HOME
Archive
Photos
Facts
News
Chronology AotC
Battles & Reports
Overview
Links
.
Reports of the Atlanta campaign 7 May - 2 Sept. 64

1. George H. Thomas
2. Ulysses S. Grant
3. William T. Sherman
4. Oliver O. Howard
5. Joseph E. Johnston
6. John Bell Hood (plus selected correspondence)
7. Patrick R Cleburne



6. John Bell Hood
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXXVIII/3 [S# 74] May 1-September 8, 1864.--THE ATLANTA (GEORGIA) CAMPAIGN
No. 598.--Report of General John B. Hood, C. S. Army, commanding Army of Tennessee, of operations July 18-Sept. 6.

<ar74_628>
RICHMOND, VA., February 15, 1865.
GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the Army of Tennessee while commanded by me, from July 18, 1864, to January 23, 1865:
The results of a campaign do not always show how the general in command has discharged his duty. The inquiry should be not what he has done, but what he should have accomplished with the means under his control. To appreciate the operations of the Army of Tennessee it is necessary to look at its history during the three months which preceded the day on which I was ordered to its command. To do this it is necessary either to state in this report all the facts which illustrate the entire operations of the Army of Tennessee in the recent campaign, or to write a supplemental or accompanying report. I deem the former more appropriate, and will, therefore, submit in a single paper all the information which seems to me should be communicated to the Government.
On the 6th of May, 1864, the army lay at and near Dalton awaiting the advance of the enemy. Never had so large a Confederate army assembled in the West. Seventy thousand effective men were in the easy direction of a single commander, whose good fortune it was to be able to give successful battle and redeem the losses of the past. Extraordinary efforts had been used to secure easy victory. The South had been denuded of troops to fill the strength of the Army of Tennessee. Mississippi and Alabama were without military support, and looked for protection in decisive battle in the mountains of Georgia. The vast forces of the enemy were accumulating in the East, and to retard their advance or confuse their plans, much was expected by a counter-movement by us in the West. The desires of the Government expressed to the Confederate commander in the West were to assume the offensive. Nearly all the men and resources of the West and South were placed at his disposal for the purpose. The men amounted to the number already stated, and the resources for their support were equal to the demand. The re-enforcements were within supporting distance. The troops felt strong in their increased numbers, saw the means and arrangements to move forward and recover (not abandon) our own territory, and believed that victory might be achieved. In such condition was that splendid army when the active campaign fairly opened. The enemy, but little superior in numbers, none in organization and discipline, inferior in spirit and confidence, commenced his advance, The Confederate forces whose faces and hopes were to the North, almost simultaneously commenced to retreat. They soon reached positions favorable for resistance. Great ranges of mountains running across the line of march and deep rivers are stands from which a well-directed army is not easily driven or turned. At each advance of the enemy the Confederate army, without serious resistance, fell back to the next range or river in the rear. This habit to retreat soon became a routine of the army, and was substituted for the hope and confidence with which the campaign opened. The enemy soon perceived this. With perfect security he divided his forces, using one column to menace in front and one to threaten in rear. The usual order to retreat, <ar74_629> not strike in detail, was issued and obeyed. These retreats were always at night; the day was consumed in hard labor. Daily temporary works were thrown up, behind which it was never intended to fight. The men became travelers by night and laborers by day. They were ceasing to be soldiers by the disuse of military duty. Thus for seventy-four days and nights that noble army--if ordered to resist, no force that the enemy could assemble could dislodge from a battle-field--continued to abandon their country, to see their strength departing, and their flag waving only in retreat or in partial engagements. At the end of that time, after descending from the mountains when the last advantage of position was abandoned, and camping without fortifications on the open plains of Georgia, the army had lost 22,750 of its best soldiers. Nearly one-third was gone, no general battle fought, much of our State abandoned, two others uncovered, and the organization and efficiency of every command, by loss of officers, men, and tone, seriously diminished. These things were the inevitable result of the strategy adopted. It is impossible for a large army to retreat in the face of a pursuing enemy without such a fate. In a retreat the losses are constant and permanent. Stragglers are overtaken, the fatigued fall by the wayside, and are gathered by the advancing enemy. Every position by the rear guard, if taken, yields its wounded to the victors. The soldiers, always awaked from rest at night to continue the retreat, leave many of their comrades asleep in trenches. The losses of a single day are not large. Those of seventy-four days will embrace the strength of an army. If a battle be fought and the field held at the close, however great the slaughter, the loss will be less than to retreat in the face of an enemy. There will be no stragglers. Desertions are in retreat; rarely, if ever, on the field of battle. The wounded are gathered to the rear and soon recover, and in a few weeks the entire loss consists only of the killed and permanently disabled, which is not one-fifth of the apparent loss on the night of the battle. The enemy is checked, his plans deranged, territory saved, the campaign suspended or won. If a retreat still be necessary it can then be done with no enemy pressing and no loss following. The advancing party loses nothing but its killed and permanently disabled. Neither straggler nor deserter thins its ranks. It reaches the end of its march stronger for battle than when it started. The army commanded by General Sherman and that commanded by General Johnston, not greatly unequal at the commencement of the campaign, illustrate what I have written. General Sherman in his official report states that-his forces, when they entered Atlanta, were nearly the same in number as when they left Dalton. The Army of Tennessee lost 22,750 men, nearly one-third of its strength. I have nothing to say of the statement of losses made by General Johnston in his official report, except to state that by his own figures he understates his loss some thousands; that he excludes the idea of any prisoners, although his previous official returns show more than 7,000 under the head "absent without leave," and that the returns of the army while he was in command, corrected and increased by the records of the army, which has not been fully reported to the Government, and the return signed by me, but made up under him as soon as I assumed command, show the losses of the Army of Tennessee to be what I have stated, and a careful examination of the returns with the army will show the losses to be more than stated. <ar74_630>
This statement of the previous conduct of the campaign is necessary, so as to show what means I had to retrieve the disasters of the past, and if the results are not such as to bring joy to the country, it is not the first time that the most faithful efforts of duty were unable to repair the injury done by others. If, as is untruly charged, the Army of Tennessee ceased to exist under my command, it is also true that it received its mortal wound when it turned its back in retreat in the mountains of Georgia, and under different management it lingered much longer than it would have done with the same daily loss occurring when it was placed under my direction.
The army was turned over to me, by order of the President, at Atlanta, on the 18th of July, 1864. Its effective strength was: Infantry, 33,750; artillery, 3,500; cavalry, 10,000, with 1,500 Georgia militia, commanded by Maj. Gen. G. W. Smith, making a total effective of 48,750 men. The enemy was in bivouac south of the Chattahoochee River, between Atlanta and that river, and was advancing, the right near Pace's Ferry and the left near Roswell. On the evening of the 18th our cavalry was principally driven across Peach Tree Creek. I caused line of battle to be formed, the left resting near the Pace's Ferry road and the right covering Atlanta On the morning of the 19th the dispositions of the enemy were substantially as follows: The Army of the Cumberland, under Thomas, was in the act of crossing Peach Tree Creek. This creek, forming a considerable obstacle to the passage of an army, runs in a northwesterly direction, emptying into the Chattahoochee River near the railroad crossing. The Army of the Ohio, under Schofield, was also about to cross east of the Buck Head road. The Army of the Tennessee, under McPherson, was moving on the Georgia Railroad at Decatur. Feeling it impossible to hold Atlanta without giving battle, I determined to strike the enemy while attempting to cross this stream. My troops were disposed as follows: Stewart's corps on the left, Hardee's in the center, and Cheatham's on the right, intrenched. My object was to crush Thomas' army before he could fortify himself, and then turn upon Schofield and McPherson. To do this Cheatham was ordered to hold his left on the creek, in order to separate Thomas' army from the forces on his (Thomas') left. Thus I should be able to throw two corps (Stewart's and Hardee's) against Thomas. Specific orders were carefully given these generals in the presence of each other, as follows: The attack was to begin at 1 p.m., the movement to be by division in echelon from the right, at the distance of about 150 yards, the effort to be to drive the enemy back to the creek, and then toward the river into the narrow space formed by the river and creek, everything on our side of the creek to be taken at all hazards, and to follow up as our success might permit. Each of these generals was to hold a division in reserve. Owing to the demonstrations of the enemy on the right, it became necessary to extend Cheatham a division front to the right. To do this Hardee and Stewart were each ordered to extend a half division front to close the interval. Foreseeing that some confusion and delay might result, I was careful to call General Hardee's attention to the importance of having a staff officer on his left to see that the left did not take more than half a division front. This unfortunately was not attended to, and the line closed to the right, causing Stewart to move two or three times the proper distance. In consequence of this the attack was delayed until nearly 4 p.m. At this hour the attack began as ordered, Stewart's corps carrying the temporary <ar74_631> works in his front. Hardee failed to push the attack, as ordered, and thus the enemy, remaining in possession of his works on Stewart's right, compelled Stewart by an enfilade fire to abandon the position he had carried. I have every reason to believe that our attack would have been successful had my order been executed. I am strengthened in this opinion by information since obtained through Brigadier-General Govan, some time a prisoner in the enemy's hands, touching the condition of the enemy at the time. The delay from 1 to 4 p.m. was unfortunate, but would not have proved irretrievable had the attack been vigorously made. Ascertaining that the attack had failed, I caused the troops to retire to their former positions.
The position and demonstration of McPherson's army on the right threatening my communications made it necessary to abandon Atlanta or check his movements. Unwilling to abandon, the following instructions were given on the morning of the 21st: The chief engineer was instructed to select a line of defense immediately about Atlanta, the works already constructed for the defense of the place being wholly useless from their position ; Stewart's and Cheatham's corps to take position and construct works to defend the city, the former on the left, the latter on the right. The artillery, under the command of Brigadier-General Shoup, was massed on the extreme right. Hardee was ordered to move With his corps during the night of the 21st south on the McDonough road, crossing Intrenchment Creek at Cobb's Mills, and to completely turn the left of McPherson's army. This he was to do, even should it be necessary to go to or beyond Decatur. Wheeler, with his cavalry, was ordered to move on Hardee's right, both to attack at daylight, or as soon thereafter as possible. As soon as Hardee succeeded in forcing back the enemy's left, Cheatham was to take up the movement from his right and continue to force the whole from right to left down Peach Tree Creek, Stewart in like manner to engage the enemy as soon as the movement became general. Hardee failed to entirely turn the enemy's left as directed, took position and attacked his flank. His troops fought with great spirit and determination, carrying several lines of intrenchments, Wheeler attacking on the right. Finding Hardee so hotly engaged, and fearing the enemy might concentrate upon him. I ordered Cheatham forward to create a diversion. Hardee held the ground he gained. Cheatham carried the enemy's intrenchments in his front, but had to abandon them in consequence of the enfilade fire brought to bear upon him. Cheatham captured 5 guns and 5 or 6; stand of colors, and Hardee 8 guns and 13 stand of colors. While the grand results desired were not accomplished, the movements of McPherson upon my communications were entirely defeated, and no further effort was made in that direction at any time. This engagement greatly inspired the troops and revived their confidence. Here, I regret to say, the brave and gallant Maj. Gen. W. H. T. Walker was killed. The enemy withdrew his left to the Georgia Railroad and strongly intrenched himself, and here properly began the siege of Atlanta. It became apparent almost immediately that he would attempt our left. He began to mass his forces in that quarter. On the 28th it became manifest that the enemy desired to place his left [right] on Utoy Creek. I desired to hold the Lick Skillet road and accordingly ordered Lieutenant-General Lee--who on the 25th [26th?] had relieved Major-General Cheatham from the command of the corps formerly commanded by myself--to move his forces so <ar74_632> as to prevent the enemy from gaining that road. He was ordered to hold the enemy in check on a line nearly parallel with the Lick Skillet road, running through to, Ezra Church. General Lee, finding that the enemy had already gained that position, engaged him with the intention to recover that line. This brought on the engagement of the 28th. General Stewart was ordered to support General Lee. The engagement continued until dark, the road remaining in our possession.
On the 27th of July I received information that the enemy's cavalry was moving round our right with the design of interrupting our communication with Macon. The next day a large cavalry force also crossed the Chattahoochee River at Campbellton, moving round our left. Major-General Wheeler was ordered to move upon the force on the right, while Brigadier-General Jackson, with Harrison's and Ross' brigades, was sent to look after those moving on the left. I also dispatched Lewis' brigade of infantry down the Macon railroad to a point about where they would probably strike the road. The force on the left succeeded in reaching the road, tearing up an inconsiderable part of the track. It was the design of the enemy to unite his forces at the railroad, but in this he was defeated. The movement was undertaken by the enemy on a grand scale, having carefully picked his men and horses. A Federal force, under General Stoneman, moved farther south against Macon. He was defeated by our forces under Brigadier-General Iverson. General Wheeler, leaving General Kelly to hold the force on the right, moved against that already at the railroad. He succeeded in forcing them to give battle near Newnan on the 30th, and routed and captured or destroyed the whole force. Too much credit cannot be given General Wheeler for the energy and skill displayed. He captured 2 pieces of artillery, 950 prisoners, and many horses, equipments, &c. Brigadier-General Iverson captured 2 pieces of artillery and 500 prisoners. Believing the enemy's cavalry well broken, and feeling myself safe from any further serious operations of a like nature, I determined to dispatch a force of cavalry to the enemy's rear, with the hope of destroying his communications. I accordingly ordered Major-General Wheeler, with 4,500 cavalry, to effect this object. He succeeded in partially interrupting the enemy's communications by railroad. This still left sufficient cavalry to meet the necessities of the army. This is sufficiently shown by the fact that several determined cavalry movements were subsequently attempted and successfully met by our cavalry. From this time till the 26th of August there is nothing of any particular moment to mention. The enemy gradually extended his right, and I was compelled to follow his movement; our entire front was covered with a most excellent abatis and other obstructions. Too much credit cannot be given the troops generally for the industry and endurance they displayed under the constant fire of the enemy. On the 26th of August the enemy abandoned his works on the extreme right and took up a line, the left resting in front of our works on the Dalton railroad and extending to the railroad crossing the river. Again he withdrew, on the night of the 27th, across the Utoy Creek, throwing one corps across the river to hold the railroad crossing and the intermediate points. His left then rested on the Chattahoochee River, strongly fortified and extending across the West Point railroad. The corps defending the crossing of the Chattahoochee, his works on this side of the river, and the obstacle formed by <ar74_633> the Utoy and Camp Creeks, rendered it impossible for me to attack him with any possibility of success between the river and railroad. On the 30th it became known that the enemy was moving on Jonesborough with two corps. I determined upon consulting with the corps commanders to move two corps to Jonesborough during the night, and to attack and drive the enemy at that place across Flint River. This I hoped would draw the attention of the enemy in that direction, and that he would abandon his works on the left, so that I could attack him in flank. I remained in person with Stewart's corps and the militia in Atlanta. Hardee's and Lee's corps moved accordingly, Hardee in command. It was impressed upon General Hardee that the fate of Atlanta depended upon his success. Six hours before I had any information of the result of his attack I ordered Lee to return in the direction of Atlanta, to be ready to commence the movement indicated in the event of success, and if unsuccessful to cover the evacuation of Atlanta, which would thus be compelled. As it turned out unsuccessful it allowed the enemy the opportunity either to strike us as we marched out of Atlanta or to concentrate on Hardee. Lee's corps constituted a guard against the former, and I did not fear the destruction of Hardee before Stewart and Lee could join him, as his position on a ridge between two rivers I thought strong in front, and want of time would prevent the enemy from attacking him in flank. The small loss in Hardee's corps, and the much greater loss of the enemy, show my views to have been correct. The attack at Jonesborough failed, though the number of men on our side considerably exceeded that of the enemy. The vigor of the attack may be in some sort imagined when only 1,400 were killed and wounded out of the two corps engaged. The failure necessitated the evacuation of Atlanta. Thirty-four thousand prisoners at Andersonville, Ga, in my rear, compelled me to place the army between them and the enemy, thus preventing me at that time from moving on his communications and destroying his depots of supplies at Marietta. A raid of cavalry could easily have released those prisoners, and the Federal commander was prepared to furnish them arms. Such a body of men, an army of itself, could have overrun and devastated the country from West Georgia to Savannah. The subsequent removal of the prisoners, at my request, enabled me to make the movement on the enemy's communications at a later period.
On the night of the 1st of September we withdrew from Atlanta. A train of ordnance stores and some railroad stock had to be destroyed in consequence of the gross neglect of the chief quartermaster to obey the specific instructions given him touching their removal. He had ample time and means, and nothing whatever ought to have been lost.
On the 1st of September Hardee's corps was attacked in position at Jonesborough. The result was the loss of 8 guns and some prisoners. Hardee then retired to Lovejoy's Station, where he was joined by Stewart's and Lee's corps. The militia, numbering about 3,000, under Maj. Gen. G. W. Smith, was ordered to Griffin. It is proper to remark here that this force rendered excellent and gallant service during the siege of Atlanta. The enemy followed and took position in our front.
On the 6th of September, however, he abandoned his works and returned to Atlanta. Here properly ended the operations about <ar74_634> Atlanta. Of the forces turned over to me nearly two months before, and since that day daily engaged in battle and skirmishes with a greatly superior enemy, there were remaining effective, as shown by the return of the 20th of September: Infantry, 27,094; cavalry, 10,543; artillery, 2,766. There had been sent to Mobile one brigade of infantry, 800 strong, and to Macon three battalions of artillery, 800 strong. The militia had increased, as stated, but counting it at the same as originally turned over, we have, against the aggregate turned over, 48,750--present, 40,403; sent off, 3,100, making an aggregate of 43,503, thus giving a total loss of all arms of 5,247 men.(*)
And now, lest an opportunity should not be again presented, I trust I may be pardoned for noticing in self-defense one or two statements in General Johnston's report of the previous operations of this army, which has just been given to the public, in which the action of Lieutenant-General Polk and myself has been impugned. I thoroughly understand that it is not the part of an officer to state what may have occurred from time to time in council, but a charge publicly made ought certainly to be publicly met.
In General Johnston's report he says:

On the morning of the 19th (May), when half of the Federal army was near Kingston, the two corps at Cassville were ordered to advance against the troops that had followed them from Adairsville, Hood's leading on the right. When the corps had advanced some two miles one of his staff officers reported to Lieutenant-General Hood that the enemy was approaching on the Canton road, in rear of the right of our original position. He drew back his troops and formed them across that road. When it was discovered that the officer was mistaken, the opportunity had passed, by the near approach of the Federal army. Expecting to be attacked I drew up my troops in what seemed to me an excellent position--a bold ridge immediately in rear of Cassville, with an open valley before it. The fire of the enemy's artillery commenced soon after the troops were formed, and continued until night. Soon after dark Lieutenant-Generals Polk and Hood together expressed to me decidedly the opinion formed upon the observation of the afternoon, that the Federal artillery would render their positions untenable the next day, and urged me to abandon the ground immediately and cross the Etowah. Lieutenant-General Hardee, whose position I thought weakest, was confident that he could hold it. The other two officers, however, were so earnest and so unwilling to depend upon the ability of their corps to defend the ground that I yielded, and the army crossed the Etowah on the 28th [20th]--a step which I have regretted ever since.

For myself and the good and great man, now deceased, with whom I am associated in this stricture, I offer a statement of the facts in reply: After the army had arrived at Cassville I proposed to General Johnston, in the presence of Generals Hardee and Polk, to move back upon the enemy and attack him at or near Adairsville, urging as a reason that our three corps could move back, each upon a separate road, while the enemy-had but one main road upon which he could approach that pike. No conclusion was obtained. While Generals Polk and Hardee and myself were riding from General Johnston's headquarters the matter was further discussed; General Polk enthusiastically advocated, and General Hardee also favoring, the proposition. It was then suggested that we should return and still further urge the matter on General Johnston. We, however, concluded to delay till the morning. The next morning while we were assembled at General Johnston's headquarters it was reported that the enemy was driving in the cavalry on the Adairsville road in front of Polk's position. Polk's corps was in line of battle, and my corps was in bivouac on his right. <ar74_635> We all rode to the right of Polk's line, in front of my bivouac. Hardee soon left and went to his position, which was on the left, there being some report of the enemy in that direction. General Johnston said to me:

You can, if you desire, move your corps to the Canton road, and if Howard's corps is there you can attack it.

My troops were put in motion. At the head of the column I moved over to this road and found it in possession of our own dismounted cavalry and no enemy there. While in motion a body of the enemy, which I supposed to be cavalry, made its appearance on the Canton road, in rear of the right of my original position. Major-General Hindman was then in that direction with his division to ascertain what force it was keeping the other two divisions in the vicinity of the Canton road. It was not a mistake (as General Johnston states) that the force appeared, as is shown from the fact that Major-General Hindman had men wounded from the small-arms and artillery fired from this body. Maj. James Hamilton, of my staff, was sent to report to General Johnston the fact that the enemy had appeared on the Canton road. During Major Hamilton's absence Brigadier-General Mackall, chief of staff, rode up in great haste and said that General Johnston directed that I should not separate myself so far from General Polk. I called his attention to where General Polk's right was resting, and informed him that I could easily form upon it, and orders were given to that effect, throwing back my right to look after this body, which turned out to be the enemy's cavalry. Feeling that I had done all which General Johnston had given me liberty to do, I then rode to his headquarters, where General Johnston decided to take up his line on the ridge in rear of the one occupied by General Polk, a line which was enfiladed by heights, of which the enemy would at once possess himself, as was pointed out to General Johnston by Brigadier-General Shoup, commanding the artillery. In a very short time thereafter the enemy placed his artillery on these heights and began to enfilade General Polk's line. Observing the effect upon the troops of this fire, I was convinced that the position was unsuited for defense. Accordingly, General Polk and myself said to General Johnston that our positions would prove untenable for defense, but that we were in as good position to advance upon the enemy as could be desired. We told him that if he did not intend to take the offensive he had better change our position. He accordingly ordered the army across the Etowah.
It will thus be seen that I received no order to give battle, and I believe that had General Polk received such an order he would have mentioned it to me. Were General Polk now alive he would be astounded at the accusation made against him.
Again General Johnston says:

That the usual skirmishing was kept up on the 28th (May). Lieutenant-General. Hood was instructed to put his corps in position during the night to attack the enemy's left flank at dawn the next morning, the rest of the army to join in the attack successively from right to left. On the 29th (May) Lieutenant General Hood, finding the Federal left covered by a division which had intrenched itself in the night, thought it inexpedient to attack; so reported and asked for instructions. As the resulting delay made the attack inexpedient, even if it had not been so before, by preventing surprise upon which success in a great measure depended, he was recalled.

The enemy on the 28th had extended his left flank across Allatoona Creek and along the Acworth road. At my own suggestion <ar74_636> General Johnston directed me to move my corps and strike the enemy's left. Upon arriving the next morning, and while moving to accomplish this, I found that the enemy had retired his flank a mile and strongly fortified it. The opportunity having thus passed by the act of the enemy and not by my delay, I reported the fact to General Johnston, deeming it best that the attack should not be made, and the instructions to me were countermanded.
My operations are now fully stated. It may not be improper to close with a general resume of the salient points presented. I was placed in command under the most trying circumstances which can surround an officer when assigned to a new and most important command. The army was enfeebled in number and in spirit by long retreat and by severe and apparently fruitless losses. The Army of Tennessee between the 13th and 20th of May, two months before, numbered 70,000 effective arms-bearing men, as the official reports show. It was at that time in most excellent condition and in full hope. It had dwindled day by day in partial engagements and skirmishes, without an action that could properly be called a battle, to 47,250, exclusive of 1,500 militia, which joined in the interim. What with this constant digging and retreating from Dalton to Atlanta, the spirit of the army was greatly impaired and hope had almost left it. With this army I immediately engaged the enemy, and the tone constantly improved and hope returned. I defended Atlanta, a place without natural advantages (or rather with all the advantages in favor of the enemy), for forty-three days. No point, of all passed over from Dalton down, was less susceptible of defense by nature. Every preparation was made for retreat. The army lay in bivouac a short distance from the town, without attempting to construct works of defense in front of the camps, ready to resume the line of march as soon as the enemy pressed forward. I venture the statement that there was neither soldier nor officer in that army who believed that in the open plain between Atlanta and the river a battle would be offered, which had so often been refused in strong positions on the mountains. My first care was to make an intrenched line, and the enemy, despairing of success in front, threw his army to the left and rear, a thing that he never could have done had it not been for the immense advantage the Chattahoochee River gave him. I arrived at Lovejoy's Station, having fought four battles, and the official reports of the army on the 20th of September show an effective total of 40,403 present, giving a total loss in all this time of 5,247 men.(*)
I invite special attention to the report of Maj. Gen. G. W. Smith of the operations of the Georgia militia in the vicinity of Atlanta, the reports of Lieutenant-General Stewart and his subordinate of-ricers, herewith submitted. Maps (+) of the campaign accompany this report.
Respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. B. HOOD, General.

General S. COOPER,
Adjutant and Inspector General, Richmond, Va.
 <ar74_637>

ADDENDA.
Strength of the Army of Tennessee on the 31 of July and 20th of September, 1864.(*)
 ---------------Present.--------------- [Present] and absent.
 Effective. Total. Aggregate. Total. Aggregate.
July 31, 1864:
Infantry 30,451 39,414 43,448 93,759 101,715
Cavalry 10,269 15,904 17,313 26,354 28,363
Artillery 3,775 4,610 4,840 6,317 6,606
Total 44,495 59,928 65,601 126,430 136,684

September 20, 1864:
Infantry 27,094 36,301 39,962 81,824 89,030
Cavalry 10,543 15,978 17,416 27,005 29,215
Artillery 2,766 3,408 3,570 4,628 4,845
Total 40,403 55,687 60,948 113,457 123,090

SMITHFIELD, April 1, 1865.
General S. Cooper:
I have read General Hood's report, and will prefer charges against him as soon as I can find leisure. Please inform him.
J. E. JOHNSTON.
-----
SMITHFIELD, April 4, 1865.
Lieut. Gen. J. B. HOOD:
After reading your report as submitted, I informed General Cooper by telegraph that I should prefer charges against you as soon as I have leisure to do so, and desired him to give you the information.
J. E. JOHNSTON.
-----
CHESTER, S.C., April 4, 1865.
 General J. E JOHNSTON,
Smithfield, N. C. :
Your telegram of this date received informing me that you intended, so soon as you had leisure, to prefer charges against me. I am under orders for the Trans-Mississippi Department. I shall inquire of General Cooper whether I am to await my trial and not proceed as ordered. I will be ready to meet any charges you may prefer.
J. B. HOOD.
-----
CHESTER, April 5, 1865.
General S. COOPER:
I have the honor to request that a court of inquiry be assembled, at the earliest practicable moment, to investigate and report upon the facts and statements contained in my official report of the operations of the Army of Tennessee.
J. B. HOOD, Lieutenant-General.
 <ar74_638>
DANVILLE, April 5, 1865.
 Lieut. Gen. J. B. HOOD:
Proceed to Texas, as heretofore ordered.
S. COOPER, Adjutant and Inspector General.
-----
DANVILLE, April 7, 1865.
Lieut. Gen. J. B. HOOD:
A court of inquiry cannot be convened in your case at present. Must proceed to Texas, as heretofore ordered.
S. COOPER, Adjutant and Inspector General.



John Bell Hood correspondence
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXXVIII/5 [S# 76] CONFEDERATE CORRESPONDENCE, ORDERS, AND RETURNS RELATING TO OPERATIONS IN THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN, FROM JULY 1, 1864, TO SEPTEMBER 8, 1864.--#2

GENERAL ORDERS No. 4.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
July 17, 1864.
In obedience to orders of the War Department, I turn over to General Hood the command of the Army and Department of Tennessee. I cannot leave this noble army without expressing my admiration of the high military qualities it has displayed. A long and arduous campaign has made conspicuous every soldierly virtue, endurance of toil, obedience to orders, brilliant courage. The enemy has never attacked but to be repulsed and severely punished. You, soldiers, have never argued but from your courage, and never counted your foes. No longer your leader, I will still watch your career, and will rejoice in your victories. To one and all I offer assurances of my friendship, and bid an affectionate farewell.
 J. E. JOHNSTON,
General.
 <ar76_888>
ATLANTA, July 18, 1864.
 General S. COOPER:
GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of my appointment as general of the Army of Tennessee. There is now heavy skirmishing and indications of a general advance. I deem it dangerous to change the commanders of this army at this particular time, and to be to the interest of the service that no change should be made until the fate of Atlanta is decided.
Respectfully,
 J. B. HOOD,
General.
-----
RICHMOND, July 18, 1864.
 General HOOD:
Your telegram of this date received. A change of commanders, under existing circumstances, was regarded as so objectionable that I only accepted it as the alternative of continuing in a policy which had proved so disastrous. Reluctance to make the change induced me to send a telegram of inquiry to the commanding general on the 16th instant. His reply but confirmed previous apprehensions. There can be but one question which you and I can entertain--that is, what will best promote the public good; and to each of you I confidently look for the sacrifice of every personal consideration in conflict with that object. The order has been executed, and I cannot suspend it without making the case worse than it was before the order was issued.
 JEFFERSON DAVIS.
(Same to Generals Hardee and Stewart.)
--------------------------------
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXXVIII/5 [S# 76]
CONFEDERATE CORRESPONDENCE, ORDERS, AND RETURNS RELATING TO OPERATIONS IN THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN, FROM JULY 1, 1864, TO SEPTEMBER 8, 1864.--#3

HEADQUARTERS,
July 23, 1864.
 His Excellency Governor BROWN:
The State troops under Major-General Smith fought with great gallantry in the action of yesterday.
 J. B. HOOD,
General.
-----
HEADQUARTERS,
Macon, July 23, 1864.
 General J. B. HOOD,  Atlanta:
I am proud to hear of the gallant conduct of the State troops. Thousands of others have now assembled in response to my call, and will be armed and sent forward as rapidly as possible, who upon the soil of their beloved State will strike with equal valor for the defense of their wives and their children, their homes and their altars. I assure you of the most energetic co operation with all the aid in my power. May God grant you success and aid to drive the invaders from the soil of the Confederacy.
 JOSEPH E. BROWN.
 <ar76_904>
RICHMOND, July 23, 1864.
 General J. B. HOOD:
Maj. Gen. M. L. Smith has been sent to report to you as chief engineer of your army. He has been serving in that capacity with General R. E. Lee throughout the present campaign in Virginia, and has won the highest reputation, and has the entire confidence both of the general and the army. You will find him an able counsellor and gallant soldier, and he is commended to your special regard.
 JEFFERSON DAVIS.
-----------------------------------
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXXVIII/5 [S# 76]
CONFEDERATE CORRESPONDENCE, ORDERS, AND RETURNS RELATING TO OPERATIONS IN THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN, FROM JULY 1, 1864, TO SEPTEMBER 8, 1864.--#4
ATLANTA, GA., July 30, 1864.
 Hon. JAMES A. SEDDON,
Secretary of War, Richmond:
As soon as I can get the dismounted cavalry General Bragg is to send and the militia here I hope to strike the enemy with my main force. The recent raids have caused delay in receiving the re-enforcements referred to. I hope in a few days to send Wheeler, with his cavalry, to break Sherman's communications. The two recent engagements have checked his extension on both flanks.
 J. B. HOOD,
General.
-------------------------------
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXXVIII/5 [S# 76]
CONFEDERATE CORRESPONDENCE, ORDERS, AND RETURNS RELATING TO OPERATIONS IN THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN, FROM JULY 1, 1864, TO SEPTEMBER 8, 1864.--#5
ATLANTA, GA., August 9, 1864.
 His Excellency President DAVIS,  Richmond, Va.:
The Nineteenth Army Corps having gone to Virginia or Washington City, the infantry force threatening Mobile cannot be more than 7,000 at the most, after leaving a garrison at New Orleans and in Louisiana. All that is necessary at Mobile is 7,000 men, as 6,000 will man the trenches. The reserve and militia of Alabama are thought to be ample. None but small boats can get near to Mobile, and the heaviest batteries are near the city. This information in regard to Mobile I got from Lieutenant-General Lee. The force at Holly Springs is the same or less than Lee compelled to retreat. I suggest that the Trans-Mississippi troops come here. If they, or apart of them, are retained in Mississippi Forrest should go to Middle Tennessee, as the force at Holly Springs cannot march to Mobile with Forrest or a part of the Trans Mississippi troops to oppose them. To march the Trans-Mississippi troops to Middle Tennessee may be too late, as they have to equip themselves with transportation. To hold Atlanta I have to hold East Point. The enemy are gradually extending to East Point, and hope to force me to give up Atlanta or to fight him at great disadvantage to as. I am making dispositions which will, I hope, enable me to hold both East Point and Atlanta.
 J. B. HOOD,
 General
-------------------------------
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXXVIII/5 [S# 76]
CONFEDERATE CORRESPONDENCE, ORDERS, AND RETURNS RELATING TO OPERATIONS IN THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN, FROM JULY 1, 1864, TO SEPTEMBER 8, 1864.--#6
ATLANTA, August 19, 1864--8 a.m.
 Brigadier-General JACKSON,
Cavalry, East Point:
Brigade of infantry will start to Jonesborough without delay. Ferguson has been ordered to Rough and Ready. Go ahead with your force.
 [J. B. HOOD,
General.]

ATLANTA, August 19, 1864--12.15p. m.
 General W. H. JACKSON,  East Point:
A cavalry force of the enemy is reported moving on the Fayetteville road from Decatur, and also on the McDonough road. On the former road their advance at Mrs. Alston's. On the McDonough road their advance at Ousley Chapel. Look out for them and use your discretion.
 [J. B. HOOD,
General.]

ATLANTA, August 19, 1864--10.35 a.m.
 Governor JOSEPH E. BROWN,  Milledgeville, Ga.:
General Winder has been instructed to send the militia at Andersonville to Macon.
 [J. B. HOOD,
General.

ATLANTA, August 20, 1864.
 General BRAXTON BRAGG:
Your dispatch in regard to a small Alabama brigade for Mobile just received. I am ready to send it if the necessity is great. Cannot, however, do so till day after to-morrow owing to the break in the road. Have telegraphed General Maury to know the condition of affairs at Mobile. The brigade ought not to leave here except in case of great emergency. Please answer.
 J. B. HOOD.

ATLANTA, August 20, 1864.
 Major-General CLEBURNE,
 East Point:
Have Scott and Granbury in readiness to move to the right in case of necessity.
 [J. B. HOOD,
 General.]

ATLANTA, August 20, 1864.
 Major-General CLEBURNE,
East Point:
Movement on the right seems to be foraging party. Let Waltham move down, however, and be ready here for you if needed. Will not send for Granbury and Scott unless absolutely necessary.
 [J. B. HOOD,
General.]

ATLANTA, GA., August 21, 1864.
 Hon. J. A. SEDDON,
Richmond, Va.:
In the evening of the 19th the enemy's cavalry struck the Macon railroad near Jonesborough, tearing up the track a short distance. Brigadier-General Jackson's cavalry command and Brig. Gen. D. H. Reynolds' <ar76_982> infantry brigade met the enemy at Lovejoy's Station yesterday evening, routed them, capturing a number of prisoners, 2 stand of colors, and 1 piece of artillery.
 J. B. HOOD,
General.

ATLANTA, August 21, 1864.
(Received 8.40 a.m.)
 Major-General CLEBURNE:
GENERAL: With Scott and Granbury, where does your left rest? Keep your scouts close up to enemy day and night and well down West Point road.
 J. B. HOOD,
General.

ATLANTA, August 21, 1864.
 Brigadier-General JACKSON,
Jonesborough, Ga.:
Do you think you have broken the enemy sufficiently to spare a regiment for our left? The cavalry serving with the several corps probably annoy us. What has become of the raiders?
 J. B. HOOD,
General.

ATLANTA, GA., August 25, 1864.
 Hon. JAMES A. SEDDON,
Secretary of War, Richmond:
No material change in lines of enemy during the past two days.
 J. B. HOOD,
General.

ATLANTA, August 25, 1864--7.45 a.m.
 Major-General CLEBURNE,
East Point:
General Hood desires you to have the citizens move their hogs and cattle from the immediate flanks of the army. He does not wish to take the stock if the citizens are willing to drive them from the enemy’s reach.
 [F. A. SHOUP,
Chief of Staff.]

ATLANTA, August 27, 1864.
 Hon. J. A. SEDDON,
Secretary of War:
Last night the enemy continued [to] change their position by their left and center. They have drawn back so that their left is now on the Chattahoochee at the railroad bridge; their right is unchanged, and they appear to be moving troops in that direction. They have no troops nearer than four miles of Atlanta.
 J. B. HOOD.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
August 27, 1864--7.40 a.m.
 Lieutenant-General STEWART,
Coming, &c. :
GENERAL: General Hood desires me to inform you that General Hardee reports the enemy still in his front. He desires you to move forward with extreme caution if you try to develop their position.
Respectfully,
 L. P. DODGE,
Aide-de. Camp.

ATLANTA, August 28, 1864--12.20 p.m.
 General ARMSTRONG:
Keep your main force well in hand till you find where the enemy's principal force is, so that you can fall upon him with effect.
 [J. B. HOOD,
General.]

ar76_999>
ATLANTA, August 28, 1864--9.40 p.m.
 Brig. Gen. M. J. WRIGHT,  Macon:
Send Colonel Hannon, with his command, to Jonesborough. No immediate danger of raid. Yankees have not left West Point railroad.
 [J. B. HOOD,
General.]
 

ATLANTA, August 29, 1864, 2 p.m.
 Lieutenant-General HARDEE,  Commanding Corps, East Point:
General Lee is instructed to ascertain position of the enemy, as suggested; also to relieve an additional brigade, if necessary.
 [J. B.HOOD,
General.]

ATLANTA, August 29, 1864---5 p.m.
 Lieutenant-General HARDEE,  East Point:
General Hood desires you to send copy of dispatch received from General Armstrong at 2 p.m. to Maj. Gen. John C. Brown. He also directs that all parties approaching from direction of the enemy shall be halted and not suffered to enter our lines without permission from these headquarters,
 [F. A. SHOUP,
Chief of Staff.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
August 29, 1864.
 Lieutenant-General STEWART,  Commanding Corps:
General Hood directs that you use rails as far as possible in the construction of stockades, they being easily procured.
Respectfully, &c.,
 L. P. DODGE,
Aide-de-Camp.

TLANTA, August 29, 1864.
 Maj. Gen. D. H. MAURY,  Enterprise, Miss.:
It is of the last importance that you assist me to protect my communications at Optlika. Sherman has changed his position so that he faces east, thus putting that road to his back. What forces can I rely upon to defend it?
 J. B. HOOD,
General.

ATLANTA, August 29, 1864--9.10 p.m.
 General DANIEL W. ADAMS,  Opelika, care Post Commander:
General Hood desires you to look well to the defenses of Opelika and that quarter against raids. What force can you rely upon for such purpose?
 [F. A. SHOUP,
Chief of Staff.]
-----------------------------------
.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXXVIII/5 [S# 76]
CONFEDERATE CORRESPONDENCE, ORDERS, AND RETURNS RELATING TO OPERATIONS IN THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN, FROM JULY 1, 1864, TO SEPTEMBER 8, 1864.--#7

[ar76_1000 con't]
ATLANTA, August 30, 1864--12.40 p.m.
 General BRAXTON BRAGG,  Richmond, Va.:
General Maury telegraphs following dispatch from Forrest:
 Grenada, August 29 1864.
Enemy left Holly Springs at 2 a.m. yesterday, moving rapidly in direction of Memphis and La Grange. They say they are ordered to re-enforce Sherman.
 [G. B. HOOD,
General. ]
-----
ATLANTA, August 30, 1864--1 p.m.
 Lieutenant-General HARDEE,  East Point:
General Hood does not think the necessity will arise to send any more troops to Jonesborough to-day. Will send you a map soon as one can be procured. General Lee is instructed to move Patton Anderson's division near the railroad to assist you if need be. Please place yourself in communication with General Anderson.
 [F. A. SHOUP,
 Chief of Staff.]
-----
ATLANTA, August 30, 1864--1.45 p.m.
 Lieutenant-General HARDEE,  Rough and Ready:
I start map to you at once. General Lee has ordered Anderson's division to East Point. It may become necessary for you to send another brigade and battery to Jonesborough. General Lees headquarters at East Point. General Anderson's division can go into line in place of Maney's. Use judgment, and communicate with General Lee at East Point.
 [J. B. HOOD,
General.]
-----
ATLANTA, August 30, 1864--2 p.m.
 General HARDEE,  Rough and Ready:
General Hood desires you to take whatever measures you may think necessary to prevent the enemy from gaining Jonesborough or Rough and Ready this afternoon, so that he may make other dispositions to-night. He does not think they will attack Jonesborough to-day.
 [F. A. SHOUP,
Chief of Staff.]
 <ar76_1001>
ATLANTA, August 30, 1864---3.15 p.m.
 Lieutenant-General HARDEE,  Rough and Ready:
Will send engine for you; had anticipated it before your dispatch was received.
 [J. B. HOOD,
General.]
-----
ATLANTA, August 30, 1864---3.20 p.m.
 General HARDEE,  Rough and Ready:
Please have your command under arms at Sunset. Leave a staff officer at your headquarters to receive dispatches for you. An engine will be at East Point for you at sunset. Please come to headquarters.
 [J. B. HOOD,
General.]
ATLANTA, August 30, 1864---6 p.m.
 Lieutenant-General HARDEE,  East Point:
General Armstrong telegraphs that there is a probability of the enemy striking the railroad to-night between Jonesborough and the left of our army. Please prevent it if possible.
 [J. B. HOOD,
General.]
-----
ATLANTA, August 30, 1864--6.10 p.m.
 Lieutenant-General HARDEE,  Rough and Ready:
Your corps will move to Jonesborough to-night. Put it in motion at once if necessary to protect the railroad, General Lee will follow up the movement. Inform Lee if you move and what force. Please come in to-night.
 [J. B. HOOD,
 General.]
-----
ATLANTA, August 30, 1864.
 Lieutenant-General HARDEE,  Rough and Ready:
When you move let Scott's brigade go to East Point. General Lee is directed to confer with you touching skirmishers, and such other matters as may be necessary.
 [J. B. HOOD,
 General.]
-----
 AUGUST 30, 1864-- 11.30 a.m.
(Received 12 m.)
 Lieutenant-General LEE,  Commanding Corps:
General Jackson has been directed to send regiment to East Point to make a reconnaissance on Campbellton road. Please send a staff officer to meet this command. See the commanding officer and personally give him such instructions as may be necessary to procure the required information.
 [F. A. SHOUP,
Chief of Staff.]
 <ar76_1002>
 AUGUST 30, 1864--11.30 a.m.
 Lieutenant-General LEE:
General Hood calls attention to the necessity of using the greatest exertion to procure a sufficient supply of forage. The wagons of the command, whether appropriated to that use or not, should be used to gather green corn from the country between the Macon and Augusta railroads. The matter requires the attention of the commanding officers.
 [F. A. SHOUP,
Chief of Staff.]
(Same as above to Lieutenant-Generals Stewart and Hardee.)
-----
 AUGUST 30, 1864---1.10 p.m.
 Lieutenant-General LEE,
Commanding Corps:
General Hardee reports the enemy moving upon him. General Hood directs that you move Anderson's division to your left, near the railroad, to support him. Please keep your command under arms.
 [F. A. SHOUP,
Chief of Staff.]
-----
 AUGUST 30, 1864--1.25 p. m:
(Received 2.30 p.m.)
 Lieutenant-General LEE,
Commanding Corps:
General Hardee's headquarters are now at Rough and Ready. General Hood desires you to move to East Point as soon as possible.
 [F. A. SHOUP,
Chief of Staff.]
-----
ATLANTA, August 30, 1864--2.40 p.m.
 General LEE,
East Point:
Please send Anderson's division to Mount Gilead Church, as requested by General Hardee.
 [F. A. SHOUP,
Chief of Staff.]
-----
ATLANTA, August 30, 1864--3.15 p.m.
 Lieutenant-General LEE,
East Point:
General Hood directs me to say that Scott's brigade will be relieved to-night as soon as may be. He desires you to move Anderson's division to the vicinity of Mount Gilead Church.
 [F. A. SHOUP,
Chief of Staff.]
 <ar76_1003>
ATLANTA, August 30, 1864 --3.25 p.m.
 Lieutenant-General LEE,
East Point:
Place Anderson's division on the right of Maney's instead of sending it to Mount Gilead Church. It will take the place of Maney's if General Hardee moves to the left.
 [J. B. HOOD,
General.]
-----
ATLANTA, August 30, 1864--3.45 p.m.
 General LEE,
East Point:
An engine will be at East Point to bring you and General Hardee to headquarters at sunset. Leave a staff officer at your headquarters to receive dispatches for you. Have your command under arms. Acknowledge receipt of this by telegraph.
 [J. B. HOOD,
General.]
-----
ATLANTA, August 30, 1864--5.45 p.m.
 Lieut. Gen. S. D. LEE,
East Point:
General Hood desires you to hold your command under arms and ready to move at a moment's warning.
 [F. A. SHOUP,
Chief of Staff.]
-----
ATLANTA, August [30, 1864---6.35 p.m.].
 Lieutenant-General LEE,
East Point:
General Hardee is directed to move if need be in direction of Jonesborough to protect railroad. If he moves he will inform you, and you will follow up the movement. If you should move come in as directed to headquarters. Communicate with General Hardee touching skirmishers, &c.
 [J. B. HOOD,
 General.]
-----
ATLANTA, August 30, 1864---8.45 p.m.
 Lieutenant-General LEE,
East Point:
Follow up movement of General Hardee. Take brigade from Sandtown road. Leave staff officers and courier at telegraph office to carry any order you may desire to send after your arrival here. Let your trains move on road to the east of railroad.
 [J. B. HOOD,
General.]
 <ar76_1004>
CONFIDENTIAL.]                       AUGUST 30, 1864--12 m.
 Brigadier-General LEWIS,  Commanding, &c.:
General Hood desires you to send some of your most discreet officers to such point as you may think best to procure horse equipments for your command, to be held ready to use at any moment. It may become necessary to mount you very soon, but he desires that you shall not inform your command of the fact, so that they may not feel useless anxiety on the subject. Direct your officers to consult with chief of ordnance of this army, who has been instructed to assist you.
 [F. A. SHOUP,
Chief of Staff.]
-----
ATLANTA, August 30, 1864--5.15 p.m.
 Brigadier-General LEWIS,  Jonesborough:
You will co-operate with General Armstrong in preventing the enemy crossing Flint River to-night.
 [J. B. HOOD,
General.]
-----
ATLANTA, August 30, 1864--6.35 p.m.
 General LEWIS,  Jonesborough:
Hold your position at all hazards. Help is ordered to you,
 [J. B. HOOD,
General.]
-----
HEADQUARTERS,
In the Field, August 30, 1864.
TENNESSEEANS: Confederate troops again press the soil of your noble State. The opportunity for which you have so long asked is now given you. The brave men, who, in this hour of your country's peril, still cling to your country's standard, appeal to you for aid. Shall they call in vain? Georgia has called her last available citizens between the ages of seventeen and fifty years. They are now fighting beside your chivalrous sons before Atlanta. Other States are also throwing their entire male population into the field.
Citizens of Tennessee! You who have always been ready to respond to your country's call, every one of you must rise to duty. If all who should come will now join us, we pledge the honor of those States whose sons compose the Western army of the Confederacy that Tennessee shall be redeemed.
 J. WHEELER,
Major-General.
-----
ATLANTA, August 30, 1864--8 a.m.
 General JACKSON,  Commanding, &c. :
Should the enemy move to the railroad you must detain them as long as possible. Flint River gives us great advantages in protecting the Macon railroad.
 [J. B. HOOD,
General.]
 <ar76_1005>
ATLANTA, August 30, 1864--10 a.m.
 Brigadier-General JACKSON,
Rough and Ready:
Should the enemy detach raiding party do not send all your cavalry in pursuit. Enemy's cavalry remaining with his corps might cause us considerable annoyance. Retain at least one regiment.
 [J. B. HOOD,
General.]
-----
ATLANTA, August 30, 1864--10.30 a.m.
 Brigadier-General JACKSON,
Rough and Ready:
Can you send a regiment under a "dashing" colonel to make reconnaissance on Campbellton road? If so, send them at once to East Point, and telegraph to these headquarters their arrival there.
 [J. B. HOOD,
General.]
-----
ATLANTA, August 30, 1864--1.20 p.m.
 General JACKSON,
Rough and Ready:
General Hood does not think there can be a large force advancing upon Jonesborough. Please ascertain from Armstrong what infantry it is, if possible.
 [F. A. SHOUP,
Chief of Staff.]
-----
ATLANTA, August 30, 1864--6.55 p.m.
 General JACKSON,
Rough and Ready:
Have your command saddled before you start for headquarters, so that you can send orders to your staff officer to move if need be.
 [J. B. HOOD,
General.]
-----
ATLANTA, August 30, 1864--5.15 p.m.
Brigadier-General ARMSTRONG,
Jonesborough:
General Hood directs that you prevent the enemy crossing Flint River to-night. General Lewis will assist you.
 [F. A. SHOUP,
Chief of Staff.]
-----
ATLANTA, August 30, 1864--7.20 p.m.
  Brigadier-General ARMSTRONG,
Jonesborough:
Look out for enemy's cavalry. Has Hannon reached you? If not, stop him at such point as you may think best.
 [F. A. SHOUP,
Chief of Staff.]
 <ar76_1006>
ATLANTA, August 30, 1864--11 a.m.
Major-General MAURY,
Enterprise:
General Bragg informs me that he has ordered the remainder of Gholson's brigade to me. I have ordered this brigade to Opelika, and desire his horses, transportation, and absent men ordered to join him there.
 J. B. HOOD,
General.
-----
[AUGUST 31, 1864.--For Hardee to Jefferson Davis, reporting engagement at Jonesborough, see Part III, p. 696.]
-----
ATLANTA, August 31, 1864---3 a.m.
 Lieutenant-General HARDEE,
Jonesborough :
Have dispatch from Pickett. He says Cleburne and Brown are within three miles of Jonesborough. Have directed him to push them forward. As soon as you can get your troops in position the general says you must attack and drive the enemy across the river.
 [F. A. SHOUP,
Chief of Staff.]
-----
ATLANTA, August 31, 1864--3.10 a.m.
 Lieutenant-General HARDEE,
Jonesborough :
You must not fail to attack the enemy so soon as you can get your troops up. I trust that God will give us victory.
 [J. B. HOOD,
General.]
-----
ATLANTA, August 31, 1864--3.20 a.m.
 Lieutenant-General HARDEE,
Jonesborough :
General Hood desires you to say to your officers and men that the necessity is imperative. The enemy must be driven into and across the river.
 [F. A. SHOUP,
Chief of Staff.]
-----
ATLANTA, August 31, 1864--9.10 a.m.
 Lieutenant-General HARDEE,
Jonesborough :
There are about 600 horses east of Griffin to mount the Kentucky brigade if it becomes necessary. General Hood desires you to use your best judgment.
 [F. A. SHOUP,
Chief of Staff.]
 <ar76_1007>
ATLANTA, August 31, 1864--10 a.m.
 General HARDEE,
Jonesborough :
General Hood desires the men to go at the enemy with bayonets fixed, determined to drive everything they may come against.
 [F. A. SHOUP,
Chief of Staff.]
-----
ATLANTA, August 3I, 1864--12.15 p.m.
General HARDEE,
 Jonesborough :
General Morgan reports enemy in strong force advancing against Clinch at Mount Gilead Church.
 [F. A. SHOUP,
Chief of Staff.]
-----
ATLANTA, August 31, 1864.--2 p.m.
 General HARDER,
Jonesborough :
General Morgan says enemy drove Clinch from breast-works at Mount Gilead Church about 11 a.m.; were in considerable force. This sent you to show that enemy have not all his troops in your front.
 [F. A. SHOUP,
Chief of Staff.]
-----
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF,
August 31, 1864--6 p.m.
 Lieutenant-General HARDEE,
Commanding, &c. :
General Hood directs that you return Lee's corps to this place. Let it march by 2 o'clock to-morrow morning. Remain with your corps and the cavalry, and so dispose your force as to best protect Macon and communications in rear. Retain provision and ordnance trains. Please return Reynolds' brigade, and, if you think you can do so and still accomplish your object, send back a brigade or so of your corps also. There are some indications that the enemy may make an attempt on Atlanta to-morrow.
Very respectfully, &c.,
 F. A. SHOUP,
Chef of Staff.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF,
August 31, 1864.
 Lieutenant-General HARDEE,
Commanding Corps:
General Hood directs that you return Lee's corps to this place. Let it march by 2 o'clock to-morrow morning. Remain with your corps and the cavalry, and so dispose of your force as to best protect the Macon railroad and communications in rear. Retain provision and ordnance <ar76_1008> trains. Please return Reynolds' brigade. Should Lee have been badly cut up to-day, and you think you can spare them, send back some of the troops of your own corps. There are indications that the enemy may make an attempt on Atlanta to-morrow.
Very respectfully, &c.,
 F. A. SHOUP,
Chief of Staff.
Enemy at Rough and Ready in considerable force. Morgan thinks that they will attack East Point to-morrow. Send back Lieutenant-Colonel McMicken, chief quartermaster.
Respectfully, &c.,
 F. A. S.
(Duplicate of dispatch sent at 6 p.m.(*))
-----
ATLANTA, August 31, 1864.
 General J. T. MORGAN.
East Point :
Move the ordnance train to this place at once.
 [J. B. HOOD,
General.]
-----
ATLANTA, August 31, 1864--9.10 a.m.
 Brigadier-General MORGAN,
East Point :
Keep up vedettes in the direction of Jonesborough as far as possible.
 [J. B. HOOD,
General.]
-----
ATLANTA, August 31, 1864--12.15 p.m.
 General MORGAN,
East Point:
Let Clinch offer the last resistance in his power. If beaten back, and they move in this direction, keep us thoroughly informed.
 [F. A. SHOUP,
Chief of Staff.]
-----
ATLANTA, August 31, 1864--5 p.m.
 Brigadier-General MORGAN,
East Point:
Notify General Scott of all the enemy's movements. He is on your right. What force is it that has driven in Clinch? Try to ascertain.
 [F. A. SHOUP,
Chief of Staff.]
 <ar76_1009>
ATLANTA, August 31, 1864--5.05 p.m.
 Brigadier-General MORGAN,
East Point:
Send scouts around the enemy to report the facts to General Hardee. Try and get his strength.
 [J. B. HOOD,
General.]
-----
ATLANTA, August 31, 1864.--6 p.m.
 General MORGAN,  East Point:
Please give the position of the enemy on the Macon railroad and elsewhere at dark. Watch him closely to-night, and send information.
 [F. A. SHOUP,
Chief of Staff.]
-----
ATLANTA, August 31, 1864---8.30 p.m.
 Brigadier-General MORGAN,
East Point:
Make the best resistance you can. It is not expected that you should hold your position against a movement in force. Keep General Scott fully informed. If pushed back retire fighting, giving timely notice. Have you heard much firing in direction of Jonesborough since 2 p.m.?
 [J. B. HOOD,
General.]
-----
ATLANTA, August 31, 1864---9.30 a.m.
 General SCOTT,  East Point:
Take position with right on Newnan wagon road and left on railroad Keep us fully advised. If driven back retire on this place.
 [J. B. HOOD,
General. ]
-----
ATLANTA, August 31, 1864--11.30 a.m.
 Brigadier-General SCOTT,
East Point:
Some cavalry covering Campbellton road. You had better, however, keep a lookout for yourself.
 [F. A. SHOUP,
Chief of Staff.]
-----
ATLANTA, August 31, 1864--9.15 p.m.
 Brigadier-General SCOTT,
East Point:
Keep yourself in constant communication with General Morgan. He is instructed to keep you advised of all movements of the enemy. Be careful not to allow yourself to be cut off. If forced to fall back retire skirmishing. Use sound judgment. Keep us informed.
 [J. B. HOOD,
General.]
 «64 R R--VOL XXXVIII, PT V» <ar76_1010>
ATLANTA, August 31, 1864---3 a.m.
 Colonel PICKETT,
Rough and Ready:
Hasten forward the troops to Jonesborough. General Hardee is there.
 [J. B. HOOD,
General.]
-----
ATLANTA, August 31, 1864--12.35 p.m.
 POST COMMANDER,
Jonesborough :
There is said to be a train of cars at Rough and Ready. It must be moved down the road; it has no engine. Take measures to get it down be careful, however. Colonel McMicken has started down the road on engine.
 [F. A. SHOUP,
Chief of Staff.]
-----
HEADQUARTERS SEARS' BRIGADE,
August 31, 1864.
 Maj. D. W. SANDERS,
Assistant Adjutant-General:
MAJOR: The report rendered regarding the strength of the enemy in our front has been greatly exaggerated. It was brought in by our cavalry scouts. Not more than ten of the enemy were seen in one body. The report about their deploying was not sustained. It amounts to a few cavalry scouts. We have extended our line to the right, connecting with the militia, so that we now cover the whole of General Walthall's front. I sent a staff officer to our right. He has just come in; reports our scouts in front as having lost sight of the enemy. The report of having killed a man was incorrect; his horse fell, and evidence of blood shows that horse or man was badly wounded. On visiting the ground the men were a good deal disappointed in finding horse and man both gone.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 C. W. SEARS,
Brigadier-General.
-----
 AUGUST 31, 1864.
 Major-General WHEELER,
Commanding Cavalry:
Sherman faces Atlanta from the west, crossing the Chattahoochee at Sandtown. His wagon trains must be greatly exposed. General Hood thinks you had better move this way, destroying as you come, to operate upon them.
 [F. A. SHOUP,
Chief of Staff.]
-----
[AUGUST 31, 1864.--For the organization and strength of Hood's army, see Part III, pp. 668, 683.]
 <ar76_1011>
JONESBOROUGH, September 1, 1864.
 His Excellency JEFFERSON DAVIS,  Richmond, Va.:
Last night Lee's corps was ordered back to Atlanta by General Hood. I recommended that he should evacuate Atlanta while it was practicable. He will be compelled to contract his lines, and the enemy has force enough to invest him. My instructions are to protect Macon.
 W. J. HARDEE,
Lieutenant-General.
-----
RICHMOND, September 1, 1864.
(Received Lovejoy's 2d.)
 Lieut. Gen. W. J. HARDEE:
The enemy's movement is to gain Atlanta ; we must endeavor to defeat his purpose. I have called on General Cobb with the hope that he will be able to re-enforce you. If you can beat the detachment in front of you, and then march to join Hood, entire success might be hoped to result from the division which the enemy have made of his force. I hope General Cobb may increase your cavalry to enable you more effectually to deprive the enemy of supplies and impede his movements.
 JEFFERSON DAVIS.
-----
HEADQUARTERS STEWART'S CORPS,
September 1, 1864.
 Major-General FRENCH,  Commanding Division:
GENERAL: A brigade is reported as advancing on the Marietta road. Major-General Walthall has been ordered to take his division out and drive them away. In case the enemy advance on the East Point road it may become necessary for you to move on Brigadier-General Featherston.
Respectfully, general, your obedient servant.
 DOUGLAS WEST,
 Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.
-----
HEADQUARTERS STEWART'S CORPS,
September 1, 1864--7.30 p.m.
(Received 8.10 p.m.)
 Major-General FRENCH,  Commanding Division:
GENERAL: The lieutenant-general commanding directs that you put your troops in motion immediately in the order of march indicated in the previous order this evening.(*)
Respectfully, general, your obedient servant,
 D. WEST,
 Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.
-----
HEADQUARTERS STEWART'S CORPS,
September 1, 1864---8 p.m.
 Major-general FRENCH,  Commanding Division:
GENERAL: The lieutenant-general commanding directs that you leave a staff officer to withdraw all your pickets at 11 o'clock to-night <ar76_1012> and bring them on by the route you will march. Direct them to pick up all stragglers as they pass through town. Impress on all your commanders to prevent straggling by all means in their power.
I am, general,
 D. WEST,
 Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.
-----
ATLANTA, September 1, 1864--8.25 a.m.
 General MORGAN,
East Point:
Keep some of your cavalry between Rough and Ready and Decatur, as well as between enemy and this place. Send situation this morning.
 [J. B. HOOD,
General.]
-----
ATLANTA, September 1, 1864--9.30 a.m.
 Brigadier-General MORGAN,
East Point:
Make the stoutest possible resistance, and keep us informed of result.
 [J. B. HOOD,
General.]


HOME
Archive
Photos
Facts
News
Chronology AotC
Battles & Reports
Overview
Links