens' Gap toward Dug Gap in Pigeon Mountain, while Thomas himself, with the remainder of his corps, putting himself into communication with Crittenden, will advance toward Catlett's Gap. McCook at the same time is to rest his left flank on the southern base of Mission Ridge and, extending his line toward Summerville, fall on the flank of the enemy should he follow the valley that way.
It is probable, however, that before these dispositions are completed he will have got east of Pigeon Mountain and made good his escape to Rome. This region is composed of long mountains with few practicable passes. It is above 30 miles from the head of Lookout Mountain to the first gap, for instance. The roads are worse than those over any other mountains in the country; not impassable, but very destructive to wagons. The valleys are narrow, irregular, and bare of corn and cattle. R[osecrans] thinks, however, that he will be able to find forage a short distance ahead. Two million rations now remain to be drawn from Stevenson depot.
 [C A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
CHATTANOOGA, September 13, 1863--7 a.m.
General disposition of troops remains as yesterday. Crittenden has concentrated his corps at Gordon's Mills, where the road hence to La Fayette crosses the west Chickamauga, and is near enough to Thomas for either to open when the other is attacked, though they have not yet opened communication with each other, the enemy's cavalry being in possession of the intervening part of the valley.
At the latest reports received last night the enemy was still in force in front of Crittenden, though he did not seem to have a distinct idea in what force. Critteden had some unimportant skirmishes during yesterday. Thomas reported last night that he had moved from Stevens' Gap toward Dug and Catlett's Gaps, finding no enemy, his scouts and citizens all stating the rebels had withdrawn to La Fayette to make a stand there. This being true, Crittenden <ar50_186> will find his roads clear before him to-day, and will easily get through Pigeon Mountain.
At the latest advices from McCook he was taking up position from southern extremity of Mission Ridge toward Summerville. There is a possibility that the corps attacking Negley on Friday, now reported as D. H. Hill's, may have attacked McCook, but the latter is strong enough to fight successfully. Rosecrans leaves here immediately for Thomas' headquarters.
As the telegraph ends here my dispatches will be delayed accordingly.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
HEADQUARTERS FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
Before Stevens' Gap, September 14, 1863--11 a.m.
 Everything progresses favorably; concentration of the three corps already substantially effected. Enemy has withdrawn from this basin, and the reports of scouts show that he is evacuating La Fayette and moving toward Rome. Our forces will to-day occupy gaps leading toward La Fayette, and that place will probably be occupied to-morrow. Army now has provisions for ten days, by the end of which time depot will be established at Chattanooga. Forage abounds everywhere.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
BEFORE STEVENS' GAP,
September 14, 1863--12.30 p.m.
Johnston is here in command of enemy, having arrived just before evacuation of Chattanooga. His Mississippi army is mainly here also. There is no evidence that any troops have come from Lee's army, but deserters all report that heavy re-enforcements are on road from there. Deserters continue to be picked up. Provost-marshal of Rosecrans reports he has taken 2,500 since leaving Tullahoma, mainly men of Kentucky and East Tennessee.
No news here from Burnside.
One steamboat taken at Chattanooga will be repaired and ready for work within ten days. Supplies can then be towed in flat-boats from Bridgeport to Chattanooga, saving wagoning over mountains. Thermometer now at 75.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
BEFORE STEVENS' GAP, September 14, 1863.
This army has now gained a position from which it can effectually advance upon Rome and Atlanta, and deliver there the finishing blow of the war. The difficulties of gaining this position, of crossing the <ar50_187> Cumberland Mountains, passing the Tennessee,, turning and occupying Chattanooga, traversing the mountain ridges of Northern Georgia, and seizing the passes which lead southward have been enormous, and can only be fully appreciated by one who has personally examined the region. These difficulties are now all substantially overcome. The army is in the best possible condition, and is advancing with all the rapidity which the nature of the country allows. Burnside will secure its left flank, but a sudden movement of the enemy to its right would endanger its long and precarious line of communications and compel a retreat to the Tennessee.
To avoid this danger a column as strong as possible should be pushed eastward from Corinth. The advantages already gained are so great, and the possibilities of further triumphs so important, that I take the liberty of especially urging the subject upon your attention. Would it not be better even to recall Steele from Arkansas than to risk a check here, where heart of rebellion is within reach and the final blow already prepared?
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
CRAWFISH SPRING, September 16, 1863--12.30 p.m.
Your dispatches concerning an obscure passage in mine of 12th, have just come to hand. The words not understood are:
It is probable, however, that before these dispositions are completed he will have got east of Pigeon Mountain and made good his escape to Rome. This region is composed of long mountains with few practicable passes. For instance, it is about 30 miles from the head of Lookout Mountain to the first gap. The roads are worse than those over any other mountains in the Union; not impassable, but very destructive to wagons.
This place is 13 miles south-southwest from Chattanooga. Weather pleasant.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 Major ECKERT.
-----
CRAWFISH SPRING, September 16, 1863--1 p.m.
 McCook mistook the order of march prescribed for him to concentrate upon Thomas; marched from Alpine around the southwestern flank of Lookout Mountain, coming down into this valley by way of Stevens' Gap, instead of moving directly northward and coming in by Dougherty's Gap. This mistake has caused two days' delay. Sheridan's division got down into the valley yesterday, and the others will get down to-day. The concentration of the army will then be perfect, McCook holding the right, as before, Thomas the center, and Crittenden the left, while Granger, with Steedman's division and Col. Daniel McCook's brigade of the Reserve Corps, is posted at Rossville on the extreme left to guard the approach to Chattanooga from the direction of Cleveland and Ringgold. The concurrent testimony of spies and deserters shows that the enemy are concentrated at La Fayette. No re-enforcements from Virginia have yet arrived there, nor does it seem that any considerable body has reached Dalton. The present plan of Rosecrans is to hold gaps in Lookout Mountain in his rear, and to seem to threaten the gaps of <ar50_188> Catlett, Dug, and Blue Bird in Pigeon Mountain, and then, taking great care to show camp fires and every other evidence that his forces remain in their camps in this valley, to march by night from Pigeon Mountain by taking the road which leads around its northern extremity and surprise the rebels at La Fayette. This road you will find laid down on the maps as Shields Gap, but really it is no gap, but a complete cessation of the mountain. Everything will be completely ready for this movement by to-morrow night, and, should no new development prevent, it will then be executed.
Nothing heard from Burnside. It is exceedingly necessary that his cavalry should appear on that flank to prevent cavalry attacking trains.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
CRAWFISH SPRING, September 16, 1863--3 p.m.
 Though the Louisville and Nashville Railroad is paid by the Government for transportation at its own rates of charge, those rates being some 25 per cent. higher than are charged by other roads, it persists in preferring private freight over that of Government. It will be impossible to maintain this army without a complete change in the management of that road. The Government is its great customer, and should control its movements.
The excuse now made by the company is that some 50 of its cars have been taken for the Chattanooga road, but that is no reason why it should carry private freight rather than our supplies.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
CRAWFISH SPRING, September 17, 1863--9 a.m.
The character of the roads here and the severity of the service, owing to the numerical superiority of the enemy's cavalry, use up horses very rapidly. Two thousand are now necessary to remount men whose animals are unserviceable. They can be procured in Nashville and in the region between here and there as cheaply and more promptly than elsewhere. It would be greatly for advantage of service if Lieutenant-Colonel Hodges, chief quartermaster of this department, could be authorized by General Stoneman to purchase. He can be relied on perfectly.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
CRAWFISH SPRING, September 17, 1863--10 a.m.
 McCook's divisions not let all over the mountain, but must be in position before night. Column of enemy moving yesterday on road between Ringgold and Shields' Gap, and his pickets were posted last <ar50_189> night in front of Wood, on Crittenden's left. He is apparently disposed to dispute passage of Shields' Gap. We are still without information of Longstreet's arrival.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
CRAWFISH SPRING, September 17, 1863--5 p.m.
 There are pretty clear indications that the rebels are massing their forces about Rock Spring Church, east of Pigeon Mountain, between Shields' and Catlett's Gaps. A body of rebel infantry and cavalry has just come into this valley by way of Dug Gap, and the rebel column reported in my dispatch of this morning continues to raise a cloud of dust on the road between Shields' Gap and Ringgold.
Reports that Longstreet has reached Atlanta began to come in from various sources. A rebel deserter reported this morning at Chattanooga that some of Burnside's cavalry were at Cleveland on 15th, but nothing positive reaches us from Burnside. His forces needed here.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
CRAWFISH SPRING, September 18, 1863--12 m.
Rebel cavalry and infantry are appearing along front of Wood, whose division holds Crittenden's left, and on right of Van Cleve, who holds Crittenden's center. Apparently it is a reconnaissance in force, but everything is ready for serious attack. Our position is excellent, with West Chickamauga River in front of greater part of our lines. Minty's cavalry and Wilder's mounted infantry on left flank, and on right two divisions cavalry under Mitchell, who succeeds Stanley, the latter being very sick. Thomas with the central corps is moving down the Chickamauga in this direction, and McCook, whose troops have all got over into this valley, except one brigade yet on Lookout Mountain, is closing up on Thomas' right. Sky cloudy, thermometer 62;perfect day for fighting. Nothing from Burnside; his cavalry at Cleveland, reported yesterday, were only scouts sent out from Byrd's brigade, which has been at Athens some time.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
CRAWFISH SPRING, September 18, 1863--5 p.m.
 Rebel demonstration to-day proves to have been reconnaissance in force. Some 10,000 men of all arms were engaged. They felt our line along Wood's position on Crittenden's left, exchanging a few shots, and attacked Minty and Wilder with vigor, compelling them to retire west of Chickamauga. Casualties not yet reported. <ar50_190>
Enemy are reported by our watchmen on Lookout Mountain as having lighted extensive camp-fires on hither side of Shields' Gap, as well as beyond. Our troops are now being drawn toward our left, and concentrated as much as possible. Rosecrans has not yet determined whether to make a night march and fall on them at daylight or to await their onset.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
CRAWFISH SPRING, September 19, 1863--10.30 a.m.
 Battle opened at 9 this morning on our right. Bragg in command of rebels. His force not yet ascertained. Engagement not yet general. His effort is to push into Chattanooga. In anticipation of this movement Thomas marched last night to our left. Crittenden pushed up behind him and McCook brought here as reserve.
As I write enemy are making diversion on our right, where Negley was left to hold fords. Negley is supported by Sheridan. An orderly of Bragg's just captured says there are reports in rebel army of Longstreet's arrival, but he does not know that they are true. Rosecrans has everything ready to grind up Bragg's flank.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
NEAR CRAWFISH SPRING, September 19, 1863--1 p.m.
 In my dispatch of this morning where it is said battle has begun on our right it should have been left. There is the fighting. Everything is going well, but the full proportions of the conflict are not yet developed. The engagement is now between here and Rossville, where Thomas has his headquarters.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
WIDOW GLENN'S, September 19, 1863--2.30 p.m.
 Fight continues to rage. Enemy, repulsed on left by Thomas, has suddenly fallen on right of our line of battle, held by Van Cleve; musketry and artillery there fierce and obstinate. Crittenden with remainder of his corps is just going in. Negleys and Sheridan's divisions and cavalry alone remain unengaged and Sheridan is ordered here, leaving Negley to hold the fords beyond Crawfish Spring. The mass of cavalry guards the gaps beyond it. Thomas loses pretty heavily in men; also lost one battery of Brannan. Decisive victory seems assured to us.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
 <ar50_191>
 WIDOW GLENN'S, September 19, 1863--3 p.m.
 Enemy, forced back by Crittenden on right, has just massed his artillery against Davis on center. His attack there is the most furious of the day. He seems giving way.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
WIDOW GLENN'S, September 19, 1863--3.20 p.m.
 Thomas reports that he is driving rebels, and will force them into Chickamauga to-night. It is evident here their line is falling back. The battle is fought altogether in a thick forest, and is invisible to outsiders. Line is 2 miles long.
4 p.m.
Negley being nearer than Sheridan has come up in his stead. Negley's first brigade is just going in. Everything is prosperous.
Sheridan is coming up. Cavalry has been brought to Crawfish Spring ready for use.
4.30 p.m.
 I do not yet dare to say our victory is complete, but it seems certain. Enemy silenced on nearly whole line. Longstreet is here. Governor Brown has taken part in battle.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
WIDOW GLENN'S, September 19, 1863--5.20 p.m.
 Firing has ceased. Reports are coming in. Enemy holds his ground in many places. We have suffered severely. Reynolds reported killed. Now appears to be undecided contest, but later reports will enable us to understand more clearly.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
WIDOW GLENN'S, September 19, 1863--7.30 p.m.
 Immediately after my last dispatch Negley opened on enemy with two fresh brigades and drove him back half a mile. The firing did not cease till all hour after dark, the feeble light of the moon favoring the combatants. This gives us decidedly the advantage in respect of ground. The result of the battle is that enemy is defeated in attempt to turn and crush our left flank and regain possession of Chattanooga. His attempt was furious and obstinate, his repulse was bloody, and maintained till the end. If he does not retreat Rosecrans will renew the fight at daylight. His dispositions are now being made. There are here two brigades and one regiment which have not been engaged at all, and two brigades which have been engaged <ar50_192> but little. At Rossville are 8,000 men of Reserve Corps not engaged at all. We have lost no prominent officer. Reynolds safe. Weather cool; favorable to wounded.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
 [SEPTEMBER 19]--8 p.m.
 We have taken about 250 prisoners, including men from thirty different regiments. We have captured 10 guns and lost 7. I cannot learn that we have lost any considerable number of prisoners. Battle-field is 3 miles north from Crawfish Spring, and about 8 south of Rossville. It is mainly in a forest 4 miles square.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
 [SEPTEMBER 19]--11 p.m.
Dr. Perin, medical director of this department, estimates the number of our wounded as not exceeding 2,000.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
CHATTANOOGA, September 20, 1863--4 p.m.
My report to-day is of deplorable importance. Chickamauga is as fatal name in our history as Bull Run. The battle began late this morning. The first cannon was fired at 9, but no considerable firing till 10. Previous to 10 Rosecrans rode the whole length of lines. All seemed promising, except columns of dust within rebel lines moving north, and report from our right that enemy had been felling timber there during night. Soon after the battle commenced Thomas, who held the left, began to call for re-enforcements. Then about 12 came word that he had been forced to retire to his second line. Re-enforcements were sent him, and McCook's whole corps, which was on right and as reserve in the center, was ordered to his assistance. Wood, of Crittenden's corps, and Van Cleve, who held the front in center, were also ordered to left, where the fury of cannonade showed that enormous rebel force was massed. Their places were filled by Davis and Sheridan, of McCook's corps. But hardly had these divisions taken their places in the line when the rebel fire, which had slackened on our left ever since it was turned and driven back about three-quarters of an hour previously, suddenly burst over in enormous volume upon our center.
Never in any battle I have witnessed was there such a mass of cannon and musketry. This lasted some twenty minutes, and then Van Cleve, on Thomas right, was seen to give way, but in tolerable order, soon after which the lines of Sheridan and Davis broke in disorder, borne down by immense columns of enemy. These columns <ar50_193> are said to have consisted of Polk's entire corps. They came through with resistless impulse, composed of brigades formed in divisions. Before them our soldiers turned and fled. It was wholesale panic. Vain were all attempts to rally them. They retreated directly across two lines of considerable ridges running parallel to our line of battle, and then most of them made their way over Missionary Ridge, and are coming here by Chattanooga Valley road. Our wagon trains have mostly got here already, and the road is full of a disordered throng of fugitives. McCook, with the right of his corps and Wilder's mounted infantry, attempted to recover the day, but it was useless. Davis and Sheridan are said to be coming off at the head of a couple of regiments in order, and Wilder's brigade marches out unbroken. Thomas, too, is coming down the Rossville road with an organized command, but all the rest is confusion. Our wounded are all left behind, some 6,000 in number. We have lost heavily in killed today. The total of our killed, wounded, and prisoners can hardly be less than 20,000, and may be much more.
How much artillery We lose I cannot guess, nor do I yet know what officers have been lost. Lytle said to be killed. Rosecrans escaped by Rossville road. Enemy not yet arrived before Chattanooga. Preparations making to resist his entrance for a time.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
CHATTANOOGA, September 20, 1863--8 p.m.
I am happy to report that my dispatch of 4 p.m. to-day proves to have given too dark a view of our disaster. Having been myself swept bodily off the battle-field by the panic-struck rabble into which the divisions of Davis and Sheridan were temporarily converted, my own impressions were naturally colored by the aspect of that part of the field. It appears, however, that only those two divisions were actually routed, and that Thomas, with the remainder of the army, still holds his part of the field. Beside the two divisions of Davis and Sheridan, those of Negley and Van Cleve were thrown into confusion, but were soon rallied and hold their places, the first on the left, the second on the right of Thomas' fighting column. In addition to this Davis and Sheridan have succeeded in rallying some 8,000 or 10,000 of the fugitives, and have also joined Thomas. This corps, consisting, after all losses, of at least 30,000 men, has still further been strengthened by the addition of that portion of the reserve lately stationed at Rossville under Granger. It has changed its front from the nearly north-and-south line of this morning, and faces the enemy in an east-and-west line. It will at once fall back to the strongest line of defense, for the purpose of defeating enemy's design of regaining Chattanooga and the Tennessee.
The latest report from Thomas is that he was driving back the advance of the rebels. In addition to these forces we have the cavalry and mounted infantry, not less than 10,000 in number, who are perfectly intact, and with this army it is not difficult to make good our lines until re-enforcements can arrive. The cavalry at our last advices had their headquarters at Crawfish Spring, where they will perhaps be able to protect our main hospital until the wounded can «13 R R--VOL XXX, PT I» <ar50_194> be brought here by the Chattanooga Valley road, which still is free from rebels.
The number of the enemy yesterday and to-day I estimate at not less than 70,000. He was able to touch and threaten our lines at all points, and still form the tremendous columns whose onset drove Thomas back and dissolved Sheridan and Davis in panic. I learn from- General Rosecrans, who himself took part in the effort previously to the final stampede of Sheridan's division, that that general charged the advancing columns of the enemy in flank. The charge was too spasmodic to be effectual; our men became involved in the rushing mass and did not break it. Rosecrans has telegraphed Burnside to hurry forward his re-enforcements. The advance of his cavalry is reported as having leached Cleveland yesterday morning.
Some gentlemen of Rosecrans' staff say Chickamauga is not very much worse than was Murfreesborough. I can testify to the conspicuous and steady gallantry of Rosecrans on the field. He made all possible efforts to rally the broken columns; nor do I see that there was any fault in the disposition of his forces.
The disaster might perhaps have been avoided but for the blunder of McCook in marching back from his previous advanced position. That blunder cost us four days of precious time.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
CHATTANOOGA, September 21, 1863--1 p.m.
 Deserters and captives both report that Ewell's corps is on its way to join Bragg. One of the latter, taken this morning by Thomas, says the corps has arrived, though not in season to fight yesterday. Is now moving on the Tennessee River above this. Longstreet, as we know, is here.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
CHATTANOOGA, September 21, 1863--2 p.m.
Garfield, chief of staff, becoming separated from Rosecrans in the route of our right wing yesterday, made his way to the left, and spent the afternoon and night with General Thomas. He arrived here before noon to-day, having witnessed the sequel of the battle in that part of the field. Thomas, finding himself cut off from Rose-crams and the right, at once brought his seven divisions into position for independent fighting. Refusing both his right and left, his line assumed the form of a horse-shoe posted along the slope and crest of a partly wooded ridge. He was soon joined by Granger from Rossville, with the brigade of McCook and division of Steedman, and with these forces firmly maintained the fight till after dark. Our troops were as immovable as the rocks they stood on. The enemy hurled against them repeatedly the dense columns which had routed Davis and Sheridan in the morning, but every onset was repulsed with dreadful slaughter. Falling first on one and then another point of our lines, for hours the rebels vainly sought to break them. <ar50_195> Thomas seemed to have filled every soldier with his own unconquerable firmness, and Granger, his hat torn by bullets, raged like a lion wherever the combat was hottest with the electrical courage of a Ney.
Every division commander bore himself gloriously, and among brigade commanders, Turchin, Hazen, and Harker especially distinguished themselves. Turchin charged through the rebel lines with the bayonet, and becoming surrounded, forced his way back again. Harker, who had two horses shot under him on the 19th, forming his men in four lines, made them lie down till the enemy were close upon him when they suddenly rose and delivered their fire with such effect that the assaulting columns fell back in confusion, leaving the ground covered with the fallen. When night fell this body of heroes stood on the same ground they had occupied in the morning, their spirit unbroken, but their numbers greatly diminished. Their losses are not yet ascertained. Van Cleve had this morning 1,200 men in the ranks, but this number will probably be doubled by evening in stragglers. Neither he, Sheridan, nor Davis fought with Thomas. The divisions of Wood, Johnson, Brannan, Palmer, Reynolds, and Baird, which never broke at all, have lost very severely. We hear unofficially from Brannan that but about 2,000 effective men remain in his division. Steedman lost one-third of his men. Thomas retired to Rossville after battle. Dispositions have been made to resist the enemy's approach on that line, but if Ewell be really there, Rosecrans will have to retreat beyond the Tennessee.
Thomas telegraphs this morning that the troops are in high spirits. He brought off all his wounded. Of those at Crawfish Spring, our main field hospital, nearly all have been brought away. It now seems probable that not more than 1,000 of our wounded are in the enemy's hands, and Rosecrans has sent flag to recover them. The number of prisoners taken by enemy is still uncertain. It will hardly surpass 3,000, besides wounded.
In artillery our loss is probably forty pieces. Many were left because all of their horses had been killed. Of rebel prisoners we have already sent 1,300 to Nashville.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
CHATTANOOGA, September 21, 1863--4.30 p.m.
 An intelligent deserter from Bragg's army who came in this morning says he belonged to Johnston's Mississippi army, that it is all here, and that Mobile has been stripped of soldiers. Granger tells me they took prisoners in the battle yesterday afternoon who said they had just come from Charleston.
Confederacy seems concentrated here.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
CHATTANOOGA, September 21, 1863.
Rosecrans has issued orders for all our troops to be concentrated here to-night. Thomas, with the forces at Rossville, will get in about <ar50_196> 11 [p.m.] unless prevented by enemy who have been fighting him this afternoon. Mitchell also reports from our right flank, where he is watching with his cavalry, that two divisions of Longstreet are advancing on him. There is no time to wait for re-enforcements, and R[osecrans] is determined not to abandon Chattanooga and [Bridgeport] without another effort. Battle here will probably be fought to-morrow or next day. Granger, who is here, says that in yesterday's battle rebels were finally defeated, and if Thomas had not withdrawn during night enemy would not have dared attack further. In last two assaults our troops fought with bayonet, their ammunition being quite exhausted.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
CHATTANOOGA, September 22, 1863---3 p.m.
Whole army withdrew into this place last night without difficulty, leaving only necessary outposts and parties of observation.
The troops arrived here about midnight in wonderful spirits, considering their excessive fatigues and heavy losses. They have been working all day improvising rifle-pits. Line of defense is about 3 miles long, crossing the peninsula some 2 miles from its extremity. It includes two redoubts erected by rebels, and is pretty strong, though much weakened by a blunder made by somebody in pushing McCook's wing half mile forward of line designed by Chief Engineer Morton. This cannot be remedied to-day, but if possible mistake repaired to-night. McCook holds the right, that noble old hero Thomas the center, the weakest part of the line, and Crittenden the left. The enemy have been approaching all morning in three columns, resisted by our advance parties, but the artillery firing has now drawn very near and battle may be fought before dark. Rosecrans estimates our effectives at 30,000 besides cavalry, but I fear our numbers are hardly so great as that. There are provisions here for fifteen days. Mass of cavalry under Mitchell has been sent across river to guard the road to Bridgeport via Jasper, and to strengthen Wilder, who is watching fords above here. Mitchell will there find forage for horses, of which none is here. Only cavalry remaining on this side are Minty's brigade, in front toward Rossville and Missionary Ridge, and Watkins' brigade, left behind by Mitchell, and now making its way over Lookout Mountain.
How large force enemy brings here, you know as well as we.
He was awfully slaughtered on Sunday, but certainly outnumbers this army even if he has received no re-enforcements. Our losses on that awful day are still uncertain. Four thousand wounded have already been sent hence to Bridgeport. General King, commanding brigade of regulars, went into action with 1,600, brought out only 450. He lost two battalions, taken prisoners. General Baird, who commanded Rousseau's division, estimates his loss in prisoners at 2,000, though his line never flinched. This army looks anxiously for re-enforcements. No signs of approach of Burnside.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
 <ar50_197>
Rosecrans is considering question of retreat from here. I judge that he thinks that unless he can have assurance of ample re-enforcements within one week, the attempt to hold this place will be much more disastrous than retreat. That part of the army which was routed on Sunday is much demoralized.
If you have any advice to give, it should come to-night.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
CHATTANOOGA, September 22, 1863--9.30 p.m.
 Rosecrans has determined to fight it out here at all hazards. The official returns show the army to consist of 35,000 effectives. There are here ten days' full rations, sufficient for twenty days in case of need. Besides it will be difficult for enemy to interfere with our hauling from Bridgeport via Jasper. Of ammunition there is enough here for two days' hard fighting in field, and this will last much longer behind rifle-pits.
The enemy will most probably attack in morning.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
CHATTANOOGA, September 23, 1863--7 a.m.
Your dispatch to me yesterday was lost before reaching me, while I was absent in the field. Please repeat.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
CHATTANOOGA, September 23, 1863--10 a.m.
 All quiet yet. Enemy is in front along our whole line. The troops rested well last night, and are greatly refreshed. Everything ready.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
CHATTANOOGA, September 23, 1863--11.30 a.m.
The net result of the campaign thus far is that we hold Chattanooga and the line of Tennessee River. It is true this result has been attended by a great battle with heavy losses, but it is certain that the enemy has suffered quite as severely as we have.
The first great object of the campaign, the possession of Chattanooga and the Tennessee line, still remains in our hands, and can be held by this army for from fifteen to twenty days against all efforts of the enemy, unless he should receive re-enforcements of overwhelming strength. But to render our hold here perfectly safe <ar50_198> no time should be lost in pushing 20,000 to 25,000 efficient troops to Bridgeport. If such re-enforcements can be got there in season, everything is safe, and this place--indispensable alike to the defense of Tennessee and as the base of future operations in Georgia--will remain ours.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
CHATTANOOGA, September 23, 1863--1.30 p.m.
 Enemy still slowly advancing three columns, but no attack yet. Our rifle-pits are now strong and every preparation complete as possible considering shortness of time. Ammunition train of 50 wagons from Bridgeport has arrived, increasing our supply materially.
Orders have been given to construct an interior line of defenses, so that 5,000 to 10,000 troops can hold the place and rest of army move wherever needed. This will probably be accomplished to-night.
Official report received from Burnside's advance, which was at Athens night before last. Mass of his forces far behind that place. R[osecrans] advises B[urnside] to come here by road on the north side Tennessee River.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
CHATTANOOGA, September 23, 1863--2 p.m.
After careful study of the disaster to our right wing on Sunday, I am of opinion that it arose from the following causes:
First, great numerical superiority of the enemy.
Second, the too great extent and consequent thinness of our line.
Third, and in its results the most fatal of all, the disobedience of orders of General McCook in placing his corps from one-third to one-half mile farther to the right than he had been directed, thus elongating the line still farther.
Fourth, the attempt of Rosecrans to re-enforce the left Wing when Thomas reported it had been forced to fall back. In this attempt he necessarily had to move troops from the right, the whole reserve being already engaged. While this movement was taking place the enemy suddenly fell upon Davis as he was marching by the left flank. The attack was tremendous, and resulted in our rout. Sheridan, who joined Davis on the latter's right, and formed the right extremity of our line, was also engaged in moving by the flank at double-quick time and in line of battle, when Davis broke. Sheridan had not time to halt, and attempted to convert his movement into a charge, but it failed, of course, and his men became routed also. Had McCook taken the right place in the morning his movement to the left, passing over a shorter distance, would sooner have been completed and Davis and Sheridan would not have been taken in flank and routed. These two generals, however, remained and rallied their men, as did Van Cleve, who was almost as badly dissolved as they; but McCook and Crittenden, two corps commanders, made their way <ar50_199> here and slept here all night, and did not look after their troops till Monday. True they were tired, but so were those who remained and fought the glorious battle of Sunday afternoon, in which Granger would seem to have been right when he pronounced the enemy defeated and urged Thomas to disregard Rosecrans' order to retire on the ground that latter was at Chattanooga ignorant of the facts.
 [(C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
CHATTANOOGA, September 24, 1863---8 a.m.
Your telegrams of last night and this morning received. Have no further doubt about this place; it will hold out. Indeed, it has now been made so strong that it can only be taken by regular siege. The labors of this army for last forty-eight hours have been herculean. As soon as Hooker arrives and Sherman and Hurlbut make their appearance in Tuscumbia Valley, it will be able to resume the offensive irresistibly.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
CHATTANOOGA, September 24, 1863--11 a.m.
 No attack yet. Division rebel cavalry advanced from Stevens' Gap on Lookout Mountain yesterday and compelled a regiment R[osecrans] had left at Summertown, on the head of mountain, to guard signal station to retire. Another rebel column on Missionary Ridge on east side Chattanooga Valley, and no doubt mass of their infantry is in that valley in front of us. R[osecrans] will make reconnaissance in force to-day.
With our present defenses it is very desirable they should attack us.
 [(C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
CHATTANOOGA, September 24, 1863--12 m.
Words telegram 21st you desire repeated are:
With the electrical courage of a Ney.
My cipher clerk, myself, shall be more careful.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
CHATTANOOGA, September 24, 1863.
 In my report yesterday upon causes of Sunday's disaster to our right wing I omitted to mention, under my second head, that, before the battle began, Rosecrans evidently saw that his line was too long, and then attempted to shorten it. To this end he withdrew Negley's division from the place assigned to it, between Reynolds and Brannan, <ar50_200> and placed Negley as a support, behind Baird, on the extreme left. The gap thus made in the line  he filled by moving Brannan, Johnson, and Wood to the left, leaving a gap which he intended to fill by crowding Davis and Sheridan likewise to the left, which would have made the whole line shorter by the extent of one division. But before this operation could be completed the battle became so hot that, instead of filling this gap in the manner he had intended, he had to precipitate Van Cleve's division into it, thus leaving himself no reserves and no means of re-enforcing the left wing, except by withdrawing forces from his right, and in the very act of this withdrawal the enemy fell upon him.
It is plain that having committed an error in too much extending his line originally, he committed another and a more pregnant error in the mode of contracting it which he adopted.
The fatal consequences of these errors might have been escaped but for the act of that dangerous blunderhead McCook, who always imperils everything.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
CHATTANOOGA, September 24, 1863--8.30 p.m.
 Reconnaissance in force to-day shows enemy encamped on Chattanooga Creek along base Lookout Mountain. Probably other camps east of Missionary Ridge on Chickamauga. No other places near here where an army can find water. No distinct evidence rebels intend attack Chattanooga, nor is it certain all Bragg's army is here, nor are there any signs he is moving elsewhere.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
CHATTANOOGA, September 25, 1863--10.30 a.m.
 No demonstration from enemy. A captain of our cavalry out on scouting expedition with 35 men came in last night, making his way through Bragg's camps on Chickamauga east of Missionary Ridge. Led by a shrewd guide he came through by-ways in the woods, and was not seen till he reached infantry pickets at west base of ridge, and there he dashed through, losing 4 men. He reports the Chickamauga Valley full of rebels. Evidently gross of rebel army is there. McCook reports this morning from our right that noise of wagons and artillery moving was heard during the night. He thinks rebel force discovered on Chattanooga Creek by reconnaissance yesterday has been withdrawn from fear of being cut off, a thing Rosecrans had determined to try.
A negro brought in from Forrest's cavalry last night reports that since Monday 10,000 men have left Bragg for Mobile. Among our wounded prisoners are 10 or 12 who say they belong to General Ewell's corps. Rebel General Adams, wounded, in hospital here, says slaughter in their army was awful, and he has enough of war.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
<ar50_201>
CHATTANOOGA, September 25, 1863--11.30 a.m.
Advices from Burnside received this morning. He was at Carter's Depot 23d; had defeated rebels there and burned bridge. Was about to move hitherward with whole available force. Will probably get here about Wednesday next week.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
CHATTANOOGA, September 25, 1863--9 p.m.
No change of importance. Rebels still remain in Chattanooga Valley; report they had withdrawn erroneous. Telegraph cut to-day between here and Bridgeport. New line ordered on north side Tennessee.
 [C. A. DANA].
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
CHATTANOOGA, September 26, 1863--10 a.m.
Enemy pushed forward his pickets on our left at 5 a.m. to-day, driving in ours. Sharp skirmish ensued, rebels being driven at 6.30. General Palmer received severe flesh wound while standing in embrasure of one of our forts. Our loss otherwise inconsiderable. We took several prisoners from Breckinridge's division, who report the main rebel force encamped along Missionary Ridge. We have reports that rebel cavalry have appeared in Lookout. Valley, threatening Bridgeport, but other evidence contradict them. R[osecrans] is about to lay a bridge across Tennessee at mouth of Lookout Creek, so that he can operate from here in that valley without crossing the mountain. Weather bright, cool, pleasant.
 [C. A. DANA].
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
CHATTANOOGA, September 27, 1863.
A very serious fermentation reigns in the Twentieth and Twenty-first Army Corps, and, indeed, throughout this whole army, growing out of events connected with the battle on Sunday last.
I have already reported that the generals of those two corps left the field of battle amid the rout of the right wing, made their way here with the crowd of fugitives, and went to sleep, while one division of each corps remained fighting with the left wing to the end. The generals of division and of brigade feel deeply this desertion of their commanders, and say, as I am informed on good evidence, for only two or three have spoken to me on the subject, that they can no longer serve under such superiors, and that if it is required of them they must resign. This feeling is universal among them, including men like Major-Generals Palmer and Sheridan and Brigadier-Generals Wood, Johnson, and Hazen. What is the sentiment <ar50_202> of Davis I do not know, but I judge from his expressions on a kindred subject that he must agree with the others.
Of course this is a matter which I cannot directly inquire into, and cannot be so fully informed about as if it were an ordinary affair. The feeling in the case of McCook is deepened by the recollection of his faults at Perryville and Murfreesborough, and of the great waste of life which they caused; while toward Crittenden it is relieved somewhat by consideration for his excellent heart, general good sense, and charming social qualities. Against these, however, is balanced the fact, which I can testify to from my own observation, that he is constantly wanting in attention to the duties of his command, never rides his lines, or exercises any special care for the well-being and safety of his troops, and, in fact, discharges no other function than that of a medium for the transmission of orders.
The feeling of the officers I have mentioned above does not seem in the least to partake of a mutinous or disorderly character; it is rather conscientious unwillingness to risk their men and the country's cause in hands proved to be so uncertain and unsafe. No formal representation of this unwillingness has been made to Rosecrans, but he has been made aware of the state of things by private conversations with several of the parties. The defects of his character complicate the difficulty. He abounds in friendliness and approbativeness, and is greatly lacking in firmness and steadiness of will. He is a temporizing man, dreads so heavy an alternative as is now presented, and hates to break with McCook and Crittenden. Besides, there is a more serious obstacle to his acting decisively in the fact that if Crittenden and McCook fled to Chattanooga, with the sound of artillery in their ears, from that glorious field where Thomas and Granger were saving their army and their country's honor, he fled also; and although it may be said in his excuse that, under the circumstances, it was proper for the commanding general to go to his base of operations, while the corps commanders ought to remain with their troops, still he feels that that excuse cannot entirely clear him either in his own eyes or in those of the army. In fact, it is perfectly plain that while the subordinate commanders will not resign if he is retained in the chief command, as I believe they certainly will if McCook and Crittenden are not relieved, their respect for him as a general has received an irreparable blow. And that not from his abandonment of the army alone but from his faulty management on the field, especially in leaving a gap of a whole brigade distance between the divisions of Wood and Davis, and not providing for it till after the battle had become furious, when he attempted to fill it with Van Cleve's forces as I have explained in former reports. But for this gap General Davis thinks the enemy could not have broken his lines and routed the right wing. Thus you will see that here in the face of the enemy this army is in a dangerous condition. The officers who have taken this grave resolution are among the bravest and most discreet in our service. In my judgment the removal of Crittenden and McCook is imperatively required, not merely as a matter of discipline, but to preserve the efficacy, not to say the organization, of this army.
If it be decided to change the chief commander also, I would take the liberty of suggesting that some Western general of high rank and great prestige, like Grant, for instance, would be preferable as his successor to any one who has hitherto commanded in East alone.
I should add that Rosecrans himself intends to punish Negley for <ar50_203> having withdrawn his division from the battle on Sunday without orders and with his ranks undisturbed, he having been directed to post himself behind Baird on the extreme left; and all parties feel that Van Cleve ought to he relieved on account of his age, and the utter confusion of mind and incapacity which he manifested on Saturday and Sunday both.
 C. A. DANA.
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
CHATTANOOGA, September 28, 1863--4 a.m.
All quiet along the lines. Enemy apparently lying still, except occasional picket skirmishing. We are fortifying. We know that rebels have force at all points in Chattanooga Valley in our front, but their principal camps are on the Chickamauga, just over Missionary Ridge. Our signal officers have deciphered signals from their signal stations showing that Longstreet is still here. We learn from prisoners and from a flag of truce Rosecrans sent out yesterday that two brigades of Longstreet's corps have come up since the battle. Bragg yesterday agreed to surrender our wounded after paroling them, and to allow supplies to be sent to those who cannot be moved. I go to Nashville to-day; will be here again Thursday.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
NASHVILLE, September 29, 1863--8 a.m.
 Arrived here at 6 a.m. All quiet at Bridgeport, except that pickets occasionally fire across the Tennessee. No considerable rebel force in that vicinity. Railroad bridge there will soon be done, and that over Running Water also ready to put up. Hooker will first he stationed at Wauhatchie in Lookout Valley, at the junction of the Chattanooga and Trenton and Memphis and Charleston Rail roads. Weather warm, pleasant.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
NASHVILLE, September 29, 1863.
 An intelligent refugee from Georgia arrived here yesterday. His name is Upsham and he has a brother who is post quartermaster at Dalton, which place he left two days after Chickamauga battle. He says that the facts he states were learned by him in his brother's office.
According to his report when Bragg retreated from Chattanooga he had but 25,000 men. He was re-enforced by Longstreet, with the divisions of Hood and McLaws, 21,000 men; together with Buckner, from East Tennessee, with 10,000; by Joe Johnston, from Mississippi, with the division of Breckinridge, 8,000 strong, and one brigade <ar50_204> from McCown's division, about 3,000 strong, while Governor Brown furnished 15,000 Georgia militia armed with shot-guns and squirrel rifles, who were not to remain after the battle.
Upsham says Bragg had no intention to flank or outwit Rosecrans, but simply to crush his army, and that the result is felt to be failure. General Gillem tells me he will have the Northwestern Railroad to Reynoldsburg finished two months hence.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
NASHVILLE, September 30, 1863.
Six thousand one hundred wounded are suddenly accumulated here from the battle-field of the Chickamauga, and, on representation of the medical officers that it is indispensable for the proper care of these wounded that Surgeon Clendenin, who has been ordered to West Virginia, should remain here for the present, I have taken the liberty to authorize it until you can be heard from. Please confirm or withdraw the permission thus given.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
NASHVILLE, September 30, 1863.
Since my dispatch of the 27th, several officers of prominence and worth--such as General Garfield, General Wood, and Colonel Opdycke--have spontaneously waited upon me to represent the state of feeling in the army upon the subject of that dispatch.
They all confirm in the strongest manner the tenor of that report, and tell me in addition that the same conviction pervades all ranks; in fact, I was myself aware that the soldiers believed victory to be impossible so long as McCook and Crittenden command army corps.
The other day, as General Rosecrans was making one of those little speeches to a group of men which it is his constant practice to deliver as he passes among them, a soldier asked him if General McCook still commanded the Twentieth Army Corps. "Yes," was the answer. "Then the right will be licked again," said the man; and all the others agreed with him. This Colonel Opdycke represents as the unanimous sentiment respecting both the generals in question, and I have no doubt he is right.
I learn also, confidentially, from these officers and others, that the soldiers have lost their attachment for General Rosecrans since he failed them in the battle, and that they now do not cheer him until they are ordered to do so by officers.
On the other hand, General Thomas has risen to the highest point in their esteem, as he has in that of every one who witnessed his conduct on that unfortunate and glorious day; and should there be a change in the chief command, there is no other man whose appointment would be so welcome to this army. I would earnestly recommend that in such an event his merits be considered. He is certainly an officer of the very highest qualities, soldierly and <ar50_205> personal. He refused before because a battle was imminent and he unacquainted with the combinations. No such reason now exists, and I presume that he would accept.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
NASHVILLE, September 30, 1863.
Nothing important occurred at Chattanooga yesterday. Four regiments, Steinwehr's division, passed through here to Bridgeport last night. One division of Sherman's corps arrived at Louisville yesterday. I return to Chattanooga this afternoon.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
CHATTANOOGA, October 3, 1863--12 m.
Yours of 30th arrived here at midnight last night. Wheeler, with a force of cavalry, forded the Tennessee Wednesday night [30th] at various places above and below Washington. The highest statement concerning this force is that it consisted of two divisions; the lowest, two brigades. Crook, with two small brigades, was lying along the river watching the fords, but was unable to prevent the rebels from crossing.
Immediately on receiving this news, Rosecrans ordered General Edward M. McCook with a division of cavalry about Bridgeport to hasten to the Sequatchie Valley to protect our wagon trains. McCook marched Thursday, but the violent storm that day prevented his reaching Anderson, the distance being 39 miles, in season, and Wheeler fell upon a train yesterday morning at the foot of the mountain where the road rises out of the Sequatchie Valley. The Twenty-first Kentucky Infantry, which was there to guard the wagons, made a gallant fight, but was driven back, and the wagons were destroyed. How many were lost is unknown, but probably from 250 to 300, all belonging to Fourteenth Corps. One-third of them contained ammunition. McCook being not far off soon attacked the rebels and drove them up the valley, but we have no particulars. When McCook was ordered up from Bridgeport, Burnside was also requested to send his cavalry down the west bank of the Tennessee to cut off Wheeler's retreat, and if he has done so it is hardly possible Wheeler should escape. Under Bragg's agreement, 1,742 Union wounded have been brought from Crawfish Spring within our lines, and about 750 remain in his hands, of whom one-third can be moved, leaving 500 severe cases which must remain. In return for those already delivered to us he demands an equal number of well men from among rebel prisoners taken at Chickamauga. This Rosecrans has decisively refused.
Of our surgeons, 52 were left behind with our wounded, and 4 rebel surgeons came into our hands. The latter Rosecrans released, and Bragg thereupon released 4 of ours, but refuses to release any more on the ground that we have detained rebel surgeons at the East contrary <ar50_206> to the cartel, and Dr. Flewellen, Bragg's medical director, has notified our surgeons that they will not only be removed to Atlanta, but be confined in prison.
Dr. Perin, medical director, Department of the Cumberland, informs me that he has ample medical supplies, but is temporarily prevented from moving them here from Nashville by the monopoly of the road transporting soldiers. Of medical officers he has already received 8 from Saint Louis, but owing to Bragg's sequestration will need 30 more.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
CHATTANOOGA, October 4, 1863--11 a.m.
No direct advices from McCook's cavalry since Rosecrans' dispatch to Halleck yesterday, but Colonel Palmer, of Anderson Cavalry, on western slope Walden's Ridge, reports last evening that enemy was hotly engaged by McCook, and was retreating toward McMinnville. That place was attacked yesterday morning by another detachment of Wheeler's which had moved by way of Pikeville. The telegraph to McMinnville being cut, no particulars have reached us. Stores at McMinnville moderate in amount. Hooker has been ordered to post strong detachments of Twelfth Corps along railroad till this raid is over.
No news of Burnside's cavalry, nor of Crook's cavalry brigade belonging to this army, which was concentrated after enemy had forced the passage of the Tennessee and started in pursuit. Affairs here unchanged; enemy apparently still in force from Lookout Mountain on west to Missionary Ridge on east.
Approximate returns from Chickamauga battle make our total loss 1,536 killed, 8,747 wounded, 4,998 missing.(*) Of cannon we lost 36 and captured 2. Of rebel prisoners we took 2,005. Assistant Surgeon Walton, Eighty-sixth Indiana, captured by rebels and since released, reports that he was on battle-field during Monday and Tuesday after contest, and carefully endeavored to ascertain enemy's comparative loss. He concludes it was double ours, and many Confederate officers thought so too. Even on Wednesday they had not yet finished burying their dead or begun to bury ours. The Atlanta Appeal of Wednesday last states that the rebel wounded had all been moved there from the field, except 2,500 cases which could not bear removal. Same paper says Bragg has two hundred guns, including some siege guns, bearing on Chattanooga.
I ask your attention to the case of General Negley. Being ordered to post himself behind Baird's division in the battle of Chickamauga, he seems to have sent one of his brigades somewhere to the left, but General Baird tells me it did not come to him. With the remainder of his force Negley took up a position out of fire in the rear, and a little to the left of the place from which he had been ordered to move, and there remained doing nothing till about noon, when the conflict had grown hot, when he marched his troops to Rossville without firing a shot, leaving the rest of Thomas' corps to fight the desperate battle without help from him. These facts were stated to me by <ar50_207> R[osecrans], who, when I said Negley ought to be shot, answered, "That is my opinion." He added that he should have him punished, yet now he has determined to do nothing more than apply to have him relieved and ordered elsewhere.
Engineers are now engaged upon the pontoon bridge to cross the Tennessee at mouth of Lookout Creek. Nothing done yet on interior fortifications here, without which a very large garrison is necessary.
General Thomas desires me to say to you that he is deeply obliged to you for good opinion.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
CHATTANOOGA, October 4, 1863--1 p.m.
Sheridan reports rebels very active building works on Lookout Mountain and thinks they are massing cannon there.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
CHATTANOOGA, October 5, 1863--9 a.m.
 All quiet in front. Rebels seem to be intrenching themselves, but this cannot be positively known, as their lines are covered by woods. One of our trestle bridges over the Tennessee here gave way last night, owing to a rise in the river, and the other bridge threatens to fail. A new pontoon bridge will take their place to-day. Two 30-pounder Parrotts have arrived and are placed in Fort Wood, on our left. The largest rifle guns in this army previously were 3-inch.
At McMinnville the rebels captured a Tennessee infantry regiment, about 250 strong, also one locomotive and eleven cars, which they burned. Notice of their approach and full instructions had been sent there in season. Burnside telegraphed last night inquiring if it was true rebel cavalry had crossed Tennessee. As he was not only notified of the fact four days ago, but promised to send his cavalry in pursuit, this inquiry is astonishing. It proves that he has done nothing. Had he taken the proper measures to protect the left flank of this army this disaster could not have happened, and unless he acts now he will probably be responsible for worse calamities.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
CHATTANOOGA, October 5, 1863.
I learn that part or all of my first report of the second day of the great battle was translated and shown about at Nashville on the evening of that day. Horace Maynard even repeated at Cincinnati, a few days ago, a whole sentence of it. General R. S. Granger is said to have had it. I have inquired of him respecting the facts, and <ar50_208> suggest to you that I ought to have a new cipher with many more arbitrary words and combinations less easy to discover. You ought also to deal with your faithless subordinates who betrayed me.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
CHATTANOOGA, October 5, 1863.
 General R. S. GRANGER,
Nashville:
GENERAL: I am informed that on the evening of the 20th ultimo, or soon afterward, you were in possession of part or all of a dispatch of mine to the Secretary of War. Will you kindly oblige me by telling me if my information be correct, and, if so, by whom this dispatch was communicated to you?
Yours, very respectfully,
 C. A. DANA.
-----
CHATTANOOGA, October 5, 1863--4 p.m.
 About 1 o'clock rebels opened from batteries planted on eastern slope of Lookout Mountain, and also from 2 guns on the west base of Missionary Ridge, and have been firing steadily but not rapidly since. On Lookout and low spur thereof, which stretches eastwardly toward Chattanooga Creek, they fire 7 guns in all. They are apparently shooting to get the range. No damage done. Knoxville Register, now issued at Atlanta, says, in its impression of 3d instant, that Polk and Hindman have come to Atlanta under arrest, by order of General Bragg, for disobedience in second day's battle.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
CHATTANOOGA, October 6, 1863--4 p.m.
 Result of rebel bombardment yesterday was that 1 private artilleryman, Stanley's brigade, Negley's division, Fourteenth Corps, had foot shattered and leg amputated. No other casualty. Firing not yet resumed to-day. Chattanooga Rebel, 4th instant, published at Atlanta, says re-enforcements are constantly going forward to Bragg. Stevenson's division went up last Saturday. This is a Vicksburg division. Tennessee here fell 4 inches last night, and the remaining trestle bridge is safe for the present. New pontoon bridge nearly completed. A boom of heavy logs is being stretched across above the bridges to guard them against objects that may be sent down the river by the rebels. Baldy Smith, appointed chief engineer of the department, infuses much energy and judgment into that branch of the operations. The news? consolidation of the two corps reached here last night in a Nashville newspaper; not having been previously promulgated it caused sensation. Crittenden was much excited; said as the Government no longer required his services he would resign to-day. At any rate, he would not hibernate like others, drawing pay and doing no work. He has admirable qualities of character. McCook takes it easily. <ar50_209>
Reports of corps, division, and brigade commanders in recent battle now nearly all in. Careful examination of them seems to prove that the gap in the lines through which the enemy poured, flanking and routing all of three divisions and a part of a fourth, was caused by an order of the commanding general. They prove also that there was much confusion and uncertainty in the general movements of the day, though the probability still remains very strong that but for this unfortunate order we should have gained a decisive victory.
To make the case clear to you, let me state the position of the various divisions. On the extreme left was Baird, supported by one brigade of Negley, which had moved there, leaving the remainder of division under Negley halting in rear of Brannan, though he had been ordered to move his whole force to support Baird. Next to Baird was Palmer; next to Palmer, Johnson; next to Johnson, Reynolds. At least such was the original order, but after the line was formed, a gap appearing between Johnson and Reynolds, and the latter having no reserve, inasmuch as his third brigade, Wilder's, being mounted, was detached and posted on the extreme right, under McCook, Brannan's reserve brigade was marched into this gap and fought there. Next to Reynolds, on his right, stood Brannan, and next to Brannan, in the original line, Negley. When that line was formed Wood and Van Cleve, of Crittenden's corps, were both held in reserve, while McCook with the two divisions remaining under his command, Davis' and Sheridan's, flanked on the right by Wilder's mounted infantry, was to hold the right, and also to be ready to re-enforce the left when necessary. On taking Negley out to support Baird, Wood, of Crittenden's corps, was ordered to fill Negley's place and did so, having Davis closed in upon his right, as McCook maintains, though Davis tells me that there was always a space between him and Wood. However that may be, it is now certain that the fatal gap was caused by an order of Rosecrans issued at fifteen minutes before 11 a.m. R[osecrans] had been informed by a staff officer of Thomas' that Brannan had been ordered out of the line to support the extreme left, and supposing him to have left the line accordingly, R[osecrans] sent a written order to Wood "to close up on Reynolds and support him." When Wood received this order he was, as he says, in some doubt about obeying it, as Brannan was between him and Reynolds, and thus he could not close up on Reynolds, but supposing from the additional words, "and support him," that Reynolds must be hard pressed and in danger, he at once took his command out of the line and marched past the rear of Brannan to the rear of Reynolds' right, where he found that Reynolds needed no support. McCook endeavored to close the vacancy thus left by Wood by moving Davis to the left, but before this could be accomplished, the enemy had broken through and all was over in that part of the field.
Had Wood remained in the line, there is little reason to doubt that the partial repulse which the enemy suffered from our diminished forces later in the day would have been changed into a complete and final victory for us.
General Rosecrans says that in obeying this order Wood was guilty of an error of judgment; that he should have seen in the fact that it required him to close up on Reynolds evidence that it was based on mistaken information, and should therefore have remained where he was. To this Wood replies that he was partially of that opinion, but that he consulted General McCook, who was with him at the «14 R R--VOL XXX, PT I» <ar50_210> moment, and the latter advised him not to take the responsibility of disobeying a written order, especially as he could not know what was passing on the part of the field where he was ordered to go.
I judge from intimations that have reached me that in writing his own report General Rosecrans will elaborately show that the blame of his failure in this great battle rests on the Administration; that is, on the Secretary of War and General-in-Chief, who did not foresee Bragg would be re-enforced, and who compelled him to move forward without cavalry enough, and very inadequately prepared in many other respects.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
CHATTANOOGA, October 8, 1863--8 a.m.
 We have heard nothing of Burnside since the 4th, nor anything positive from his troops. But some things have occurred in the rebel lines which give ground for the surmise that he is executing the third of the plans he proposed ten days since. That plan was to throw out a flanking force toward the enemy's army before Chattanooga, and with his main body to move rapidly, without baggage, against Dalton, Rome, and Atlanta, destroying railroad and bridges as he went along, and after burning depots and shops in the three places above mentioned, strike for the Atlantic coast.
Now, on the 5th instant, cannonade was heard in the direction of Ringgold, and on the 6th, forenoon, the sounds of a battle were distinguished east of Missionary Ridge, in that direction.
More than this, the combat was actually witnessed on that day by one of the signal stations from Walden's Ridge, by two civilians, and Col. Daniel McCook, from his post at the mouth of Chickamauga. It lasted for some hours, and from the descriptions of the witnesses, none of whom, however, saw it near enough to distinguish who the combatants actually were, it was the attempt of a weak party to resist the advance of a strong one. In addition to this evidence, on the night of the 6th the whole rebel camps were in motion as if they were about to retreat, and their guns on Lookout Mountain were all brought down. Now, this was either a conflict with Burnside's flanking column or a mutiny, more probably the former. An intelligent deserter who came in last night, and who arrived in Chattanooga Valley on the 5th, knows nothing of any such engagement. This deserter, a paroled man from Vicksburg, reports that all the troops captured there are being brought back into service.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
CHATTANOOGA, October 8, 1863--10 a.m.
All our reports show that Wheeler broke up railroad, destroyed bridges between Wartrace and Murfreesborough. At M[urfreesborough] sacked the town but did nothing to fortifications. Wheeler sent detachment, about 2,000, to Wartrace, where Colonel Lowe overtook them, afternoon of 6th, just as they were about to fire the <ar50_211> town, and after they had burned railroad bridge, fought them an hour, drove them toward Shelbyville, and pursued 3 miles till stopped by darkness. On 7th, Mitchell, with main cavalry force, Crook having joined him, overtook them at Shelbyville [Farmington] and put them to flight, killing 100 and capturing 200. Butterfield, who came up during this action with Lowe's cavalry and a regiment of Grangers infantry from Wartrace, reports that Mitchell will probably capture and destroy all of Wheeler's force.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
CHATTANOOGA, October 8, 1863--11 a.m.
 A sergeant of Fifth (rebel) Kentucky Regiment, who deserted to us this morning, says it was understood in the rebel camps in Chattanooga Valley that the firing beyond Missionary Ridge on the 6th was occasioned by the refusal of a brigade of Georgia militia, 5,000 strong, to cross the State line. The result of fight deserter does not know.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
CHATTANOOGA, October 8, 1863.
General Rousseau, who seems to be regarded throughout this army as an ass of eminent gifts, having reported to General Thomas that you had inquired how the army would like to have him in the chief command, that officer has sent a confidential friend to me to say that while he would gladly accept any command out of this department to which you might see fit to assign him, he could not consent to become the successor of General Rosecrans, because he would not do anything to give countenance to the suspicion that he had intrigued against his commander. Besides he has as perfect confidence in capacity and fidelity of Rosecrans as he had in those of General Buell.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
CHATTANOOGA, October 8, 1863--1 p.m.
The consolidation of the two corps is universally well received, and being followed by a general reorganization of the army, with consolidation of reduced regiments and new and more equal combinations of brigades and divisions, must produce the most happy consequences. The men, however, of the consolidated corps are somewhat troubled by letters from home, showing that their friends regard the consolidation as a token of disgrace and punishment. It is very desirable to obviate any such feeling, especially as of the six divisions composing the consolidated corps, three fought with heroism and <ar50_212> success throughout the battle. Will it not then be practicable to publish an order at Washington, complimenting the steadiness and gallantry of the two corps, and putting the consolidation on the ground of the great reduction in their numbers, and especially on necessity of rendering our brigades numerically more equal to those of the enemy against which they are sent to fight?
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
CHATTANOOGA, October 9, 1863--11 a.m.
Deserters yesterday reported Bragg making hard bread and constructing pontoons at LaFayette. Last evening our pickets reported his troops to be felling trees in front as if to obstruct roads. Pickets this morning, however, seem to have noticed nothing of the sort during the night, nor is any special symptom reported. Bragg's force is now said by some deserters to be 80,000, by others 125,000.
Chattanooga Rebel of 6th, published at Marietta, contains Polk's farewell to his soldiers on being relieved. He says he retires from the army. Cheatham succeeds to the command of corps. Same paper says these are reports. Jeff. Davis on his way to the seat of war in Tennessee. It also publishes a letter from Davis to Confederate Society, of Enterprise, Miss., formed to keep currency at par with gold. He says:
The passion for speculation has seduced citizens of all classes from a determined prosecution of the war to a sordid effort to amass money.
And also--
I am burdened by the complaining and despondent letters of many who have stood all the day idle, and now blame anybody but themselves for reverses which have come and dangers which threaten.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
 [OCTOBER 9]--12.30 p.m.
An intelligent Union citizen who has just got in from beyond rebel lines reports Bragg's main body retreating to Dalton. Forage very scarce with rebels as with us. We are now losing some twenty animals daily of starvation, in addition to the usual mortality.
Work on interior fortifications actively begun. When finished, with garrison of 10,000 men, Chattanooga will be absolutely impregnable.
I desire to call your attention to the fact that there are too few telegraph operators between Chattanooga an(t Nashville, and that many of those we have are drunken, worthless fellows, who should be dismissed immediately.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
 <ar50_213>
 CHATTANOOGA, October 10, 1863--2 p.m.
No demonstration from enemy. Union people from Cleveland report Bragg's main body retiring to Dalton. General Pillow has taken command of conscript bureau at Marietta. Buckner has taken command of Polk's corps. Lieutenant-Colonel Napier, commanding Eighth Georgia Battalion, advertises $2,800 reward for 96 deserters from seven companies.
President Davis is positively announced as on his way to visit Bragg's army.
The reorganization of our forces here, consequent on consolidation of the two corps, is nearly complete. The combination of divisions and brigades is as follows:
Fourth Corps.--First Division, Major-General Palmer: First Brigade, Cruft, nine regiments, 2,044 men; Second Brigade, Brigadier-General Whitaker, eight regiments, 2,035 men; Third Brigade, Colonel Grose, eight regiments, 1,968 men. Second Division, Sheridan: First Brigade, Brigadier-General Steedman, ten regiments, 2,385 men; Second Brigade, Brigadier-General Wagner, eight regiments, 2,188 men; Third Brigade, Colonel Harker, 2,026 men. Third Division, Wood: First Brigade, Willich, nine regiments, 2,069 men; Second Brigade, Brigadier-General Hazen, nine regiments, 2,195 men; Third Brigade, Brig. Gen. Samuel Beatty, eight regiments, 2,222 men.
Fourteenth Corps.--First Division, Rousseau: First Brigade, Brigadier-General Carlin, nine regiments, 2,072 men; Second Brigade, Brigadier-General King, four regiments regulars and four regiments volunteers, 2,070 men; Third Brigade, Brigadier-General Starkweather, eight regiments, 2,214 men. Second Division, J. C. Davis: First Brigade, Morgan, five regiments, 2,285 men; Second Brigade, Brig. Gen. John Beatty, seven regiments, 2,460 men; Third Brigade, Col. Daniel McCook, six regiments, 2,099 men. Third Division, Brigadier-General Baird: First Brigade, Turchin, seven regiments, 2, 175 men; Second Brigade, Colonel Van Derveer, seven regiments, 2,116 men; Third Brigade, Colonel Croxton, seven regiments, 2,165 men.
This does not include those portions of the late Reserve Corps which still remain as garrisons along the railroad and elsewhere in Tennessee. It does, however, include the troops under General Morgan who have occupied Stevenson, Bridgeport, and Battle Creek until relieved by Hooker. It is intended to divide Tennessee into two districts, the northern commanded by General R. S. Granger, having his headquarters at Nashville, and the southern under General Johnson, having his headquarters at Stevenson.
The department staff is also reorganized by the appointment of Major-General Reynolds chief of staff, General Smith chief engineer, and General Brannan chief of artillery. The artillery, heretofore serving one battery with each brigade, will now be attached to divisions only, three batteries to each division, the remainder being organized as a reserve.
These changes, and especially the remarkable strength of the new staff, cannot fail to add much to the discipline and efficiency of the army.
McCook and Crittenden have just left.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
 <ar50_214>
CHATTANOOGA, October 10, 1863--5 p.m.
 Rebels are holding reviews to-day, and troops hitherto posted near Lookout Mountain have been moved east to Missionary Ridge for this purpose. Possibly Jefferson Davis is with them.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 [Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]
-----
CHATTANOOGA, October 11, 1863--9 a.m.
 The dispatch disclosed was the first one of September 20. General R. S. Granger explains that, being very anxious for news, he went with General Gillem to the telegraph office as my dispatch was passing through, some portions of which were guessed at by the operator. The person who guessed out the dispatch was Mr. Smith, who informed us at the time "it was mere surmise, as he had no key to the cipher." It is rather curious, however, that the agent of the Associated Press at Louisville, in a private printed circular, quoted me as authority for reporting the battle as a total defeat, while Horace Maynard repeated in Cincinnati the entire second sentence of the dispatch. If practicable, send me a cipher whose meaning no operator can guess out.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 Major ECKERT.
-----
CHATTANOOGA, October 12, 1863--8 a.m.
 Reports arrived last night from up the river to the effect that the rebels are concentrating a force on the Hiwassee at a point about 12 miles from its mouth. These reports lack confirmation, but they are very probable, and agree with the apparent disappearance of Longstreet from our front.
If a serious attempt should be made by Bragg to march into Kentucky, this army will find itself in a very helpless and dangerous position. Owing to the destruction of our wagon train by Wheeler, on the 2d instant, with all the forage on board which had been brought to Stevenson, and the subsequent occupation of the railroad transporting Hooker's troops, with its interruption by Wheeler and by guerrillas, our animals have had no regular supply of forage for ten days. Corn enough has been hauled from the Sequatchie Valley, from the Tennessee bottoms below Bridgeport, and from places up the river 30 and 40 miles distant, to furnish the mass of the animals with about quarter rations, while all that could be sent away have been taken to Stevenson to be fed as best they might. The result is that a large number, say 250, have died of starvation, in addition to the usual mortality, and those which remain are already so debilitated as to render impracticable any efficient attack or pursuit of the enemy marching through East Tennessee toward Kentucky.
Nor is this all. We have now on hand here but two days rations for the troops, with bad mountain roads from hence to the west base of Walden's Ridge, while from thence to Bridgeport the roads pass through the bottoms of the Sequatchie and the Tennessee, which a little rain will render impracticable.
In addition to all this the road used for empty trains from here to Walden's Ridge was yesterday rendered impassable by a few rebel <ar50_215> sharpshooters posted on the south bank of the river at a place some 5 miles from here, where this road runs for a mile or so along the bank. It is true that we have here at Chattanooga one steamboat in good running order which can navigate the river with 27 inches water, and that another is nearly completed at Bridgeport which will run with 12 inches, and that flat-boats for towage have been prepared there. Could the river be used, 400 tons freight might daily be delivered here. But the same military error which gave the enemy control of the south shore between here and Bridgeport, and which is illustrated by the stoppage of our trains by sharpshooters, deprives us of the power of using our steamboats, and also prevents our rebuilding and using the railroad between here and Bridgeport. That error is the abandonment of Lookout Mountain to the rebels. Immediately after the retreat to Chattanooga, Rosecrans ordered the withdrawal of Spears' brigade, which held the head of the mountain, and the destruction of the wagon road which winds along its side at about one-third of its height and connects the valleys of Chattanooga and Lookout. Both Granger and Garfield earnestly protested against this order and contended that the mountain and the road could be held by not more than seven regiments against the whole power of the enemy, whether he should attack from below or, passing up Stevens' Gap, make his approach by the road extending longitudinally upon the crest. There can, I think, be no question that they were right, but Rosecrans, who is sometimes as obstinate and inaccessible to reason as at others he is irresolute, vacillating, and inconclusive, pettishly rejected all their arguments, and the mountain was given up. It is difficult to say which was the greater error, this order or that which on the day of battle created the gap in our lines. At any rate, such is our present situation: our animals starved and the men with starvation before them, and the enemy bound to make desperate efforts to dislodge us. In the midst of this the commanding general devotes that part of the time which is not employed in pleasant gossip to the composition of a long report to prove that the Government is to blame for his failure. It is my duty to declare that while few persons exhibit more estimable social qualities, I have never seen a public man possessing talent with less administrative power, less clearness and steadiness in difficulty, and greater practical incapacity than General Rosecrans. He has inventive fertility and knowledge, but he has no strength of will and no concentration of purpose. His mind scatters; there is no system in the use of his busy days and restless nights, no courage against individuals in his composition, and, with great love of command, he is a feeble commander. He is conscientious and honest, just as he is imperious and disputatious; always with a stray vein of caprice and an overweening passion for the approbation of his personal friends and the public outside.
Under the present circumstances I consider this army to be very unsafe in his hands; but do know of no man except Thomas who could now be safely put in his place. Weather pleasant but cloudy.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.
-----
CHATTANOOGA, October 12, 1863--1 p.m.
A rebel deserter, who came in this morning, reports Jeff. Davis reviewed Bragg's army Saturday, riding through lines, but not addressing <ar50_216> troops. Bragg, he says, has one hundred and thirty pontoons already finished in Chickamauga Valley, and is building more to cross the Tennessee.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 Hon. E. M. STANTON,
[Secretary of War.]
-----
CHATTANOOGA, October 12, 1863--9 p.m.
Would it not be possible for General Halleck to come here? What is needed to extricate this army is the highest administrative talent, and that without delay. Weather cloudy; rain threatened.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 Hon. E. M. STANTON,
[Secretary of War.]
-----
CHATTANOOGA, October 13, 1863--10.30 a.m.
No demonstrations from the enemy. Granger, who rode the picket lines yesterday afternoon, is convinced that Bragg's main body is still here. We have, however, pretty good reason for believing that Ector's, McNair's, and Ormes' [?] brigades have gone to Mobile. We had heavy rain all night; still raining.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 Hon. E. M. STANTON,
[Secretary of War.]
-----
CHATTANOOGA, October 14, 1863--12 m.
After thirty-six hours heavy rain there is now a prospect of clearing up. The river has risen 8 or 10 inches, and General Smith has ordered the trestle bridge to be taken up, leaving only the new pontoon bridge to connect us with the north side.  The roads have been greatly injured by the storm, one of them, the Anderson road; used by the loaded wagons, having been rendered impracticable on the eastern side of the mountain.
In the Sequatchie and Tennessee bottoms all the roads must be nearly spoiled, but no reports from them have yet arrived. Some forage got in here yesterday, and we hear from Bridgeport that a train load of forage has got there from Nashville, but it is clearly impossible to haul, from Bridgeport here, both food for men and forage for animals. All the forage in the country near here is exhausted and the chief quartermaster reports that there is none left in the Sequatchie Valley, the only region within convenient reach where it could be procured. A wagon train loaded with rations got here yesterday, and last night we had here 300,000 full rations. The troops now receive but three-quarter rations.
The necessity of opening the river being thus imperative, General Rosecrans has ordered Hooker to concentrate his troops preparatory to seizing the passes of Raccoon Mountain and occupying Shellmound, and, if possible, Lookout Valley. If this can be done we shall greatly shorten our lines of wagon transportation; if we could regain Lookout Mountain we could use water all the way. Deserters from the enemy report Jeff. Davis as still in Bragg's camp. Pemberton is there also, and some say Lee. Davis made a speech on <ar50_217> Sunday, the 11th instant, in which he said that they would have East Tennessee again, even if they had to withdraw every man from Richmond and Charleston. A captain of Arkansas cavalry, who deserted to us this morning, and of whose honesty we have proofs, says that only one brigade has gone from Bragg to Mobile, and that another has taken its place. He says an additional force of 30,000 men is promised to Bragg's soldiers, and that the conviction everywhere prevails among both people and army that unless they can recover East Tennessee the Confederacy is ruined. Having lost Texas they have no other place to procure cattle. The official report of rebel killed and wounded at Chickamauga makes the number 17,000. Efforts are anxiously made here to complete our inner fortifications. Were they finished 10,000 men could hold this place against the world, leaving the rest of the army to operate against the enemy, or to retire to points where it could be more easily subsisted while covering the approaches to Chattanooga. But by some strange improvidence the needful tools are not here, and instead of working 10,000 men per day, General Smith is only able to work 1,000.
Before General McCook left, General Rosecrans gave him a letter stating that McCook had never disobeyed an order.
The Ohio soldiers voted yesterday almost unanimously for Brough. So far I hear 249 for Vallandigham.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 Hon. E. M. STANTON,
[Secretary of War.]
-----
CHATTANOOGA, October 14, 1863--1.30 p.m.
Atlanta Intelligencer of yesterday has report of Jeff. Davis' visit to Bragg's army. He arrived at the camp on the evening of the 10th, reviewed the troops on the 11th, and was to return to Atlanta on the 13th. Intelligencer says he was received with great enthusiasm by troops, which is false. Raining here again.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 Hon. E. M. STANTON,
[Secretary of War.]
-----
CHATTANOOGA, October 14, 1863--8 p.m.
 The Ohio regiments in this army, so far as heard from, have cast for Brough 9,234 votes, for Vallandigham 252. Eleven regiments infantry, four cavalry, and eight batteries still to be heard from. This does not include regiments under Hooker.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 Hon. E. M. STANTON,
[Secretary of War.]
-----
CHATTANOOGA, October 15, 1863--10 a.m.
Rain continued through the night with great violence and still falling. Barometer indicates no change. Sequatchie River has risen so that it can no longer be forded near Jasper, and all wagons are now compelled to make the circuit to Therman, while the mud in the roads constantly grows deeper. Work on the fortifications <ar50_218> and movements of troops are alike stopped by the rain. Troops here receiving half rations. It will soon become necessary for all persons except soldiers to leave here. Shall I then return to Washington or endeavor to make my way to Burnside?
 [C. A. DANA.]
 Hon. E. M. STANTON,
[Secretary of War.]
-----
CHATTANOOGA, October 16, 1863--12 m.
For fifteen hours little rain has fallen, but the skies remain threatening and the barometer still points to rain. The river has risen some 4 feet, and old boatmen predict a rise of 6 feet more. Our bridge was broken by drift-wood at 10 p.m. yesterday, but all the pontoons and chess planks were saved. The rebels sent down two or three rafts to break it, but they came after it was broken. The steamer Paint Rock and a flat-boat were employed during the night in gathering these masses of floating timber, much of which may prove useful. The bridge is not yet replaced, it being thought more prudent to wait till to-morrow when the rise will be complete and the drift will have mainly passed down.
Our couriers report that from Bridgeport to the foot of the mountain the mud is up to their horses' bellies. The mortality among animals here rapidly increases, and those remaining must soon perish. Day before yesterday the mules attached to the empty train returning to Bridgeport were too weak to haul the wagons up the mountain without doubling the teams, though they went on the easiest of all our roads, which had just been put in thorough order. General Brannan tells me he could not possibly haul away the artillery with the horses that are left.
I think I reported some time ago that all the artillery horses, except four per gun, had been sent to Stevenson to be fed, but those that are there are so far reduced that it will require a month's feeding to make them effective.
Nothing can prevent the retreat of the army from this place within a fortnight, and with a vast loss of public property and possibly of life, except the opening of the river. General Hooker has been ordered to prepare for this, but Rosecrans thinks he cannot move till his transportation arrives from Nashville, from which place it marched on the 8th. It should have been in Bridgeport on the 14th, but is not yet reported. The telegraph between there and here is broken, however, and it now requires ten to twelve hours for couriers to make the distance.
In the midst of all these difficulties General Rosecrans seems to be insensible to the impending danger, and dawdles with trifles in a manner which can scarcely be imagined. Having completed his report, which he sent off for Washington by General Garfield yesterday, he is now much occupied with the map of the battle-field and with the topography of the country between here and Burnside's lower posts. Most probably the enemy contemplates crossing in that region, but we are no longer able to pursue him, hardly to strike a sudden blow at his flank before he shall have crushed Burnside. Meanwhile, with plenty of zealous and energetic officers ready to do whatever can be done, all this precious time is lost because our dazed and mazy commander cannot perceive the catastrophe that is close <ar50_219> upon us, nor fix his mind upon the means of preventing it. I never saw anything which seemed so lamentable and hopeless.
A rebel officer last evening shouted to one of our pickets that Bragg had been relieved and either Johnston or Longstreet put in his place.
Reports from our cavalry, which Rosecrans will forward to-day, make the rebel loss in the recent raid 2,000 men and five guns. Thirty-eight men captured in our uniform were summarily executed. Nothing heard from forces of Sherman.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 Hon. E. M. STANTON,
[Secretary of War.]
-----
CHATTANOOGA, October 16, 1863--4 p.m.
I have just had a full conversation with General Rosecrans upon the situation. He says the possession of the river as far up as the head of Williams' Island, at least, is a sine qua non to the holding of Chattanooga, but that it is impossible for him to make an, y movement toward gaining such possession until General Hooker's troops are concentrated and his transportation gets up. Hooker's troops are now scattered along the line of the railroad, and cannot be got together before next Wednesday. The wagons must all have arrived by that time, and if the enemy does not interfere sooner the movement upon Raccoon Mountain and Lookout Valley may then be attempted. Rosecrans, however, expects that as soon as the weather will allow the enemy will cross the river in force on our left, and then it will be necessary for us to fight a battle, or else to retreat from here and attempt to hold the line of the Cumberland Mountains. Such movement against this army he thinks will be made only in the event that they accumulate here a force enormously superior to ours, so that we should fight, if at all, at a great disadvantage. It is his opinion that they are collecting such a force, because, first, it is a military probability; secondly, we hear of their gathering men here from every place whence troops can be scraped; thirdly, most of the deserters represent their numbers as greatly increased, and a smart negro boy, who came in this morning, said that two train loads arrived at Chickamauga Station yesterday, and they are coming all the time. But General Rosecrans says he inclines to the opinion that they will rather attempt to crush Burnside first. The same negro boy reports that he heard Jefferson Davis say in a speech at Chickamauga Station last Saturday that they would have East Tennessee if it took every soldier in the South.
When I suggested that his animals were too weak to move the army with any promptness and efficacy, Rosecrans answered that the case was by no means so bad as I supposed. It was true, he said, that the mules were a great deal worn down, but both they and the artillery horses were still capable of use. But even if he could get along without being obliged to evacuate Chattanooga, he said it was certain that even with Hooker he is too weak for any offensive movement. It is his opinion that 100,000 to 125,000 men is the smallest army with which a movement can be made upon Atlanta, with reasonable certainty of success.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 Hon. E. M. STANTON,
[Secretary of War.]
 <ar50_220>
CHATTANOOGA, October 17, 1863--10 a.m.
Skies clear; barometer indicates fair weather. Courier from Burnside reports rains much heavier in East Tennessee than here, and streams more swollen. Tennessee here still rising, but Sequatchie falling. Wagons will probably be able to ford near Jasper to-day. Colonel Atkins, commanding at Dallas [Harrison's Landing?], reports some small indications of rebel purpose to cross in that vicinity.
Atlanta papers of 13th report that previous to Jeff. Davis' visit here he sent an aide, who reported that the dissensions in Bragg's army could only be composed by Davis himself. Deserters report rebel bridge across Chickamauga carried away, and army on short rations in consequence.
No news from Sherman. Weather warm.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 Hon. E. M. STANTON,
[Secretary of War.]
-----
CHATTANOOGA, October 17, 1863--11 a.m.
The general organization of this army is inefficient and its discipline defective. The former proceeds from the fact that General R[osecrans] insists on personally directing every department, and keeps every one waiting and uncertain till he himself can directly supervise every operation. The latter proceeds from his utter lack of firmness, his passion for universal applause, and his incapacity to hurt any man's feelings by just severity. It is certain that if it had been left to him, McCook and Crittenden might have lost other battles and fled from other fields without a word of censure. As I have already reported, McCook got from him a whitewashing letter, and Crittenden might have got one had he not been too proud to ask for it. In the same way he gave Negley a similar letter, although he had repeatedly declared that he ought to be shot, and although the official reports of General Brannan, General Wood, and Colonel Harker leave no doubt of his guilt. I learn, on the best evidence, that a few months ago General Stanley defeated an important operation by being drunk at the critical moment, and that he has repeatedly been guilty of that offense while in the discharge of most important duties in the field, yet General Rosecrans has never taken any notice of the fact. He cannot bear to hurt Stanley's feelings, and prefers, instead, to jeopardize the cause of the country. Another illustration is found in the case of General Rousseau, who is discontented because he only commands a division. General Rosecrans told me on Thursday that he was thinking of giving him the command of all Tennessee lately held by Granger, and requiring all his extraordinary talent, quickness, and energy.
There is thus practically no discipline for superior officers, and of course the evil, though less pernicious in the lower grades, is everywhere perceptible.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 Hon. E. M. STANTON,
[Secretary of War.]
-----
CHATTANOOGA, October 18, 1863--11 a.m.
Rain began again about midnight and still continues, but the barometer is rising and the wind has shifted, so that we hope for <ar50_221> the final cessation of the storm. Meanwhile, our condition and prospects grow worse and worse. The roads are in such a state that wagons are eight days making the journey from Stevenson to Chattanooga, and some which left on the 10th have not yet arrived. Though subsistence stores are so nearly exhausted here, the wagons are compelled to throw overboard portions of their precious cargo in order to get through at all. The returning trains have now for some days been stopped on this side of the Sequatchie, and a civilian who reached here last night states that he saw fully five hundred teams halted between the mountain and the river, without forage for the animals and unable to move in any direction.
I rode through the camps here yesterday, and can testify that my previous reports respecting the starvation of the battery horses were not exaggerated. A few days more and most of them will be dead. If the effort which Rosecrans intends to make to open the river should be futile, the immediate retreat of this army will follow. It does not seem possible to hold out here another week without a new avenue of supplies. General Smith says that as he passed among the men working on the fortifications yesterday several shouted "crackers" at him.
Amid all this, the practical incapacity of the general commanding is astonishing, and it often seems difficult to believe him of sound mind. His imbecility appears to be contagious, and it is difficult for any one to get anything done.
The pontoon bridge broken three days ago is not yet replaced, though every part is ready to be laid. The telegraph is broken by our pioneers as fast as it is re-established, and the steamboat is rendered useless by the carelessness or wantonness of her crew, while the work on the fortifications is carried on so slowly that they might as well be abandoned; and if the army is finally obliged to retreat, the probability is that it will fall back like a rabble, leaving its artillery, and protected only by the river behind it. If, on the other hand, we regain control of the river and keep it, subsistence and forage can be got here, and we may escape with no worse misfortune than the loss of 12,000 animals.
 [C. A. DANA.]
 Hon. E. M. STANTON,
[Secretary of War.]



7. Braxton Bragg

O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXX/2 [S# 51] AUGUST 16-SEPTEMBER 22, 1863.--The Chickamauga Campaign.
No. 236.--Reports of General Braxton Bragg, C. S. Army, commanding Army of Tennessee.

<ar51_21>
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF TENNESSEE,
Chattanooga, September 4, 1863.
SIR: The advance of Burnside with a heavy force from Kentucky upon East Tennessee at the same time that Rosecrans moved upon Bridgeport induced General Buckner to d raw his forces (except those at Cumberland Gap) to Loudon. At that time it was utterly impossible for me to assist him from here. Before the arrival of the re-enforcements from Mississippi (not all up yet) he was threatened in front, while a move was made to cut his connections in this direction. Unable to sustain him with a sufficient force, I ordered his command to fall back to the Hiwassee, where it is in supporting distance. These dispositions were not made without great regret and reluctance, but the force disposable rendered it impossible to hold a line extending so many hundred miles, assailable at any point, without the certainty almost of being cut up in detail. With our present dispositions we are prepared to meet the enemy at any point he may assail, either with a portion or with the whole of his forces, and should he present us an opportunity we shall not fail to strike him. My position is to some extent embarrassing in regard to offensive movements. In a country so utterly destitute we cannot for a moment abandon our line of communications, and unable to detach a sufficient force to guard it, we must necessarily maneuver between the enemy and our supplies. The approach of his right column (the heaviest, it will be observed) is directly on our left flank and seriously threatens our railroad. No effort will be spared to bring him to an engagement whenever the chances shall favor us.(*)
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 BRAXTON BRAGG,
General, Commanding.
 General S. COOPER,
Adjutant-General, Richmond.
[Indorsement.]
 SEPTEMBER 12, 1863.
Read and returned.
The case demands great activity, with which it is hoped the enemy's purpose may be defeated by fighting his two columns separately. If the weakest can be beaten first the strongest will be attacked afterward, with the advantage which success and re-en-forcements will give. In the meantime, it seems feasible to operate effectively on Rosecrans' line of communication by sending out cavalry expeditions.
 J. D[AVIS].
-----
FIFTEEN MILES SOUTH OF CHATTANOOGA,
September 9, 1863.
The order to General Jones is just what I desired, and renders the evacuation unnecessary at present. (+) Burnside's force is not less than <ar51_22> 20,000, but is mostly tending this way. Rosecrans' main force had obtained my left and rear. I followed and endeavored to bring him to action and secure my connections. This may compel the loss of Chattanooga, but is unavoidable.
 BRAXTON BRAGG.
 Hon. JAMES A. SEDDON,
Secretary of War.
-----
FIVE MILES SOUTH OF CHATTANOOGA, 10TH,
Via Dalton, September 11, 1863.
(Received 11th.)
The enemy entered Chattanooga yesterday in force, driving out the small garrison I could leave behind. His main force in Will's Valley still threatens my rear, and compels me to follow on this side of the mountain. The difficulty of supplying the army in this mountainous region is very great, and may compel me to turn east to the railroad.
 BRAXTON BRAGG,
General.
 General S. COOPER,
Adjutant and Inspector-General.
-----
LA FAYETTE, September 14, 1863.
(Received 15th.)
We have so far failed to encounter the enemy in any force. Whenever we make our appearance he retires before us. His policy seems to be to avoid an engagement. We shall press him as long as able to subsist.
 BRAXTON BRAGG.
 General S. COOPER.
-----
LA FAYETTE, September 15, 1863.
(Received 16th.)
The enemy has retired before us at all points. We shall now turn on him in the direction of Chattanooga.
 BRAXTON BRAGG.
 General S. COOPER.
-----
TEN MILES SOUTH OF CHATTANOOGA,
September 21, 1863.
The enemy retreated on Chattanooga last night, leaving his dead and wounded in our hands. His loss is very large in men, artillery, small-arms, and colors. Ours is heavy, but not yet ascertained. The victory is complete, and our cavalry is pursuing. With the blessing of God our troops have accomplished great results against largely superior numbers. We have to mourn the loss of many gallant men and officers. Brigadier-Generals Preston Smith, Helm, and Deshler are killed; Major-General Hood and Brigadier-Generals Adams, Gregg, and Brown wounded.
 BRAXTON BRAGG.
 [General S. COOPER.]
 <ar51_23>
CHICKAMAUGA RIVER,
September 21, 1863.
After two days' hard fighting we have driven the enemy, after a desperate resistance, from several positions, and now hold the field; but he still confronts us. The losses are heavy on both sides; especially so in our officers, We have taken over twenty pieces of artillery and some 2,500 prisoners.
 BRAXTON BRAGG.
 General S. COOPER.
-----
THREE MILES FROM CHATTANOOGA,
Via Tunnel Hill, September 23, 1863.
The enemy is confronting us behind strong defenses. Our troops are arriving and deploying, but our policy can only be determined after developing him more fully. He is in very heavy force. A regimental color of Burnside's (Ninth) corps was captured on the field of Chickamauga. Half of McLaws' division not yet up.
 BRAXTON BRAGG.
 General S. COOPER.
-----
CHATTANOOGA, September 24, 1863.
The report from General Hood last night was favorable. Our prisoners will reach 7,000, of which 2,000 are wounded. We have 25 stand of colors and guidons, 36 pieces of artillery, and have already collected 15,000 small-arms over and above those left on the field by our killed and wounded. More are being found. Our movements are much retarded by limited field transportation and the breaks on the road.
 BRAXTON BRAGG.
 General S. COOPER.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
Three Miles from Chattanooga, September 24, 1863.
SIR: The enemy having thrown the main body of his forces from his depot at Stevenson to the south of Chattanooga, in the direction of our communications, it became necessary for me to meet that movement or suffer an isolation from my supplies, and the probable destruction of our depots and workshops. Major-General Buck-her with his forces, entirely too weak to cope with the heavy column approaching him from Kentucky, and threatened by a corps in his rear, had been withdrawn from the line of railroad through East Tennessee and united with this army. Unable to divide without great danger to both parts, our opponents having the power to concentrate on either, I marched from Chattanooga on the 8th instant with the whole force, and took position opposite the enemy's center, extending from the crossing of the Chickamauga to La Fayette, Ga. This movement checked the enemy's advance, and, as I expected, he took possession of Chattanooga, and looking upon our movement as a retreat, commenced a concentration and pursuit. As soon as his movements were sufficiently developed I marched on the 17th instant <ar51_24> from La Fayette to meet him, throwing my forces along the Chickamauga between him and my supplies at Ringgold.
On the afternoon of the 18th, we effected a crossing of the Chickamauga at two points, about 7 miles nearly due west from Ringgold, after considerable resistance and some loss.
These forces moved at daylight on the 19th up the Chickamauga, and were joined by others, which crossed in succession as their positions were unmasked. About 10 a.m. our right encountered the enemy, and the action soon became hot and extended gradually toward our left. It was most obstinate until dark, and only resulted in a partial success. Our forces were all concentrated that night, and a vigorous assault ordered at daylight on the 20th, to commence on the right and be taken up to the left. By delays, not yet satisfactorily explained, this movement was not made until near 11 o'clock, and after I had visited that part of the field and reiterated my orders to Lieutenant-General Polk. After being commenced it was promptly, vigorously, and satisfactorily followed on the left under Lieutenant-General Longstreet. We met with the most obstinate resistance, the enemy holding selected positions strengthened by barricades, slight breastworks of timber and abatis, all concealed from us in a dense forest. Though frequently repulsed at points, our troops invariably returned to the charge, and when night suspended the work the whole field was ours.
The next morning the enemy had entirely disappeared from our front, leaving his dead and wounded. A vigorous pursuit followed his rear guard into Chattanooga, where we found him strongly intrenched.
We lost some artillery the first day, but recovered all before the close of the action. Thirty-six pieces taken from the enemy have so far been reported and secured. We have also collected about 15,000 stand of small-arms over and above what were left on the field from our casualties, and have some 25 stand of colors and guidons, and about 7,000 prisoners. These gratifying results were obtained at a heavy sacrifice on our part. Major-General Hood lost a leg on the 20th, when gallantly leading his command. Brig. Gen. Preston Smith was killed on the 19th, and Brig. Gens. B. H. Helm and James Deshler fell on the next day--all gallant soldiers and able commanders. Brigadier-Generals Gregg, McNair, and Adams were severely wounded, the first two not dangerously; the latter is missing. The accounts of him are conflicting, but he probably fell into the hands of the enemy. Brigadier-General Brown was slightly wounded, but is again on duty. The loss of inferior officers and men, though known to be large, is not yet sufficiently ascertained to justify an estimate.
The conduct of the troops was admirable. Though often repulsed, they never failed to respond when called on, and finally carried all before them. For two weeks most of them had been without shelter, on short rations, in a country parched by drought, where drinking water was difficult to obtain, yet no murmur was heard, and all was glee and cheerfulness whenever the enemy was found. During the action, and for a day or two before, and up to this time, all were on short rations and without cooking utensils.
The enemy had concentrated against us four corps, being all of Rosecrans' army, and one infantry standard was captured from a regiment of Burnside's old army corps--the Ninth. But three small infantry brigades of General Longstreet's command had joined us. <ar51_25> Under all the circumstances we could not have anticipated more satisfactory results, and feel that the protection of a merciful Providence has been extended to us at a time when the safety of our cause was involved.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 BRAXTON BRAGG,
General, Commanding.
 General S. COOPER,
Adjt. and Insp. Gen., C. S. Army, Richmond, Va.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
Three Miles South of Chattanooga, September 29, 1863.
SIR: Herewith will be found an approximate return of the killed, wounded, and missing at Chickamauga.(*) Some of the missing are returning, and many of the wounds reported are very slight. Returns from the cavalry have not been received. They will swell the aggregate to nearly if not quite 18,000.
A field return of the present effective strength (infantry and artillery) is also inclosed. The enemy far exceeds us in strength now, and is rapidly and heavily re-enforcing. Every available man should be pushed to our assistance.
The question of subsistence should receive early attention, as our supplies are nearly exhausted at Atlanta.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 BRAXTON BRAGG,
General, Commanding.
 General S. COOPER,
Adjt. and Insp. Gen., C. S. Army, Richmond, Va.
[Inclosure.]
FIELD RETURN OF THE EFFECTIVE STRENGTH OF THE ARMY OF TENNESSEE.
Infantry:
Polk's corps  10, 313
Hill's corps  10,307
Longstreet's corps  (+)15,522
  36,142

Artillery:
Polk's corps  755
Hill's corps  922
Longstreet's corps  1,027
  2,704
Total effective (++)   38,846
The artillery is much crippled by loss of horses.
 KINLOCH FALCONER,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
 MISSIONARY RIDGE,
September 27, 1863.
 <ar51_26>
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
Near Chattanooga, October 9, 1863.
SIR: In my report from this place, dated September 24, 1863, occurs this sentence: "But three small infantry brigades of General Longstreet's command had joined us. This was intended and should have been made to apply to the commencement of the action on Saturday, the 19th. Two other brigades of McLaws' division joined on Sunday morning, and rendered distinguished service on that day.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 BRAXTON BRAGG,
General, Commanding.
 General S. COOPER,
Adjutant-General, Richmond, Va.
-----
WARM SPRINGS, GA.,
January 3, 1864.
SIR: I forward the reports of the battle of Chickamauga by my aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Ellis. The maps of the battle-field have been so long and so unexpectedly delayed that I conclude not to wait for them any longer. They are daily expected from Dalton, where I left them nearly completed, and will be forwarded as soon as received.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 BRAXTON BRAGG,
General.
 General S. COOPER,
Adjutant-General, C. S. Army, Richmond, Va.
-----
WARM SPRINGS, GA.,
December 28, 1863.
SIR: Most of the subordinate reports of the operations of our troops at the battle of Chickamauga having been received are herewith forwarded, and for the better understanding of the movements preceding and following that important event the following narrative is submitted:
On August 20, it was ascertained certainly that the Federal army from Middle Tennessee, under General Rosecrans, had crossed the mountains to Stevenson and Bridgeport. His force of effective infantry and artillery amounted to fully 70,000, divided into four corps. About the same time General Burnside advanced from Kentucky toward Knoxville, East Tennessee, with a force estimated by the general commanding that department at over 25,000.
In view of the great superiority of numbers brought against him General Buckner concluded to evacuate Knoxville, and with a force of about 5,000 infantry and artillery and his cavalry took position in the vicinity of Loudon. Two brigades of his command (Frazer's, at Cumberland Gap, and Jackson's, in Northeast Tennessee) were thus severed from us.
The enemy having already obtained a lodgment in East Tennessee by another route, the continued occupation of Cumberland Gap became very hazardous to the garrison and comparatively unimportant to us. Its evacuation was accordingly ordered, but on the appeal <ar51_27> of its commander, stating his resources and ability for defense, favorably indorsed by Major-General Buckner, the orders were suspended on August 31. The main body of our army was encamped near Chattanooga, while the cavalry force, much reduced and enfeebled by long service on short rations, was recruiting in the vicinity of Rome, Ga.
Immediately after crossing the mountains to the Tennessee the enemy threw a corps by way of Sequatchie Valley, to strike the rear of General Buckner's command, while Burnside occupied him in front. One division already ordered to his assistance proving insufficient to meet the force concentrating on him, Buckner was directed to withdraw to the Hiwassee with his infantry, artillery, and supplies, and to hold his cavalry in front to check the enemy's advance. As soon as this change was made the corps threatening his rear was withdrawn, and the enemy commenced a movement in force against our left and rear.
On the last of August, it became known that he had crossed his main force over the Tennessee River at and near Caperton's Ferry, the most accessible point from Stevenson. By a direct route he was now as near our main depot of supplies as we were, and our whole line of communication was exposed, while his was partially secured by mountains and the river. By the timely arrival of two small divisions from Mississippi our effective force, exclusive of cavalry, was now a little over 35,000, with which it was determined to strike on the first favorable opportunity.
Closely watched by our cavalry, which had been brought forward, it was soon ascertained that the enemy's general movement was toward our left and rear in the direction of Dalton and Rome, keeping Lookout Mountain between us. The nature of the country and the want of supplies in it, with the presence of Burnside's force on our right, rendered a movement on the enemy's rear with our inferior force extremely hazardous, if not impracticable. It was therefore determined to meet him in front whenever he should emerge from the mountain gorges. To do this and hold Chattanooga was impossible without such a division of our small force as to endanger both parts.
Accordingly our troops were put in motion on September 7 and 8, and took position from Lee and Gordon's Mills to La Fayette, on the road leading south from Chattanooga and fronting the east slope of Lookout Mountain. The forces on the Hiwassee and at Chickamauga Station took the route by Ringgold A small cavalry force was left in observation at Chattanooga, and a brigade of infantry, strongly supported by cavalry, was left at Ringgold to hold the railroad and protect it from raids.
As soon as our movement was known to the enemy his corps nearest Chattanooga, and which had been threatening Buckner's rear, was thrown into that place, and shortly thereafter commenced to move on our rear by the two roads to La Fayette and Ringgold. Two other corps were now in Will's Valley--one nearly opposite the head of McLemore's Cove (a valley formed by Lookout Mountain and a spur of the main range, called Pigeon Mountain) and the other at or near Colonel Winston's, opposite Alpine.
During the 9th it was ascertained that a column, estimated at from 4,000 to 8,000, had crossed Lookout Mountain into the cove by way of Stevens' and Cooper's Gaps. Thrown off his guard by our rapid movement, apparently in retreat, when in reality we had concentrated <ar51_28> opposite his center, and deceived by the information from deserters and others sent into his lines, the enemy pressed on his columns to intercept us and thus exposed himself in detail.
Major-General Hindman received verbal instructions on the 9th to prepare his division to move against this force, and was informed that another division from Lieutenant-General Hill's command, at La Fayette, would join him. That evening the following written orders were issued to Generals Hindman and Hill:
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
Lee and Gordon's Mills, September 9, 1863--11.45 p.m.
Major-General HINDMAN,
Commanding Division:
General: You will move with your division immediately to Davis' Cross-Roads, on the road from La Fayette to Stevens' Gap. At this point you will put yourself in communication with the column of General Hill, ordered to move to the same
point, and take command of the joint forces, or report to the officer commanding Hill's column according to rank. If in command you will move upon the enemy, reported to be 4,000 or 5,000 strong, encamped at the foot of Lookout Mountain at Stevens' Gap. Another column of the enemy is reported to be at Cooper's Gap; number not known.
I am, general, &c.,
KINLOCH FALCONER,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
Lee and Gordon's Mills, September 9, 1863-11.45 p.m.
Lieutenant-General HILL,
Commanding Corps:
GENERAL: I inclose orders given to General Hindman. General Bragg directs that you send or take, as your judgment dictates, Cleburne's division to unite with General Hindman at Davis' Cross-Roads to-morrow morning. Hindman starts at 12 o'clock to-night, and he has 13 miles to make. The commander of the column thus united will move upon the enemy encamped at the foot of Stevens' Gap, said to be 4,000 or 5,000. If unforeseen circumstances should prevent your movement, notify Hindman. A cavalry force should accompany your column. Hindman has none. Open communication with Hindman with your cavalry in advance of the junction. He marches on the road from Dr. Anderson's to Davis' Cross-Roads.
I am, general, &c.,
KINLOCH FALCONER,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
On the receipt of his order, during the night, General Hill replied that the movement required by him was impracticable, as General Cleburne was sick, and both the gaps (Dug and Catlett's) had been blocked by felling timber, which would require twenty-four hours for its removal.
Not to lose this favorable opportunity--Hindman, by a prompt movement, being already in position--the following orders were issued at 8 a.m. on the 10th, for Major-General Buckner to move with his two divisions and report to Hindman:
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
Lee and Gordon's Mills, September 10, 1863--8 a.m.
Major-General BUCKNER,
Anderson's:
General: I inclose orders issued last night to Generals Hill and Hindman. General Hill has found it impossible to carry out the part assigned to Cleburne's division. The general commanding desires that you will execute without delay the order issued to General Hill. You can move to Davis' Cross-Roads by the direct road from your present position at Anderson's, along which General Hindman has passed.
I am, general, &c.,
GEORGE WM. BRENT,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
 <ar51_29>
And both Hindman and Hill were notified. Hindman had halted his division at Morgan's, some 3 or 4 miles from Davis' Cross-Roads, in the cove, and at this point Buckner joined him during the afternoon of the 10th.
Reports fully confirming previous information in regard to the position of the enemy's forces were received during the 10th, and it became certain he was moving his three columns to form a junction upon us at or near La Fayette.
The corps near Colonel Winston's moved on the mountain toward Alpine, a point 20 miles south of us. The one opposite the cove continued its movement and threw forward its advance to Davis' CrossRoads, and Crittenden moved from Chattanooga on the roads to Ringgold and Lee and Gordon's Mills. To strike these isolated commands in succession was our obvious policy. To secure more prompt and decided action in the movement ordered against the enemy's center, my headquarters were removed to La Fayette, where I arrived about 11.30 p.m. on the 10th, and Lieutenant-General Polk was ordered forward with his remaining division to Anderson's, so as to cover Hindman's rear during the operations in the cove.
At La Fayette, I met Major Nocquet, engineer officer on General Buckner's staff, sent by General Hindman, after a junction of their commands, to confer with me and suggest a change in the plan of operations. After hearing the report of this officer, and obtaining from the active and energetic cavalry commander in front of our position (Brigadier-General Martin) the latest information of the enemy's movements and position, I verbally directed the major to return to General Hindman and say that my plans could not be changed, and that he would carry out his orders. At the same time the following written orders were sent to the general by courier:
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
La Fayette, Ga., September 10, 1863--12 p.m.
Major-General HINDMAN,
Commanding, &c. :
General: Headquarters are here, and the following is the information: Crittenden's corps is advancing on us from Chattanooga. A large force from the south has advanced to within 7 miles of this point. Polk is left at Anderson's to cover your rear. General Bragg orders you to attack and force your way through the enemy to this point at the earliest hour that you can see him in the morning. Cleburne will attack in front the moment your guns axe heard.
I am, general, &c.,
GEORGE WM. BRENT,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
Orders were also given for Walker's Reserve Corps to move promptly and join Cleburne's division at Dug Gap to unite in the attack. At the same time Cleburne's was directed to remove all obstructions in the road in his front, which was promptly done, and by daylight he was ready to move. The obstructions in Catlett's Gap were also ordered to be removed, to clear the road in Hindman's rear. Breckinridge's division (Hill's corps) was kept in position south of La Fayette, to check any movement the enemy might make from that direction.
At daylight I proceeded to join Cleburne at Dug Gap, and found him waiting the opening of Hindman's guns to move on the enemy's flank and rear. Most of the day was spent in this position, waiting in great anxiety for the attack by Hindman's column. Several couriers and two staff officers were dispatched at different times urging him to move with promptness and vigor. <ar51_30>
About the middle of the afternoon the first gun was heard, when the advance of Cleburne's division discovered the enemy had taken advantage of our delay and retreated to the mountain passes. The enemy now discovered his error, and commenced to repair it by withdrawing his corps from the direction of Alpine to unite with the one near McLemore's Cove, while that was gradually extended toward Lee and Gordon's Mills.
Our movement having thus failed in its justly anticipated results, it was determined to turn upon the third corps of the enemy, approaching us from the direction of Chattanooga. The forces were accordingly withdrawn to La Fayette, and Polk's and Walker's corps were moved immediately in the direction of Lee and Gordon's Mills. The one corps of the enemy in this direction was known to be divided, one division having been sent to Ringgold. Upon learning the dispositions of the enemy from our cavalry commander in that direction, on the afternoon of the 12th Lieutenant-General Polk, commanding the advance forces, was directed in the following note to attack at daylight on the 13th:
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
La Fayette, Ga., September 12, [1863]--6 p.m.
Lieutenant-General POLK:
GENERAL: I inclose you a dispatch(*) from General Pegram. This presents you a fine opportunity of striking Crittenden in detail, and I hope you will avail yourself of it at daylight to-morrow. This division crushed, and the others are yours. We can then turn again on the force in the cove. Wheeler's cavalry will move on Wilder, so as to cover your right. I shall be delighted to hear of your success.
Very truly, yours,
BRAXTON BRAGG.
Upon further information, the order was renewed in two notes at later hours of the same day, as follows:
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
La Fayette, September 12, 1863--8 p.m.
Lieutenant-General POLK,
Commanding Corps:
GENERAL: I inclose you a dispatch, marked A,(*) and I now give you the orders of the commanding general, viz, to attack at day dawn to-morrow. The infantry column reported in said dispatch at three-quarters of a mile beyond Pea Vine Church, on the road to Graysville from La Fayette.
I am, general, &c.,
GEORGE WM. BRENT,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
La Fayette, Ga., September 12, 1863.(+)
Lieutenant-General POLK,
Commanding Corps:
GENERAL: The enemy is approaching from the south, and it is highly important that your attack in the morning should be quick and decided. Let no time be lost.
I am, general, &c.,
GEORGE WM. BRENT,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
At 11 p.m. a dispatch was received from the general, stating that he had taken a strong position for defense, and requesting that he should be heavily re-enforced. He was promptly ordered not to defer his attack, his force being already numerically superior to the <ar51_31> enemy, and was reminded that his success depended upon the promptness and rapidity of his movements. He was further informed that, Buckner's corps would be moved within supporting distance the next, morning.
Early on the 13th, I proceeded to the front, ahead of Buckner's command, to find that no advance had been made on the enemy, and that his forces had formed a junction and recrossed the Chickamauga. Again disappointed, immediate measures were taken to place our trains and limited supplies in safe positions, when all our forces were concentrated along the Chickamauga, threatening the enemy in front. Major-General Wheeler, with two divisions of cavalry, occupied the positions on the extreme left, vacated by Hill's corps, and was directed to press the enemy in McLemore's Cove, to divert his attention from our real movement. Brigadier-General Forrest, with his own and Pegram's divisions of cavalry, covered the movement on our front and right. Brig. Gen. B. R. Johnson, whose brigade had been at Ringgold, holding the railroad, was moved toward Reed's Bridge, which brought him on the extreme right of the line. Walker's corps formed on his left opposite Alexander's Bridge, Buckner's next near Thedford's Ford, Polk's opposite Lee and Gordon's Mills, and Hill's on the extreme left. With Johnson moved two brigades just arrived from Mississippi, and three of Longstreet's corps, all without artillery and transportation.
The following orders were issued on the night of the 17th, for the forces to cross the Chickamauga, commencing the movement at 6 a.m. on the 18th by the extreme right, at Reed's Bridge:
[CIRCULAR.]             HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
In the Field, Leet's Tan-yard, September 18, 1863.
1. Johnson's column (Hood's), on crossing at or near Reed's Bridge, will turn to the left by the most practicable route and sweep up the Chickamauga, toward Leo and Gordon's Mills.
2. Walker, crossing at Alexander's Bridge, will unite in this move and push vigorously on the enemy's flank and rear in the same direction.
3. Buckner, crossing at Thedford's Ford, will join in the movement to the left, and press the enemy up the stream from Polk's front at Lee and Gordon's Mills.
4. Polk will press his forces to the front of Lee and Gordon's Mills, and if met by too much resistance to cross will bear to the right and cross at Dalton's Ford, or at Thedford's, as may be necessary, and join in the attack wherever the enemy may be.
5. Hill will cover our left flank from an advance of the enemy from the cove, and by pressing the cavalry in his front ascertain if the enemy is re-enforcing at Lee and-Gordon's Mills, in which event he will attack them in flank.
6. Wheeler's cavalry will hold the gaps in Pigeon Mountain and cover our rear and left and bring up stragglers.
7. All teams, &c., not with troops should go toward Ringgold and Dalton, beyond Taylor's Ridge. All cooking should be done at the trains. Rations, when cooked, will be forwarded to the troops.
8. The above movements wall be executed with the utmost promptness, vigor, and persistence.
By command of General Bragg:
GEORGE WM. BRENT,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
The resistance offered by the enemy's cavalry and the difficulties arising from the bad and narrow country roads caused unexpected delays in the execution of these movements. Though the commander of the right column was several times urged to press forward, his crossing was not effected until late in the afternoon. At this time Major-General Hood, of Longstreet's corps, arrived and <ar51_32> assumed command of the column, Brigadier-General Johnson resuming his improvised division of three brigades.
Alexander's Bridge was hotly contested and finally broken up by the enemy just as General Walker secured possession. He moved down stream, however, a short distance, and crossed, as directed, at Byram's Ford, and thus secured a junction with Hood after night.
The movement was resumed at daylight on the 19th, and Buckner's corps, with Cheatham's division, of Polk's, had crossed and formed, when a brisk engagement commenced with our cavalry under Forrest on the extreme right about 9 o'clock. A brigade from Walker was ordered to Forrest's support, and soon after Walker was ordered to attack with his whole force. Our line was now formed, with Buckner's left resting on the Chickamauga about 1 mile below Lee and Gordon's Mills. On his right came Hood with his own and Johnson's divisions, with Walker on the extreme right, Cheatham's division being in reserve, the general direction being a little east of north. The attack ordered by our right was made by General Walker in his usual gallant style, and soon developed a largely superior force opposed. He drove them handsomely, however, and captured several batteries of artillery in most gallant charges. Before Cheatham's division, ordered to his support, could reach him, he had been pressed back to his first position by the extended lines of the enemy assailing him on both flanks. The two commands united were soon enabled to force the enemy back again and recover our advantage, though we were yet greatly outnumbered.
These movements on our right were in a direction to leave an opening in our line between Cheatham and Hood. Stewart's division, forming Buckner's second line, was thrown to the right to fill this, and it soon became hotly engaged, as did Hood's whole front.
The enemy, whose left was at Lee and Gordon's Mills when our movement commenced, had rapidly transferred forces from his extreme right, changing his entire line, and seemed disposed to dispute with all his ability our effort to gain the main road to Chattanooga, in his rear. Lieutenant-General Polk was ordered to move his remaining division across at the nearest ford, and to assume the command in person on our right. Hill's corps was also ordered to cross below Lee and Gordon's Mills and join the line on the right. While these movements were being made, our right and center were heavily and almost constantly engaged. Stewart, by a vigorous assault, broke the enemy's center and penetrated far into his lines, but was obliged to retire for want of sufficient force to meet the heavy enfilade fire which he encountered from the right. Hood, later engaged, advanced from the first fire, and continued to drive the force in his front until night. Cleburne's division, of Hill's corps, which first reached the right, was ordered to attack immediately in conjunction with the force already engaged. This veteran command, under its gallant chief, moved to its work after sunset, taking the enemy completely by surprise, driving him in great disorder for nearly a mile, and inflicting a very heavy loss.
Night found us masters of the ground, after a series of very obstinate contests with largely superior numbers. From captured prisoners and others we learned with certainty that we had encountered the enemy's whole force, which had been moving day and night since they first ascertained the direction of our march. Orders had been given for the rapid march to the field of all re-enforcements arriving by railroad, and three additional brigades from this source <ar51_33> joined us early next morning. The remaining forces on our extreme left, east of the Chickamauga, had been ordered up early in the afternoon, but reached the field too late to participate in the engagement of that day. They were ordered into line on their arrival, and disposed for a renewal of the action early the next morning. Information was received from Lieutenant-General Longstreet of his arrival at Ringgold and departure for the field. Five small brigades of his corps (about 5,000 effective infantry, no artillery) reached us in time to participate in the action, three of them on the 19th and two more on the 20th.
Upon the close of the engagement on the evening of the 19th, the proper commanders were summoned to my camp fire, and there received specific information and instructions touching the dispositions of the troops and for the operations of the next morning. The whole force was divided for the next morning into two commands and assigned to the two senior lieutenant-generals, Longstreet and Polk-the former to the left, where all his own troops were stationed, the latter continuing his command of the right. Lieutenant-General Longstreet reached my headquarters about 11 p.m., and immediately received his instructions. After a few hours' rest at my camp fire he moved at daylight to his line, just in front of my position.
Lieutenant-General Polk was ordered to assail the enemy on our extreme right at day-dawn on the 20th, and to take up the attack in succession rapidly to the left. The left wing was to await the attack by the right, take it up promptly when made, and the whole line was then to be pushed vigorously and persistently against the enemy throughout its extent.
Before the dawn of day myself and staff were ready for the saddle, occupying a position immediately in rear of and accessible to all parts of the Free. With increasing anxiety and disappointment I waited until after sunrise without hearing a gun, and at length dispatched a staff officer to Lieutenant-General Polk to ascertain the cause of the delay and urge him to a prompt and speedy movement. This officer, not finding the general with his troops, and learning where he had spent the night, proceeded across Alexander's Bridge to the east side of the Chickamauga and there delivered my message.
Proceeding in person to the right wing, I found the troops not even prepared for the movement. Messengers were immediately dispatched for Lieutenant-General Polk, and he shortly after joined me. My orders were renewed, and the general was urged to their prompt execution, the more important as the ear was saluted throughout the night with the sounds of the ax and falling timber as the enemy industriously labored to strengthen his position by hastily constructed barricades and breastworks. A reconnaissance made in the front of our extreme right during this delay crossed the main road to Chattanooga and proved the important fact that this greatly desired position was open to our possession.
The reasons assigned for this unfortunate delay by the wing commander appear in part in the reports of his subordinates. It is sufficient to say they are entirely unsatisfactory. It also appears from these reports that when the action was opened on the right about 10 a.m. the troops were moved to the assault in detail and by detachments, unsupported, until nearly all parts of the right wing were in turn repulsed with heavy losses.
Our troops were led with the greatest gallantry and exhibited great coolness, bravery, and heroic devotion. In no instance did they fail «3 R R--VOL XXX, PT II» <ar51_34> when called on to rally and return to the charge. But though invariably driving the enemy with slaughter at the points assailed, -they were compelled in turn to yield to the greatly superior numbers constantly brought against them. The attack on the left, promptly made as ordered, met with less resistance, much of the enemy's strength having been transferred to our right, and was successfully and vigorously followed up.
About 2 p.m., passing along the line to our left, I found we had been checked in our progress by encountering a strong position strengthened by works and obstinately defended. Unable to afford assistance from any other part of the field, written orders were immediately dispatched to Lieutenant-General Polk to again assault the enemy in his front with his whole force and to persist until he should dislodge him from his position. Directing the operations on our left to be continued, I moved again to the right and soon dispatched a staff officer to General Polk, urging a prompt and vigorous execution of my written orders.
About 4 p.m. this general assault was made and the attack was continued from right to left until the enemy gave way at different points, and finally, about dark, yielded us his line. The contest was severe, but the impetuous charge of our troops could not be resisted when they were brought to bear in full force, even where the enemy possessed all the advantage of position and breastworks. The troops were halted by their respective commanders when the darkness of the night and the density of the forest rendered further movements uncertain and dangerous, and the army bivouacked on the ground it had so gallantly won.
Both flanks having advanced more rapidly than the center, they were found confronting each other in lines nearly parallel and within artillery range. Any advance by them, especially at night, over ground so thickly wooded, might have resulted in the most serious consequences.
The enemy, though driven from his line, still confronted us, and desultory firing was heard until 8 p.m. Other noises, indicating movements and dispositions for the morrow, continued until a late hour at night.
During the operations by the main forces on the 19th and 20th, the cavalry on the flanks was actively and usefully employed, holding the enemy in observation and threatening or assailing him as occasion offered.
From the report of Major-General Wheeler, commanding on the left, it will be seen what important service was rendered both on the 20th and 21st by his command, especially in the capture of prisoners and property and in the dispersion of the enemy's cavalry.
Brigadier-General Forrest's report will show equally gallant and valuble services by his command, on our right. Exhausted by two days' battle, with very limited supply of provisions, and almost destitute of water, some time in daylight was absolutely essential for our troops to supply these necessaries and replenish their ammunition before renewing the contest.
Availing myself of this necessary delay to inspect and readjust my lines, I moved as soon as daylight served on the 21st. On my arrival about sunrise near Lieutenant-General Polk's bivouac. I met the ever-vigilant Brigadier-General Liddell, commanding a division in our front line, who was awaiting the general to report that his picket this morning discovered the enemy had retreated during the night <ar51_35> from his immediate front. Instructions were promptly given to push our whole line of skirmishers to the front, and I moved to the left and extended these orders. All the cavalry at hand, including my personal guard, were ordered to the front.
Members of my staff, in passing through the lines of our left wing with their escort, were warned of danger and told that they were entering on the neutral ground between us and the enemy. But this proved to be an error, and our cavalry soon came upon the enemy's rear guard where the main road passes through Missionary Ridge. He had availed himself of the night to withdraw from our front, and his main body was already in position within his lines at Chattanooga.
Any immediate pursuit by our infantry and artillery would have been fruitless, as it was not deemed practicable with our weak and exhausted force to assail the enemy, now more than double our numbers, behind his intrenchments. Though we had defeated him and driven him from the field with heavy loss in men, arms, and artillery, it had only been done by heavy sacrifices, in repeated, persistent, and most gallant assaults upon superior numbers strongly posted and protected.
The conduct of our troops was excellent throughout the prolonged contest. Often repulsed where success seemed impossible, they never failed to rally and-return to the charge until the last combined and determined effort, in which the spirit of every man seemed to conspire for success, was crowned with the reward due to such gallantry in a just cause.
Our loss was in proportion to the prolonged and obstinate struggle. Two-fifths of our gallant troops had fallen, and the number of general and staff officers stricken down will best show how these troops were led.
Major-General Hood, the model soldier and inspiring leader, fell after contributing largely to our success, and has suffered the irreparable loss of a leg. That his valuable life should be spared to us is, however, a source for thankfulness and gratitude.
Major-General Hindman, highly distinguished for gallantry and good conduct, received a severe contusion, but persisted in keeping the saddle until he witnessed the success in which his command largely participated.
Brig. Gens. B. H. Helm, Preston Smith, and James Deshler died upon the field in the heroic discharge of duty. They were true patriots and gallant soldiers, and worthy of the high reputation they enjoyed.
Brigadier-Generals Adams, Gregg, and McNair fell severely wounded while gallantly leading their commands in the thickest of the fight. It is gratifying to know they are convalescing and will be again found at the post of duty and danger.
Judging from appearances on the field, the enemy's losses must have exceeded our own largely, but we have no means of correctly estimating them. We captured over 8,000 prisoners, 51 pieces of artillery, 15,000 stand of small-arms, and quantities of ammunition, with wagons, ambulances, and teams, medicines, hospital stores, &c., in large quantities.
The accompanying maps (*) (1, 2, 3, and 4), based on accurate surveys, will afford the necessary information for the correct understanding <ar51_36> of the movements of both armies. The positions of the troops on the field are given mostly from the sketches of their respective commanders. The times selected for indication were the morning of the 19th, when the action commenced; the morning of the 20th, and the evening of the 20th at the close of the operations.
There has been much delay in rendering some of the subordinate reports, and none have been received from Lieutenant-Generals Polk and Hill,(*) and only two from brigades in Longstreet's corps. The absence of these has caused a delay in making up my own, and induced me to defer forwarding the others, hoping that all might be submitted together.
For the many deeds of daring and acts of heroic devotion exhibited on this field reference is made to the subordinate reports. It will be remarked that the private soldier is eminently distinguished, as he always will be in an army where the rank and file is made up of the best citizens of the country.
The medical officers, both in the field and in the hospitals, earned the lasting gratitude of the soldier and deserve the highest commendation. The great number of wounded thrown suddenly upon their hands taxed every energy and every faculty. With means greatly inadequate, especially in transportation, they soon reduced confusion into order, and by assiduity and skill afforded to the gallant sufferers that temporal relief for which they might look in vain to any other source. In this connection it is a pleasing duty to acknowledge in grateful terms the deep indebtedness of the army to the hospital relief associations, which so promptly and so generously pressed forward their much needed assistance. Under the admirable management of their officers in Atlanta we were soon furnished with every necessary and comfort, and stores continued to arrive until notice was given that our wants were all supplied.
The officers of my staff, personal and general, served me on this field and on the arduous marches preceding with their usual zeal, intelligence, and gallantry.
The whole cavalry force having been dispatched to press the enemy and cut off detachments, orders were given for the army to move to a point near the railroad and convenient to Water, still interposing between the enemy and our large number of wounded our trophies and our wounded prisoners, whose removal from the field occupied many days.
Our supplies of all kinds were greatly reduced, the railroad having been constantly occupied in transporting troops, prisoners, and our wounded, and the bridges having been destroyed to a point 2 miles south of Ringgold. These supplies were ordered replenished, and as soon as it was seen that we could be subsisted the army was moved forward to seize and hold the only communication the enemy had with his supplies in the rear. His most important road and the shortest by half to his depot at Bridgeport lay along the south bank of the Tennessee. The holding of this all-important route was confided to Lieutenant-General Longstreet's command, and its possession forced the enemy to a road double the length, over two ranges of mountains, by wagon transportation. At the same time our cavalry, in large force, was thrown across the river to operate on this long and difficult route. These dispositions faithfully sustained insured the enemy's speedy evacuation of Chattanooga for want of <ar51_37> food and forage. Possessed of the shortest road to his depot, and the one by which re-enforcements must reach him, we held him at our mercy and his destruction was only a question of time.
The disastrous loss of these advantages and our subsequent operations in consequence must be the subject of a future communication.
The suggestion of a movement by our right immediately after the battle to the north of the Tennessee and thence upon Nashville requires notice only because it will find a place on the files of the department. Such a movement was utterly impossible for want of transportation. Nearly half our army consisted of re-enforcements just before the battle without a wagon or an artillery horse, and nearly, if not quite, a third of the artillery horses on the field had been lost. The railroad bridges, too, had been destroyed to a point south of Ringgold, and on all the road from Cleveland to Knoxville. To these insurmountable difficulties were added the entire absence of means to cross the river except by fording at a few precarious points too deep for artillery and the well-known danger of sudden rises, by which all communication would be cut, a contingency which did actually happen a few days after the visionary scheme was proposed. But the most serious objection to the proposition was its entire want of military propriety. It abandoned to the enemy our entire line of communication and laid open to him our depots of supplies, while it placed us with a greatly inferior force beyond a difficult and at times impassable river, in a country affording no subsistence to men or animals. It also left open to the enemy, at a distance of only 10 miles, our battle-field, with thousands of our wounded and his own, and all the trophies and supplies we had won. All this was to be risked and given up for what? To gain the enemy's rear and cut him off from his depot of supplies by the route over the mountains, when the very movement abandoned to his unmolested use the better and more practicable route, of half the length, on the south side of the river. It is hardly necessary to say the proposition was not even entertained, whatever may have been the inferences drawn from subsequent movements.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 BRAXTON BRAGG,
General.
 General S. COOPER,
Adjutant-General, C. S. Army, Richmond, Va.
ADDENDA.
GENERAL ORDERS No. 180.
HDQRS. ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
In the Field, La Fayette, Ga., Sept. 16, 1863.
The troops will be held ready for an immediate move against the enemy. His demonstration on our flank has been thwarted, and twice has he retired before us when offered battle. We must now force him to the issue.
Soldiers, you are largely re-enforced; you must now seek the contest. In so doing I know you will be content to suffer privations and encounter hardships.
Heretofore you have never failed to respond to your general when he has asked sacrifice at your hands. Relying on your gallantry and patriotism, he asks you to add the crowning glory to the wreath you wear. Our cause is in your keeping; your enemy boasts that you are demoralized and retreating before him. <ar51_38>
Having accomplished our object by driving back his flank movement, let us now turn on his main force and crush it in its fancied security.
Your generals will lead you; you have but to respond to assure us a glorious triumph over an insolent foe. I know what your response will be.
Trusting in God and the justice of our cause, and nerved by the love of the dear ones at home, failure is impossible and victory must be ours.
 BRAXTON BRAGG,
General, Commanding.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
Field of Chickamauga, September 22, 1863.
It has pleased Almighty God to reward the valor and endurance of our troops by giving to our arms a complete victory over the enemy's superior numbers. Homage is due and is rendered unto Him who giveth not the battle to the strong.
Soldiers, after two days of severe battle, preceded by heavy and important outpost affairs, you have stormed the barricades and breastworks of the enemy, and driven before you in confusion and disorder an army largely superior in numbers, and whose constant theme was your demoralization and whose constant boast was your defeat. Your patient endurance under privations, your fortitude and your valor, displayed at all times and under all trials, have been meetly rewarded. Your commander acknowledges his obligations, and promises to you in advance the country's gratitude. But your task is not ended. We must drop a soldier's tear upon the graves of the noble men who have fallen by our sides and move forward. Much has been accomplished. More remains to be done before we can enjoy the blessings of peace and freedom.
 BRAXTON BRAGG.
-----
GENERAL ORDERS No. 228.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
Dalton, Ga., December 22, 1863.
The following resolutions of the General Assembly of the State of Georgia, tendering the sincere and grateful thanks of the people of that State to the officers and soldiers of the Army of Tennessee for the courage and brave endurance displayed by them, are published for the information of the army:
The General Assembly of Georgia do resolve, That, acting for and in behalf of the people of the State, we hereby tender our sincere and grateful thanks to General Braxton Bragg and the officers and soldiers of his entire command, including each and every one of their gallant countrymen by whom they have been from time to time re-enforced, for the highly meritorious services they have rendered to the Confederacy, and especially in guarding the approaches to Georgia, and for the brilliant victory which they achieved over the Federal Army at Chickamauga.
Of this great army it may well be said that their patience has only been equaled by their courage. It is difficult to say which should be most admired in the history of its campaign, that Fabian strategy, sustained by patient brave endurance, which avoided general engagements until all things were ready, or the chivalric valor which carried the tide of battle against the stubborn invaders of our soil. <ar51_39>
Resolved further, That the Governor be requested to transmit a copy of these resolutions to General Bragg, in order that they may be communicated to the army.
THOS. HARDEMAN, JR.,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
L. CARRINGTON,
Clerk of the House of Representatives.
A. R. WRIGHT,
President of the Senate.
L. H. KEENAN,
Secretary of the Senate.
Approved November 11, 1863.
JOSEPH E. BROWN,
Governor.
By command of Lieutenant-General Hardee:
 KINLOCH FALCONER,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF CONFEDERATE STATES,
Richmond, May 20, 1864.
 Hon. JAMES A. SEDDON,
Secretary of War:
SIR: In the month of May, 1863, I forwarded to the Adjutant-General a full report of all my operations with the Army of Tennessee during its movements from Tupelo, Miss., in July, 1862, until its return from Kentucky in November of that year. In January last I also forwarded a full report of the operations of the same army, resulting in the battle of Chickamauga. Both these reports have been twice called for by Congress for publication, but have never been furnished. I find on inquiry that both were sent to the office of Secretary of War soon after receipt, and have never been returned. I have rested patiently under the criticism and assaults of parties misrepresenting the facts of these campaigns, knowing the truth, when revealed, would be my best vindication. As I cannot see any public necessity for withholding them, when all others of a much later date have been published, I beg to ask your special and early attention to them, and inquire if I may expect them to be sent to Congress; or, if not, that I may know the reasons for withholding them.
I am, sir, most respectfully, your obedient servant,
 BRAXTON BRAGG,
General.
[Indorsements.]
 MAY 20, 1864.
 Mr. KEAN:
The following is correct, is it not? Respectfully acknowledge. The report of the Kentucky campaign it was not thought by the President expedient to publish. I have not felt at liberty to send it in. The copying of that of Chickamauga was not finished in time for the last Congress, and will now be forwarded. I was not aware it had not been furnished with others.
 J. A. S[EDDON,]
Secretary.
 <ar51_40>
 MAY 21, 1864.
 Hon. SECRETARY OF WAR:
The memorandum is correct according to my recollection as respects the report of the Kentucky campaign, and is shown to be accurate as respects that of Chickamauga by the records of the office. General Bragg is in error in his statements that both these reports "were sent to the office of the Secretary of War soon after receipt, and have never been returned." The report of the Kentucky campaign was withdrawn from the copyist on June 5, 1863, and submitted by you to the President on the 6th with remarks. It has never been in the War Office since, and appears to have been returned to the Adjutant and Inspector General's Office in March last.
The report of Chickamauga was received at this office January 13, 1864, and was immediately put in the hands of two copyists, who returned the duplicate copies March 23 (after the adjournment of Congress), and the original returned to the Adjutant and Inspector-General's Office, after being compared with the copies, April 14, 1864.
As General Bragg may suppose that there has been unusual delay, these particulars will show the contrary to be the case.
Respectfully,
 R. G. H. KEAN,
Chief of Bureau of War.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ARMIES CONFEDERATE STATES,
Richmond, September 22, 1864.
 A. R. LAMAR,  Esq.,
Clerk of the House of Representatives, Richmond:
SIR: Accept my acknowledgments for the copies of the official report of the battle of Chickamauga. Quite an important error occurs in my report, on page 14, line 11, which reverses the meaning of a most important sentence. It reads: "It is sufficient to say they are entirely satisfactory," and should be, "entirely unsatisfactory."(*) There are a few other minor errors of little importance. If permitted, I desire to send a clerk to correct this error through the edition.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
 BRAXTON BRAGG.



8. James Longstreet

O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXX/2 [S# 51] AUGUST 16-SEPTEMBER 22, 1863.--The Chickamauga Campaign.
No. 340.--Report of Lieut. Gen. James Longstreet, C.S. Army, commanding Left Wing.

[ar51_287 con't]
HEADQUARTERS,
Near Chattanooga, October --, 1863.
COLONEL: Our train reached Catoosa Platform, near Ringgold, about 2 o'clock in the afternoon of September 19. As soon as our horses came up (about 4 o'clock), I started with Colonels Sorrel and Manning, of my staff, to find the headquarters of the commanding general. We missed our way and did not report till near 11 o'clock at night. Upon my arrival, I was informed that the troops had been engaged during the day in severe skirmishing while endeavoring to get in line for battle. The commanding general gave me a map <ar51_288> showing the roads and streams between Lookout Mountain and the Chickamauga River, and a general description of our position, and informed me that the battle was ordered at daylight the next morning, the action to be brought on upon our right and to be taken up successively to the left, the general movement to be a wheel upon my extreme left as a pivot. I was assigned to the command of the Left Wing, composed of Hood's and Hindman's divisions, an improvised division under Brig. Gen. B. R. Johnson, and Buckner's corps, consisting of Stewart's and Preston's divisions. The artillery consisted of the battalions of Majors Williams, Robertson, and Leyden, together with some other batteries attached to brigades.
As soon as the day of the 20th had dawned, I rode to the front to find my troops. The line was arranged from right to left as follows: Stewart's, Johnson's, Hindman's, and Preston's divisions. Hood's division (of which only three brigades were up) was somewhat in the rear of Johnson's. Kershaw's and Humphreys' brigades, of McLaws' division, were ordered forward from Ringgold the night before, but were not yet up. General McLaws had not arrived from Richmond. I set to work to have the line adjusted by closing to the right, in order to occupy some vacant ground between the two wings and to make room for Hood in the front line. The divisions were ordered to form with two brigades in the front line, and one supporting where there were but three brigades, and two supporting where there were more than three. General Hood was ordered to take the brigades of Kershaw and Humphreys and use them as supports for his division, thus making his division the main column of attack. Before these arrangements were completed the attack was made by our right wing about 10 o'clock. The battle seemed to rage with considerable fury, but did not progress as had been anticipated. As soon as I was prepared I sent to the commanding general to suggest that I had probably better make my attack. Before the messenger returned I heard that the commanding general had sent orders for the division commanders to move forward and attack. I had no time to find the officer who brought the order, as some of the troops were in motion when I heard of it. Upon this information I at once issued orders to attack to the troops not already in motion, holding one of Buckner's divisions (Preston's) in reserve. As the battle upon our right was not so successful as had been expected in the plan of attack, I was obliged to reverse the order of battle by retaining my right somewhere near the left of the Right Wing. To do this Stewart's division was obliged to halt upon reaching the La Fayette and Chattanooga road.
Hood's column broke the enemy's line near the Brotherton house and made it wheel to the right. In making this movement Major-General Hood fell severely, and it was feared mortally, wounded by a Minie ball breaking his thigh. He had broken the enemy's line, however, and his own troops and those to his right and left continued to press the enemy with such spirit and force that he could not resist us. Brigadier-General Law succeeded to the command of Hood's division, and Brigadier-General Kershaw to the command of the two brigades of McLaws' division. General Kershaw, having received no definite orders himself (being under the command of General Hood), was not advised of the wheel to the right, and gained more ground to the front than was intended in the movement of his two brigades. Johnson's division followed the movement made by Hood, and gained the Crawfish Spring and Chattanooga road, having <ar51_289> a full share in the conflict. Major-General Hindman, in command of my left division, first met the enemy near the Vineyard house, and drove him back upon his strong position near the Widow Glenn's (or burned) house. By a well-directed front and flank attack, he gained the position after a severe struggle. The enemy's dead at this point mark well his line of battle. Hindman was then ordered to move by his right flank and re-enforce Johnson near the Vidito house, who was pressing forward against great odds.
About 3 o'clock in the afternoon I asked the commanding general for some of the troops of the Right Wing, but was informed by him that they had been beaten back so badly that they could be of no service to me. I had but one division that had not been engaged, and hesitated to venture to put it in, as our distress upon our right seemed to be almost as great as that of the enemy upon his right. I therefore concluded to hold Preston for the time, and urge on to renewed efforts our brave men, who had already been engaged many hours. The heights extending from the Vidito house across to the Snodgrass house gave the enemy strong ground upon which to rally. Here he gathered most of his broken forces and re-enforced them. After a long and bloody struggle, Johnson and Hindman gained the heights near the Crawfish Spring road. Kershaw made a most handsome attack upon the heights at the Snodgrass house simultaneously with Johnson and Hindman, but was not strong enough for the work.
It was evident that with this position gained I should be complete master of the field. I therefore ordered General Buckner to move Preston forward. Before this, however, General Buckner had established a battery of 12 guns, raking down the enemy's line which opposed our Right Wing, and at the same time having fine play upon any force that might attempt to re-enforce the hill that he was about to attack. General Stewart, of his corps, was also ordered to move against any such force in flank. The combination was well-timed and arranged. Preston dashed gallantly at the hill. Stewart flanked a re-enforcing column and captured a large portion of it. At the same time the fire of the battery struck such terror into a heavy force close under it that we took there also a large number of prisoners. Preston's assault, though not a complete success at the onset, taken in connection with the other operations, crippled the enemy so badly that his ranks were badly broken, and by a flank movement and another advance the heights were gained. These re-enforce-ments were the enemy's last, or reserve, corps, and a part also of the line that had been opposing our Right Wing during the morning. The enemy broke up in great confusion along my front, and about the same time the Right Wing made a gallant dash and gained the line that had been held so long and obstinately against it. A simultaneous and continuous shout from the two wings announced our success complete. The enemy had fought every man that he had, and every one had been in turn beaten. As it was almost dark I ordered my line to remain as it was, ammunition boxes to be refilled, stragglers to be collected, and everything in readiness for the pursuit in the morning.
Early on the 21st, the commanding general stopped at my bivouac and asked my views as to our future movements. I suggested crossing the river above Chattanooga, so as to make ourselves sufficiently felt on the enemy's rear as to force his evacuation of Chattanooga, «19 R R--VOL XXX, PT II» <ar51_290> and, indeed, force him back upon Nashville, and if we should find our transportation inadequate for a continuance of this movement, to follow up the railroad to Knoxville, destroy Burnside, and from there threaten the enemy's railroad communication in rear of Nashville. This I supposed to be the only practicable flank movement, owing to the scarcity of our transportation, and it seemed to keep us very nearly as close to the railroad as we were at the time. At parting I understood the commanding general to agree that such was probably our best move, and that he was about to give the necessary orders for its execution.
Orders came in the afternoon for the march. The rear of the Right Wing did not move until quite dark. I did not, therefore, put my wing in motion till daylight the following morning.
Before moving on the morning of the 22d, McLaws' division was ordered to follow the enemy on to Chattanooga. The remainder of the command marched for the Red House Ford and halted about noon.
During that night I received orders to march the entire command back to Chattanooga, and moved in pursuance thereof early on the 23d. We reached the Watkins house about 11 a.m., and proceeded to take up a line around the enemy's position at Chattanooga.
I desire to mention the following named officers as distinguished for conduct and ability, viz: Major-Generals Hood, Buckner, Hindman, and Stewart; Brig. Gens. B. R. Johnson, Preston, Law (respectively in command of divisions), Kershaw, Patton Anderson, Gracie, McNair (severely wounded), and Colonels Trigg and Kelly, both in command of brigades. Honorable mention should also be made of Brigadier-Generals Humphreys, Benning, Deas, Clayton, Bate, Brown, Robertson, and Manigault.
For more detailed accounts of the noble deeds performed by our gallant officers and brave soldiers I refer you to the reports of my junior officers.
The steady good conduct throughout the long conflict of the subordinate officers and men, which the limits of this report will not permit me to particularize, is worthy of the highest praise and admiration.
I am greatly indebted to Lieutenant-Colonel Sorrel, assistant ad-jutant-general; Lieutenant-Colonel Manning, chief of ordnance; Major Latrobe, assistant adjutant and inspector general, and Captain Manning, signal corps, for their able, untiring, and gallant assistance. Colonel Manning received a painful wound. The movement of Stewart's division against the enemy's re-enforcements was made upon the suggestion of Colonel Sorrel and Captain Manning. The result was the beginning of the general break throughout the enemy's line. My other staff officers had not arrived from Virginia.
Major Walton, acting chief of subsistence department, and Major Kelley, acting chief of quartermaster's department, were at the railroad depot in the active discharge of the duties of their departments.
Among the captures made by the Left Wing during the day were not less than 40 pieces of artillery, over 3,000 prisoners, and 10 regimental standards, besides a few wagons, 17,645 small-arms, 1,130 sets accouterments, and 393,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition were collected on the field.
The accompanying list of casualties shows a loss by the command (without McNair's brigade, from which no report has been received) of 1,089 killed, 6,506 wounded, and 273 missing. Its strength on going <ar51_291> into action on the morning of the 20th was 2,033 officers and 20,849 men.
I have the honor to be, colonel, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,
 J. LONGSTREET,
Lieutenant-General.
 Col. GEORGE WILLIAM BRENT,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
[Inclosure.]
Casualties of the Left Wing, Army of Tennessee, in the engagement of September 20, 1863, near Chickamauga, Ga.
A Officers and enlisted men killed. C Officers and enlisted men missing.
B Officers and enlisted men wounded. D Total officers and enlisted men.

Command. A B C D

HOOD'S DIVISION

Robertson's brigade  78 457 35 570
Benning's brigade  46 436 6 488
Law's brigade  61 329 .... 390
Total  185 1,222 41 1,448

M'LAWS' DIVISION.

Kershaw's brigade  68 419 1 488
Humphreys' brigade  20 132 .... 152
Total  88 551 1 640

HINDMAN'S DIVISION.

Anderson's brigade  80 464 24 568
Deas' brigade  123 578 28 729
Manigault's brigade  66 426 47 539
Total  269 1,468 99 1,836

JOHNSON'S DIVISION.

Johnson's brigade  28 271 74 373
Gregg's brigade  113 447 17 577
McNair's brigade  .... .... .... ....
Total  141 718 91 950

BUCKNER'S CORPS

STEWART'S DIVISION

[Headquarters] .... 1 .... 1
Brown's brigade 50 426 4 480
Bate's brigade  63 530 11 604
Clayton's brigade  86 518 15 619
Total  199 1,475 30 1,704

PRESTON'S DIVISION.

Gracie's brigade  90 576 2 668
Trigg's brigade  46 231 4 281
Kelly's brigade  66 241 3 310
Total  202 1,048 9 1,259

Total infantry  1,084 6,482 271 7,837

Artillery  5 23 1 29
Grand total  1,089 6,505 272 7,866
 <ar51_292>
ADDENDA.
Abstract from Maj. F. H. Robertson's report of guns engaged, ammunition expended, &c., in Battalion Reserve Artillery, September 18 to 20.
A 12-pounder Napoleons G Men killed
B 10-pounder Parrotts H Officers wounded
C 3.80-inch James rifles I Men wounded
D 12-pounder howitzers J Horses killed
E 6-pounder bronze K Horses wounded
F Rounds of ammunition expended

 ----Guns engaged.-----  -Casualties.-
Batteries A B C D E F G H I J K
Barret's  .... .... .... 2 2 .... .... .... .... .... ....
Havis' 2 .... 1 .... .... 35 1 .... 1 1 1
Lumsden's 3 1 .... 1 .... 58 1 .... 1 5 3
Massenburg's .... 2 .... .... .... 58 .... 1 3 1 ....
Total  5 3 1 3 2 151 2 1 5 7 4
REMARKS--Barret's battery not engaged. Harts' battery--1 gun disabled, trail rotten and snapped in recoil. Lumsden's battery--1 gun disabled by breaking of rotten trail; 1 gun abandoned, but recovered.



9. Leonidas Polk

O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXX/2 [S# 51] AUGUST 16-SEPTEMBER 22, 1863.--The Chickamauga Campaign.
No. 238.--Reports of Lieut. Gen. Leonidas Polk, C. S. Army, commanding Right Wing.

[ar51_43 con't]
HEADQUARTERS POLK'S CORPS, ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
Anderson's House, September 11, 1863--1 a.m.
COLONEL: Having met the courier with the accompanying dispatch,(*) I have read and forwarded it. From this you will perceive that General Hindman thinks it doubtful whether the force at his disposal will be adequate for the emergency. Of this the general, perhaps, has better means of judging. In compliance with orders, I shall send the whole of my wagon train (Cheatham's and Hindman's) forward, and shall remain at Anderson's with the troops of Cheat-ham's division to cover Hindman's, and only to move forward to La Fayette when pressed by the enemy. It is for the commanding general to determine, with General Hindman's communication, whether my presence with Cheatham's division will be of more value to Hill or Hindman. I do not know the difficulties to be encountered in passing from the head of McLemore's Cove over to La Fayette, nor the strength of the force which the enemy can bring against Hill from the direction of Summerville; but I think it of the highest importance that thorough work should be made in the operations of the first attack. <ar51_44>
One half of my wagon train has now passed Anderson's, and the other is following rapidly. General Buckner's wagon train I found crossing my road on my arrival at Anderson's, going in the direction of his column. Thirty wagons, composing his supply train, seem to have been ordered to fall in and accompany my wagon train. These are now going toward La Fayette; all the rest of his train, by General Buckner's orders, are following his column. I take it for granted the commanding general has abandoned the intention mentioned to me to take it the other way.
Respectfully, colonel, your obedient servant,
 L. POLK,
Lieutenant-General, Commanding.
 Lieut. Col. GEORGE WILLIAM BRENT,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
P. S.--My instructions are to remain here to protect Hindman unless pressed by the enemy. Supposing myself not to be pressed, how long am I to remain?
-----
HEADQUARTERS POLK'S CORPS, ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
Rock Spring Church, September 12, 1863--8 p.m.
GENERAL: I arrived here as soon as I anticipated, and have just finished reconnoitering the ground on which my engineers and General Cheatham have formed my line of battle. I send you a sketch(*) of the ground. You will see there are three roads converging on the spring. A is the Gordon's Mills road; B is the Pea Vine Church road, and C is the La Fayette and Ringgold road. From A to B, at the point where my line is, is three-quarters of a mile; from B to C is l¾ miles. On this line Cheatham's division is extended; it is too much drawn out and has no reserves of its own. It will take 10,000 men to fill the line as it should be. Since my arrival I find I have the whole of Crittenden's corps and Wilder's cavalry brigade immediately before me, to wit, Van Cleve on road A, with his advance en-camping 1½ miles in my front: Palmer on road B, with his advance about the same distance, and Wood's on road C, with his advance on a line with the other two. It will thus be perceived I have the whole of Crittenden's corps, with Wilder's cavalry brigade, confronting me and moving in line of battle. How much more of the enemy's force is behind this line as a reserve there is no means of determining; but there is reason to believe that he has received a considerable accession of force at Chattanooga, and it is not to be believed that he will omit to send them forward. I am, therefore, clearly of the opinion that you should send to me additional force, so as to make failure impossible, and great success here would be of incalculable benefit to our cause. I think I should have, so as to make success sure, the force under General S. B. Buckner. That will leave General Hill's corps intact for any contingency in your quarter. In this opinion I find all the general officers with me agree, and I am myself so profoundly convinced of this that I beg leave, most respectfully and urgently, to press this upon your attention. It would not only insure success if there were no other troops present with the enemy as a reserve, but prevent failure if there should be. <ar51_45>
The enemy is moving with steady step upon my position--it is a strong one--and will no doubt attack early in the morning.
My troops I cannot get into position in time to attack myself at so early an hour as day-dawn. If I find he is not going to attack me I will attack him without delay.
I send you a map(*) of the situation. I send this by a staff officer.
Respectfully, general, your obedient servant,
 L. POLK,
Lieutenant-General, Commanding.
 Brigadier-General MACKALL.
-----
HDQRS. POLK'S CORPS, ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
At Mrs. Park's, near Rock Spring,
September 17, 1863--10.30 p.m.
GENERAL: My divisions left La Fayette this p.m. as soon as the roads were clear, and arrived at the end of their march about 10 o'clock. I have caused Cheatham's division to be bivouacked in nearly the same position which it formerly occupied. It followed Walker's command. Hindman's division moved out on the Crawfish Valley road, and is now encamped with its right near the point at which Cheatham's left rests, and extends thence in the direction of Worthen's Gap. These are the dispositions I have made for the night. Early to-morrow morning permanent dispositions will be made. I find Worthen's Gap guarded by a brigade of Armstrong's cavalry, which is supported by Wharton's division of cavalry. I understand that Van Cleve's and Palmer's divisions are on the Crawfish Spring road leading up the cove. I learn of no enemy on my right. General Armstrong informs me that he finds some of the enemy on the Chattanooga road, between Anderson's and Gordon's Mills; the force not known. He is picketing the Crawfish Valley road as far as Glass' Mill. The space between Pea Vine Church and Worthen's Gap is too long for my corps.
Respectfully, general, your obedient servant,
 L. POLK,
Lieutenant-General, Commanding.
 Brigadier-General MACKALL,
 Chief of Staff.
-----
HDQRS. POLK'S CORPS, September 18, 1863--8.15 a.m.
GENERAL: The order to move my corps at 6.30 a.m. was received at 6.15, and issued immediately. General Cheatham's division is in motion on the Long Hollow road. General Anderson moves on the Gordon's Mills road from Dr. Anderson's. I have ordered Armstrong to move a regiment ahead of each column: to move two regiments forward to the ford near Glass' Mill, and to hold Worthen's Gap and cover my flank with a brigade. It will be perceived that this force of cavalry is inadequate should the enemy, reported to be in force beyond Worthen's Gap, press on that flank. I have ordered my ordnance trains to be placed at Pea Vine Church, and shall myself move on the Gordon's Mills road.
Most respectfully, general, your obedient servant,
 L. POLK,
Lieutenant-General, Commanding.
 Brigadier-General MACKALL,
 Chief of Staff.
 <ar51_46>
HEADQUARTERS POLK'S CORPS,
September 18, 1863--8.40 a.m.
GENERAL: Robertson's Reserve Artillery was ordered to report to me at. La Fayette, and I ordered it to report to General Hindman for the march. General Anderson (commanding Hindman's division) states that he ordered copy of marching orders of that division to be furnished Major Robertson, and now reports that Major R[obertson] has not joined him and has not been found, although two couriers have been dispatched for him. The general commanding having subsequently informed me that he was not placed under my orders, but was only to march in company with my column, I thought it possible that other orders may have been given him from army headquarters. Please inform me. In the meantime I shall make further search for him and order him to follow General Cheatham's column.
Respectfully, general, your obedient servant,
 L. POLK,
Lieutenant-General, Commanding.
 Brigadier-General MACKALL,
 Chief of Staff.
-----
HDQRS. POLK'S CORPS, ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
Anderson's House, Two Miles from Gordon's Mills,
September 18, 1863--12.30 p.m.
GENERAL: This column found the enemy in some force (not large) a short distance beyond this point. I am now engaged in deploying my troops and posting my batteries with a view of pressing him. A few of my batteries have already opened. A citizen from the other side of the river this morning reports the presence of five generals (Crittenden, Wood, Van Cleve, Palmer, and a Dutchman, whose name was not remembered). A staff officer this morning reports the enemy's column moving down Chickamauga on the other side in quiet line.
Respectfully, general, your obedient servant,
 L. POLK,
Lieutenant-General, Commanding.
 Brigadier-General MACKALL.
-----
HEADQUARTERS POLK'S CORPS, ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
Anderson's House, September 18, 1863--5.40 p.m.
GENERAL: I have pressed down to a point immediately opposite Gordon's Mills, and find the hills on the other side occupied strongly with infantry and batteries. The ground on the other side is high and commanding, and covered with wood. That on this side is low, and consists of open fields. As Buckner and Cheatham are in possession of Hunt's and Thedford's Fords, within a short distance below, and I have a good road into their line of march, I shall continue to threaten this position and shall pass over below. I am just advised by one of my staff officers that the column above me was in the act of crossing as he left it.
Respectfully, general, your obedient servant,
 L. POLK,
Lieutenant-General, Commanding.
 Brigadier-General MACKALL,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
 <ar51_47>
HEADQUARTERS POLK'S CORPS, ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
Missionary Ridge, September 28, 1863.
COLONEL: In reply to your communication(*) I would respectfully submit to the commanding general the following statement, explanatory of the failure to make an attack upon the enemy, as ordered, at daylight on the 20th:
After leaving army headquarters on the night of the 19th, where I received a verbal order to attack the enemy at daylight, I rode immediately to my headquarters, beyond Alexander's Bridge, where I arrived 11 p.m.
On the way, accompanied by General Breckinridge, I met with a staff officer of Lieutenant-General Hill, to whom I communicated my orders, and from whom I learned that General Hill's headquarters were at Thedford's Ford. I asked him to say to General Hill that my headquarters were beyond and near to Alexander's Bridge, and that I desired to see him there. On arriving at my headquarters, I issued orders, dated 11.30 [o'clock], to Lieutenant-General Hill and Major-General Cheatham to attack the enemy simultaneously at daylight, General Walker's division being held in reserve.
I also posted two couriers at the bridge to keep up fires and inform persons where my headquarters were. My orders were sent by couriers to the headquarters of the respective generals--General Hill's to Thedford's Ford. The couriers to Generals Cheatham and Walker returned promptly. The courier sent to General Hill, after searching for the general-through the night, returned about daylight, saying that he could not find him. General Hill did not make his appearance at my headquarters. Hearing nothing of the attack, and not knowing where to find General Hill, I sent staff officers in haste directly to Generals Breckinridge and Cleburne, with information that General Hill could not be found, and with orders to make the attack at once, and rode myself to the front. Shortly afterward I received, in reply to these orders, a communication from General Hill, stating that his divisions were getting their rations, and would not be ready to move for an hour or more, and also reporting that Breckinridge's wagons had been lost between Thedford's Ford and the battle-field. On reaching General Hill's line, I saw General Cleburne, of General Hill's corps, and asked if he had received my order to attack. He said he had received it in the presence of General Hill. I found also that General Hill had delayed his attack in consequence of a misapprehension on his part as to the relation between his line and that of General Cheatham, he supposing that Cheatham's line was formed, as he said, on his left at nearly a right angle to his own. In this he was mistaken. The relation of the lines were such as is indicated in the accompanying diagram.(+) General Hill mistook the line of one of Cheatham's reserve brigades (Jackson's) for that of his front line. The order to attack was then repeated and executed.
Respectfully, colonel, your obedient servant,
 L. POLK,
 Lieutenant-General, Commanding.
 Lieut. Col. GEORGE WILLIAM BRENT,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
 <ar51_48>
[Inclosure.][bitmap]
ATLANTA, October 7, 1863.
COLONEL: In my reply to your note of the 22d, asking for the reasons of the failure to attack the enemy at daylight on Sunday, the 20th, there occurs this passage: "My orders were sent by courier to the headquarters of the respective generals--General Hill's to Thedford's Ford. The couriers to Generals Cheatham and Walker returned promptly," &c. The memorandum from which that statement was made was furnished from the office of my adjutant-general, through whom orders are transmitted and received. On a careful examination of the facts since that reply was forwarded, I find that as the couriers were about to leave General Walker came to my camp and received his orders in person. The fact is not material, but as it is proper to have what occurred stated as it happened, the correction is made and this paper submitted as a supplement to my reply.
I am, colonel, respectfully, your obedient servant.
 L. POLK,
 Lieutenant-General.
 Lieut. Col. GEORGE WILLIAM BRENT.
ADDENDA.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
La Fayette, September 11, 1863.
 [Lieutenant-General POLK :]
GENERAL: The general commanding directs that you hold your command in readiness to move at daylight in the morning.
I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,
 GEORGE WM. BRENT.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
La Fayette, Ga., September 12, 1863--a. m.
 [Lieutenant-General POLK :]
GENERAL: The general commanding directs that you will at once proceed with Cheatham's division and take position at Rock Spring. You will order forward also the rest of your corps as soon as practicable.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 GEORGE WM. BRENT.
 <ar51_49>
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
La Fayette, Ga., September 12, 1863--12 o'clock at night.
 [Lieutenant-General POLK :]
GENERAL: I have your dispatch (*) giving me your position and the disposition of the enemy opposite to you. Your position seems to be a strong one for defense, but I hope will not be held unless the enemy attacks early. We must force him to fight at the earliest moment and before his combinations can be carried out. Your generals who advise the concentration of the larger portion of the army with you only know of Crittenden's corps being opposed to you, and did not know of the advance again of a heavy infantry force in the cove upon this place, and of another from the south, preceded by a very large cavalry force. However, to avoid all danger, I shall put Buckner in motion in the morning and run the risk here. You must not delay attack for his arrival, or another golden opportunity may be lost by the withdrawal of our game. Had you and the generals with you had the information in my possession at the date of your dispatch your conclusions might have varied. But I trust that the cavalry sent south may hold the enemy in check until you can finish the job intrusted to you. Action, prompt and decided, is all that can save us. The troops are ready to respond.
I am, general, very truly, yours,
 BRAXTON BRAGG.
-----
CIRCULAR.]                HDQRS. POLK'S CORPS, ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
Rock Spring Church, September 12, 1863--11.30 p.m.
Major-General Cheatham will take position on the left of the line, his left resting on the high ground on the southwest of Anderson's residence, extending thence to the right across Gordon's Mills road, so as to cover one-half of the indicated line of battle. All the rest of his troops not required for that purpose will be held in reserve.
Major-General Walker will place the left of his line so as to rest on Cheatham's right and extend thence across the Ringgold road to the extreme right of the line. So many of his troops as are not necessary to cover his front line will be held by him as his reserve.
The troops of Major-General Hindman and of any other infantry command that may be present will be held as a general reserve to be disposed of by the lieutenant-general commanding as occasion may require.
The cavalry of General Pegram will cover the right and that of General Armstrong the left of the line so formed.
The lieutenant-general commanding cannot permit the troops under his command to engage in the battle now before us without expressing to them his profound sense of the importance of the issues which hang upon the result. If we are successful the star of the Confederacy rises in the ascendant. The spirits of our friends everywhere will be cheered and our homes made happy. The thorough defeat of the enemy now would blast the prospects of our cruel invaders. The lieutenant-general knows that the troops he has now the honor to command have long and eagerly desired an opportunity to confront their adversaries. That opportunity is now offered them, «4 R R--VOL XXX, PT II» <ar51_50> and he confidently believes that they have the power as well as the will to make themselves felt as no troops were ever felt before. They will not fail to remember that this is the enemy by whom their property has been destroyed, their hearthstones desolated, their women insulted and outraged, their altars profaned, and they will sternly avenge their wrongs.
By command of Lieutenant-General Polk:
 [THOMAS M. JACK,]
Assistant Adjutant-General.
-----
(*) HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
In the Field, La Fayette, Ga., Sept. 13, 1863--12.30 a.m.
 [Lieutenant-General POLK :]
GENERAL: The enemy is approaching from the south, and it is highly important your attack in the morning should be quick and decided. Let no time be lost.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 GEORGE WM. BRENT,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
In the Field, La Fayette, Ga., September 17, 1863.
 [Lieutenent-General POLK :]
GENERAL: You will proceed to execute the instructions received from the commanding general as soon as the road is cleared by the commands of Generals Buckner and Walker.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 GEORGE WM. BRENT,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
-----
HEADQUARTERS OF ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
In the Field, Leet's Tan-yard, September 18, 1863.
 Lieutenant-General POLK:
General Wheeler is upon your left. General Hill is also supporting your left and rear.
Respectfully,
 KINLOCH FALCONER,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
In the Field, Leet's Tan-yard, September 18, 1863.
 [Lieutenant-General POLK :]
GENERAL: The general commanding desires me to say that should General Buckner be pressed, you will sustain him from Cheatham's <ar51_51> division. He wishes you to communicate with General Buckner. Should you send any force to his relief you will advise General Hill of the fact.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 GEORGE WM. BRENT,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
In the Field, Leet's Tan-yard, September 18, 1863.
 [Lieutenant-General POLK :]
GENERAL: On march to this place the general commanding found Robertson's reserve out of its line of march. He, therefore, has made other disposition of it.
Respectfully,
 GEORGE WM. BRENT,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE.
In the Field, Leet's Tan-yard, Sept. 18, 1863--8.30 p.m.
 [Lieutenant-General POLK :]
GENERAL: Generals Walker and Buckner are now at the fords and ordered to cross at daylight. The commanding general directs you to move General Cheatham's division at daylight to its right, to cross the river as circumstances may demand. General Hill has been ordered to move to his right, to correspond with your movement.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 KINLOCH FALCONER,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
-----
HEADQUARTERS POLK'S CORPS, ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
Anderson's House, September 19, 1863--9 a.m.
 Brigadier-General MACKALL,
Assistant Adjutant-General :
GENERAL: This morning General Forrest sent me by his adjutantgeneral an earnest request for one of General Armstrong's brigades. As General Hill is closing upon my left, I had no occasion for more than one brigade of cavalry, and therefore consented that Dibrell's brigade, of Armstrong's division, should go to General Forrest. I report this fact for your information.
Respectfully, general, your obedient servant,
 L. POLK,
Lieutenant-General, Commanding.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
In the Field, Thedford's Ford, September 19, 1863.
 [Lieutenant-General POLK :]
GENERAL: Our line is moving up the Chickamauga from this place, Hood on the right, Walker in the second line, Buckner on <ar51_52> the left, Cheatham in the second line. The general directs you to move down the river, cross at the first ford, and be ready to support the line of battle. If you discover that the enemy has left Lee and Gordon's Mills you will cross at that place.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 GEORGE WM. BRENT,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
In the Field, Thedford's Ford, September 19, 1863.
 [Lieutenant-General POLK :]
GENERAL: The general commanding has arrived at this place and has established his headquarters here. General Buckner has crossed. General Cheatham will follow in his rear. The general wishes to know the state of affairs in your front.
I am, general, very respectfully,your obedient servant,
 GEORGE WM. BRENT,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
-----
CIRCULAR.(*)]           HDQRS. RIGHT WING, ARMY OF TENN.,
Near Alexander's Bridge, September 19, 1863--11.30 p.m.
1. Lieutenant-General Hill, on the right, will attack the enemy with his corps to-morrow morning at daylight.
2. Major-General Cheatham, on Hills left, will make a simultaneous attack.
3. Major-General Walker's corps will act as reserve. Corps and division commanders will see that their troops are amply supplied with ammunition before daylight.
By command of Lieutenant-General Polk:
 [THOMAS M. JACK,]
Assistant Adjutant-General.
-----
HEADQUARTERS RIGHT WING,
Near Alexander's Bridge, September 20, 1863--5.30 a.m.
 Major-General CLEBURNE,
Major-General BRECKINRIDGE:
GENERALS: The Lieutenant-General commanding, having sought in vain for Lieutenant-General Hill, gives you directly the following orders:
Move upon and attack the enemy so soon as you are in position.
Major-General Cheatham, on our left, has been ordered to make a simultaneous attack.
Respectfully, generals, your obedient servant,
 [THOMAS] M. JACK,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
 <ar51_53>
IN THE FIELD,
September 20, 1863--7 a.m.
 Brigadier-General MACKALL,
Assistant Adjutant-General :
GENERAL: I am this instant in receipt of my first communication [following] from General Hill, who informs me that, he will not be ready to move for an hour or more, because his troops are receiving rations and because his wagons were lost last night. The attack will be made as soon as he is prepared for it.
Respectfully, general, your obedient servant,
 L. POLK,
Lieutenant-General, Commanding.
-----
SEPTEMBER 20, [1863.]
 [Lieutenant-General POLK :]
GENERAL: I could find no courier at Alexander's Bridge, and therefore could not find you. My divisions are getting their rations and will not be ready to move for an hour or more. Breckinridge's wagons seem to have got lost between Thedford's Ford and this place. It will be well for you to examine the line from one end to the other before starting. Brigadier-General Jackson is running from east to west. My line is from north to south. General Cleburne reports that the Yankees were felling trees all night, and consequently now occupy a position too strong to be taken by assault. What shall be done when this point is reached?
Respectfully,
 D. H. HILL,
Lieutenant-General.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
In the Field, September 21, 1863.
 [Lieutenant-General POLK :]
GENERAL: The general commanding desires that you will at daylight to-morrow send a division from your command on the Chickamauga Station road, to press upon the enemy and drive him as far as possible. Cavalry will be upon your flank to protect it. The general is advised that large numbers of arms and munitions of war are scattered throughout the country in front. He desires every effort shall be made to collect and save them.
I am, general, very respectfully,your obedient servant,
 GEORGE WM. BRENT,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
-----
HEADQUARTERS RIGHT WING, ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
Near Mission Mills, September 21, 1863--12 [p.]m.
 General BRAXTON BRAGG:
GENERAL: The division will be sent as ordered. In consequence of the number of roads in this vicinity, I respectfully ask more definite information as to which is the Chickamauga Station road.
Respectfully, general, your obedient servant,
 L. POLK,
Lieutenant-General, Commanding.
 <ar51_54>
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
In the Field, near Red House Ford, September 22, 1863.
 [Lieutenant-General POLK :]
GENERAL: In reply to your communication of 12 p.m., I have the honor to state that the road referred to is the road from Chickamauga Station to Chattanooga.
I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,
 GEORGE WM. BRENT,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
-----
HEADQUARTERS RIGHT WING, ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
Near Mission Mills, September 22, 1863--6 a.m.
 Lieut. Col. GEORGE WILLIAM BRENT:
COLONEL: Under the construction of your order to move a division to the front this morning upon the Chickamauga and Chattanooga road, I have ordered General Cheatham, who commands my extreme right, to put himself in motion upon that road. It crosses the Chickamauga Creek at the Shallow Ford. He has instructions to press forward until he finds the enemy, with his sharpshooters well advanced to the front. General Anderson's division is upon the Mission Mills and Chattanooga road, and Walker is to his left, covering another parallel road with a good gap, and Hill, should it be necessary, could cross at a gap between the gap on Walker's road and Rossville.
Respectfully, colonel, your obedient servant,
 L. POLK,
Lieutenant-General, Commanding.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
Red House Ford, September 22, 1863.
 Lieutenant-General POLK,
Commanding Right Wing :
GENERAL: The general commanding desires that you will make as early as practicable a report explanatory of your failure to attack the enemy at daylight on Sunday last in obedience to orders.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 GEORGE WM. BRENT,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
Top of Missionary Ridge, September 25, 1863.
 [Lieutenant-General POLK :]
GENERAL: The general commanding instructs me to call your attention to the fact that a communication addressed to you several days [since] from these headquarters, calling for an explanation of your failure to attack the enemy at daylight on the morning of the 20th instant, has been unanswered. He desires that you will report without delay what caused or impeded the execution of your orders.(*)
I am, general, very respectfully,your obedient servant,
 GEORGE WM. BRENT,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
 <ar51_55>
NEAR CHATTANOOGA,
Via Chickamauga, September 29, 1863.
 General S. COOPER,
Adjutant and Inspector General:
Major-General Hindman and Lieutenant-General Polk have been suspended from their commands by my orders and sent to Atlanta, for not obeying orders on the 11th and 20th instant. This has been deemed necessary after grave consideration.
 BRAXTON BRAGG,
General, Commanding.
[Indorsements.]
Respectfully submitted to His Excellency the President.
General Bragg has power to arrest an officer of his command, but is bound in that case to show cause by preferring charges as prescribed.
 J. D[AVIS].
-----
RICHMOND, October 1, 1863.
 General BRAXTON BRAGG,
Near Chattanooga, Tenn. :
Your dispatch, stating you had suspended Generals Polk and Hind-man from command, received. I am directed to inform you that the power of a commanding general in such cases is limited to arrest and the furnishing charges in order to trial, and that suspension from command as above be considered punishment without trial.
 S. COOPER,
Adjutant and Inspector General.
-----
Charges preferred against Lieut. Gen. L. Polk, Provisional Army, Confederate States.
CHARGE 1.--Disobedience of the lawful command of his superior officer.
Specification.--That Lieut. Gen. L. Polk, Provisional Army, Confederate States, having received orders from his commanding general on the evening of September 19, 1863, to attack the enemy with his command on the field of Chickamauga at daylight the next morning, did fail to obey said order, and did not make the attack until about 10 a.m., and after the order was repeated.
CHARGE 2.--Neglect of duty to the prejudice of good order and military discipline.
Specification.--That Lieut. Gen. L. Polk, Provisional Army, Confederate States, having failed to carry into effect the orders received from his commanding general on the night of September 19, 1863, to wit, to attack the enemy on the field of Chickamauga at daylight the next morning, did make no report of his non-compliance at the time of such failure, and did take no proper or prompt measures himself to ascertain the causes thereof; did not join his command or any portion of it before or at the time appointed for such attack, to wit, daylight, but did remain at his field headquarters beyond the Chickamauga, <ar51_56> 2 miles from his troops, until and after the arrival of a staff officer of the commanding general with an inquiry as to the cause of his delay; this at 7 o'clock on the morning of September 20, and that he had failed at this hour to ascertain the cause of the neglect of his troops to make the attack ordered at daylight.
 BRAXTON BRAGG,
General, Commanding Army of Tennessee.
Witnesses:
General BRAXTON BRAGG, C. S. Army; Maj. P. B. LEE, Provisional Army, Confederate States; Lieut. Gen. D. H. HILL, Provisional Army, Confederate States; Maj. Gen. W. H. T. WALKER; Lieutenant-General POLK'S report; map of field.
-----
SPECIAL ORDERS,HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
No. 249. Missionary Ridge, September 29, 1863.
*          *          *          *          *          *          *          *          *          *
III. Lieut. Gen. L. Polk, for not obeying his orders for the attack on the enemy at Chickamauga on the 20th instant, is suspended from his command. He will proceed with his personal staff to Atlanta, and await further orders.
*          *          *          *          *          *          *          *          *          *
By command of General Bragg:
 GEORGE WM. BRENT,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
-----
MISSIONARY RIDGE,
September 29, 1863.
 Lieut. Gen. D. H. HILL:
DEAR SIR: You are no doubt aware that I have been relieved from command and ordered to proceed to Atlanta. This procedure is based on the assumed ground that my reasons for not attacking the enemy at daylight on Sunday, the 20th instant, are unsatisfactory. I presume, of course, that an investigation or charges of some character will follow the action already taken, and it is a matter of great importance to me to present the whole truth as to what occurred on the night of the 19th and morning of the 20th instant. You are in possession of some facts on that subject that are important in any development that may be made, and are necessary in order to enable me to present my conduct in its true light, and I therefore desire to propound to you the following questions:
1. Where were your quarters on the night of the 19th instant?
2. Did you communicate with me in that night, or attempt to do so, and at what hours of the night or morning, if any attempt was so made?
3. Did any staff officer of yours on that night or morning tell you that he had seen me, and that I had directed him to inform you that you must attack at daylight? If he did so, what was his name and at what time did you receive this communication?
4. What were the reasons for your unreadiness to attack the enemy at daylight? <ar51_57>
5. Were you present when an order from me to General Cleburne (one of your division commanders) was received directing him to commence the attack, which he turned over to you? If so, at what hour this occurred.
6. Did I meet you on the morning of the 20th, and at what hour did we meet, and what conversation occurred between us?
7. Were you then ready for an attack, and was it made as soon as possible?
Your early attention to this matter will confer a favor on your obedient servant,
 L. POLK,
 Lieutenant-General.
-----
MISSIONARY RIDGE,
September 29, 1863.
 Major-Generals WALKER and CHEATHAM:
SIRS: You are, perhaps, officially informed of my being relieved from command and ordered to Atlanta. This procedure is based on the assumed ground that my reasons for not attacking the enemy at daylight on the 20th instant are unsatisfactory. It is fair to presume that an investigation of my conduct, through charges preferred or otherwise, will soon take place, and it is due to myself and to truth that the whole matter should be fully investigated. You are one of my corps commanders, and I desire an answer from you to the following questions:
1. Where were your quarters on the night of the 19th, and how far from mine?
2. Did you receive orders for the attack from me; and at what hour of night or morning?
3. When or at what time were you ready for the attack?
4. At what time in the morning did you first see me on the field?
Please add any other fact material to the elucidation of this matter. Your early answer to this letter will oblige me.
Yours, respectfully,
 L. POLK,
 Lieutenant-General.
-----
Deposition of John H. Fisher.
HEADQUARTERS POLK'S CORPS,
September 29, 1863.
On the night of September 19, I was on duty at headquarters as courier. About 12 o'clock a dispatch was handed me to be carried to Lieutenant-General Hill. I left immediately in search of General Hill, having been informed that General Hill was near Thedford's Ford. I was unable to find General Hill after searching for him for about four hours. In my search I came up with General Cheatham and made inquiry of him for General Hill. He informed me that he knew nothing of his whereabouts. I also met with General Breck-inridge and made of him the same inquiry and received of him the same answer. After going in every direction and inquiring of all <ar51_58> the soldiers I met of his and other commands I returned to headquarters, after a search of about four hours, unable to find General Hill. Upon my return I did not report to Colonel Jack, as I understood from his clerk (Mr. McReady) that I was not to disturb him upon my return.
 JOHN H. FISHER,
Orleans Light Horse.
Sworn to and subscribed before me September 29, 1863.
 ANDREW EWING,
Presiding Judge of the Military Court of
Lieutenant-General Polk's Corps.
-----
Statement of Lieut. Col. Thomas M. Jack.
NEAR CHATTANOOGA,
September 29, 1863.
About 11 o'clock on the night of the 19th, General Polk reached his headquarters near Alexander's Bridge, and stated to me that he was to attack the enemy at daylight the next morning. He instructed me to issue orders at once to Lieutenant-General Hill and Major-General Cheatham to make the attack at that time, directing me to send General Hill's orders to him at Thedford's Ford, where, as he had heard, General Hill's headquarters were established that night. These orders were accordingly issued at 11.30 p.m. General Walker's corps was to be held in reserve. A copy of the orders was handed to him on the spot.
During the night the courier who bore General Cheatham's orders returned, bringing back the envelope and reporting that he had delivered the orders. The courier bearing orders to General Hill was directed to Thedford's Ford, and ordered to inquire for and find the general. He failed to deliver his orders. His written statement is here referred to as to the reasons for this failure.
Shortly after daylight (perhaps before sunrise)General Polk instructed me to issue orders directly to Generals Breckinridge and Cleburne to make the attack, notifying them that General Hill could not be found. These orders were prepared and placed in the hands of a staff officer, who was ordered to proceed in haste and deliver them. His statement will show what he did.
Immediately afterward another staff officer was dispatched with verbal orders to the same officers and to the same effect. The general then rode to the front accompanied by his staff.
 THOMAS M. JACK,
Lieut. Col., and Asst. Adjt. Gen., Polk's Corps.
-----
Deposition of L. Charvet.
 SEPTEMBER 30, 1863.
I am a member of the Orleans Light Horse, Lieut. Gen. L. Polk's escort. On the night of Saturday, the 19th instant, after the battle, we were ordered by General Polk from the field to the camp at about 8 p.m. The headquarters of the general and our camp were <ar51_59> to be located in a new place, at about one-half or three-quarters of a mile from Alexander's Bridge on the Chickamauga Creek. When we arrived at the spot selected as the headquarters of the general, and our camping ground, I was ordered, pursuant to instructions received from headquarters by our orderly sergeant (Mr. Charles Galloway), to go back to Alexander's Bridge and give all necessary directions to couriers and all other persons inquiring for the headquarters of General Polk. At about 9.30 p.m. I was relieved and ordered to repair to the fork of the main road running from Alexander's Bridge and the road leading to the headquarters of General L. Polk, which were at about 100 yards from the main road. The instructions given to me, pursuant to orders from headquarters, were to stay at the above-designated place and to direct all persons looking for the general to his headquarters. I was especially instructed not to move from that place until Generals Walker and Hill would have passed. During the time I was on post several persons inquired for the headquarters of General Polk, and were by me instructed where they were located. Among those inquiring for said headquarters I remember Lieut. Wm. E. Bertus, one of the staff of General Breckinridge, and two other staff officers of General Hill. I had conversation with one of the two staff officers of General Hill. As he passed near the fork of the roads above mentioned he asked me if I had seen General Hill. I answered that I had not, and that I was waiting till he passed to show him the road to the headquarters of General Polk; He then said, "You could give me the information I want, Do you know if General Hill has been at General Bragg's to-night?" I answered that I did not know, but that he could ascertain it from General Polk, who had arrived a few minutes since from the headquarters of General Bragg. He then requested me to go and ascertain it from General Polk, stating that he wished to have said information, because if General Hill had not been at General Bragg's he would have to go. I answered that I could not leave my post; that the headquarters of General Polk were right on the road where they were, at 100 yards. He then said, "Go on; I and my friend will during your absence direct all those inquiring for the headquarters of General Polk." I then repaired to General Polk, whom I found sitting near the fire with the late Colonel Richmond. I delivered him the message of the staff officer of General Hill. General Polk's answer was, "Go and tell that officer that it is useless for him to go to General Bragg, inasmuch as I have all the orders to be transmitted to General Hill, and have full authority to give all instructions," or something to that effect. "Tell him to come here, and that I will give him all necessary instructions." I then went back to my post and there found the two above-mentioned officers, to whom I gave the answer of General Polk. They then left and repaired to the headquarters of General Polk. Several parties inquired during the time I was on post for the headquarters of General Polk and I directed them.
 L. CHARVET.
Sworn to and subscribed before me October 1, 1863.
 ANDREW EWING,
 Presiding Judge of the Military Court of
Lieutenant-General Polk's Corps.
 <ar51_60>
Deposition of J. A. Perkins.
HEADQUARTERS POLK'S CORPS,
Missionary Ridge, September 30, 1863.
I am a member of the Orleans Light Horse Troop, acting as escort to General Polk. On the night of the 19th September, I was on duty as courier, and was stationed by General Polk at Alexander's Bridge, to direct Generals Hill, Walker, and others to General Polk's headquarters. These were the orders given and so specified. I was also directed to keep up a fire at that point, so as to attract the attention of any one in search of General Polk's quarters. This I did. While there General Walker came up. I guided him to General Polk, and by him (General Polk) was directed to return to the bridge in order to guide General Hill, and directed to remain there for an hour or so. I remained for about two hours, until about 2 o'clock, when I left, after renewing the fire. I left at the fire several infantrymen.
 J. A. PERKINS.
Sworn to before me on this the 30th day of September, 1863.
 ANDREW EWING,
Presiding Judge of the Military Court of
Lieutenant-General Polk's Corps.
-----
[Statement of J. Minick Williams.]
CAMP NEAR CHATTANOOGA,
September 30, 1863.
On the morning of September 20, in camp near Alexander's Bridge, between daylight and sunrise, Lieutenant-General Polk ordered me to direct Lieutenant-Colonel Jack, assistant adjutant-general of his staff, to write duplicate orders to Generals Cheatham, Breckinridge, and Cleburne, division commanders (the original orders having been previously sent by Capt. J. F. Wheless, of his staff), directing them to move immediately upon the enemy and attack him vigorously. I proceeded about a mile distant from the bridge and I met Captain Wheless returning, who informed me that he had delivered the orders to the above-mentioned division commanders, and that he had seen Lieutenant-General Hill, who informed him that rations were being issued to the commands of Generals Breckinridge and Cle-burne, of his corps, and that they would not be able to commence the attack for more than an hour, as the men had to eat. Captain Wheless requested me to inform Major-General Cheatham of the fact, who occupied the position on the left of the command of Lieutenant-General Hill. I proceeded to inform Major-General C[heat-ham] of the fact, when I found his command in position to commence the attack as so [ordered]. I did not carry the duplicate orders to Generals Breckinridge and Cleburne, but returned to the headquarters of Lieutenant-General Polk to inform him of General Cheatham's readiness to move in concert with Lieutenant-General Hill when he was ready to commence the attack. I met Lieutenant-General Polk at the point occupied by him as his headquarters on Saturday, the 19th instant. General Polk directed me to lead him to the position of Major-General Cheatham, where he met Major-General Cheatham with his command in line. This was about 7 a.m.
 J. MINICK WILLIAMS.
 <ar51_61>
[Statement of J. Frank Wheless.]
IN CAMP,
September 30, 1863.
The following is a statement of facts within my knowledge relating to the engagement on Sunday, September 20:
On the morning of the 20th instant, between daylight and sunrise, Lieutenant-General Polk sent for me to carry orders to Major-Generals Cleburne and Breckinridge to make an immediate attack upon the enemy. I went directly to Colonel Jack, assistant adjutant-general, to get the orders. As he handed them to me he remarked that during the night General Polk sent orders to General Hill to make the attack at daylight, that it was now after that time, and the person who carried the order had returned and reported that he had searched in every part of the field and could not find General Hill, and that the orders he (Colonel Jack) was then giving me were sent direct to the division commanders to make the attack at once. General Polk's last remark to me was not to lose time, but ride as rapidly as possible. This I did, passing by Major-General Cheatham's headquarters in rear of his line. I left with him a copy of the orders I had for Generals Breckinridge and Cleburne, and said to him that it was for his information, and he was expected to conform to the movement. I proceeded rapidly along the line of battle until I found General Cleburne's command, in rear of which I found Lieutenant-General Hill and Major-Generals Breckinridge and Cleburne around a campfire. On dismounting, I remarked that I had orders from General Polk. General Hill put forth his hand as if to receive the orders, when I said, "These orders are for Generals Breckinridge and Cleburne," and then, in explanation of why the orders were sent direct to the division commanders, I told General Hill that during the night General Polk sent him orders to make the attack at daylight, but the bearer of the order could not find him, and when General Polk became aware of this he sent these orders--these orders just de-livered--to the division commanders. Either General Cleburne or General Breckinridge, when he had read the order, handed it to General Hill and remarked that the men could not go into the fight until they had their rations distributed to them, to which General H[ill] consented. I then asked General H[ill] if he had anything he desired to say to General Polk. He remarked that General Polk had promised to have a courier at the bridge to show him (General H[ill]) the way to his (General Polk's) headquarters, but that he could not find the courier when he went there. He then requested me to wait and he would write a note to General Polk. I said to General Hill I knew General Polk had couriers placed at the bridge; that they remained there until late, but the hour I did not know. I waited some ten minutes or more for General Hill's note and then I started back to General Polk. On my way I met Captain Williams with duplicate orders to the ones I had just delivered. I informed him that I had delivered the original orders, consequently there was not any use in his going farther, but requested him to go up to General Cheatham and say to him that it would be an hour or two before General Hill was ready to attack the enemy. This he did. Some 200 yards farther on I met General Polk on his way to the field. I turned back and he stopped for me to read General Hill's note. When I had finished I said. "General, you notice General Hill says it will be an hour or so before he is ready to make the attack. I am <ar51_62> confident it will be more than two hours before he is ready." General Polk said to me he was going out to inspect his lines, and ordered me to keep his escort there and establish his headquarters just on the right of where they had been the day before. Some fifteen minutes after General Polk left, General Bragg came up and asked me where he was. I replied that he had gone along the line to make an inspection and find out the cause of the delay in making the attack. I remarked that General Polk would return there, but that he (General Bragg) would no doubt find him sooner by going along the line; and I then said, "General, in case you should not find General Polk I will tell you what has been done this morning: General Polk sent orders to General Hill in time for the attack to have been made by daylight if General Hill could have been found; but this was impossible, and when General Polk learned this he sent orders by me to Generals Breckinridge and Cleburne to make an immediate attack.
Major-General Cheatham was informed of this and ordered to conform to the movements; that I found Generals Breckinridge and Cleburne and Hill together, and delivered the orders to Generals B[reckinridge] and C[leburne] in presence of General Hill." I then told General Bragg the contents of General Hill's note to General Polk, and said I did not believe General Hill would be ready to move to the attack in two hours, but that he should have done so at daylight. General Bragg asked me how I expected General Hill to make the attack before he received orders to do So. I said, "General, you will remember when General Polk sent me to you yesterday evening you instructed me to say that you would send a staff officer for him and the other generals, as you wished to have a conference with them." My last remark was made under the impression that General Hill was, of course, present at that conference and understood that he was to make the attack at daylight, and that General Polk had renewed the orders himself, so that there could not possibly be any mistake. I then said, "General, General Cleburne reported to General Hill this morning while I was there that the enemy were felling trees on his front all night." General Bragg said, "Well, sir, is this not another important reason why the attack should be made at once?" I said, "Yes, sir; it does certainly seem so to me; but it did not seem to impress General Hill in that way.
 J. FRANK WHELESS,
Captain, and Assistant Adjutant-General.
-----
HEADQUARTERS,
Missionary Ridge, September 30, 1863.
 Lieut. Gen. D. H. HILL:
GENERAL: You will remember in a conversation held with you some days ago I handed you an order from army headquarters, directing me to furnish an explanation of my failure to attack the enemy at daylight on the morning of the 20th. You will remember, also, that in that conversation I discussed with you the reasons which had caused that failure. Those reasons, as I understood them, I embodied in an answer to the above order and transmitted them as my reply to the commanding general. A copy of that communication I think it proper to furnish you. You will find it herewith inclosed.(*) So far as I remember there was but one point of difference between us as to <ar51_63> statements contained in that communication. That was as to the relation of your line to that of General Cheatham. There is one other point to which you called my attention, and on which it may be proper to remark: It is that in which I stated that on meeting your staff officer in the road on the night of the 19th I communicated to him my orders. You replied, "If you communicated them to him, they were not communicated by him to me." On this point I have to say my recollection of the conversation with him was that I had orders to attack at daylight; that I wished you to post General Breckinridge as a supporting force to General Cleburne, and that I wished to see you at my headquarters beyond Alexander's Bridge, where I would have couriers posted to direct you. He said, "In regard to the posting of the troops, you had expressed a wish to place Breckinridge on Cleburne's right." I replied, "Then tell General Hill he may post his troops as he pleases." In reply to my question where your headquarters would be, he said they would be at Thed-ford's Ford.
Referring you to my communication of yesterday's date, I remain, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 L. POLK,
Lieutenant-General.
-----
HEADQUARTERS CHEATHAM'S DIVISION,
Camp near Chattanooga, September 30, 1863.
 Lieutenant-General POLK:
GENERAL: Your note of the 29th, asking some questions, is received and the following answers returned:
Question 1. "Where were your quarters on the night of the 19th, and how far from mine?"
Answer. My quarters were near the ground occupied by yourself during the day of the 19th, and about 1 mile from where I understood your quarters to be on that night.
Question 2. "Did you receive orders for the attack from me, and at what hour of night or morning?"
Answer. I received your orders for the attack about 1 [o'clock] on the morning of the 20th.
Question 3. "When and at what time were you ready for the attack?"
Answer. My lines were reformed on the night of the 19th, after the night attack, with four brigades in the front line, and Jackson as a reserve. I was ready at daylight. Just before daylight Captain Wheless, of your staff, passed my quarters, and remarked that the courier had been unable to find General Hill, and that he was then bearing orders to General Cleburne to make the attack at daylight.
Question 4. "At what time in the morning did you first see me on the field."
Answer. To the best of my recollection I saw you at Turner's battery about sunrise, you having, as I understood, just returned from the right of your lines.
Yours, very respectfully,
 B. F. CHEATHAM,
Major-General, C. S. Army.
 <ar51_64>
 SEPTEMBER 30, 1863.
 Lieutenant-General POLK:
GENERAL: Your inquiries embrace points upon which we have conversed, but I will answer them in order:
1st. I was at Thedford's Ford from 11 till 3 [o'clock] on the night of the 19th. I went there after the battle to communicate with General Bragg and to ask for orders for the next day, as I had not been apprised that I was placed under your command until midnight, or after it.
2d. I left Thedford's Ford at 3 o'clock and went with my staff to Alexander's Bridge, where I had been told couriers were posted to conduct me to your quarters. Myself and staff searched about there for such couriers, but found none. I then went up to the battlefield and notified Generals Cleburne and Breckinridge of my presence.
3d. Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson, and possibly Lieutenant Reid, told me that they had seen you, and that you wished to see me at Alexander's Bridge that night. No staff officer of mine or yours communicated any order to me to attack at daylight.
4th. I had no orders to make such attack, which is a sufficient answer.
5th. I was present when an order was sent to Generals Cleburne and Breckinridge to begin the attack. I think the order reached them about 7.30 a.m. on the 20th instant.
6th. I think you came up some half hour or later after the receipt of your order for attack. Our conversation was in reference to a note which I had sent you, stating that the line of my corps was at right angles to yours, and asking that the two lines be properly connected while rations were being distributed to my men.
7th. Breckinridge had got into position when you came up, and my line was ready, in a tactical sense, for attack; but I thought no attack ought to be made till the men had taken their breakfast, and till the whole line of battle was properly arranged from right to left.
Yours, &c.,
 D. H. HILL,
 Lieutenant-General.
-----
HEADQUARTERS POLK'S CORPS,
September 30, 1863.
In consequence of an unfortunate disagreement between myself and the commander-in-chief of this department, I have been relieved of my command, and am about to retire from the army.
Without attempting to explain the circumstances of this disagreement, or prejudicing the public mind by a premature appeal to its judgment, I must be permitted to express my unqualified conviction of the rectitude of my conduct, and that time and investigation will amply vindicate my action on the field of Chickamauga.
I cannot, however, part even temporarily with the gallant officers and soldiers of my old corps, without the deepest feeling of regret and a heartfelt expression of my gratitude for the courage, conduct, and devotion they have always manifested while under my command. Belmont, Shiloh, Perryville, Murfreesborough, and Chickamauga all attest on your part the very highest soldierly qualities, and are crowded with precious memories.
Contending with a numerous, well-appointed, and merciless enemy <ar51_65> for all that man holds dear, you have borne unexampled privations with fortitude, fought with undaunted bravery, and ever yielded a ready and cheerful obedience to your officers.
Soldiers who struggle in such a cause, and with such hearts, can never be conquered. Clouds and darkness may enshroud you for a time, but the sunlight of the future is bright and glowing; the blood of patriots is never shed in vain, and our final victory is certain and assured.
Whoever commands you, my earnest exhortation and request to you is, to fight on and fight ever, with true hearts, until your independence is achieved. Thousands of hearts may fall crushed and bleeding under the weapons of the foe, or the passions and mistakes of friends, but the great cause must never be sacrificed, or our flag abandoned. Our cause is just, and your duty to your country and God is as clear as the sun in the heavens.
I leave my command in the care of the bravest of the brave, who has often led them in the darkest hour of their trials. He and you will have my hopes and prayers to the Ruler of the Universe for your happiness and success.
Your kindness, devotion and respect for me exhibited during the years of our association, both in camp and on the field, is graven on my heart, and will be treasured there until it ceases to beat.
Your friend,
 L. POLK,
Lieutenant-General.
-----
BEFORE CHATTANOOGA, TENN.,
October 4, 1863.
 His Excellency JEFFERSON DAVIS,
President of Confederate States, Richmond:
SIR: Your petitioners, general officers of the Confederate armies, now serving with the Army of Tennessee, impressed alike with the importance of the questions they propose to present to you and the responsibilities attached to their action, deem it their duty to make to you the following representations:
Disclaiming in this paper any criticism on the actions of their superiors, they desire to limit their representation to a statement of the existing status of affairs in this locality with suggestions which, in their judgment, will serve as a remedy for the existing evils.
Two weeks ago this army, elated by a great victory which promised to be the most fruitful of the war, was in readiness to pursue its defeated enemy. That enemy, driven in confusion from the field, was fleeing in disorder and panic-stricken across the Tennessee River.
To-day, after having been twelve days in line of battle in that enemy's front, within cannon range of his position, the Army of Tennessee has seen a new Sebastopol rise steadily before its view. The beaten enemy, recovering behind its formidable works from the effects of his defeat, is understood to be already receiving re-enforce-ments, while heavy additions to his strength are rapidly approaching him. Whatever may have been accomplished heretofore, it is certain that the fruits of the victory of the Chickamauga have now escaped our grasp. The Army of Tennessee, stricken with a complete paralysis, will in a few days' time be thrown strictly on the defensive, and may deem itself fortunate if it escapes from its present position without disaster. «5 R R--VOL XXX, PT II» <ar51_66>
It is needless to enlarge upon the importance of the possession of Chattanooga. To us it is the gateway of supplies for a Confederate army in Tennessee. To the enemy it is a formidable tête-de-pont, from which his armies can debouch into the heart of the Confederacy. It has already been to him an asylum, within which his routed army has found a safe refuge, and the possession of which has enabled him to paralyze the movement of our forces. It has thus far maintained him in possession of a great part of East Tennessee. A few more weeks of unmolested possession and it will be to him a formidable fortress, provisioned for six months and capable of being held by a small garrison against any assailing force. The recovery of Middle Tennessee will thereby be effectually prevented--even though we defeat his armies beyond the river---our only line of supply will be obstructed, and the maintenance of our army cut off.
With this state of facts your petitioners approach Your Excellency. They view this campaign as virtually closed-. The preponderance of strength by the delays of the last two weeks is again with the enemy. Their re-enforcements must be met as nearly as possible by corresponding re-enforcements to this army. The increasing difficulties of the position require increased resources on our part. Without additional strength the ablest general could not be expected to grapple successfully with the accumulating difficulties of the situation. But in addition to re-enforcements, your petitioners would deem it a dereliction of the sacred duty they owe the country if they did not further ask that Your Excellency assign to the command of this army an officer who will inspire the army and the country with undivided confidence. Without entering into a criticism of the merits of our present commander, your petitioners regard it as a sufficient reason, without assigning others, to urge his being relieved, because, in their opinion, the condition of his health totally unfits him for the command of an army in the field.
In making these representations to Your Excellency your petitioners are aware that the proceeding is unusual among military men, but the extraordinary condition of affairs in this army, the magnitude of the interests at stake, and a sense of the responsibilities under which they rest to Your Excellency and to the Republic, render this proceeding, in their judgment, a matter of solemn duty, from which, as patriots, they cannot shrink. While Your Excellency may be assured that any commander whom you may assign or retain in this army will receive their earnest support, as far as their ability extends, your petitioners cannot withhold from Your Excellency the expression of the fact that under the command, as it now exists, they can render you no assurance of the success which Your Excellency may reasonably expect.
Your petitioners, therefore, protesting that in making these representations they are actuated solely by a sense of public duty, pray that Your Excellency will grant such speedy action as the exigencies of the situation demand.
We are, respectfully, Your Excellency's obedient servants,
[Indorsement.(*)]
Supposed to have been written by Buckner. Signed by Hill, Brown, Preston, and others.
 W. M. P[OLK].
 <ar51_67>
ATLANTA, October 6, 1863.
 His Excellency PRESIDENT DAVIS:
MY DEAR SIR: I wrote you on the 27th(*) renewing the expression of my opinion of the incapacity of General Bragg for the responsible office of commander-in-chief of the Army of Tennessee, and asking that he should be replaced by General Lee or some other. It is proper to add that that letter was written after a meeting by appointment of Lieutenant-Generals Longstreet, Hill, and myself to consider what should be done in view of the palpable weakness and mismanagement manifested in the conduct of the military operations of this army. It was agreed that I should address you, sir, and General Longstreet (+) the Secretary of War on the subject. These letters were written and forwarded, and, I need not add, after mature deliberation. General Hill concurred in the necessity of this measure. As you may not have perused these letters before leaving Richmond, I have deemed it proper to bring them to your notice. Two days subsequent to my writing this letter to you, sir, I received an order from General Bragg suspending me from my command and ordering me to this place. This order was based on alleged disobedience in not attacking the enemy at daylight on Sunday, the 20th. My explanation of that failure was furnished in a note, of which the accompanying is a copy. (++) In this paper it will be perceived, 1st, that I directed a staff officer of General Hill to say to the general I desired to see him at my headquarters, that he might learn his orders as to the operations of the following day; 2d, that the necessary orders were issued from my headquarters at 11.30 p.m. to General Hill and to Generals Cheatham and Walker, and dispatched by courier. Cheatham and Walker received their orders. Hill could not be found by my courier, nor did Hill make his way to my headquarters. These facts, with others, as you will observe, were embodied and presented the commanding general in reply to a request for a written explanation of the failure to attack. They were pronounced unsatisfactory, and the order for my suspension issued, and it should be observed that for the delay charged I cannot feel myself responsible, by whomsoever caused. Did we occasion any failure in our success of the battle, for the enemy were clearly beaten at all points along my line and fairly driven from the field?
It will be, no doubt, affirmed that had the attack been made at daylight the enemy would have been overwhelmed and Chattanooga taken, &c., and that all subsequent delay and miscarriages are to be set down to that account. To make this affirmation good, it must be shown that at the close of the battle that night, a condition of things was developed which made pursuit impossible, and that it was equally hopeless next morning. This will not be pretended, inasmuch as the troops at the close of the fight were in the very highest spirits, ready for any service, and the moon, by whose guidance the enemy fled from the field, was never brighter--as bright to guide us in the pursuit as the enemy in their flight. Besides, if the commanding general, under a delusion he took no pains to dispel, thought the troops were fatigued and chose to put off pursuit until the morning, why did he not attempt it then? Was it because he had made the discovery that the enemy had made his retreat into Chattanooga in <ar51_68> good order, and that he was secure behind ample fortifications? No sir; General Bragg did not know what had happened, and allowed the whole of the fruits of this great victory to pass from him by the most criminal negligence, or, rather, incapacity, for there are positions in which weakness is wickedness. If there be a man in the public service who should be held to a more rigid accountability for failures, and upon the largest scale, than another, that man is General Bragg, and I shall be happy to go before a court of inquiry on charges preferred against me by General Bragg, that I may have the opportunity not only of vindicating my own conduct, but of establishing the truth and justice of what I have written of his lack of capacity as a commanding general.
I have addressed a note to the Secretary of War, calling his attention respectfully to my case, and asking at the earliest moment a court of inquiry.
I remain, respectfully, your obedient servant,
 L. POLK,
Lieutenant-General.
-----
ATLANTA, GA.,
October 6, 1863
 Hon. JAMES A. SEDDON,
Secretary of War, Richmond, Va.:
SIR: Having been suspended from my command by the general commanding the Army of Tennessee for alleged disobedience of orders, I have respectfully to ask a court of inquiry at the earliest moment practicable.
I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,
 L. POLK,
Lieutenant-General, Provisional Army, C. S.
-----
[Indorsements.]
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF TENNESSEE,
October 14, 1863.
Respectfully forwarded.
 W. W. MACKALL,
Chief of Staff.
-----
 OCTOBER 21, 1863.
Respectfully submitted to Secretary of War.
Charges have been preferred by General Bragg against Lieutenant-General Polk, which are now before the Secretary of War. It is not the practice to grant a court of inquiry where charges are preferred for trial by court-martial.
 S. COOPER,
Adjutant and Inspector General.
-----
 OCTOBER 22, 1863.
Respectfully referred to the President.
I concur in the opinion of the Adjutant-General, and do not advise a court of inquiry.
 J. A. SEDDON,
Secretary of War.
Returned, the case having been disposed of.
 J. D[AVIS].
 <ar51_69>
ATLANTA, GA.,
October 7, 1863.
 Hon. JAMES A. SEDDON,
Secretary of War:
SIR: I beg leave respectfully to enter my protest against the arbitrary and unlawful order (No. 249) of General Bragg, by which I have been suspended from my command and ordered to this post. The Army Regulations especially enact that no officer of less grade than the Secretary of War or President shall exercise such power, and provide that when an officer has been guilty of a breach of orders he shall be arrested and charges preferred against him. No order for my arrest has been received by me, nor, so far as I know, been issued.
Respectfully, your obedient servant,
 L. POLK,
Lieutenant-General.
-----
CAMP RAPPAHANNOCK,
October 26, 1863.
 General LEONIDAS POLK:
MY DEAR GENERAL: I received your letter of the 27th ultimo, the day I was about to make a move upon General Meade to prevent his further re-enforcing General Rosecrans. I have been unable to reply until now. I have rejoiced exceedingly at your great victory, and heartily wished that the advantages gained could be pursued and confirmed. I am indebted, I know, entirely to your kind feelings for the proposition made to me. I wish I could be of any service in the west, but I do not feel that I could do much anywhere. In addition to other infirmities, I have been for more than a month a great sufferer from rheumatism in my back, so that I can hardly get about. I hope the President has been able to rectify all difficulties in your army, and that Rosecrans will at last be obliged to abandon his position. I trust you are again with your command, and that a merciful God will continue His blessings to us and shield us from any danger. That He may have you and your brave army under His care is my earnest prayer.
I am, general, with great respect, your obedient servant,
 R. E. LEE.
-----
 OCTOBER 28, 1863.
 [Lieutenant-General POLK :]
MY DEAR GENERAL: I send Riley down to get some papers pertaining to the military court, &c., affording an opportunity of writing you.
General Buckner has been repeatedly requested to furnish you his notes of operations on the left wing in the recent battle, which he repeatedly promises to do, but never does. We are nursing the matter, and the notes shall be sent you the moment they are received.
I have requested Generals Cheatham, Walker. Breckinridge, and Cleburne for their reports. They all readily agreed to forward them, though they think some little while may elapse before they <ar51_70> are ready. I shall continue to press the matter on their attention, and send you the reports at the earliest possible moment.
I have again set on foot inquiries respecting the order which you suppose to have been issued by General Bragg on the night of Saturday, September 19, organizing the army into two wings, &c. Inclosed you will find a note(*) from Colonel Sorrel, General Longstreet's adjutant-general, in reply to one from me on that subject. You will see that at Longstreet's headquarters they have no such order on file and know nothing of it. This coincides with Brent's statement. Do you think it could have been written and issued under the circumstances? Brent says not, Sorrel says not, and it is not in my office. Could there be any motive for concealment? Let me hear any further wishes you have in the premises. I send you by Riley another list of your commissioned staff, learning from Colonel Year-man that the first roster has been misplaced. Cheatham's division has not yet returned.
It has been commonly expected here that the President would again visit us. It seems to me his presence and counsel are greatly needed in this army. There seems to prevail a feeling of dissatisfaction and restlessness I have never before observed. Surely something is due to officers and men such as these. At any rate, something is due to the cause. The gentlemen of your staff are well, and your name is often heard around their camp fire.
Most respectfully, general, your friend and obedient servant,
 THOMAS M. JACK.
-----
ATLANTA, GA.,
October 29, 1863.
 Lieut. Gen. LEONIDAS POLK,
Atlanta, Ga.:
GENERAL: After an examination into the causes and circumstances attending your being relieved from command with the army commanded by General Bragg, I have arrived at the conclusion that there is nothing attending them to justify a court-martial or a court of inquiry, and I therefore dismiss the application. Your assignment to a new field of duty, alike important and difficult, is the best evidence of my appreciation of your past service and expectations of your future career.
I am, very truly and respectfully, yours,
 JEFFERSON DAVIS.
-----
Extracts from notes of Lieut. W. B. Richmond, aide-de-camp to Lieutenant-General Polk.
SUNDAY, September 6, 1863.
The enemy made quite a demonstration in Lookout Valley. We drove them back from the point and they went in the direction of Trenton. Orders issued to march--Hill in advance of Polk on La Fayette road, and Walker in advance of Buckner on parallel road <ar51_71> to east. Just at night orders were countermanded to move the army. The feeling is one of great doubt as to the movements of the enemy. All want to fight him, but the question is, can we make him fight us?
MONDAY, September 7, 1863.
Clear and warm. Enemy shelling the town from batteries opposite and came down with eight regiments of infantry to within a short distance of Lookout Point. Preston Smith at the point drove them off handsomely, killing quite a number. At night Mercer [W. N. Mercer Otey] got out of lights and quite a trouble was the result. At 3 p.m. the order to move at dark was renewed. Pegram, in command of the cavalry, left to defend Chattanooga; a poor show. Rucker in command of the force immediately in front of the town and at the Point. Hill left by dusk, and at 9 p.m. young Breckin-ridge reported the last of his command gone. The dust terrible---almost impossible to see; the drivers could not see to drive.
TUESDAY, September 8, 1863.
Clear and warm. Smith was not relieved at the point of Lookout till 8 a.m. Hindman took the advance, Cheatham following. We got off at 6 a.m. with General Bragg. Waterson was to have come with us, but did not. McKinstry made mistake in keeping a regiment (Thirty-ninth Alabama) on provost duty and not relieving it till we got 5 miles from town. Failed also in giving Mr. Browning (the guide) the mule that was left for him. Mr. Browning walked. The army marching in the very best of spirits under the conviction that we are to have a fight. The dust terrible and very warm. Reached Scott's, on Chattanooga Creek, about 5 p.m. Hindman encamps on the farther side and Cheatham on this side of the creek. Wagons and the army late getting into camp.
WEDNESDAY, September 9, 1863.
Clear and warm; frightfully dusty. Rucker sent in reports nearly all night. Order received at dark last night to resume the march toward La Fayette at 6 a.m. to-day was at 5.30 a.m. suspended. Rucker represented the enemy as having skirmished with Colonel Mauldin's force at point of Lookout till night of last night. About 1 a.m. Brigadier-General Martin's letter, explanatory of the condition of things in his front, was received at these headquarters. Martin sent it to Brent. Brent to Hill for information, and Hill to Brig. Gen. L. E. Polk for his information. By mistake the courier brought it to General L. Polk. At an early hour to-day heard the enemy's guns in Chattanooga. By 12 m. learned that Rucker had given up the town. Mauldin had but 75 men, at the Point; lost 3 killed and had 10 wounded. Said that two brigades were brought against him; that Rucker gave him no help, and he could not hold the Point. Rucker had a race with the enemy--they on one side of the creek, in town, and he on the other--to get away from the Yanks. Rucker, of course, beat them. Toward night had information that the enemy were crossing Lookout Mountain and coming down into McLemore's Cove. Question as to the route they will take, whether down Chattanooga Creek or Chickamauga Creek. The mouth of the cove covered by Mauldin's men, who were ordered to advance up the cove till they came in contact with the enemy. Large trains said to be coming down the mountain. The enemy having got on the top by Johnson's Crook, then came southwardly on the top of the mountain, and <ar51_72> then down into the cove by the way of Stevens' and Cooper's Gaps. About 6 [o'clock] heard that the enemy were coming down the cove; in fact, that our pickets had fired on their advance and then retired. Smith's brigade immediately ordered out on outpost duty. In half an hour learned that it was the men on picket killing hogs that caused the alarm. Rucker (about 2 p.m.) and Mauldin (about 3 p.m.) came to camp. Rucker's headquarters 1 mile this side of McFarland's Spring, and his command about 2 miles in advance of him. Marsh. Polk sick. General not well; rheumatism. Mercer Otey not to be found. Forrest said to be about 6 miles southwest of La Fayette with 10,000 cavalry. We are in utter darkness so far as the enemy's whereabouts in force and his movements are concerned. Martin at La Fayette.
THURSDAY, September 10, 1863.
Clear and warm. Mercer Otey came into camp, had been to La Fayette. At 8 a.m. one of Rucker's men came into camp with great haste, saying Rucker was being driven back, and the enemy only 1 ½ miles off. He had hardly gone when John Harris came up and announced that a lieutenant of Rucker's had come into his camp with a number of Rucker's cavalry, and stated that Rucker was in full retreat, and the enemy only three-quarters of a mile away and advancing. The whole staff were at once mounted, a number ordered to the various brigade headquarters, and the whole of Cheatham's division placed under arms; Strahl's brigade ordered out on Crawfish Spring road, and Jackson on the road on which we came to this place. The whole camp excited, and all through the stampeding report of the cavalry. General Hindman ordered on detached service with his division. Went to General Bragg by order of General Polk to get a cavalry officer of experience with an additional force to cover the approaches from the direction of Chattanooga. Brigadier-General Armstrong ordered to relieve Rucker with his brigade. Learned that Hill was at La Fayette, and that our cavalry had been driven from Alpine, and the enemy had crossed the mountain at that place in force and apparently going toward Rome. Forrest ordered to Dalton with his command.
At 3.30 p.m. the following was received:
McDONALD'S,
Four Miles above the Mill on Chattanooga Road-2.30 p.m.
Colonel BRENT:
I find Colonel Rucker at this place. His scouts report the enemy as having one regiment on the Crawfish Spring road (infantry), and one brigade of infantry and one regiment of cavalry moving on toward Ringgold, and had crossed the Chickamauga on old State Line road. Colonel Rucker's pickets are 2 miles this side of Rossville. I have three regiments feeding at Reed's Bridge, 2 ½ miles east of this place, on Chickamauga. I will learn from my own scouts something more definite to-night, as I have started Colonel Woodward with a scout to find out positively what the enemy are doing. My headquarters are at this place. I will have the pickets strengthened on roads on my left. I have sent to communicate with cavalry on railroad, but have not learned where Colonel Scott is as yet.
FRANK C. ARMSTRONG,
Brigadier-General.
At about 4 p.m. 3 Yankee prisoners from Crittenden's corps, Palmer's division (1 from Third Kentucky and 2 from Fifty-first Ohio Regiments), were brought in. They reported two brigades of that division moving on Dalton via Ringgold from Chattanooga. <ar51_73>
At 7 p.m. the following was received:
HEADQUARTERS AT McDONALD'S,
September 10, 1863--5 p.m.
Colonel JACK,
Assistant Adjutant-General
COLONEL: Your dispatch received. The enemy are encamped (about a division) on the Chattanooga and Ringgold road, at the crossing of Pea Vine Creek, 6 miles from Ringgold. They have over 100 wagons, and at 8 p.m. were halted to feed. This force was encamped in the valley, and could be distinctly seen from the village. I have a line of couriers from Ringgold to this place, crossing Chickamauga at Alexander's Bridge. I have also sent (at 3 p.m. to-day) Colonel Woodward with 75 select men to ascertain, if possible, the intentions of the enemy. Colonel Rucker's force is still on this road, but I have advanced his line of vedettes, and cannot discover any force of consequence between here and Rossville, The enemy holds that point. An infantry force, reported by Captain Darwin, of Rucker's regiment, to be two brigades (Van Cleve's division), on the Crawfish Spring road, nearly west of this place. I have sent 75 men of Rucker's regiment on that road, with instructions to picket well out to the left. I will move with two regiments (600 men) to Reed's Bridge, 2 miles west of this place and 3 miles from where the enemy were feeding, and, if an opportunity offers, dash in upon them. From all I can learn, I am inclined to think the enemy are moving most of their force on the Ringgold road, one column via Chickamauga and the other I have mentioned. They have not much cavalry.
FRANK C. ARMSTRONG.
[P. S.]--Please forward to General Bragg.
At 8.20 p.m. the following was received from General Armstrong:
Colonel BRENT,
(Through General Polk):
COLONEL: I inclose you Colonel Woodward's dispatch. I find there is a road leading down in direction of Snow Hill, east of Chickamauga Creek and west of Pea Vine. This is the road Colonel Woodward mentions the enemy are on. I will throw the most of my command across the Chickamauga and leave Colonel Rucker here. Communications will reach me at Reed's Bridge through Colonel Rucker at this place.
FRANK C. ARMSTRONG.
The following was inclosed in the above:
5.15 o'clock.
General ARMSTRONG:
I find the enemy to the right of the Ringgold road, and that Pegram's are between them and you. Some of his men have had a skirmish with their infantry and taken 54 prisoners. I shall go on and communicate with Pegram and scout in a direction between you and him.
T. G. WOODWARD,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding Detachment.
Above all sent to General Mackall by his courier, Bryant. Immediately after sending above, all the headquarters train was put in motion for La Fayette. Hindman's wagons were sent in advance, General Polk's followed, then the train of Cheatham and his division. Shortly after starting the general sent mo on to General Bragg to get him to interpret the following order, dated 7.30 p.m., Gordon's Mills:
CIRCULAR.]
General Polk will start all his trains immediately for La Fayette, to be followed by his troops. General Polk will halt his column at Anderson's, so that Hindman may be protected, unless forced to retire from the pressure of the enemy.
By command of General Bragg:
KINLOCH FALCONER,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
 <ar51_74>
FRIDAY, [September] 11, 1863.
After a run of 13 miles by all the wagons with Captain Gibbes, and hunting for Bragg nearly an hour in La Fayette, found him at Hill's headquarters, on Dalton road. He admitted the order was wretchedly worded, and explained that General Polk was to wait at Anderson's to prevent Crittenden from coming down on Buckner's rear, and to help Buckner and Hindman in case they had to fall back. He informed me that Cleburne was in Dug Gap, in the rear of the enemy, and Buckner and Hindman were on the other side of them in McLemore's Cove; that Cleburne had positive and peremptory orders to attack at daylight and cut his way through if they didn't surrender. I started back by 12 midnight, meeting all the trains and taking an order from Presstman to Morris to clear out the road to Thornton's Mill via Catlett's Gap. Reached Anderson's about 3 a.m., the troops having all got up there and lying sleeping in the road. The dust thicker than I ever saw it. At daylight an order came for General Polk to immediately start his column for La Fayette. Started and reached there at 11 a.m. No fighting. General Bragg at Dug Gap.
At 4.45 p.m. the following was received:
GORDON'S MILL--2.15 p.m.
Colonel BRENT,
Assistant Adjutant-General:
COLONEL: The enemy are advancing steadily; skirmishers in front, artillery next, and column of infantry, as far as I can get information, back; some cavalry on their flanks. There is at least one division. My rear is near the point occupied by Lieuten-ant-General Polk as headquarters. My artillery is too small to be of much service. The hills across the creek commanding the valley and hill on the south side. Can't hear from Pegram, on my right. He wrote to me at 7.30 a.m. to-day that he would soon have to fall back.
Respectfully,
FRANK C. ARMSTRONG,
Brigadier-General.
In half an hour later another dispatch was received from Armstrong stating the enemy's line of skirmishers were at least 1 mile long and advancing steadily, he, of course, retiring. At 5 p.m. Withers, of signal corps, came in and reported that there had been but two brigades in McLemore's Cove, and the reports about the immense force there were all bosh. The general, Yeatman, and I started at 5.30 for Dug Gap, meeting Liddell's and Walthall's brigades coming into La Fayette. Reached General Walker's quarters, at head of Dug Gap, just at dark, General Bragg having gone ahead. In about an hour General Bragg and all his staff returned, having been clear through the gap to Hindman and Buckner, and no enemy there. The bird had flown and the farce was complete. Forty men to catch two brigades--those in a trap, it was supposed, impossible for them to escape from; and when search was made they were like the Irishman's flea. Comment, pooh! No pencil or pen could do such a subject justice. Came in behind Bragg and his staff and got to town about 9.30 p.m., hungry and dusty. Orders received about 12 at night to put Cheatham's division in readiness to move.<ar51_75> [bitmap]
 <ar51_76>
SATURDAY, September 12, [1863.]
Clear and very warm during the day. Shower for ten minutes; did no good. By 7 a.m. Cheatham's division en route for Rock Spring Church. Van Cleve's division, of Crittenden's corps, said to be advancing on the Gordon's Mills road, Palmer's division (same corps) on Pea Vine Church road, and Wood's division (same corps) on Ringgold and La Fayette road, with Wilder's cavalry on their left. Cheatham covered all the roads with is division from Dr. Anderson's, on the left, to Pea Vine Church road, as per the following diagram.(*)
At 4 p.m. general and staff started for Rock Spring Church and got there about dark. Walker's division got up about 8 p.m. At 10.25 p.m. general sent me with dispatch to General Bragg, with the request that he (Bragg) would send Buckner's command to his support. I was desired to go in a hurry, and delivered the dispatch, 8 ½ miles off, in thirty-five minutes. Hindman was by the same order directed to come out immediately.
SUNDAY, September 13, [1863.]
Clear and very warm. By 3 a.m. General Walker was ordered to take position to right of Cheatham. At 4.30 Hindman reported in person at headquarters at Mrs. Susan Parks', near Rock Spring Church, on Pea Vine road. At 6 a.m. Hindman was ordered to take position between Cheatham and Walker. The new line thus formed left Cheatham with three brigades in front and two in reserve; Hindman, two in front and one in reserve, and Walker, three in front and one in reserve. Orders issued at 9 a.m., before the line was formed, to division commanders to inform corps headquarters when they were in line, as the order was for the whole line to advance. About this time information came from Pegram that there was no enemy on the Ringgold road, and there was a movement of the enemy from that road toward the Gordon's Mills road. The enemy were only about 1 ½ miles out on that road, and Strahl was sent out to develop them. The first guns were fired about 12.30, and Strahl retired, with the intention of drawing the enemy after him on Cheatham. After some artillery practice, the firing ceased. General Bragg and staff arrived at General Polk's quarters about 9 a.m. Buckner was ordered partly out and then ordered back. At 2 p.m. Walker was ordered to swing from right toward left, in order to strike the enemy, said to be at Pea Vine Church in force. Before, however, the order was executed it was discovered that, leaving only his skirmishers to deceive, he had gone with his whole force toward Chattanooga. At 5 p.m. General Bragg and staff returned to La Fayette.
MONDAY, September 14, [1863.]
Clear and warm. At 9 a.m. all the troops started for La Fayette. General returned by 6 p.m. Changed camp between the two Dalton roads.
WEDNESDAY, September 16, [1863.]
Clear and warm. General Bragg issued address to troops, telling them we should march against the enemy and crush him. Learned that Longstreet's corps was arriving at Dalton, and French's division was also coming up from Mississippi. Heard that Frazer had given up Cumberland Gap without a shot; surrendered upon demand. In evening order received to march at 8 a.m. to-morrow.
 <ar51_77>
ENTERPRISE, MISS., December 1, 1863.
 Major-General HINDMAN,  Madison, Ga.:
GENERAL: I have been quite unwell since I arrived, which must be my apology to yourself and other correspondents whose communications have not been answered. I have received and read your reports of the affairs of McLemore's Cove and the battle of Chickamauga, and have read both with pleasure. The first I regard as entirely satisfactory, especially as showing your action was inspired throughout by instructions received from army headquarters, in compliance with which you were evidently seeking to conform your movements. I think it would be so regarded by any impartial court.
The second--your report of the part borne by your command in the Chickamauga tight--is very clear and presents a brilliant record. It was highly gratifying to me to know that not only were its old laurels so gracefully worn on such a field, but that it added so largely to its already ample crown. The result of that day's work cannot but be to you among your most pleasing memories, and strengthens your claim to be restored at an early day to your command.
I hope ere you shall have received this note you will have received that I addressed to Selma, where I heard you had gone. In that I informed you I had communicated the substance of your conversation with me at McFarland's to the gentlemen of my staff, as well as your expressed [wish] to make to them an appropriate apology. As no suitable opportunity presented itself, after my mentioning your wishes, for such a meeting as you proposed, the gentlemen accepted your message through me as satisfactory and adequate, and took the necessary steps to have the charges in General Bragg's hands withdrawn. They presume that this has been accomplished, and that the matter has been satisfactorily disposed of.
Hoping you may speedily find yourself at work and agreeably, very shortly, I remain, general, your obedient servant,
 [L. POLK,]
Lieutenant-General, C. S. Army.



10. Patrick R. Cleburne

O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXX/2 [S# 51] AUGUST 16-SEPTEMBER 22, 1863.--The Chickamauga Campaign.
No. 277.--Report of Maj. Gen. Patrick R. Cleburne, C. S. Army, commanding division.

[ar51_153 con't]
HEADQUARTERS CLEBURNE'S DIVISION,
HILL'S CORPS, ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
Missionary Ridge, near Chattanooga, Tenn., Oct. 18, 1863.
COLONEL: I have the honor to report the operations of my division in the battle of Chickamauga, fought on Saturday and Sunday, September 19 and 20.
During the afternoon of Saturday, the 19th ultimo, I moved my <ar51_154> division in a westerly direction across the Chickamauga River at Thedford's Ford, and having received orders to report to Lieutenant-General Polk, commanding the right wing of the army, I did so, and was directed by him to form a second line in rear of the right of the line already in position. Accordingly, soon after sunset my division was formed partially en echelon about 300 yards in rear of the right of the first line. My right rested in front of a steam saw-mill, known as Jay's Mill, situated on a small stream running between the Chickamauga and the road leading from Chattanooga to La Fayette. My line extended from the saw-mill almost due south for nearly a mile, fronting to the west. Polk's brigade, with Calvert's battery (commanded by Lieut. Thomas J. Key), composed my right wing; Woods brigade, with Semple's battery, my center, and Deshler's brigade, with Douglas' battery, my left wing.
I now received orders from Lieutenant-General Hill to advance (passing over the line which had been repulsed) and drive back the enemy's left wing. In my front were open woods, with the exception of a clearing (fenced in) in front of my center, the ground sloping upward as we advanced. Ordering the brigades to direct themselves by Wood's (the center) brigade and preserve brigade distance, I moved forward, passing over the first line, and was in a few moments heavily engaged along my right and center. The enemy, posted behind hastily constructed breastworks, opened a heavy fire of both small-arms and artillery. For half an hour the firing was the heaviest I had ever heard. It was dark, however, and accurate shooting was impossible. Each party was aiming at the flashes of the other guns, and few of the shot from either side took effect. Major Hotchkiss, my chief of artillery, placed Polk's and Wood's artillery in position in the cleared field in front of my center. Availing themselves of the noise and the darkness, Captain Semple and Lieutenant Key ran their batteries forward within 60 yards of the enemy's line and opened a rapid fire. Polk pressed forward at the same moment on the right, when the enemy ceased firing and quickly disappeared from my front. There was some confusion at the time, necessarily inseparable, however, from a night attack. This, and the difficulty of moving my artillery through the woods in the dark, rendered a farther advance inexpedient for the night. I consequently halted, and, after readjusting my lines, threw out skirmishers a quarter of a mile in advance and bivouacked.
In this conflict the enemy was driven back about a mile and a half. He left in my hands 2 or 3 pieces of artillery, several caissons, 200 or 300 prisoners, and the colors of the Seventy-seventh Indiana and those of the Seventy-ninth Pennsylvania.
At about 10 o'clock next morning, I received orders from Lieutenant-General Hill to advance and dress on the line of General Breck-inridge, who had been placed on my right. Accordingly, directing each brigade to dress upon the right and preserve its distance, I moved forward. Breckinridge was already in motion. The effort to overtake and dress upon him caused hurry and some confusion in my line, which was necessarily a long one. Before the effects of this could be rectified, Polk brigade and the right of Wood's encountered the heaviest artillery fire I have ever experienced. I was now within short canister range of a line of log breastworks, and a hurricane of shot and shell swept the woods from the unseen enemy in my front. This deadly fire was direct, and came from that part of the enemy's breastworks opposite to my right and right center. <ar51_155> The rest of my line, stretching off to the left, received an oblique fire from the line of breastworks, which, at a point opposite my center, formed a retiring angle running off toward the Chattanooga and La Fayette road behind.
The accompanying map,(*) showing the shape of the enemy's line of works opposite my line, will explain our relative positions. Upon reference to it, it will be seen that opposite to my right and right center the enemy's works ran about half a mile north and south, and nearly parallel to the Chattanooga and La Fayette road, which was about 300 yards behind; that at a point opposite my center, his works formed, as before stated, a retiring angle running in a westerly and somewhat oblique direction to the Chattanooga and La Fayette road, and that at a point nearly opposite my right his works formed another retiring angle running back also to the road. My right and right center, consisting of Polk's brigade and Lowrey's regiment, of Wood's brigade, were checked within 175 yards of the advanced part of this portion of the enemy's works, and the rest of the line were halted in compliance with the order previously given to dress upon the right.
Passing toward the left at this time, I found that the line of advance of my division, which was the left of the right wing of the army, converged with the line of advance of the left wing of the army. The flanks of the two wings had already come into collision. Part of Wood's brigade had passed over Bate's brigade, of Stewart's division, which was the right of the left wing, and Deshler's brigade, which formed my left, had been thrown out entirely and was in rear of the left wing of the army. I ordered Wood to move forward the remainder of his brigade, opening at the same time in the direction of the enemy's fire with Semple's battery. That part of Wood's brigade to the left of Lowrey's regiment and to the left of the southern angle of the breastworks in its advance at this time entered an old field bordering the road (Chattanooga and La Fayette)and attempted to cross it in the face of a heavy fire from works in its front. It had almost reached the road, its left wing being at Poe's house (known as the burning house), when it was driven back by a heavy oblique fire of small-arms and artillery which was opened upon both its flanks, the fire from the right coming from the south face of the breastworks, which was hid from view by the thick growth of scrub-oak bordering the field.
Five hundred men were killed and wounded by this fire in a few minutes. Upon this repulse (Lowrey's regiment having also in the meantime been forced to retire), I ordered the brigade still farther back to reform. Semple's battery, which had no position, I also ordered back.
I now moved Deshler's brigade by the right flank, with the intention of connecting it with Polk's left, so filling the gap left in my center by the withdrawal of Wood. This connection, however, I could not establish, as Polk's left had in its turn been also driven back. Finding it a useless sacrifice of life for Polk to retain his position, I ordered him to fall back with the rest of his line, and with his and Wood's brigades I took up a strong defensive position some 300 or 400 yards in rear of the point from which they had been repulsed. Deshler's brigade had moved forward toward the right of the enemy's advanced works, but could not go beyond the crest of a <ar51_156> low ridge from which Lowrey had been repulsed. I therefore ordered him to cover himself behind the ridge and hold his position as long as possible. His brigade was now en echelon about 400 yards in front of the left of the rest of the division, which here rested for some hours.
In effecting this last disposition of his command, General Deshler fell, a shell passing fairly through his chest. It was the first battle in which this gentleman had the honor of commanding as a general officer. He was a brave and efficient one. He brought always to the discharge of his duty a warm zeal and a high conscientiousness. The army and the country will long remember him.
At about 3.30 p.m. I received orders from Lieutenant-General Polk to move forward on a line with my left (Deshler), connecting my right with Jackson's brigade, and when I had formed my line, to remain and hold the position. I accordingly advanced with my center and right wing, drove in the enemy's skirmishers, and found his line behind the works from which he had repulsed us in the morning. The left wing of the army had been driving the enemy. The right wing now attacked, Lieutenant-General Polk ordering me to advance my heavy batteries and open on the enemy. Captain Semple, my acting chief of artillery (Major Hotchkiss, my chief of artillery, being disabled by a wound received the day before), selected positions in front of the line and placed his own and Douglas' batteries within 200 yards of the enemy's breastworks and opened a rapid and most effective fire, silencing immediately a battery which had been playing upon my lines. About the same time Brigadier-General Polk charged and soon carried the northwestern angle of the enemy's works, taking in succession three lines of breastworks. In this brilliant operation he was materially aided by Key's battery, and toward its close by Douglas' battery, which had again been moved by my orders to my extreme right, where it was run into position by hand. A large number of prisoners (regulars) were here captured. The enemy abandoned his works and retired precipitately. Briga-dier-General Polk pursued to the Chattanooga and La Fayette road, where he captured another piece of artillery. I here received directions from Lieutenant-General Hill to halt my command until further orders.
I cannot close this report without an acknowledgment of distinguished services rendered by various officers and men which would otherwise pass unnoticed.
I have already incidentally called attention to the gallant conduct of Brigadier-General Polk, but it is due to him and to the country, which wishes to appreciate its faithful servants, to say that to the intrepidity and stern determination of purpose of himself and men, I was principally indebted for the success of the charge on Sunday evening which drove the enemy from his breastworks and gave us the battle.
Colonel Mills, also, is entitled to be remembered. Leading his men through the battle until the fall of his brigadier (the lamented Deshler), he was then called, by seniority, to command the brigade, which he did with gallantry and intelligence.
To my staff--Maj. Calhoun Benham, assistant adjutant-general (who received a contusion on the right shoulder from a grape-shot or fragment of shell); Capt. Irving A. Buck, assistant adjutant-general (whose horse was shot under him); Maj. Joseph K. Dixon, assistant inspector-general, Capt. B. F. Philips, assistant inspector-general;
 <ar51_157> [bitmap]
 <ar51_158> Lieut. J. W. Jetton, aide-de-camp and acting assistant in-spector-general; Maj. T. R. Hotchkiss, chief of artillery (who received a wound from a Minie ball in the foot on Saturday, which deprived me of his valuable services afterward); Capt. Henry C. Semple, who replaced Major Hotchkiss as chief of artillery when disabled; Capt. C. F. Vanderford, chief of ordnance; Lieut. L. H. Mangum, aide-de-camp, and Lieut. S. P. Hanly, aide-de-camp (who received a contusion from a grape-shot)--I am indebted for the faithful and indefatigable manner in which they performed their vital, though perhaps not showy, duties throughout these operations.
Maj. T. R. Hotchkiss, chief of artillery; Captain Semple, with his battery, and Lieut. Thomas J. Key, commanding Calvert's battery, rendered invaluable service and exhibited the highest gallantry on Saturday night in running their pieces up as they did within 60 yards of the enemy. In this they were ably sustained by Lieut. Richard W. Goldthwaite, of Semple's battery. Here Major Hotchkiss received his wound.
Captain Semple also displayed skill and judgment as acting chief of artillery, particularly in the selection of a position for his own and Douglas' batteries on Sunday evening, which gave an oblique fire upon the enemy in his works, contributing to the success of the final charge by Polk's brigade.
Capt. O. S. Palmer, assistant adjutant-general of Wood's brigade, was conspicuous for his coolness and attention to duty on the field, and has my thanks.
I am much indebted also to Dr. D. A. Linthicum, chief surgeon of my division. The completeness of his arrangements, his careful supervision of subordinates, both on the field under fire and elsewhere, and in the hospitals, secured our gallant wounded prompt attention, and all the comfort and alleviation of pain attainable in the exigencies of battle.
Surg. A. R. Erskine, then acting (now actual) medical inspector of my division, rendered most efficient service.
Asst. Surg. Alfred B. De Loach particularly distinguished himself by his unselfish devotion, going repeatedly far forward under fire and among the skirmishers to attend the wounded.
James P. Brady and Melvin L. Overstreet, privates in the Buck-ner Guards (my escort), specially detailed to attend me through the battle, went with me wherever my duty called me. Brady was wounded in the hand; Overstreet had his horse shot.
To Capt. C. F. Vanderford, my chief of ordnance, my thanks are specially due. His trains were always in the best order and in the most accessible position, and to his care in this respect I am indebted for a prompt supply of ammunition in every critical emergency which arose.
I carried into action on Saturday (the 19th) 5,115 officers and men, 4,875 bayonets.
On Sunday (the 20th) I carried in 4,671 officers and men, 4,437 bayonets.
In the two days my casualties were 204 killed, 1,539 wounded, 6 missing; making in all, 1,749.
Respectfully,
 P. R. CLEBURNE,
Major-General
 Lieut. Col. ARCHER ANDERSON,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Hill's Corps.
 <ar51_159>
ADDENDA
Abstract from report of guns engaged, ammunition expended, &c., in artillery battalion, of Cleburne's division, at the battle of Chickamauga, September 19 and 20·(*)
A 12-pounder Napoleons F Men killed
B 6-pounder smooth-bores G Officers wounded
C 6-pounder rifles, bronze H Men wounded
D 12-pounder howitzers I Horses killed
E Rounds of ammunition expended J Horses wounded

 --Guns engaged.-  --Casualties.--
Batteries A B C D E F G H I J
Calvert's  .... 2 .... 2 243 .... .... 6 3 1
Douglas' .... 2 .... 2 130 .... .... .... 2 1
Semple's  4 .... .... .... 220 .... 1 9 4 3
Swett's (+) 2 .... 2 .... 105 2 (a)1 8 6 5
Total. 6 4 2 4 698 2 2 23 15 10


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