The Battle of Murfreesboro (Stones River) 31 Dec. 62 and 2 Jan. 1863

Bragg nearly beat Rosecrans. Thomas saved the Union army with his artillery and judicious preparation.

Chronology AotC
Battles & Reports


 Approach and day before  -- Day 1 ( 31 Dec. 1862)  --  Day 2 (Jan. 1863) -- Van Horne's map

According to a staff officer,  Bragg "often related anecdotes of Buell, Thomas, and Sherman. Thomas had been in his old battery, and he never could praise him too much."

On 14 April 1865 Grant told Lincoln that Rosecrans and Thomas' battle at Stones River "was no victory, - that a few such fights would have ruined us." This display of  jealousy and hyprocrisy from the butcher of Cold Harbor is still hard to stomach, even 150 years later.

"Numbering at least two to our one, he [Rosecrans] was enabled to bring fresh troops at every point to resist our progress, and he did so with a skill and judgment which has ever characterized his aide commander [Thomas]."

After Gen. Braxton Bragg’s defeat at Perryville, Ky. on 8 Oct. 62, he retreated and reorganized his Army of the Mississippi, renaming it the Army of Tennessee. They then advanced to Murfreesboro, Tenn., and prepared to go into winter quarters.  William S. Rosecrans’s Army of the Cumberland followed Bragg from Kentucky and occupied Nashville. Rosecrans left Nashville on 26 Dec. 62 with about 44,000 men. He found Bragg’s army of about 37,000 men on 29 Dec. 62 and went into camp. That evening the battle started with a contest between the respective military bands. It is reported that at the end of the concert both armies, together, sang Home Sweet Home: "Mid pleasures and palaces though we may roam, be it ever so humble, there's no place like home. A charm from the skies seems to hallow us there, which, seek through the world, is not met with elsewhere. Home, home, sweet, sweet home, there's no place like home, there's no place like home." It's a nice story, anyway.

At dawn on the 31st, before Rosecrans's attack against Bragg’s right got started, Bragg, although outnumbered, attacked with the bulk of his forces the Union right flank under Alexander McCook. Rosecrans had allowed his attacking wing under Crittenden to eat breakfast first, and then these troops had to cross the river in order to get into action. Both of these factors allowed Bragg to get the jump on Rosecrans. Another factor was the negligence of McCook whom Rosecrans had put in charge of his right wing, despite McCook's mixed performance at Perryville. Thomas had warned Rosecrans to expect an attack against McCook's wing, but McCook was not prepared.  As Henry M. Cist wrote ("The Army of the Cumberland," 1882, chapt. 8):

"Every soldier on that field knew when the sun went down on the 30th that on the following day he would be engaged in a struggle unto death, and the air was full of tokens that one of the most desperate of battles was to be fought. In the face of all this, Johnson, the commander of the First Division on the right, was not on the line nor near enough to his troops to give orders to them, his headquarters being a mile and a half in the rear. General Willich the commander of the Second Brigade, which had been posted for the express purpose of protecting the extreme right of our army, was absent from his command at division headquarters. His brigade was not even in line, as they had been ordered to get their breakfast. The batteries of the division were not properly posted, and in some cases the horses were away from the guns to the rear for water. All this was criminal negligence--a failure in the performance of duty--for which some one should have suffered.  To the faulty position of the line and to the unprepared condition of the troops is to be attributed the almost overwhelming disaster that overtook our army on that day."

McCook was in charge of that portion of the Union line and was responsible for its dispositions. Rosecrans had put him in that position, and for Rosecrans to hold him to account would have required that he hold himself to account. This is not to fault the personal courage of both McCook and Rosecrans who stayed at the front and attempted to manage their forces while men to the left and right of them were killed, but the reponsibility of a commander encompasses more than standing fast under fire.

Furthermore, Rosecrans' place was in the middle of his line, but he had so little confidence in Crittenden to carry out the planned attack that he felt compelled to be there in person. In exculpation it should be mentioned that this was Rosecran's first experience in battle as independent army commander, and few people are born with the ability to manage such large masses of men.

The disaster Cist referred to unfolded as Johnson's division was first attacked and then scattered west and north. Then Davis' division fell apart. While this was happening, Rosecrans was on the other end of his line, supervising the preparations for his own attack. In a repeat of his behavior at Perryville, McCook compounded his error by not keeping his commander properly informed of his situation:

"Within an hour after the opening of the battle, one of McCook's staff officers reported to Rosecrans that the Right Wing was heavily pressed and needed assistance.  Rosecrans was not told of the rout of Johnson's division, nor of the rapid withdrawal of Davis, made necessary thereby" (Cist, chapt. 8). 

McCook, in full knowledge of his failure, but not quite willing to admit it, sent off the staff officer with a message which was so muted as to be deceptive. Rosecrans, in his ignorance of the true situation on his other wing, therefore continued for a while in his project. By 10:00 AM the Confederates were in control of the field on Rosecrans' right, but had been slowed by the resistance of Sheridan's, Negley's, and Rousseau's divisions. Sheridan was the first to substantially check the Confederate onslaught, but then he reported to Thomas that he was out of ammunition and simply pulled his division out of the line and ended up on the far right of the Union line and out of the fight. As he withdrew, he passed by Palmer's and through Rousseau's divisions which were still fighting. At about this time Rosecrans met him and gave him the following order:

"Replenish your ammunition and get your men back into the fight. Hazen has his hands full at the end of the Round Forest. Support him" (Lamers, The Edge of Glory - A Biography of General William S. Rosecrans, 1961, pg. 227; J.L. Gilmore, Personal Recollections of Abraham Lincoln and the Civil War, 1898, pg. 130).

If indeed Sheridan received this instruction from Rosecrans, he did not obey it.

Thomas had held Rousseau in reserve and placed him where he could move to support one wing or the other, almost as though Thomas foresaw what was about to happen. Other measures which Thomas took also demonstrated a sort of prescience. Shortly before the battle he had created a provost guard out of one of his best divisions under Parkhurst which was to retrieve many a straggler and save much of the wagon train (with the ammunition) the morning of the 31st. Thomas also had his engineers cut roads through the cedar trees the day before the battle, so that the movement of troops and equipment between wings was facilitated. On the 31st this was to prove crucial to Thomas who directed the withdrawal of the right and reformed the Federal line along the Nashville Pike. Also at Murfreesboro Thomas stood like, well, a rock. Bragg indirectly confirmed this in his report when he wrote:

"Numbering at least two to our one, he [Rosecrans] was enabled to bring fresh troops at every point to resist our progress, and he did so with a skill and judgment which has ever characterized his aide commander [Thomas]."

By 11:00 A.M. the Confederates had driven the Union line almost back to the Nashville Pike, where Rousseau's, Negley's, and Palmer's divisions had formed a new hooked-shaped formation supported by the artillery, which Thomas had placed providentially at the center, now the angle of the line. This sector was located at the Round Forest, a clump of scrubby cedars. It wasn't very big or very high, but it provided cover. It was defended by a relatively unsung brigade commander named William B. Hazen. Polk attacked his position all day long, and couldn't budge him. Hazen, by the way, also had problems with ammunition, but his position was critical to the survival of the army. After most of Crittenden's corps was shifted to the right, Hazen was now the extreme left of the Union line. He knew that, if he fell back, the battle was over, as the following quote from his report demonstrates:

"Upon this point, as a pivot, the entire army oscillated from front to rear the entire day. The ammunition of the Forty-first Ohio Volunteers was by this time nearly exhausted, and my efforts to replenish were up to this time fruitless. I dispatched word to the rear that assistance must be given, or we must be sacrificed, as the position I held could not be given up, and gave orders to Lieutenant-Colonel Wiley to fix his bayonets and to Colonel Casey (without bayonets) to club his guns and hold the ground at all hazards, as it was the key of the whole left.

Hazen wasn't as good at self-promotion as Sheridan was, but he ran his command in Thomas' style and always got the job done. Another unsung hero of the day was Horatio P. Van Cleve. He was withdrawn from the left and thrown against Confederates who had penetrated far to the rear of the Union position. Van Cleve was wounded early but continued to lead his division until that evening, and his division suffered the highest losses (27 %) of Rosecrans' entire army.

Since Jefferson Davis had, shortly before the battle, sent one of Bragg's divisions to Vicksburg, Bragg had no reserves with which to clinch the battle.  He ordered Breckinridge to reinforce Polk, but Breckinridge only sent part of the troops requested, citing a large Union force which was approaching him from the north. However, there was no such force. He may have fabricated the intelligence as a form of protest against the recent execution of a popular soldier from his home state (Kentucky) who had been caught deserting a second time. Finally, the Confederate attack ran out of steam, especially after Union reinforcements arrived which Rosecrans had retrieved from his left and, in the thick of the firing, personally placed in the new line. Also, some of McCook's units were reconstituted and went back into the battle that afternoon. By the end of the day, Rosecrans' numerical superiority had made itself felt.

On New Year's Day both armies skirmished listlessly and rested. In wires back to Richmond Bragg declared victory, hoping that Rosecrans would confirm this by withdrawing. Rosecrans was considering it. In a late night conference he queried his generals. Thomas said according to one report: "This army can't retreat," and according to another report: "Gentlemen, I know of no better place to die than right here." Mabye he said both things, or something else entirely. Whatever he said, he was for staying, and he enjoyed such respect in the Army of the Cumberland, that his counsel was heeded. The next day, when Bragg saw that Rosecrans hadn't blinked, he decided to roll the dice once more. In the afternoon of 2 Jan. 63, Bragg sent Breckinridge with a division against a Union division which had crossed Stones River the day before and taken up a strong position east of the river. The Confederates pushed most of the Federals back across McFadden’s Ford, but then, with the assistance of the massed Union artillery under Mendenhall, the Federals repulsed the attack and retook the ground, inflicting so many casualties that Breckinridge's charge could be ranked right up there with Lee's at Malvern Hill and Gettysburg, and Hood's at Franlkin.

On 3 Jan. 63 Bragg received intelligence which informed him that Rosecrans's army was larger than previously thought, and Polk and Hardee counseled retreat. On 4 Jan. Bragg left Murfreesboro in order to set up a new line to the south based on Shelbyville and Tullahoma, Tenn. Rosecrans stayed in Murfreesboro without pursuing. He remained there 6 months while he refitted his shattered army and prepared his masterpiece Tullahoma. Since Bragg had withdrawn, the battle is considered to be a Union victory. Both sides had heavy losses. Estimated casualties: 23,515 total (US 13,249; CS 10,266)

* According to Ambrose Bierce, topographical engineer under Thomas, Hazen was "the best hated man that I ever saw, and his very memory is a terror for every unworthy soul in the service. His was a stormy life: he was in trouble all around. Grant, Sherman, Sheridan and a countless multitude of the less eminent luckless had the misfortune, at one time or another, to incur his disfavor, and he tried to punish them all...He was aggressive, arrogant, tyrannical, honorable, truthful, courageous - a skillful soldier, a faithful friend and one of the most exasperating of men."

Battle reports:
1. Rosecrans US
2. Thomas US
3. Dodge US
4. Bragg CS  plus correspondence
5. Cleburne CS

Other articles on this battle:

1. Thomas van Horne on the battle of Murfreesboro and background

2. Excerpt from Bragg's Advance and Retreat by David Urquhart, Col. CSA,  member of Bragg's staff; plus Opposing Forces

Thomas Van Horne on the battle of Murfreesboro, taken from his 1882 biography "Life of Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas"

Page 84



Major-General William S. Rosecrans was assigned to the command of the army, in room of General Buell, by General Orders No. 168, War Department, October 24, 1862. By the same order the Department of the Cumberland was restored, embracing that part of the State of Tennessee, lying east of the Tennessee River, with conditional limits to the south. The forces of the department were designated as the "Fourteenth Army Corps;" but ere long the army bore the name of the department. General Rosecrans assumed command October 30th. His army was then concentrating at Bowling Green, Kentucky, in compliance with the orders of General Buell.

In this assignment of General Rosecrans, General Thomas was overslaughed on the score of rank, and for this and other reasons he considered it unjust. If he was considered worthy of this position on the 2[?]th of September on the ground of rank and service, he could see no reason why he should be denied the command of the army on the 24th of October. He, therefore, indignantly protested against the assignment of General Rosecrans and against service under him. He thus wrote to General Halleck, commander-in-chief:

Soon after coming to Kentucky I urged on the Government to send me twenty thousand men properly equipped to take the field, that I might at least make the attempt to take Knoxville and secure


East Tennessee. My suggestions were not listened to but were even passed by in silence. But without boasting I believe I have exhibited at least sufficient energy to show that if I had been intrusted with that expedition at that time (fall of 1861) I might have conducted it successfully. Before Corinth I was intrusted with the command of the Right Wing, or Army of the Tennessee. I feel confident that I did my duty patriotically, and with a reasonable amount of credit to myself. As soon as the emergency was over I was relieved, and returned to the command of my old division. I went to my duties without a murmur as I am neither ambitious nor have any political aspirations. On the 30th of September I received an order through your aid, Colonel McKibben, placing me in command of the Department of the Ohio, and directing General Buell to turn over the command of his troops to me. This order came just as General Buell had by extraordinary efforts prepared his army to pursue and drive the rebels from Kentucky. Feeling that a great injustice would be done him if not permitted to carry out his plans, and that I would be placed in a situation to be disgraced, I requested that he might be retained in command. The order relieving him was suspended, but to-day I find him relieved by General Rosecrans, my junior, although I do not feel conscious that any just cause exists for overslaughing me by placing me under my junior, and I, therefore, am deeply mortified and grieved at the course taken in this matter.

In this letter he was self-assertive, but not in violation of true dignity, while he was remarkably careful to avoid offensive personalities. He was intensely indignant and the letter reveals this, but the measured words, though representing strongly his own mortification, and his conviction of the injustice to himself, had no venom for others. He did not mention in this letter the fact that he had asked to be relieved of the command of the Army of the Tennessee, since it was not necessary in addressing General Halleck to whom that request was made. He had considered it necessary under the circumstances that he should make this request, and recognizing this necessity, he went to his duties "without a murmur." To an ambitious general, one who desired high command, not so much for its own sake, or for an opportunity for patriotic service, as for subsequent political preferment, such a step backward in rank


would be disappointing, rather than humiliating. But he, having no political aspirations, was willing to accept such positions as the precedents of the service gave him, and did not murmur when these precedents sent him to a far lower command. The fact that he protested against the assignment of his junior over him, indicates his repugnance to humiliation when imposed by arbitrary power. It was not humiliating to him to serve under General Buell in command of a division, after he had been his peer in commanding an army; but his subjection to an alien general, his junior, he regarded as an outrage. And in revealing his indignation, he did not hesitate to recount his own services and to assert his ability to command an army.

In reply General Halleck wrote:

"HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, Washington, Nov. 15,1862.
Your letter of October 30th is just at hand. I cannot better state my appreciation of you than by referring you to the fact, that at Pittsburgh Landing I urged upon the Secretary of War to secure your appointment as major-general, in order that I might place you in command of the Right Wing of the army over your superiors. It was through my urgent solicitation that you were commissioned.
When it was determined to remove General Buell another person was spoken of as his successor; and it was through my solicitation that you were appointed. You having virtually declined the command at that time, it was necessary to appoint another, and General Rosecrans was selected.
You are mistaken about General Rosecrans being your junior. But that is of little importance, for the law gives the President power to assign without regard to dates, and he has seen fit to exercise it in this case and many others.
Rest assured, General, that I fully appreciate your military capacity, and will do everything in my power to give you an independent command, when opportunity offers. It was not possible to give command after you had declined it.
Yours truly,
H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.


And thus General Thomas' request for the retention of General Buell in command, because he thought his removal at that time unjust to him, was made a bar to his own reassigment when the crisis had passed and circumstances were radically different. It is apparent from General Halleck's letter that some person or persons higher in authority than General Halleck had not dismissed their distrust of Thomas, either on the score of loyalty, earnestness in the war, or capacity as a general. His assignment to the command of the Army of the Ohio had been made at the urgent solicitation of General Halleck, when another general had been spoken of for the position, and it was not possible after he had virtually declined it, to re-appoint him. Why it was not possible is not expressly stated, but it is evident that the opposition to his appointment to the command of the army had been intensified by his request for the retention of General Buell.

In reply General Thomas wrote:

GALLATIN, TENN., November 21st 1862.
MAJOR GENERAL HALLECK, Comd'g U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.
I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 15th instant, and to thank you sincerely for the kindness of its tone. I should not have addressed you in the first place, if I had known that General Rosecrans' commission was dated prior to mine. The letter was written not because I desired the command, but for being superseded by a junior in rank, when I felt that there was no good cause for so treating me.
I have no objections to serving under General Rosecrans, now that I know his commission dates prior to mine, but I must confess that I should be deeply mortified should the President place a junior over me without just cause, although the law authorizes him to do so should he see fit.
I am General, very truly yours,
GEORGE H. THOMAS, Major-Gen'l U. S. V.


There is an important statement in this letter illustrating his independence. He would not have written this for the reason that he desired the command of an army. He would not have asked for such a position, or sought it through political influences, or in any other way. He did desire independence as a general, but he would not humiliate himself by seeking a higher sphere. In his first letter to General Halleck he asked for service in another part of the country, to avoid subjection to a junior in an army to which he was attached by such ties as appeal to the heart of a true soldier. But General Halleck had not been altogether candid in asserting that Rosecrans ranked Thomas, and when the latter ascertained the true history of the case, he was exceedingly indignant. General Rosecrans' commission as a major-general of volunteers was dated August l6th, 1862. When it was determined to assign him to the command of the army, this date was arbitrarily changed to March 21st, 1862. His appointment as a major-general and his original commission, made him the junior of Generals McCook and Crittenden, as well as of General Thomas. When Rosecrans first met Thomas, after his assignment, the latter made inquiry in respect to the date of the former's commission, stating that he was opposed to the violation of the rule which gave assignments according to rank. Having been informed that Rosecrans' commission bore date of March 21st, 1862, he then said, that his objection to further service in the Army of the Cumberland had been removed. But when subsequently he ascertained that this date was not the original one, and that it had been changed in seeming deference to army traditions, he said to General Halleck: "I have made my last protest while the war lasts. You may hereafter put a stick over me if you choose to do so. I will take care, however, to so manage my command, whatever it may be, as not to be involved in the mistakes of the stick."

He kept his promise to the end of the war, and then he


asserted himself even more boldly than he did on the 30th of October, 1862. Soon after assuming command of the army, General Rosecrans offered to continue General Thomas in his position as second in command, but he preferred a distinct, defined office, and consequently was assigned to the command of the "Centre," composed of four divisions, with Generals Rosseau, Negley, Dumont and Fry as commanders. The "Right" and "Left" of the army contained three divisions each and were commanded respectively by Major General McCook and Major-General Crittenden.

General Rosecrans was as unwilling as General Buell had been to move his army into East Tennessee, and at once gave orders for the concentration of his forces at Nashville, except those under General Thomas. The objects of the new campaign were to defeat General Bragg's army and restore the supremacy of the National government in Tennessee, and as much further south as possible. The second object was indicated by the order which re-created the Department of the Cumberland with limits contingent upon the success of the army in gaining territory. To give success to offensive operations it was first necessary to restore railroad communications between Louisville and Nashville, and then to accumulate supplies at Nashville as a secondary base. This essential work was committed to General Thomas and his troops, and no general was better adapted to the service, since no one was more observant of details in all matters that related to military operations.

General Thomas immediately established his headquarters at Gallatin, Tennessee, and by the 28th of December preparations were completed for the advance of the army against the enemy at Murfreesboro. Abundant supplies had been provided and the forces intended for the field had been concentrated at Nashville. The troops to guard the communications with Louisville were mainly drawn from General Thomas' command, and consequently the "Centre" was


weaker than the "Wings." He had only Rousseau's and Negley's divisions and two detached brigades from divisions in the rear.

The grand units of the army having marched from Nashville on different roads were abreast before the enemy near Murfreesboro' on the 30th of December. The "Left" and "Centre" attained position on the 29th, and General Rosecrans, having concluded that General Bragg had retreated, ordered General Crittenden on the evening of that day to Cross Stone River and occupy Murfreesboro'. In attempting to carry out this order General Crittenden ascertained that the enemy had not retreated, and that the required movement would imperil his corps. He therefore halted his troops some having already crossed the river until he could confer with the commanding-general. Afterwards, with General Rosecrans' approval, the troops were recalled from their perilous advance. During the afternoon of the 30th General McCook's troops were somewhat heavily engaged near the ground which had been designated for their position in battle.

General Bragg had expected an attack on the 30th and had held his army in line of battle to meet it. At night he determined to take the offensive himself, and made preparations to open the engagement the next morning, intending to attack first with the left of his army. As a defensive measure he had taken General McCown's division from reserve, and posted it on the left of his first line of battle. He had done this to meet the expected attack on that flank. But by this measure he had placed a division entirely beyond General McCook's right which rested on the Franklin road. This fact had been ascertained by General McCook and communicated to General Rosecrans on the afternoon of the 30th. In the evening of that day General Bragg, in preparation for offense, transferred Cleburne's division from the second line on his right to a corresponding position on his left, and placed General Hardee in command


of the two divisions which were to assail General Rosecrans' right early on the 31st . General Bragg had then placed two divisions, or nearly two-fifths of his infantry, beyond General Rosecrans' right flank, and in their support was Wharton's brigade of cavalry. On the right bank of Stone River, Breckinridge's division of Hardee's corps was formed in continuation of the main line, and here were Jackson's unassigned brigades of infantry, and Wheeler's and Pegram's brigades of cavalry in support. In all there were seven brigades on the right bank of Stone River. This force was held as a possible reserve, and for resistance in the event of an advance in that direction by the left of the National army.

The trend of General Bragg's line of battle was due north from its left to the Franklin road, and thence nearly northeast to Stone River. The general direction of General Rosecrans' line was north and south. The distance between the two armies was least at the Franklin road, in consequence of the bend in the enemy's line at that point. General Bragg's line of battle was defective in formation. This fact was demonstrated the next day by the commingling of brigades from the divisions in parallel alignment. The unity of the divisions was impossible under the circumstances. And the failure of General Bragg to carry his first success to complete victory may be attributed, in part, at least, to this cause.

General Rosecrans' line of battle was radically different and greatly superior. It was formed by divisions in first and second lines and reserves. The brigades of each could act together under the direct control of their common commander. In other battles the same contrast can be traced.

General Rosecrans, besides, made his centre exceedingly strong by holding a large division entirely in reserve, but this was in provision for offense. At night, on the 30th, the divisions in order, from left to right, were Wood's, Palmers, Negley's, Sheridan's, Davis', and Johnson's.


Rousseau's division was in the rear of Negley's, and Van Cleve's was posted to the left and rear of Wood. Wood's and Van Cleve's divisions were to cross the river and advance to Murfreesboro', in rear of Bragg's army.* The Pioneer brigade was in position to cover these divisions in crossing the river. The centre was made strong to break through the middle of the enemy's line of battle.

General McCook's right flank rested upon the Franklin road. General Davis' division faced a little east of south; Kirk's brigade of Johnson's division on the right of Davis' looked more to the east, and Willich's directly to the south. In facing south Willich's brigade was nearly at right angles to the enemy's line of battle. Baldwin's brigade of Johnson's division was some distance to the rear of Kirk; and General Stanley's cavalry was still farther in the rear of the right flank of the army. General Bragg's plan of battle was similar, in so far as he also intended to take the initiative with the left of his army. But his plan proposed a very different general movement. His four divisions of infantry west of the river were to wheel to the right upon General Folk's right as a pivot.

Each of the commanding generals was ignorant of the purposes of the other, and each in the execution of his own plan expected to throw the other upon the defensive. It was, therefore, inevitable that continued aggression by either army depended upon the success of its initial attack.

Preparations and circumstances gave the advantage to General Bragg. His troops were in proximity to their point of attack, with no intervening obstacle. While General Rosecrans' forces had a river to cross, a distance of several miles to march, and a strong force of infantry and cavalry to rout before Murfreesboro' could be gained.

* The withdrawal of these divisions the next morning made Palmer's left the left flank of the army. This flank rested between the turnpike and railroad, a short distance north of their intersection.


General Bragg availed himself of his advantage and took the initiative early in the morning of the 31st, with great energy and tremendous effect. He wheeled his two over lapping divisions upon the right flank of the National army and soon dislodged Willich's and Kirk's brigades, Kirk having been attacked in front and flank. When these brigades fell back and drifted to the right a new flank was formed by General Davis' right brigade, Colonel Post commanding, and Baldwin's brigade of Johnson's division from reserve; but these brigades were soon overwhelmed, General Davis, in the meantime, repulsed repeated attacks in front with his remaining brigades—Carlin's and Woodruff's. These lost and then regained their position, but were finally compelled to fall back. Johnson's and Davis' divisions made repeated efforts to stand against the enemy, but with only temporary success, and they finally fell back to the Nashville road in rear of the centre of the army. Under the enemy's pressure Sheridan's division swung back until it was at right angles to its first position, maintaining the connection of its left with Negley's right. Immediately thereafter General Thomas threw Rousseau's division on Sheridan's right, to support him, should he maintain his position, and to resist the enemy should he fall back. After these dispositions had been made the enemy repeatedly assailed the three divisions. For some time his attacks were repulsed, but Sheridan's division having exhausted its ammunition went to the rear. Then came the supreme crisis of the battle. General Cruft's brigade of Palmer's division, on the left of Negley, had previously retired a short distance in consequence of the exposure of its left flank. After Sheridan's division left the line both of Negley's flanks were in air, and Rousseau was in the same condition, both divisions being completely isolated, and soon after were each nearly surrounded by the overlapping lines of the enemy. General Thomas at once ordered Miller's and Stanley's brigades of Negley's division to fall back, to save them


from annihilation or capture. The withdrawal of these troops exposed the right of Palmer's division, and Cruft's brigade again fell back. The enemy, having been successful in dislodging the right of the army, pressed with exultation upon Rousseau's, Negley's and Palmer's divisions, which were compelled to-fight in all directions. Grose's brigade of Palmer's division faced to the rear to meet the foe; Negley's brigades fought as they fell back, and Rousseau's three brigades, Shepherd's, Scribner's and Beatty's * were resisting attacks in all directions.

This crisis carried with it the fate of the army. General Thomas at once perceived that the only measure that would save the centre and the army was the establishment of a new line, which should connect itself with Crittenden's force on the left, and with McCook's and other forces on the right. Seldom has a new line of battle been formed under similar circumstances. A permanent line was dependent upon a temporary one, and to both in conjunction General Thomas gave prompt attention. He sent his batteries to the high ground selected for the permanent line, and then formed part of his infantry on low ground in their front to resist the advance of the enemy. Colonel Shepherd's regular brigade lost five hundred men, killed and wounded, and Beatty's and Scribner's lost heavily in covering the movements of other troops, and in fighting their own way to the new position. General Rosecrans had sent the Pioneer brigade to the centre, and its musketry and artillery fire also covered the moving troops.' After hard fighting Rousseau's,

Negley's and Palmer's divisions were firmly connected, and other dispositions made which placed the whole army in a continuous line.

Early in the morning Van Cleve's division had moved from reserve and formed by brigades in column to cross Stone River, and lead in the movement on Murfreesboro.

*Col. John Beatty.


Five brigades of Wood's division had also been withdrawn from position to take part in the movement. But when Van Cleve's foremost brigade had gained the farther bank, and his second, the nearer one, both had been arrested by the commanding General, who had ordered them and Harker's brigade of Wood's division to the support of the Right Wing. Colonel S. Beatty's brigade of Van Cleve's division, followed by Colonel Fyffe's brigade, opportunely reached the right of Rousseau's division immediately after the establishment of the new line. These fresh troops connected the new centre with McCook's forces on the right. This line of battle bent at the centre at right angles to the original line, and was well refused on its right. The enemy attacked this line repeatedly throughout its length, but was as often repulsed.

Notwithstanding General Bragg's superior strength for his turning movement, Hardee's two overlapping divisions and a great part of Wither's and Cheatham's divisions were nearly exhausted before the new line of battle of the National army had been established. As early as 10 A. M., the time of the crisis in the centre, General Hardee had called for reenforcements. Three-fifths of General Bragg's army had been moved against General McCook's corps, and afterwards most of these forces fell upon Thomas's two divisions. And in fighting McCook, and Thomas, and Palmer's division of Crittenden's corps, all of General Bragg's army on the west bank of the river had recoiled with heavy losses and broken ranks. Bragg's only hope. thereafter, was in using all his reserves against the left of Rosecrans' army. In an effort to turn this flank, he sent four brigades from the east of the river to General Polk. The left of the National army was held by Palmer's division, and Hascall's and Wagner's brigades of Wood's division. Schaeffer's brigade of Sheridan's division was in rear, on the railroad, as a supporting force. No fighting at any time was more severe than on the left, when General Bragg was making his final effort to


win the day. In this struggle Hazen's brigade moved to the left to a stronger position, and Hascall's brigade filled the vacant space, on the right of the railroad. On the left of Hazen's new position, and unconnected, Wagner's brigade resisted the enemy; and its nearness to the river made it necessary for Bragg to hold one brigade of Breckinridge's division on the east bank. The conflict was fierce and protracted, and in failing to carry the left of the National army, Bragg gave up the offensive altogether.

In the evening Starkweather's brigade of Rousseau's division, and Walker's of Fry's, came upon the field; but as Negley's two brigades were then in reserve in the centre, these fresh troops were first posted to support General McCook, and subsequently relieved the forces of General Crittenden's corps that they might return to the left of the line.

General Thomas had only five brigades in the conflict on the 31st, and with this small force he arrested the success of the enemy. Battles are won in a general way by the aggregate force of all operations to which every officer who gives or obeys an order, and every soldier who fires a cannon or a musket, makes a contribution. However, in an engagement of marked emergencies the action of a brigade, division, or corps often stands out distinctly as saving an army. The crisis at the centre was so distinct, that its mastery brought General Thomas and his five brigades into boldest relief, as having saved the army. The prompt dispositions of the commander, and the steadiness and bravery of the subordinate officers and men under circumstances which have often brought confusion to generals and panics to soldiers, give the greater prominence to their action. General Thomas gained greater distinction in other battles, but never did he meet a crisis with more promptness and skill.

In the evening of the first, there was an informal meeting of several officers, at General McCook's headquarters -- a small cabin in the rear of the line of battle. General Rosecrans soon made known that he was thinking of retreat, and


the discussion of this project lasted till midnight. General Crittenden was vehement in his opposition to the withdrawal of the army. General Thomas was quiet and soon fell asleep on an improvised seat. Near midnight General Rosecrans asked Surgeon Eben Swift, medical director of the Department of the Cumberland, "if he had transportation sufficient to remove the wounded men." The doctor replied that there were five or six thousand wounded, but many of them could walk, and there were enough wagons and ambulances for those severely injured. The commanding-general then awoke General Thomas and said: "Will you protect the rear on retreat to Overall's Creek ?" Thomas promptly answered: "This army can't retreat," and then fell asleep again. He had doubtless decided the matter for himself when it was first proposed, hence his readiness to give his opinion, and resume his restful slumber. He who had snatched his five brigades from the midst of Bragg's army when receiving fire in front, flank and rear, and had established a stable line under a cross fire of artillery and musketry, was not in favor of giving the field to the enemy.

The opposition of his corps commanders to the retreat of the army did not, however, induce General Rosecrans to abandon the project. About midnight he requested General McCook to ride with him to the rear to select a new position. The two generals rode to the bank of Overall's Creek, a few miles towards Nashville, and viewed the ground beyond that stream. General McCook objected to the position, for the reason that it was so low as to be commanded by artillery from the southern bank. When returning, General Rosecrans observed fires on the west of the road, and exclaimed: "The enemy is in our rear." He had directed General D. S. Stanley, commanding the cavalry, to forbid fires that night; but some insubordinate troopers had lighted torches, and the moving lights induced him to believe that the enemy had passed to his rear.


General McCook went at once to his command to prepare it for action, and General Rosecrans rode back to the place whence he started. As he rode up, he said: "We must fight or die." He then directed Generals Thomas and Crittenden to put their corps in readiness for battle.

He evidently alluded to this personal reconnoissance, and the circumstances that prevented retreat in the following extracts from his official report: " Orders were given for the issue of all the spare ammunition, and we found that we had enough for another battle, the only question being, where that battle was to be fought. * * * *

"After careful examination and free consultation with corps commanders, followed by a personal examination of the ground in the rear as far as Overall's Creek, it was determined to await the enemy's attack in that position, to send for the provision train and order up fresh supplies of ammunition, upon the arrival of which, should the enemy not attack, offensive operations were to be resumed."

General Rosecrans' report contains no allusion to his belief that the enemy was in his rear, and it is not thereby manifest how far it influenced his decision to hold his position.

During the 1st and 2nd days of January the two armies remained in close proximity, with no fighting beyond what resulted from tentative offense by the enemy, until late in the afternoon of the 2nd, when there was a fierce conflict on the east bank of Stone River. General Crittenden had previously sent across the river Van Cleve's division and Grose's brigade of Palmer's division. Regarding these troops and their artillery as a menace to Polk's line on the opposite bank, General Bragg resolved if practicable to dislodge them and ordered General Breckinridge to advance for this purpose. Van Cleve's division was driven from position and pursued to the river. But this action and its result drew together a heavy force of infantry and artillery on the west bank. About fifty guns were placed on high


ground by Major John Mendenhall, General Crittenden's chief of artillery, with his approval, and that of the commanding general, but their fire did not arrest the enemy who came to the river to the left of these guns, some of the men even crossing the stream. At this juncture Colonel John F. Miller leading seven regiments of Negley's division, without orders from his immediate commander, and against the orders of another general of division, crossed the river in the face of the enemy, and in a brilliant charge drove Breckinridge's forces in rout far towards Murfreesboro'.

Afterwards General Jeff. C. Davis' division advanced to the position coveted by General Bragg, and at once fortified a battery upon it.

General Bragg's object had been a defensive one, simply to gain a position on that side of the river, which commanded his line on the other bank. His troops, however, went far beyond it in pursuing Van Cleve's division, and then were driven back over it again by Miller's unbidden charge. The failure of this operation induced Bragg to abandon the general conflict, not considering his position on the other side of the river tenable when exposed to an enfilading fire of artillery. He feared also that the rising water would divide his army. He maintained position, however, until the night of the 3rd, when to cover his retreat his forces in front of General Thomas were active and annoying, and he obtained permission to make a night attack. This resulted in the penetration of the enemy's line by troops from Beatty's and Spear's brigades, the latter having joined the army with trains. Early the next morning it was discovered that General Bragg had retreated, leaving his wounded at Murfreesboro', but saving his material.

"Battles and Leaders of the Civil War", Vol. III, Yoseloff ed., 1965

Originally published in 1887 by Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarence
Clough Buell, editors of the "The Century Magazine".

[scanned, reformatted and corrected; maps and illustrations are ommitted]

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GENERAL BRAGG'S Kentucky campaign has drawn on him more criticism than any other part of his career as a military commander. During that memorable march I rode at his side from day to day, and it was his habit to confide to me his hopes and fears. About the end of June, 1862, General Bragg was visited by many prominent citizens of Kentucky, who had abandoned their homes, and who assured him that Kentuckians were thoroughly loyal to the South, and that as soon as they were given an opportunity it would be proven. Fired with this idea, he planned his offensive campaign. On the 21st of July, 1862, the movement of the Army of Mississippi from Tupelo was ordered. The infantry moved by rail, the artillery and cavalry across the country. Headquarters were established at Chattanooga on the 29th. On the 30th Major-General Kirby Smith visited General Bragg at that point, and it was arranged that Smith should move at once against the Federal forces under General George W. Morgan in Cumberland Gap. In this interview General Bragg was very certain that he would begin his forward move in ten or fifteen days at latest, and if Kirby Smith was successful in his operation against Morgan he would be on his offensive against Buell. Kirby Smith took the field on the 13th of August, 1862. On the 28th, after some inevitable delays, Bragg crossed the Tennessee, his right wing, under Polk, 13,537 strong; the left wing, under Hardee, 13,763 strong,-- total effective, 2 7,320 rank and file.

General Bragg by this time was deeply inpressed with the magnitude of his undertaking. He had lost faith somewhat in the stories that had been told him of Kentucky's desire to join the South, but he proposed to give the people a chance of so doing by the presence of Southern troops. At the same time he was resolved to do nothing to imperil the safety of his army, whose loss, he felt, would be a crushing blow to the Confederacy. He reached Carthage on the 9th of September. On the 12th he was at Glasgow, Kentucky, where he issued a proclamation to Kentuckians. About that time also the corps of Polk and Hardee were ordered to unite. Buell was now moving on Bowling Green from the south. On the 16th our army surrounded and invested Munfordville, and General Wilder, with its garrison of four thousand men, was forced to capitulate. General Kirby Smith, having found Morgan's position impregnable, detached a part of his forces to invest it; and, advancing on Lexington, defeated the Federal forces encountered at Richmond, Ky. He was relying on an early junction with General Bragg.

On the 17th of September Generals Polk and Hardee were called to a council at Munfordville. With the map and the cavalry dispatches outspread before him, General Bragg placed General Buell and his army in our rear, with Munfordville on the direct line of his march to Louisville, the

* See also articles by General Wheeler and General Buell, pp. 1 and 32.

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assumed objective point of his movement, General Bragg then explaining his plan, which was discussed and approved by his lieutenants. Our advance was then resumed, leaving General Buell to pursue his march unmolested. This action was subsequently severely criticized by military men, and at the time it was greatly deplored by many officers of his command. At 1 o'clock on the morning of the 18th of September, indeed, Bragg was on the point of rescinding the order to continue the march, and of directing instead an immediate offensive movement against Buell. The importance of recovering Nashville induced the proposed change of operation. But, upon further consideration, he reverted to his previous plans, saying to me with emphasis, "This campaign must be won by marching, not by fighting." He used similar language at subsequent stages of the campaign before the battle of Perryville. At the moment he evinced no regret at having allowed Buell to pass on our left flank.

The success of the column under Kirby Smith in its combat at Richmond, Ky., elated him. He was worried by the delays that retarded his

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junction with that officer, and was greatly relieved when all the Confederate forces in Kentucky were united at Lexington.

Here a brilliant entertainment was given to the two generals by our old comrade, General William Preston, in his delightful Kentucky home. But it was here, also, that General Bragg fully realized that the reported desire of Kentucky to cast her lot with the South had passed away, if indeed such a disposition had ever existed; for not only was Kentucky unprepared to enter the Confederacy, but her people looked with dread at the prospect of their State being made a battle-field. Under these circumstances he remarked to me again and again, "The people here have too many fat cattle and are too well off to fight." He was now aware that he had embarked in a campaign that was to produce no favorable result, and that he had erred in departing from his original plan of taking the offensive in the outset against Buell by an operation on that general's communications. He was determined, however, not to expose his army to disaster, nor to take any chances. The information we were receiving indicated that Buell was being heavily reenforced.

It was now the eve of the battle of Perryville, and Kirby Smith, at Salvisa, twenty miles to the north-east, was calling for reenforcements, as he was confident that the feint was against Perryville, and that the main attack would surely fall on him. Thus urged, General Bragg, against his own judgment, yielded, and detached two of his best divisions (Withers's and Cheatham's) to Smith's aid. The former division could not be recalled in time, and the latter arrived the morning of the battle. Having placed General Polk in command of the troops, Bragg had gone to Frankfort, the capital of the State of Kentucky, to witness the inauguration of the secessionist governor, Hawes. The inaugural was being read when the booming of cannon, shortly followed by dispatches from our cavalry outposts, announced the near presence of the enemy. As the hall was chiefly filled by the military, who hurried away to their respective commands, the governor was obliged to cut short his inaugural address.

The field of Perryville was an open and beautiful rolling country, and the battle presented a grand panorama. There was desperate fighting on both sides. I saw a Federal battery, with the Union flag planted near its guns, repulse six successive Confederate charges before retiring, saving all but one gun, and eliciting praise for their bravery from their desperate foes.

About dark, Polk, convinced that some Confederate troops were firing into each other, cantered up to the colonel of the regiment that was firing, and asked him angrily what he meant by shooting his own friends. The colonel, in a tone of surprise, said:  "I don't think there can be any mistake about it. I am sure they are the enemy." "Enemy! Why, I have just left them myself. Cease firing, sir. What is your name?" rejoined the Confederate general. "I am Colonel ___of the___ Indiana. And pray, sir, who are you?" Thus made aware that he was with a Federal regiment and that his only escape was to brazen it out, his dark blouse and the increasing obscurity happily befriending him, the Confederate general shook his fist in the Federal colonel's face and promptly said:  "I will show you who I am, sir. Cease firing at once!" Then, cantering down the line again, he shouted authoritatively to

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the men, "Cease firing!" Then, reaching the cover of a small copse, he spurred his horse and was soon back with his own corps, which he immediately ordered to open fire.

The battle of Perryville, a hard-fought fight against many odds, was merely a favorable incident which decided nothing. Our army, however, was elated and did not dream of a retreat, as we had held the field and bivouacked on it. But the commanding general, full of care, summoned his lieutenant-generals to a council in which both advised retreat.

The next day General Smith's army was called to Harrodsburg, where a junction of the two forces was effected, and where a position was selected to receive Buell's attack- -this, however, not being made, Bragg was enabled to take measures for an immediate retrograde. Forrest was at once dispatched by forced marches to take position at Murfreesboro', and prepare it for occupancy by the retreating Confederates.

The conduct of the retreat was intrusted to Polk. Our army fell back first to Camp Dick Robinson, whence the retreat began in earnest, a brigade of cavalry leading. All the supplies which it was impossible to carry from this depot were burned; the rest were hauled away in wagons, including provisions, merchandise of all kinds, and captured muskets while captured, cannon were drawn by oxen. Refugees, with their families, slaves, and a great deal of household stuff; omnibuses, stages, and almost every other description of vehicle were to be seen in this heterogeneous caravan. Thousands of beef cattle, sheep, and hogs were driven along under the charge of Texans as reckless as the affrighted cattle they were driving.

General Smith's army and Polk's and Hardee's corps followed the trains. The Federal army promptly took up the pursuit and made an effort by a flank movement to intercept our long unwieldily trains. General Wheeler with his cavalry brought up the rear-fighting by day and obstructing the roads at night. Before the pursuit was abandoned at Rock Castle, that officer was engaged over twenty-six times. His vigilance was so well known by the infantry that they never feared a surprise. Hard marching, stony roads, and deep fords lay before us until we had crossed Cumberland Gap. But at last almost all that had been taken out of Kentucky was safely conveyed to Morristown, Tenn.

About the 31st of October, 1862, General Bragg, having made a short visit to Richmond, there obtained the sanction of the Confederate Government for a movement into middle Tennessee. Returning to Knoxville, General Bragg made preparations with the utmost rapidity for the advance to Murfreesboro', where General Breckinridge was already posted, and General Forrest was operating with a strong, active cavalry force. Our headquarters were advanced to Tullahoma on the 14th of November, and on the 26th to Murfreesboro'. Notwithstanding long marches and fighting, the condition of the troops was very good; and had they been well clad, the Confederate army would have presented a fine appearance.

On November 24th, 1862, the commands of Lieutenant-General Pemberton at Vicksburg, and that of General Bragg in Tennessee, were placed under

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General Joseph E. Johnston, and his official headquarters were established at Chattanooga. Immediately thereafter General Johnston visited Murfreesboro', where he passed some days devoted to a thorough inspection of the army. Our forces numbered somewhat over 40,000 men. General Johnston's visit was followed during the second week in December by that of President Davis and his aide, General Custis Lee. The President asked Bragg if he did not think he could spare a division of his army to reenforce Pemberton. Bragg assented and dispatched a division of 8000 men under Stevenson. This step was contrary to the decided opinion previously expressed to Mr. Davis by General Johnston. [See p. 473.] So well satisfied was General Bragg at having extricated his army from its perilous position in Kentucky, that he was not affected by the attacks upon him by the press for the failure of the campaign. He was cheerful, and would frequently join the staff about the camp-fire, and relate with zest incidents of his services under General Taylor in Mexico.* On the 26th General

* He told how on one occasion, when he was asleep, the men of his battery had placed under his cot a shell, which exploded, tearing everything to pieces, but without harming him. He told us also that at the battle of Buena Vista General Taylor did not use the words so frequently quoted, "A little more grape, Captain Bragg," but had ridden up to him and exclaimed, "Captain, give them hell!" He also often related anecdotes of Buell Thomas, and Sherman. Thomas had been in his old battery and he never could praise him too much. While at Murfreesboro' flags of truce were the order of the day, and almost always some kind message from old army friends was sent thereby to General Hardee, usually accompanied by a bottle of brandy.-- D. U.

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Wheeler, commanding the cavalry outposts,* sent dispatches in quick succession to headquarters reporting a general advance of Rosecrans's army. Soon all was bustle and activity. General Hardee's corps at Triune was ordered to Murfreesboro'. Camps were at once broken up and everything was made ready for active service. On the 27th of December our army was moving.

On Sunday, December 28th, Polk and Hardee met at General Bragg's headquarters to learn the situation and his plans. Rosecrans was advancing from Nashville with his whole army. Wheeler with his cavalry was so disposed at the moment as to protect the flanks, and, when pressed, to fall back toward the main army. Hardee's corps, consisting of the divisions of Breckinridge and Cleburne, with Jackson's brigade as a reserve constituted our right wing, with its right resting on the Lebanon Pike and its left on the Nashville road. Polk's corps; composed of Withers's and Cheatham's divisions; was to take post with its right touching Hardee on the Nashville road, and its left resting on the Salem Pike; McCown's division was to form the reserve and to occupy our center. Such was the position of the Confederate army on the 29th of December.

On Tuesday, December 30th, Rosecrans was in our front, a mile and a half away. At 12 o'clock artillery on both sides was engaged. At 3 o'clock the Federal infantry advanced and attacked our lines, but were repulsed by the Louisiana and Alabama brigade, under Colonel Gibson, commanding

* Wheeler had shortly before relieved our dashing cavalryman, John H. Morgan, who, since the return from Kentucky, had commanded a brigade picketing our front. As early as the 1st of December Morgan had been ordered by Bragg to operate on Rosecrans's. lines of communication in rear of Nashville, and to prevent him from foraging north of the Cumberland. Learning that the Union force at Hartsville, at the crossing of the Cumberland, was isolated [see map, p. 635], Morgan resolved to capture it, and while two brigades of Cheatham's division, with Wheeler's cavalry, made a demonstration before Nashville, he set out on the 6th from Baird's Mills, with four regiments and one battalion of cavalry under Colonel Basil W. Duke, and two regiments of infantry and Cobb's battery from Hanson's brigade, under Colonel T. H. Hunt. The Union force at Hartsville consisted of Colonel A. B. Moore's brigade of Dumont's division and numbered about two thousand men. At Castalian springs, nine miles distant, there were two brigades numbering 5000, and at Gallatin, other forces, all belonging to Thomas's command. Morgan crossed the Cumberland on the night of the 6th, and disposed his forces so as to cut off the retreat from Hartsville on the roads to Lebanon, Gallatin, and Castalian Springs, and, closing in, attacked the troops who were drawn up to receive him. Morgan won a complete victory after a stubborn fight of an hour and a half, and promptly retired with his prisoners and some wagons, animals, and stores. While he was retiring, the advance of a brigade of reenforcements under Colonel John M Harlan, coming up from Castalian springs, reached Hartsville and attacked the Confederate rear-guard. The Union loss was: k, 58; w, 204; m, 1834; total, 2096. The Confederate loss was 139 in all. Colonel Moore was taken prisoner and his assistant adjutant-general, Captain W. G. Gholson, was killed: EDITORS.

I have been present in my life at many marriages, religious and civil, but only once did I witness one purely military, and never one with which I was so much impressed as that of John H. Morgan. A few days before the battle of Stone's River his marriage ceremony was performed at the house of the bride. General Bragg and his staff, with a few of Morgan's comrades, were gathered as witnesses in the front parlor. General Polk, Bishop of Louisiana, performed the ceremony and gave the blessing. That evening Morgan and his command left Murfreesboro' on a raid toward Kentucky. Social recreation at Murfreesboro' at this time was at its zenith; Christmas was approaching. The young officers of our army were all bent on fun and gayety. Invitations were out for a ball on the day after Christmas.--D. U.

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in the absence of General Daniel Adams. But night soon interposed, quiet prevailed, and the two armies bivouacked opposite to each other. General Bragg was on the field the entire day, but returned to his headquarters that evening at Murfreesboro'. He called his corps commanders together and informed them that his advices convinced him that Rosecrans, under cover of the day's attack, had been massing his troops for a move on our left flank. It was then agreed that Hardee should at once move to the extreme left Cleburne's division of his corps and the reserve (McCown), and that, next morning, Hardee should take command in that quarter and begin the fight.

At daylight on the 31st (Wednesday), Hardee, with Cleburne's and McCown's divisions, attacked McCook's corps of the Federal army. For a while the enemy were disorganized, many of the men being still engaged in cooking their breakfasts, but they very soon got under arms and in position, and resisted the attack with desperation. At this juncture Polk advanced with Withers's and Cheatham's divisions, and after hard fighting McCook's corps was driven back between three and four miles. Our attack had pivoted the Federals on their center, bending back their line, as one half shuts a knife-blade. At 12 o'clock we had a large part of the field, with many prisoners, cannon, guns, ammunition, wagons, and the dead and wounded of both armies.

Between 2 and 3 o'clock, however, Rosecrans massed artillery on the favorable rising ground to which his line had been forced back. On this ground cedar-trees were so thick that his movements had not been perceived. Our line again advanced. Stewart's, Chalmers's, Donelson's, and Maney's brigades, supported by Slocomb's, Cobb's, and Byrne's batteries, were hurled against the Federal line, but could not carry it. Reenforced by Gibson's and Jackson's brigades, another charge was ordered, but the position was not carried and many were killed and wounded on our side.

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A bitter cold night was now on us. We were masters of the field. The sheen of a bright moon revealed the sad carnage of the day, and the horrors of war became vividly distinct. That night General Bragg again made his headquarters at Murfreesboro', whence he gave orders for the care of the wounded. All the churches and public buildings were turned into hospitals. He announced to Richmond by telegraph: "God has granted us a happy New Year." We had indeed routed the Federal right wing, but the bloody work was not over. During January 1st Rosecrans's army was intrenching itself, but General Bragg was of the opinion that their quiet meant a retreat.

During the morning of the 2d (Friday) quiet prevailed, except some shelling on our right. At about noon General Bragg deter mined to dislodge the force on his right. Orders were given to that end, and our best troops were carefully selected. Hanson's Preston's, Gibson's, and Hunt's brigades, with Cobb's and Wright's batteries, were placed under Major-General Breckinridge. A gun fired by one of our batteries at 4 o'clock was the signal for the attack. After a fierce fight we carried the hill. The orders were to take its crest, and there remain intrenched. General Breckinridge endeavored to execute this order, but the commanders of the brigades engaged could not restrain the ardor of their men, who pushed on beyond support. The Federal batteries that had been massed on the other side of the stream now opened on them and drove the Confederates back with terrible slaughter, fully 2000 of our men being killed and wounded in this attack. At 10 o'clock P. M. the news of this disastrous charge, led by the elite of the Confederate army, cast a gloom over all.

Saturday, January 3d, the two armies faced each other, with little fighting on either side.

The miscarriage of the 2d determined General Bragg to begin to fall back on Tullahoma; but all day of the 3d our forces maintained their line of battle taken up early that morning. That night the evacuation of Murfreesboro' was effected.

General Rosecrans entered Murfreesboro' on Sunday, the 4th of January, 1863. Meantime his adversary was in full retreat on Tullahoma, thirty-six

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miles distant. By this time General Bragg's corps commanders as well as , their subordinates down to the regimental rank and file, scarcely concealed their want of confidence in him as the commander of the army. On the 11th of January he invited from his corps, division, and brigade commandeers an expression of their opinion on that point, and their replies, while affirming their admiration for his personal courage, devotion to duty, and ability as an organizer, frankly confessed that his army had lost confidence to such an extent in his capacity for chief command as wholly to impair his further usefulness. On the 4th of February General Polk went so far indeed as to write direct to President Davis with regard to the dissatisfaction felt, and the necessity for the immediate substitution of another commander. (1)

To vindicate himself, Bragg at once made an official report of the battle of the 31st of December, especially in relation to the miscarriage of the effort to break the enemy's center.(2)

The feeling outside as well as inside of his army, however, waxed so strong against Bragg that President Davis ordered General Johnston, then near Vicksburg, to go to Tennessee, with authority, if he thought it wise, to relieve Bragg from command. Johnston's arrival was hailed with joy, for our army specially wanted him as their commander. But after spending more than a week looking into its condition, he decided that he would not relieve Bragg, and thereupon returned toward Vicksburg with his staff. This result quieted the bad feeling somewhat, but did not restore harmony between the corps

(1) Colonel Brent once showed me an order from General Bragg to place General Polk under arrest. Knowing what feeling against General Bragg such a step would produce, I was deeply pained and hastened to the latter's tent where I besought, as a personal favor to myself, that the order should not be executed at present. After a short conversation General Bragg authorized me to direct Colonel Brent to withhold the arrest. The next morning, however, General Bragg, sent for me, and expressed his appreciation of what I had said, and said that he realized the feeling it would excite against himself, but that he felt that the urgent exactions of discipline made General Polk's arrest absolutely requisite. The arrest was therefore made, but it was not sustained by the Richmond authorities. It is hardly necessary to say that the incident deepened General Bragg's unpopularity with his army, while the feeling between his two corps commanders and himself grew from "bad to worse." On the eve of the battle of Chickamauga his relations with General Longstreet were no better than with the other two:--D. U.

(2) In his report General Bragg says, in part:

"To meet our successful advance and retrieve his losses in the front of his left, the enemy early transferred a portion of his reserve from his left to that flank, and by 2 o'clock had succeeded in concentrating such a force of Lieutenant-General Hardee's front as to check his further progress. Our two lines had, by this time, become almost blended, so weak were they by losses, exhaustion, and extension to cover the enemy's whole front. As early as 10 A. M. Major-General Breckinridge was called on for one brigade, and soon after for a second, to reenforce or act as a reserve to General Hardee. His reply to the first call represented the enemy crossing stone's River in heavy force in his immediate front; and on receiving the second order he informed me they had already crossed in heavy force and were advancing on him in two lines. He was immediately ordered not to wait attack but to advance and meet them. About this same time a report reached me that a heavy force of the enemy's infantry was advancing on the Lebanon Road about five miles in Breckinridge's front. Brigadier-General Pegram, who had been sent to that road to cover the flank of the infantry with the cavalry brigade (save two regiments, detached with Wheeler and Wharton), was ordered forward immediately to develop such movement. The orders for the two brigades from Breckinridge were countermanded, whilst dispositions were made at his request to reenforce him. Before they could be carried out the movements ordered disclosed the facts that no force had crossed stone's River; that the only enemy in our immediate front there were a small body of sharp-shooters, and that there was no advance on the Lebanon Road.

"These unfortunate misapprehensions on that part of the field (which, with proper precaution, could not have existed) withheld from active operations three fine brigades until the enemy had succeeded in checking our progress, had reestablished his lines, and had collected many of his broken battalions."

The orders referred to by General Bragg as having been sent to General Breckinridge were in part written by me, and the receipts for their delivery were given to and retained by me for some time. General Bragg cordially said to me afterward that my preservation of those receipts had saved his reputation.--D. U.

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commanders and their commanding general. Seldom did either of them visit headquarters except officially. On the other hand, Bragg was on good terms with the division and brigade commanders, namely, Wheeler, Cleburne, and Withers, Patton Anderson, J. C. Brown, J. K. Jackson, Bate, and Walthall.

The certainty he felt that General Rosecrans would retire from his front had led him to suffer the 1st to pass without advancing his right to cover the rising ground, thus giving ample leisure to Rosecrans to intrench and to restore order to his army after the fight of the 31st, when all the advantages of battle had remained with us. But on Friday, the 2d of January, he was convinced that Rosecrans was not going to retreat and that fighting must soon be resumed. After riding over the ground early on the morning of the 2d, at 11 o'clock he had adopted the following plan: To seize and carry by a vigorous assault that rising ground now occupied by the Federal forces, allowing only one hour to intervene between the time of the attack and dark, so that night should stop the fighting and give us opportunity to fortify at once. It w as for that reason the hour of 4 P. M. was selected for the operation.

The failure of Friday to secure the heights on our right necessitated an entire change of our lines, and Saturday his determination was to fall back to Tullahoma and await General Rosecrans's advance. No such move, however, having been made, our army went into winter quarters, undisturbed.

While the army was at Murfreesboro', no firing of guns being allowed, the country remained full of rabbits, some of which during the battle, alarmed by the din, rushed swiftly past one of our regiments, which at the time was advancing under a heavy fire of musketry. One of our soldiers was heard by a staff-officer to yell out, "Go it, cotton-tail;  I'd run too if I hadn't a reputation."

At Tupelo an order had been issued forbidding the men firing their muskets when in camp. One of the volunteers shooting at a chicken killed a man; he was tried aud shot, not, as unjustly stated,, for disobedience of orders, but for killing the man. During one of General Bragg's rides near Tullahoma, he happened to meet a countryman dressed in his "butternut" garb, one of those rough, independent citizens of the mountain district of Tennessee, who, after intelligently giving all the information asked of him about the roads we were looking for, was also asked by the general if he did not "belong to Bragg's army." "Bragg's army?" was the reply. "He's got none; he shot half of them in Kentucky, and the other got killed up at Murfreesboro." The general laughed and rode on.

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The composition, losses, and strength of each army as here stated give the gist of all the data obtainable in the Official Records. K stands for killed;  w for wounded;  m w for mortally wounded;  m for captured or missing;  c for captured.


ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND (Fourteenth Army Corps), Maj.-Gen. William S. Rosecrans.

Provost-Guard: 10th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Joseph W. Burke. Escort: Anderson Troop Pa. Cav., Lieut. Thomas S. Maple. Staff and escort loss:  k, 4;  w, 5 = 9.

RIGHT WING, Maj: Gen. Alexander McD. McCook.

FIRST (LATE NINTH) DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Jefferson C. Davis.

Escort: Cavalry Co. B, 36th Ill., Capt. Samuel B. Sherer;  G, 2d Ky. Cav., Capt. Miller R. McCulloch (k), Lieut. Harvey S. Park. Escort loss:  k, 1;  w, 4;  m, 6=11.

First (late Thirtieth) Brigade, Col. P. Sidney Post:  59th Ill., Capt. Hendrick E. Paine; 74th Ill., Col. Jason Marsh;  75th Ill., Lieut.-Col. John E. Bennett;  22d Ind., Col. Michael Gooding. Brigade loss: k, 25; w, 144; m, 155 = 324. Second (Late Thirty-first) Brigade, Col. William P. Carlin: 21st Ill., Col. J. W. S. Alexander (w), Lieut.-Col. Warren E. ,McMackin;  38th Ill., Lieut.-Col. Daniel H. Gilmer;  101st Ohio, Col. Leander Stem (m w and c), Lieut.-Col. Moses F. Wooster (m w and c), Maj. Isaac M. Kirby , Capt. Bedan B. McDonald;  15th Wis., Col. Hans C. Heg. Brigade loss: k, 129; w, 498; m, 194=821. Third (Late Thirty-second) Brigade, Col. William E. Woodruff: 25th III., Col. Thomas D. Williams (k), Capt. Wesford Taggart;  35th Ill., Lieut.-Col. William P. Chandler; 81st Ind., Lieut.-Col. John Timberlake. Brigade loss:  k, 32;  w, 179;  m, 47 = 258. Artillery:  2d Minn. (2d Brigade), Capt. William A. Hotchkiss; 5th Wis. (1st Brigade), Capt. Oscar F. Pinney (m w), Lieut. Charles B. Humphrey; 8th Wis. (3d Brigade), Capt. Stephen J. Carpenter (k), Sergt. Obadiah German, Lieut. Henry E. Stiles. Artillery loss embraced in brigades to which attached.

SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Richard W. Johnson.  First (late Sixth) Brigade, Brig.-Gen. August Willich (c), Col. William Wallace, Col. William II. Gibson:  89th Ill., Lieut.-Col. Charles T. Hotchkiss; 32d Ind., Lieut. Col. Frank Erdelmeyer;  39th Ind., Lieut.-Col. Fielder A. Jones;  15th Ohio, Col. William Wallace, Capt. A. R. Z.

Dawson, Col. William Wallace; 49th Ohio, Col. William H. Gibson, Lieut.-Col. Levi Drake (k), Capt. Samuel F. Gray. Brigade loss:  k, 90;  w, 373;  m, 701 = 1164. Second (Late Fifth) Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Edward N. Kirk (w), Col. Joseph B. Dodge:  34th Ill., Lieut: Col. Hiram W.

Bristol, Maj. Alexander P. Dysart; 79th Ill., Col. Sheridan P. Read (k), Maj. Allen Buckner;  29th Ind., Lieut.-Col. David M. Dunn (c), Maj. Joseph P. Collins; 30th Ind. Col. Joseph B. Dodge, Lieut.-Col. Orrin D. Hurd;  77th Pa., Lieut.-Col. Peter B. Housum (k), Capt. Thomas E. Rose. Brigade loss:  k, 99;  w, 384;  m, 376 = 859. Third (Late Fourth) Brigade, Col. Philemon P. Baldwin:  6th Ind., Lieut.-Col. Hagerman Tripp; 5th Ky., Lieut.-Col. William W. Berry (w);  1st Ohio, Maj. Joab A. Stafford; 93d Ohio, Col. Charles Anderson (w).

Brigade loss:  k, 59;  w, 244;  m, 209 = 512. Artillery:  5th Ind. (3d Brigade), Capt. Peter Simonson; A, 1st Ohio (1st Brigade), Lieut. Edmund B. Belding;  E, 1st Ohio (2d Brigade), Capt. Warren P. Edgarton (c). Artillery loss embraced in the brigade to which attached.

Cavalry:  G, H, I, and K, 3d Ind., Maj. Robert Klein. Loss:  k, 4;  w, 6;  m, 15 = 25.

THIRD (LATE ELEVENTH) DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Philip H. Sheridan.

Escort: L, 2d Ky. Cav., Lieut. Joseph T. Forman.

First (Late Thirty-seventh) Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Joshua W. Sill (k), Col. Nicholas Greusel:  36th Ill., Col. Nicholas Greusel, Maj. Silas Miller (w and c), Capt. Porter C. Olson; 88th Ill., Col. Francis T. Sherman; 21st Mich. Lieut.-Col. William B. McCreery; 24th Wis., Maj. Elisha C. Hibbard. Brigade loss:  k, 104;  w, 36:,;  m, 200=669. Second (Late Thirty-fifth) Brigade, Col.

Frederick Schaefer (k), Lieut.-Col. Bernard Laiboldt: 44th Ill., Capt. Wallace W. Barrett (w);  73d Ill., Maj. William A. Presson (w);  2d Mo. Lieut.-Col. Bernard Laiboldt, Maj. Francis Ehrler; 15th Mo., Lieut.-Col. John Weber. Brigade loss:  k, 71;  w, 281;  m, 46 = 398.

Third Brigade, Col. George W. Roberta (k), Col. Luther P. Bradley:  22d Ill., Lieut.-Col. Francis Swanwick (w and c), Capt. Samuel Johnson;  27th Ill., Col. Fazilo A. Harrington (k), Maj. William A. Schmitt; 42d Ill., Lieut: Col. Nathan H. Walworth; 51st Ill., Col. Luther P. Bradley, Capt. Henry F. Wescott. Brigade loss:  k, 62;  w, 343;  m, 161 = 566. Artillery:  Capt. Henry Hescock: C, 1st Ill. (3d Brigade), Capt. Charles Houghtaling; 4th Ind. (1st Brigade), Capt. Asahel K. Bush; G, 1st Mo. (2d Brigade), Capt. Henry Hescock. Artillery loss embraced in brigade to which attached.

CENTER, Maj.-Gen. George H. Thomas. Staff and escort loss: k, 1; w, 1=2.

Provost-Guard:  9th Mich., Col. John G. Parkhurst.

FIRST (LATE THIRD) DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. Lovell H. Rousseau. Staff and escort loss:  w, 2.

First (late Ninth) Brigade, Col. Benjamin F. Scribner:  38th Ind., Lieut.-Col. Daniel F. Griffin;  2d Ohio, Lieut. Col. John Kell (k), Maj. Anson G. McCook;  33d Ohio, Capt. Ephraim J. Ellis;  94th Ohio, Col. Joseph W. Frizell (w), Lieut. Col. Stephen A. Bassford; 10th Wis., Col. Alfred R. Chapin. Brigade loss:  k, 33;  w, 189;  m, 57 = 279.

Second (late Seventeenth.) Brigade, Col. John Beatty:  42d Ind., Lieut.-Col. James M. Shanklin (c);  88th Ind., Col. George Humphrey (w), Lieut.-Col. Cyrus E. Briant; 15th Ky., Col. James B. Forman (k), Lieut.-Col. Joseph R. Snider;  3d Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Orris A. Lawson. Brigade loss:  k, 53;  w, 240;  m, 96 =389. Third (late Twenty-eighth) Brigade, Col. John C. Starkweather:  24th Ill., Col. Geza Mihalotzy; 79th Pa., Col. Henry A. Hambright; 1st Wis., Lieut.-Col. George B. Bingham; 21st Wis., Lieut.-Col. Harrison C. Hobart. Brigade loss:  k, 2;  w, 31; m, 113=146. Fourth Brigade, Lieut: Col. Oliver L. Shepherd:  1st Battalion, 15th U. S., Maj. John H. King (w), Capt. Jesse Fulmer; 1st Battalion, 16th U. S., and B, 2d Battalion, Maj. Adam J. Slemmer (w), Capt. R. E. A. Crofton; 1st Battalion, and A and D, 3d Battalion, 18th U. S., Maj. James N. Caldwell; 2d Battalion, and B, C,, E, and F, 3d Battalion, 18th U. S., Maj. Frederick Townsend; 1st Battalion, 19th U. S., Maj. Stephen D. Carpenter (k), Capt. James B. Mulligan. Brigade loss:  k, 94; w, 497; m, 50=641. Artillery, Capt. Cyrus O. Loomis: A, Ky. (3d Brigade), Capt. David C. Stone;  A, 1st Mich. (2d Brigade), Lieut. George W. Van Pelt;  H, 5th U. S. (4th Brigade), Lieut. Francia L. Guenther. Artillery loss embraced in brigades to which attached. Cavalry: 2d Ky. (6 co's), Maj. Thomas P. Nicholas. Loss:  w, 3.

SECOND (late EIGHTH) DIVISION, Brig: Gen. James S. Negley.

First (Late Twenty-fifth) Brigade, (1) Brig.-Gen. James G. Spears:  1st Tenn., Col. Robert K. Byrd;  2d Tenn., Lieut.-Col. James M. Melton;  6th Tenn., Col. Joseph A. Cooper. Brigade loss: k, 5; w, 28=33. Second (Late Twenty-ninth) Brigade, Col. Timothy R. Stanley: 19th Ill., Col. Joseph R. Scott (w), Lieut.-Col. Alexander W. Raffen;  11th Mich., Col. William L. Stoughton;  18th Ohio, Lieut: Col. Josiah Given;  69th Ohio, Col. William B. Cassilly (w), Maj. Eli J. Hickcox, Capt. David Putman, Capt. Joseph H. Brigham, Lieut.-Col. George F. Elliott. Brigade loss:  k, 76;  w, 336;  m, 101 = 513. Third ,

(1) The 14th Mich., 85th Ill., and two sections 10th Wis. Battery temporarily attached Jan. 2d and 3d.

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Late Seventh) Brigade. Col. John F. Miller:  37th Ind., Col. James S. Hull (w,) Lieut.-Col. William D. Ward; 21st Ohio, Lieut.-Col. James M. Neibling;  74th Ohio, Col. Granville Moody (w);  78th Pa., Col. William Sirwell. Brigade loss:  k, 80; W, 471;  m, 97 = 648. Artillery:  B, Ky., Lieut. Alban A. Ellsworth; G, 1st Ohio, Lieut. Alexander Marshall; M, 1st Ohio (2d Brigade), Capt. Frederick Schultz. Artillery loss embraced in brigades to which attached.


First Brigade, (1), Col. Moses B. Walker: 82d Ind., Col. Morton C. Hunter; 17th Ohio, Col. John M. Connell; 31st Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Frederick W. Lister; 38th Ohio, Col. Edward H. Phelps. Brigade loss:  w, 22. Artillery:  D, 1st Mich., Capt. Josiah W. Church.

LEFT WING.-Maj.-Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden.

Staff loss:  w, 1.

FIRST (LATE SIXTH) DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Thomas J. Wood (w), Brig.-Gen.: Milo S. Hascall. Staff loss:  w, 1.

First (Late Fifteenth) Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Milo S. Hascall, Col. George P. Buell: 10th Ill., Col. Frederick A. Bartleson;  58th Ind., Col. George P. Buell, Lieut.-Col. James T. Embree;  3d Ky., Col. Samuel McKee (k), Maj. Daniel R. Collier; 26th Ohio, Capt. William H. Squires.

Brigade loss:  k, 50;  w, 316;  m, 34 = 400. Second (Late Twenty first) Brigade, Col. George D. Wagner:  15th Ind., Lieut.-Col. Gustavus A. Wood; 40th Ind., Col. John W. Blake, Lieut.-Col. Elias Neff (w), Maj. Henry Leaming; 57th Ind., Col. Cyrus C. Hines (w), Lieut.-Col. George W.

Lennard (w), Capt. John S. McGraw; 97th Ohio, Col.

John Ql. Lane. Brigade loss:  k, 57;  w, 291;  m, 32 = 380.

Third (Late Twentieth) Brigade, Col. Charles G. Harker: 51st Ind., Col. Abel D. Streight;  73d Ind., Col. Gilbert Hathaway;  13th Mich., Col. Michael Shoemaker;  64th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Alexander McIlvain;  65th Ohio, Lieut. Col. Alexander Cassil (w), Maj. Horatio N. Whitbeck (w). Brigade loss:  k, 108;  w. 330;  m, 101 = 539. Artillery, Maj. Seymour Race:  8th Ind. (First Brigade), Lieut. George Estep;  10th Ind. (Second Brigade), Capt. Jerome B. Cog; 6th Ohio (Third Brigade), Capt. Cullen Bradley. Artillery loss embraced in brigades to which attached.

SECOND (LATE FOURTH) DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. John M. Palmer. Staff loss:  w, 1.

First (Late Twenty-second) Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Charles Cruft:  31st Ind., Col. John Osborn;  1st Ky., Col. David A. Enyart;  2d Ky., Col. Thomas D. Sedgewick;  90th Ohio, Col. Isaac N. Ross. Brigade loss:  k, 44; w, 227;  m, 126=397. Second (late Nineteenth) Brigade, Col.

William B. Hazen: 110th III., Col. Thomas S. Casey; 9th Ind., Col. William H. Blake;  6th Ky., Col. Walter C. Whitaker;  41st Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Aquila Wiley. Brigade loss:  k, 45;  w, 335;  m, 29 = 409. Third (late Tenth) Brigade, Col. William Grose:  84th Ill., Col. Louis H. Waters; 36th Ind., Maj. Isaac Kinley (w), Capt. Pyrrhus Woodward;  23d Ky., Maj. Thomas H. Hamrick;  6th Ohio, Col. Nicholas L. Anderson (w);  24th Ohio, Col. Frederick C.

Jones (k), Maj. Henry Terry (k), Capt. Enoch Weller (k), Capt. A. T. M. Cockerill. Brigade loss:  k, 107; w, 478;  m, 74 = 659. Artillery, Capt. William E. Standart:  B, 1st Ohio, Capt. William E. Standart; F, 1st 0hio, Capt. Daniel T. Cockerill (w), Lieut. Norval Osburn;  H and M, 4th U. S., Lieut. Charles C. Parsons. Artillery loss:  k, 9;  w, 40;  m, 11 = 60. Third (Late Fifth) Division, Brig.-Gen. Horatio P. Van Cleve (w), Col. Samuel Beatty.

Staff loss:  w, 1. First (Late Eleventh) Brigade, Col.. Samuel Beatty, Col. Benjamin C. Grider: 79th Ind., Col. Frederick Knefler; 9th Ky., Col. Benjamin C. Grider, Lieut.-Col. George H. Cram; 11th Ky., Maj. Erasmus L. Mottley;  19th Ohio, Maj. Charles F. Manderson. Brigade loss:  k, 67;  w, 371;  m, 83 = 521. Second (late Fourteenth) Brigade, Col. James P. Fyffe: 44th Ind., Col.

William C. Williams (c), Lieut.-Col. Simeon C. Aldrich;  86th Ind., Lieut.-Col. George F. Dick; 13th Ohio, Col. Joseph G. Hawkins (k), Maj. Dwight Jarvis, Jr.;  59th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. William Howard. Brigade loss:  k, 78; w, 239;  m, 240= 557. Third (Late Twenty-third) Brigade, Col. Samuel W . Price:  35th Ind., Col. Bernard F. Mullen;  8th Ky., Lieut.-Col. Reuben May, Maj. Green B. Broaddus; 21st Ky., Lieut.-Col. James C. Evans; 51st Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Richard W. McClain; 99th Ohio, Col. Peter T. Swaine (w), Lieut.-Col. John E. Cummins. Brigade loss:  k, 79;  w, 361;  m, 143 = 583. Artillery, Capt.

George R. Swallow:  7th Ind., Capt. George R. Swallow;  B, Pa., Lieut. Alanson J. Stevens; 3d Wis., Lieut. Cortland Livingston. Artillery loss:  k, 6;  w, 19 = 25.

CAVALRY, Brig.-Gen. David S. Stanley.

CAVALRY DIVISION, Col. John Kennett.

First Brigade, Col. Robert H. G. Minty:  M, 2d Ind., Capt. J. A. S. Mitchell; 3d Ky., Col. Eli H. Murray; 4th Mich., Lieut.-Col. William H. Dickinson;  7th Pa., Maj. John E. Wynkoop. Brigade loss:  k, 5;  w, 24;  m, 77 = 106. Second Brigade, Col. Lewis Zahm:  1st Ohio, Col. Minor Milliken (k), Maj. James Laughlin;  3d Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Douglas A. Murray;  4th Ohio, Maj. John L. Pugh. Brigade loss:  k, 18;  w, 44;  m, 59 = 121. Artillery:  D, 1st Ohio (section), Lieut. Nathaniel M. Newell. Loss:  k, 1.

RESERVE CAVALRY:  (2) 15th Pa., Maj. Adolph G. Rosengarten (k), Maj. Frank B. Ward (m w), Capt. Alfred Vezin; 1st Middle (5th) Tenn., Col. William B. Stokes;  2d Tenn., Col. Daniel M. Ray. Reserve cavalry loss:  k,. 12;  w, 25;  m, 67 = 104.

UNATTACHED:  3d Tenn., Col. William C. Pickens;  4th U. S., Capt. Elmer Otis. Loss:  k, 3;  w, 10;  m, 12 = 25.


St. C. Morton:  1st Battalion, Capt. Lyman Bridges (w);  2d Battalion, Capt. Calvin Hood; 3d Battalion, Capt.

Robert Clements; Stokes's Ill. Battery, Capt. James H.

Stokes. Brigade loss: k, 15; w, 33=48.

ENGINEERS AND MECHANICS:  1st Mich., Col. William P. Innes. Loss:  k, 2;  w, 9;  m, 5 = 16.

Total loss of Union army (in the campaign):  killed, 1730; wounded, 7802; captured or missing, 3717=13,249.

Effective force December 31st, 1862, 43,400. (See " Official Records," VOL. XX., Pt. I., p. 201.)

(1) This brigade and Church's battery were the only troops of this division engaged in the battle.

(2) Under the immediate command of General Stanley, chief of cavalry.


ARMY OF TENNESSEE.-General Braxton Bragg.

POLK'S CORPS, Lieut.-Gen. Leonidas Polk.

FIRST DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. B. F. Cheatham.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Daniel S. Donelson: 8th Tenn., Col. W. L. Moore (k), Lieut.-Col. J. H. Anderson;  16th Tenn., Col. John H. Savage;  38th Tenn., Col. John C. Carter; 51st Tenn., Col. John Chester; 84th Tenn., Col. S. S. Stanton;  Tenn. Battery, Capt. W. W. Carnes.

Brigade loss:  k, 108; w, 575;  m, 17 =700. Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alexander P. Stewart:  4th and 5th Tenn., Col. Oscar F. Strahl;  19th Tenn., Col. Francis M. Walker; 24th Tenn., Col. H. L. W. Bratton (m w), Maj. S. E. Shannon;  31st aud 33d Tenn., Col. E. E. Tansil;  Miss. Battery, Capt. T. J. Stanford. Brigade loss:  k, 63;  w, 334; m, 2 = 399. Third Brigade,.

Brig.-Gen. George Maney: 1st and 27th Tenn., Col. H. R. Feild; 4th Tenn. (Prov. army), Col. J. A. McMurry; 6th and 9th Tenn., Col. C. S. Hurt; Tenn. Sharp-shooters, Capt. Frank Maney; Miss. Battery (Smith's), Lieut. William B. Turner. Brigade loss:  k, 22;  v-, 163;  m, 8 = 193. Fourth Brigade, Col. A. J. Vaughan, Jr.:  12th Tenn., Maj. J. N. Wyatt; 13th Tenn., Lieut.-Col. W. E. Morgan (m w), Capt. R. F. Lanier; 29th Tenn., Maj. J. B. Johnson; 47th Tenn., Capt. W. M. Watkins;  154th Tenn., Lieut.-Col. M. Magevney, Jr.;  9th Tex., Col. W. H. Young; Tenn. Sharp-shooters (Allin's), Lieut. J. R. J. Creighton (w), Lieut. T. F. Pattison;  Tenn. Battery

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Capt. W. L. Scott. Brigade loss:  k, 105;  w, 564; m, 38 = 707.

SECOND DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. Jones M. Withers.

First Brigade, Col. J. Q. Loomis (w), Col. J. G. Coltart:  19th Ala.,__;  22d Ala.,_;  25th Ala.,__;  26th Ala.,__;  39th Ala.,__;  17th Ala. Battalion Sharpshooters, Capt. B. C. Yancey; 1st La. (Regulars), Lieut. Col. F. H. Farrar, Jr. (m w);  Fla. Battery, Capt. Felix H. Robertson. Brigade loss:  k, 53;  w. 533; m, 5 =591.

Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. James R. Chalmers (w), Col. T. W. White:  7th Miss.,__;  9th Miss.__, Col. T. W. White;  10th Miss.,__;  41st Miss.,__;  9th Miss. Battalion Sharp-shooters, Capt. O. F. West;  Blythe's Miss.,;  Ala. Battery (Garrity's), . Brigade loss:  k, 67;  w, 445;  m, 36 = 548. Third Brigade, Brig. Gen. J. Patton Anderson:  45th Ala., Col. James G. Gilchrist; 24th Miss., Lieut.-Col. R. P. McKelvaine; 27th Miss., Col. Thomas M. Jones, Lieut.-Col. James L. Autry (k), Capt. E. R. Neilson (w);  29th Miss., Col. W. F. Brantly (w), Lieut.-Col. J. B. Morgan;  30th Miss., Lieut.-Col. J. I. Scales;  39th N. C., Capt. A. W . Bell;  Mo. Battery, Capt. O. W. Barret. Brigade loss: k, 130; w, 620; m, 13 = 763. Fourth Brigade, Col. A. M. Manigault:  24th Ala.,__;  28th Ala.,__;  34th Ala.,__;  10th and 19th S. C., Col. A. J. Lythgoe (k);  Ala. Battery, Capt. D.

D. Waters. Brigade loss: k, 73; w, 428; m, 16=517.

HARDEE'S CORPS, Lieut.-Gen. William J. Hardee.

FIRST DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. John C. Breckinridge.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Daniel W. Adams (w), Col. Randall L. Gibson: 32d Ala., Lieut.-Col. Henry Maury (w), Col. Alexander McKinstry;  13th and 20th La., Col. Randall L. Gibson, Maj. Charles Guillet;  16th and 25th La., Col. S. W. Fisk (k), Maj. F. C. Zacharie; 14th La. Battalion, Maj. J. E. Austin; 5th Battery Washington (La.) Art'y, Lieut. W. C. D. Vaught. Brigade loss: k, 1:2;  W, 445;  m, 146 = 703. Second Brigade, Col. J. B. Palmer, Brig.-Gen. Gideon J. Pillow:  18th Tenn., Lieut.-Col. W. R. Butler, Col. J. B. Palmer (w);  26th Tenn., Col. John M. Lillard;  28th Tenn., Col. P. D. Cunningham (k);  45th Tenn., Col. A. Searcy;  Ga. Battery (Moses's), Lieut. R. W. Anderson. Brigade loss:  k, 49;  w, 324;  m, 52 = 425. Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. William Preston:  1st and 3d Fla., Col. William Miller (w);  4th Fla., Col. William L. L. Bowen;  60th N. C., Col. J. A. McDowell;  20th Tenn., Col. T. B. Smith (w), Lieut.-Col. F. M. Lavender, Maj. F. Claybrooke;  Tenn. Battery , Capt. E. E. Wright (k), Lieut. J. W. Phillips. Brigade loss:  k, 58;  w, 384;  m, 97 = 539. Fourth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. R. W. Hanson (k), Col. R. P. Trabue:  41st Ala., Col. H. Talbird, Lieut.-Col. M. L. Stansel (w);  2d Ky., Maj. James W. Hewitt (w), Capt. James W. Moss;  4th Ky., Col. R. P. Trabue, Capt. T. W. Thompson; 6th Ky Col. Joseph H. Lewis; 9th Ky., Col. T. H. Hunt; Ky. Battery, Capt. Robert Cobb. Brigade loss:  k, 47;  w, 273;  m, 81 = 401. Jackson's Brigade (temporarily attached), Brig.-Gen. John K. Jackson:  5th Ga., Col. W . T. Black (k), Maj. C. P.

Daniel;  2d Ga. Battalion Sharp-shooters, Maj. J. J. Cox;  5th Miss., Lieut.-Col. W. L. Sykes (w);  8th Miss., Col. J. C. Wilkinson (w and c), Lieut.-Col. A. McNeill; Ga.. Battery (Pritchard's),__;  Ala. Battery (Lumsden's), Lieut. H. H. Cribbs. Brigade loss:  k, 41;  w, 262 = 303.

Unattached:  Ky. Battery, Capt. E. P. Byrne.

SECOND DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. P. R. Cleburne. Staff loss:  w, 2.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. L. E. Polk:  1st Ark., Col. John W. Colquitt;  13th Ark.__, -; 15th Ark.__, -; 5th Confederate, Col. J. A. Smith;  2d Tenn., Col. W. D.

Robison; 5th Tenn., Col. B. J. Hill; Ark. Battery (Helena Art'y ), Lieut. T. J. Key. Brigade loss:  k, 30;  w, 298;  m, 19 = 347. Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. St. John R. Liddell:  2d Ark., Col. D. C. Govan;  5th Ark., Lieut: Col. John E. Murray;  6th and 7th Ark., Col. S. G. Smith (vv), Lieut.-Col. F. J. Cameron (w), Maj. W. F. Douglass; 8th Ark., Col. John H. Kelly (w), Lieut.-Gol. G. F.

Baucum; Miss. Battery (Swett's), Lieut. H. Shannon.

Brigade loss:  k, 86;  w, 503;  m, 18 =607. Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Bushrod R. Johnson:  17th Tenn., Col. A. S.

Marks (w), Lieut.-Col. W. W. Floyd;  23d Tenn., Lieut.-Col. R. H. Keeble;  25 Tenn., Col. J. M. Hughs (w), Lieut.-Col. Samuel Davis; 37th Tenn., Col. Moses White (w), Maj. J. T. McReynolds (k), Capt. C. G. Jarnagin;  44th Tenn., Col. John S. Fulton;  Miss. Battery (Jefferson Art'y ), Capt. Put. Darden. Brigade loss:  k, 61;  w, 488;  m, 57 = 606. Fourth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. S. A. M. Wood:  16th Ala., Col. W. B. Wood (w); 33d Ala., Col. Samuel Adams;  3d Confederate, Maj. J. F. Cameron;  45th Miss., Lieut.-Col. R. Charlton;  15th Miss. Battalion Sharpshooters, Capt. A. T. Hawkins; Ala. Battery, Capt. Henry C. Semple. Brigade loss: k, 52; w, 339; m, 113 = 504.

MCCOWN'S DIVISION (of Kirby Smith's corps, serving with Hardee, Maj.-Gen. J. P. McCown.

First Brigade (serving as infantry), Brig.-Gen. M. D. Ector: 10th Tex. Cav., Col. M. F. Locke; 11th Tex. Cav., Col. J. C. Burks (m w), Lieut.-Col. J. M. Bounds;  14th Tex. Cav., Col. J. L. Camp; 15th Tex. Cav., Col. J. A. Andrews;  Tex. Battery, Capt. J. P. Douglas, Brigade loss: k, 28; w, 276; m, 48=352. Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. James E. Rains (k), Col. R. B. Vance: 3d Ga. Battalion, Lieut.-Col. M. A. Stovall;  9th Ga. Battalion, Maj. Joseph T. Smith;  29th N. C., Col. R. B. Vance;  11th Tenn., Col. G. W. Gordon (w), Lieut.-Col. William Thedford; Ala. Battery (Eufaula Light Art'y), Lieut. W. A. McDuffie. Brigade loss:  k, 20;  w, 161;  117, 18 = 199. Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Evander McNair, Col. R. W. Harper; 1st Ark. Mt'd Rifles (dismounted), Col. R. W. Harper, Maj. L. M. Ramsaur (w);  2d Ark. Mt'd Rifles (dismounted), Lieut.-Col. J. A. Williamson; 4th Ark., Col. H. G. Bunn; 30th Ark., Maj. J. J. Franklin (w and c), Capt. W. A. Cotter; 4th Ark. Battalion, Maj. J. A. Ross;  Ark. Battery, Capt. J. T. Humphrey s. Brigade loss:  k, 42;  w, 330;  m, 52 = 424.

CAVALRY, Brig.-Gen. Joseph W heeler.

Wheeler's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Joseph Wheeler:  1st Ala., Col. W. W. Allen (v,);  3d Ala., Maj. F. Y. Gaines, Capt. T. H. Maudlin;  51st Ala., Col . John T. Morgan;  8th Confederate, Col. W. B. Wade; 1st Tenn., Col. James E. Carter; Tenn. Battalion, Maj. DeWitt C. Douglass; Tenn. Battalion, Maj. D. W. Holman;  Ark. Battery, Capt. J. H. Wiggins. Brigade loss: k, 22; w, 61; m, 84=167. Buford's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Abraham Buford: 3d Ky., Col. J. R. Butler;  5th Ky., Col. D. H. Smith; 5th Ky., Col. J. W. Grigsby. Brigade loss:  k, 1;  w, il;  m, 6= 18.

Pegram's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. John Pegram:  1st Ga.,;  1st La., . Brigade loss, not reported. Wharton's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. John A. Wharton:  14th Ala. Battalion, Lieut.-Col. James C. Malone; 1st Confederate, Col. John T. Cox; 3d Confederate, Lieut.-Coe. William M. Estes; 2d Ga., Lieut.-Col. J. E. Dunlop, Maj. F. M. Ison;  3d Ga. (detachment), Maj. R. Thompson;  2d Tenn., Col. H. M. Ashby;  4th Tenn., Col. Baxter Smith;  Tenn. Battalion, Maj. John R. Davis; 8th Tex., Col. Thomas Harrison: Murray's Tenn., Maj. W. S. Bledsoe; Escort Co., Capt. Paul F. Anderson;  McCown's Escort Co., Capt. L. T. Hardy; Tenn. Battery, Capt. B. F. White, Jr.

Brigade loss:  k, 20; w, 131;  m, 113= 264.

The total Confederate loss (minus Pegram's cavalry brigade, not reported) was 1294 killed, 7945 wounded, and 1027 captured or missing=10,266. The number present for duty on December 31st, 1862, was 37,712.   (See "Official Records," VOL. XX., Pt. I., p. 674.)